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ABSTRACT
In 1974 the House of Commons agreed by Resolution to take the un­
precedented step o f introducing a Register o f Members' In te res ts . I t  
also converted the convention tha t a Member should declare any personal 
pecuniary in te re s t  re levant to any debate or proceeding in to  a ru le  o f 
the House. These measures were designed to avoid actual or apparent 
c o n f l ic t  between a Member's p r iva te  in te res ts  and his public  duties as 
an MR.
The experience o f the House in dealing with c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t ,  
and the problems o f d e f in ing , id e n t i fy in g  and regulating th is  phenom­
enon, have, h i th e r to ,  been discussed only pe r iphera lly  in academic l i t e r ­
ature on Parliament. This study f i l l s  a lacuna in parliamentary research 
by system atica lly  examining these issues and exploring some o f the con­
ceptual ambiguities involved. I t  f i r s t  documents and discusses the way 
the House t r a d i t io n a l ly  approached the problem p r io r  to the 1974 Reso­
lu t io n s ,  and then considers whether recent developments in the regula­
t io n  o f Members' in te res ts  ind ica te  a genuine departure from tha t 
approach. In so doing i t  provides a case-study o f an important episode 
in recent parliamentary h is to ry .
I t  establishes th a t the House's approach towards c o n f l ic t  o f in te r ­
est derives as much from h is to r ic a l  residues of 'e l i t e  p o l i t ic a l  c u ltu re ' 
as i t  does from contemporary pressures. I t  f inds th a t the House has, in 
the absence o f strong outside s t im u l i ,  been re lu c tan t to take the i n i t i a ­
t iv e  to regulate Members' in te re s ts ,  having preferred to re ly  on the 
honour o f  ind iv idua l Members, and shows tha t recent changes are less fund­
amental than the apparent innovation o f introducing the Register might 
suggest. I t  considers a lte rn a t ive  methods o f regula ting Members' in te r ­
ests , and asks whether, in dealing with c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t ,  the House 
should surrender i t s  sole r ig h t ,  enshrined in parliamentary p r iv i le g e ,  
to regulate and to  adjudicate upon the conduct of i t s  own Members in 
th e i r  parliamentary capacity.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES 
LIST OF FIGURES 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
INTRODUCTION
Page No.
6
7
PART 1: RESEARCH DESIGN
Chapter 1 STUDYING CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE HOUSE OF 
COMMONS
- What is  c o n f l ic t  o f in te res t?
- An uncharted issue in parliamentary l i te ra tu re ?
- Theoretical framework
Chapter 2 METHODS AND SOURCES
- Sources and methods o f data co l le c t io n
- Data analysis
13
13
17
23
37
39
45
PART 2:
Chapter 3
DISCLOSURE OF INTERESTS: THE ECLIPSE OF THE GENTLEMAN
MP?
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: 
ABLE' MEMBER
THE TRADITION OF THE 'HONOUR-
- A t ra d i t io n  o f outside f in a n c ia l in te res ts
- Rules on the p r iva te  f ina nc ia l in te res ts  o f Members
- Procedures o f inves tiga tion  and punishment
- Patterns and cha rac te r is t ics
Chapter 4 THE 1969 SELECT COMMITTEE: 'A FALSE
- Part 1: The Background to the Committee
Parliamentary pressure 
Extra-parliamentary pressure 
The Bagier a f f a i r
Motion to ,s e t  up the 1969 Select Committee
- Part 2: The 1969 Select Committee and i t s  Report
The in te rna l dynamics o f the Select 
Committee
The 1969 Select Committee Report
Reaction to the 1969 Select Committee 
Report
49
49
55
69
72
76
76
83
85
88
93
95
105
Chapter 5 THE 1974 RESOLUTIONS: A NEW ERA IN SELF-DISCIPLINE?
- A change o f Government and a reassertion o f 
t ra d i t io n
- The Poulson a f f a i r
- Parliamentary response to the Poulson revelations
- A change o f Government - and a change o f d irec tion?
- The 1974 Debate on Members' In te re s ts : a sort
o f gentlemen versus players match'
Chapter 6 THE REGISTER: TO BE A GENTLEMAN IS NOT ENOUGH
- The Report o f the 1974 Select Committee
- Reaction to the 1974 Select Committee Report
- Debate on implementing the 1974 Resolutions
- Compilation and Publication o f the Register
- Later ed it ions o f the Register: The Enoch Powell
case
- The Register in operation: 1975-1979
Page No 
107
107
1 12
IIS
120
125
135
136 
141 
143 
150 
158
166
PART 3: CONCLUSIONS AND BROADER OBSERVATIONS
Chapter 7 MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT AND CONFLICT OF INTEREST 171
- The 'modern campaign' f o r  a re g is te r  o f in te re s ts  171
- Implementation and operation o f the Register 178
- The Register: Innovation or extension o f t ra d i t io n ?  182
- Problems o f  s e l f -d is c ip l in e  187
- Review o f theore tica l propositions 193
- A lte rn a tive  methods o f  regula ting Members' in te res ts  196
Chapter 8 CONFLICT OF INTEREST: PROBLEMS AND AMBIGUITIES 200
- C o n f l ic t  o f  in te re s t  shades o f f  in to  representation 200 
of in te res ts
- C o n f l ic t  o f  in te re s t  shades o f f  in to  corruption 212
- How much in fluence does an MP have? 217
- Comment 220
NOTES AND REFERENCES 221
APPENDICES
Page No
1. Random Sample Survey - A Statement on Technique 263
2. Random Sample Survey - Frequency Table o f Response Data 278
3. P ro f i le  o f Key Informants 299
4. D iv is ion L is t  Analysis 301
5. Information from the Register o f  Members' In terests  310
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 322
ABBREVIATIONS 331
L IS T  OF TABLES
Page No,
1. MPs' views on what constitu tes  Corruption ^
2. MPs' views on how fa r  C o n f l ic t  o f  In te re s t overlaps w ith  315
Corruption
3. Response Rate fo r  Random Sample Interviews 375
4. Overall Response Rate by Party
5. Analysis o f Non-Response 377
6. MPs' views on whether they should have less Privacy in the 397
area o f Financial In terests  and A c t iv i t ie s  than outside 
Citizens
7. Of those MPs who voted no or abstained: Preference fo r  ^97
Voluntary Register or pre-1974 Practices cross-tabulated
with views on Privacy
8. MPs' views on Fu ll- t im e  Membership o f the House o f Commons
9. Members' involvement in outside paid/unpaid Employment
10. Voting by Party on the Amendment to the Government's Motion, ^02
Members' In terests  (Declaration) (No.1)
11. Voting w ith in  the Conservative Party on the Amendment to the 303
Government's Motion, Members' In terests  (Declaration) (No.1)
12. Voting by Party on the Government's Motion, Members' In terests  305 
(Declaration) (No.2 ) ,  to estab lish a Compulsory Register o f 
Members' In terests
13. Voting w ith in  the Conservative Party on the Government's 306
Motion, Members' In terests  (Declaration) (No.2), to estab lish
a Compulsory Register o f Members' In terests
14. Voting by Party on the Government's Motion, Members' In terests  308 
(Declaration) (N o . i) ,  to agree w ith the Recommendations made
in the Report o f the Select Committee on Members' In terests  
(Declaration)
15. Voting by Party on the Amendment proposed by Mr J. Golding 309
(Lab) to the Motion, Members' In terests  (Declaration) (No.2)
16. Composition o f the House o f Commons as on 1st November 1975 313
and as on 13th February 1979
17. Registration as on 1st November 1975 and 13th February 1979 314
18. Number o f MPs by Party reg is te r in g  ' n i l '  - 1975 and 1979 315
19. C lass if ied  en tr ies  in the Register as on 1st November 1975 316
and 13th February 1979
20. C lass if ied  en tr ies  in the Register by Party - as on 317
1st November 1975 and 13th February 1979
L IS T  OF FIGURES ^^9^.
1. Interview Schedule 268
2. Le tte r o f In troduction to MPs 274
3. Le tte r and Registration Form sent to MPs by the Registrar 311
of Members' In terests
4. L is t  o f Members entering ' n i l '  in the F i r s t  Ed ition o f the 319
Register
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
In the course o f preparing th is  study I received help from a very 
large number o f people, inc lud ing p o l i t ic ia n s .  House o f Commons Clerks, 
c i v i l  servants, o f f ic e rs  o f associations and so on. Although th e i r  
assistance was o f immeasurable value, i t  is  impossible to acknowledge 
them a l l  in d iv id u a l ly .  Indeed, some wished to remain anonymous.
However, I would l ik e  to give my special thanks to Mr D.A.M. Pring 
(former Registrar o f Members' In te re s ts ) ,  Mr R.S. Lankaster (current 
Registrar o f Members' In te re s ts ) ,  Mr Kenneth Bradshaw (Clerk Ass is tan t, 
House o f  Commons) and the Rt. Hon. J. Enoch Powell, MP, who not only 
gave me the bene fit  o f  th e i r  time and assistance during the co lle c t io n  
o f data fo r  the p ro jec t,  but also found the time to read through early 
d ra f t  chapters o f th is  study. This acknowledgment i s ,  however, d is ­
associated from any in te rp re ta t io ns  or conclusions reached in  the te x t .  
R esponsib il ity  fo r  anything included or omitted in the study is e n t i re ly  
mine.
S.A.W.
Jan 1982
INTRODUCTION
Why was the issue o f c o n f l ic t  o f  in te re s t  in the House o f Commons 
chosen as the subject fo r  th is  study? In 1974 the House o f Commons 
agreed to two Resolutions concerning re g is t ra t io n  and declaration o f 
Members' outside f ina nc ia l in te res ts . The f i r s t ,  passed in the face o f 
considerable misgivings from t r a d i t io n a l is t  MPs, introduced a Register 
o f such in te re s ts . The second converted what had previously been a 
convention o f the House in to  a ru le ,  tha t a Member should declare any 
personal pecuniary in te re s t  re levant to  any debate or proceeding. The 
s ign if icance o f the Register was recognised in the preface to  the nine­
teenth ed it ion  o f Erskine May's Parliamentary Practice, Parliament's 
procedural B ib le , which noted i t s  'nove lty  and importance' and appended 
a descrip tion .
The appearance o f Members' outside f in a n c ia l in te res ts  as a subject 
on the parliamentary agenda, and more p a r t ic u la r ly  the acceptance by the 
House o f the Resolutions, prompted th is  w r i te r  to ask two questions which 
form the backbone o f th is  study. F i r s t ,  how has the House o f Commons 
approached and dea lt w ith c o n f l ic t  o f  in te re s t  among i t s  own Membership? 
Secondly, did the 1974 Resolutions ind ica te a change in the House's recog­
n i t io n  o f ,  and approach towards, c o n f l ic t  o f  in te rest?
There has, i t  appears, been no previous research in to  th is  sub ject, 
so th is  study was conceived both in order to explore these spe c if ic
1
issues and to f i l l  a gap in the l i te ra tu r e  on the House o f Commons. 
Furthermore, i t s  methodology attempts to overcome a fundamental cleavage 
prevalent in social and p o l i t ic a l  science between normative and empirical 
ana lys is, and to avoid the shortcomings o f much parliamentary research 
observed by Samuel Patterson, th a t : -
' . . .  in the main the study o f the House o f Commons has not 
involved grappling with conceptual problems or developing and 
t ry in g  to answer d isc ip l in e d  research questions.'g
The two main research objectives can be summarised as fo llows:
(a) To document and make broad observations o f the way in  which the 
House o f Commons approaches and deals with the problem o f c o n f l ic t  
o f in te re s t  among i t s  own membership, both now and in the past.
(b) To investigate  whether the 'modern campaign' fo r  a re g is te r  o f 
Members' in te re s ts ,  and the 1974 Resolutions concerning dec lar­
ation and re g is t ra t io n  o f Members' in te re s ts ,  indicated a genuine
10
change in the House's recognition o f ,  and approach towards, the 
problem o f c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t ;  and i f  so, what?
The myriad o f conceptual problems surrounding the phenomenon of c o n f l ic t  
o f  in te re s t  which became apparent from a perusal o f  the l i te ra tu r e  
prompted the inc lus ion o f  a th i r d ,  subsidiary ob jective
(c) To consider the conceptual problems and ambiguities involved in an 
analysis o f c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t o f Members o f Parliament, p a r t ic ­
u la r ly  the problem o f determining the po int a t which a p r iva te  
in te re s t  gives r ise  to a s i tu a t io n  o f c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t ,  and the 
po int a t which th is  c o n f l ic t  becomes redefined as corrup tion .
Although an h is to r ic a l  chapter is  included to show how present day 
rules and conventions in  the area o f Members' in te res ts  have evolved, 
the main time period analysed is  1958-1979. The opening date was chosen 
because the Select Committee on Members' In terests  (Declaration) set up 
in tha t year marked a decisive move in the protracted though spasmodic 
debate over Members' f in a n c ia l in te re s ts ,  which resulted in the 1974 
Resolutions and the eventual in troduction  o f a Register o f Members' 
In terests  in 1975. The campaign leading up to the establishment o f the 
Register, which must be set in the wider context o f a parliamentary 
'c l im a te ' o f heightened s e l f - c r i t ic is m  and reform, saw an increase in 
the a r t ic u la t io n ,  both inside and outside Parliament, o f  the issues r e la t ­
ing to Members' in te res ts  and thus provides a r ich  source o f  material fo r  
analysis. The termination date o f 1979 provided scope fo r  examining the 
operation o f the Register in i t s  ea rly  stages, and the May 1979 General 
E lection was a convenient c u t -o f f  po in t. As specified in Chapter 2, the 
main sources o f data were parliamentary documentation, key informant 
in te rv iew s, a random sample survey o f MPs, Public Record O ffice archives 
and newspaper reports. Where appropria te, comparative data were used to 
throw l ig h t  on the s p e c i f ic a l ly  B r i t is h  response by Members o f Parliament 
in coming to grips with c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  and parliamentary s e l f ­
d isc i pi ine.
This is  an exp loratory piece o f research in to  an unchartered f ie ld  
and as such is  not concerned with tes t in g  precise hypotheses. However, 
as Margaret Stacey points o u t:-
' An exp loration in to  an area is  bound to be based on some 
assumptions i . e .  upon some theory and i t  is  well to make these 
e x p l ic i t ,  however abstract and d is ta n t from the phenomenon in 
question they may b e . '^
11
The thesis thus deploys, e x p l ic i t l y  and im p l i c i t l y ,  several ten ta t ive  
presuppositions which provide a basis fo r  systematic analysis and which 
are discussed, in the l ig h t  o f the research data, in Chapter 7.
The study is  arranged in three sections. Part 1 is  concerned w ith 
research design and provides the conceptual framework and methodological 
underpinnings fo r  what fo llows. Part 2 presents the f ind ings  o f the 
study. I t  comprises an h is to r ic a l  review o f the way in which the House 
o f Commons has dea lt w ith the problem o f c o n f l ic t  o f  in te re s t ,  traces 
the modern campaign fo r  a re g is te r  o f in te res ts  and examines the work­
ing o f  the Register during the period 1975-1979. Part 3 contains con­
clusions and broader observations based upon these f in d in g s , both in 
terms o f the sp e c if ic  research objectives under inves tiga tion  (Chapter 7 ) ,  
and in terms o f the problems and ambiguities associated with c o n f l ic t  of 
in te re s t  which became apparent during the study (Chapter 8).
PART 1
RESEARCH DESIGN
13
CHAPTER 1
STUDYING CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS
'The p r io r  experience o f England in de fin ing  and then in  seeking 
a so lu tion  to the problem o f c o n f l ic t  between the p riva te  in te res ts  
o f public servants and the public in te re s t  i t s e l f  has acquired an 
h is to r ic a l  s ign if icance eas ily  appreciated today. In the United 
States, where both major Parties have been embarrassed by revelations 
touching the executive branch, some a tten tion  has been given to the 
bearing o f  the problem on the le g is la t iv e  branch as w e ll.  B u t. . .  
the experience o f the House of Commons has not been tra ced . ' ,
Barry McGill
M cG ill 's  observation in 1959 on the lack o f serious systematic re ­
search in to  the issue o f c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  as experienced by the House 
o f  Commons is as apposite today as i t  was 20 years ago. I t  is  only fo l lo w ­
ing the Poulson revelations in the early  1970s which impugned the conduct 
o f  Members o f Parliament and other persons in public l i f e ,  tha t a tten tion  
has been d irected to the study o f th is  problem o f parliamentary e th ics . 
A fte r  seeking a provisional d e f in i t io n  o f c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t and showing 
how th is  phenomenon has been considered only pe riphera lly  in the l i te ra tu r e  
on Parliament, the main purpose o f th is  chapter is to set out the approach 
to inves tiga ting  the subject adopted by th is  study.
1. What is  C o n f l ic t  o f In terest?
Robert Getz's study o f c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  in the United States
Congress attempts to d e l im it  the phenomenon by s ta t in g  t h a t : t
'C o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  is  only one of the many facets o f "eth ics 
in government". The term " c o n f l ic t  o f  in te re s t"  is  l im ite d  in  mean­
ing; i t  denotes a s i tu a t io n  in which an o f f i c i a l ' s  conduct o f his 
o f f ic e  c o n f l ic ts  w ith his p r iva te  economic a f f a i r s . 'g
Clement Vose s im i la r ly  reduces the c o n f l ic t  to two spec if ic  in te re s ts :-
' . . .o n e  is  the in te re s t  o f the government o f f i c ia l  (and o f the 
pub lic ) in  the proper adm in istra tion o f his o f f ic e ;  the other is  
the o f f i c i a l ' s  in te re s t  in his p r iva te  economic a f fa i r s .  A c o n f l ic t  
o f in te re s t  ex ists whenever these two in te res ts  clash, or appear to 
c lash. ' 2
This statement also suggests th a t the concept is  applicable not only to 
s itua tions  where a c o n f l ic t  ac tu a lly  e x is ts ,  but also where i t  appears to 
e x is t .
Another refinement o f the concept is  tha t the o f f i c i a l ' s  ' in te re s t '  
is  frequently  defined in narrow terms as a personal pecuniary in te re s t
14.
or a pr iva te  economic in te re s t .  In a parliamentary context d e f in i t io n s  
such as the fo llow ing  have been advanced:-
'A c o n f l ic t  of in te re s t  denotes a s i tu a t io n  in which a Member o f 
Parliament has a personal or p r iva te  pecuniary in te re s t  s u f f ic ie n t  
to in fluence, or appear to in fluence, the exercise o f his public 
duties and r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s . '^
The arguments advanced fo r  th is  narrow d e f in i t io n  o f in te re s t  on the part 
o f  the o f f i c ia l  usually res t on the p rac tica l grounds th a t i t  would be 
d i f f i c u l t  to determine and regulate other rewards, psychological ones fo r  
example, which might influence an in d iv id u a l 's  action. This view is  i l l u s ­
tra ted  by James Kirby who, in explaining why the Association o f the Bar 
o f the C ity  o f New York singled out economic t ie s  in i t s  study of congres­
sional e th ics , endorsed the argument o f a predecessor committee, th a t : -
'The simplest reason is  tha t i t  is  b e tte r  to control whatever 
f ra c t io n  o f improper behaviour is a t t r ib u ta b le  to  economic motives 
than to control none. The second reason is  tha t regulatory schemes 
can be w r it te n  w ith  reasonable p a r t ic u la r i t y  and enforced with mod­
erate p r e d ic ta b i l i t y ;  no one has yet devised a method fo r  sorting  
out acquaintances, fr ie n d s , re la t io n s ,  and lovers fo r  the purposes 
o f  a ru le perm itting o f f i c ia l  dealings w ith some and not w ith others.
However, as argued in Chapter 8, the deceptive s im p l ic i ty  o f these 
d e f in i t io n s  based on a c o n f l ic t  between pr iva te  in te res ts  and public duty 
should not obscure the fa c t  tha t the term 'c o n f l i c t  o f in te re s t*  is  a 
magnet fo r  conceptual problems. Robert J. Williams points to the problem 
o f drawing a d is t in c t io n  between the o f f i c i a l ' s  p r iva te  in te res ts  and his 
public duty. This d is t in c t io n ,  apparent in organisation theory from Max 
Weber onwards, involves a 'depersonalisation o f public o f f ic e  which is 
s t i l l  as much an asp ira tion  fo r  the fu tu re  or an echo o f the past as an 
a c tu a l i ty  in  many s o c ie t ie s ' .^  I t  also implies a neat separation between 
the proper adm inistra tion o f the o f f i c i a l ' s  o f f ic e  and his in te re s t  in his 
pr iva te  economic a f fa i r s ,  which is  not always easy to operate in practice . 
Robert Getz h igh ligh ts  th is  problem when he asserts tha t a complicating 
fa c to r  in determining the scope o f c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t in the United 
States Congress (and one which has relevance fo r  B r i t is h  government) is 
th a t : -
' . . . c o n f l i c t  o f in te re s t  re s tra in ts  are fashioned upon a dicho­
tomy which has long ceased to be v a l id .  The complex nature o f an 
American government and society negates the assumption o f a f a i r l y  
neat separation between government and pr iva te  l i f e .  The government 
- non-government dichotomy can be observed only in a few iso la ted 
sectors o f a c t iv i t y .  By fa r  the greatest area is  one with shades 
o f grey between what is  purely governmental and what is  purely 
p r iva te ' ,-j
15.
These arguments devolve on one o f the philosophical imponderables 
underlying th is  study. That is ,  whether man is  bas ica l ly  a l t r u i s t i c  
and w i l l in g  to s a c r i f ic e  his own ends fo r  the public in te re s t  or some 
other la rger good, or whether the tendency o f man is  to take advantage 
o f  a l l  ava ilab le  means to fu r th e r  his own p r iv i le g e s . Was Cornelius 
O'Leary correc t in  his conclusion, formed in the l i g h t  o f his study o f 
the e lim ination  o f corrupt practices in B r i t is h  e le c t ions , tha t ' to  
attempt to divorce personal in te res ts  completely from p o l i t ic a l  a c t iv i t y  
would be to  s t r iv e  a f te r  the unatta inable '?^
A fu r th e r  set o f  problems derives from the ambiguous use o f the term 
' in te re s ts '  in p o l i t i c s . ^  D e fin it ions  o f c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  frequently  
incorporate some notion of the 'pu b lic  in te re s t '  but the nature of th is  
concept is usually i l l - d e f in e d .  Samuel Finer re fers to  the public in te r ­
est as a 'soc ia l f i c t i o n ' ,  so-called because 'everybody agrees tha t i t
10ex is ts  but nobody knows wherein i t  co n s is ts '.  Professor George Jones 
casts doubt on whether a view o f  'pu b lic  in te re s t '  as something o f sub­
stance apart from the clash o f personal and group in te res ts  has relevance 
fo r  present conditions. When reviewing Herbert Morrison's approach to 
the e l im in ia t io n  o f corruption in government he argues:-
'His quest fo r  an ob jective public  in te re s t . ,  seems inappro­
pr ia te  in a p o l i t ic a l  system which now emphasises p lu r a l i s t i c
bargaining between groups as the way to uncover the public 
in te re s t . ' ^^
In e v ita b ly , the problem o f a se lf - in te re s te d  in te rp re ta t io n  o f 'pub lic
in te re s t '  e x is ts .  As observed by D is ra e l i : -
' . . .  as in p r iva te  l i f e  we are accustomed to associate the 
c i r c le  o f our acquaintance with the phrase "the w o r ld " , so in public 
I have inva r iab ly  observed tha t "the people" o f the p o l i t ic ia n  is  
the c i r c le  o f  his in te re s ts .
Ins igh t in to  th is  concept is sparse in the l i te ra tu r e  concerned with con-
13f l i c t  o f in te re s t ,  but can be pursued in more general works on p o l i t i c s ,
14and in l i te ra tu r e  which crosses the d is c ip l in a ry  boundary in to  philosophy.
1 RThe lines o f argument can be traced back to the c lass ica l works o f Rousseau,
1 A
Bentham and others.
When the concept o f ' in te re s ts '  is examined more s p e c i f ic a l ly  w ith in  
the context o f c o n f l ic t  o f  in te re s t  as i t  re la tes to elected o f f i c ia l s ,  
the ambiguity takes on extra dimensions. Here we have to consider the 
nature o f the representative function o f the Member and the unique charac­
te r  o f  I- le g is la t iv e  employment. A Member o f Parliament is  properly
16,
subject to a number o f  influences, and a major problem w ith id e n t i fy in g  
and regulating c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t in the House o f Commons is  deciding 
ju s t  where representation of in te res ts  threatens to cross the f in e ,  some 
may say in v is ib le ,  l in e  in to  a po tentia l c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  s i tu a t io n .
In an American context Getz recognises th is  problem and attempts to over­
come i t  by drawing a d is t in c t io n  between 'c o n f l i c t  o f in te re s t '  and 
'c o n f l i c t  o f in te re s ts ' .  Evoking a s im ila r  conception o f 'p u b lic  in te r ­
es t' to tha t advanced by Professor Jones he argues:-
'The Madisonian view tha t fac t io n  is  ine v itab le  has prevailed in 
the United States. In terests  s e l f is h ly  struggle to achieve th e i r  
governmental goals, and le g is la to rs  w i l l  represent functiona l and 
sectional desires in the name o f 'pu b lic  in te re s t ' .  On the other 
hand, our society does not condone the practice o f o f f ic ia ls  seeking 
to  fu r th e r  th e i r  own in te re s ts . A " c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s ts "  is  accept­
able; a " c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t"  is  n o t ' .^ y
How useful th is  d is t in c t io n  is - both in abstract and operational terms -
in the context o f the B r i t is h  House o f Commons is  assessed in Chapter 8.
As Norton E. Long observes, c o n f l ic t  o f  in te re s t  not only shades o f f
a t one edge in to  representation o f in te res ts  but also shades o f f  a t  the
18other edge in to  corruption and th e f t .  Here the problem arises tha t the 
terms 'c o n f l i c t  o f in te re s t '  and 'co rrup t ion ' are frequently  confused.
This confusion is unfortunately perpetuated in  l i te ra tu r e  the in ten tion  o f 
which, paradoxically , is to c la r i f y  what is  meant by c o n f l ic t  o f  in te re s t .
This e rro r is  made by Clement Vose in his attempt to describe the etymology
o f the term 'c o n f l i c t  o f  in t e r e s t ' : -
' In  the nineteenth century, i f  an o f f i c ia l  resolved a clash 
between his personal advantage and public duty in favour o f personal 
advantage i t  was ca lled  co rrup tion , . . .  since then "corrup tion" has 
come to be associated w ith only the most odious and obvious forms of 
ven a li ty  and s e lf -se rv ice  and the term " c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t"  was 
coined to cover less b la tan t cases.'^g
Instead o f  c la r i fy in g  the o r ig in a l concept, Vose introduces fu r th e r  con­
fusion by seeming to imply tha t c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  can be recognised as
20a weak form o f the more emotive phenomenon o f corruption.
Ind iscrim inate use o f  the two terms 'c o n f l i c t  o f in te re s t '  and 'corrup­
t io n '  is  evident in much o f  the recent work on c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t ,  par­
t i c u la r l y  in  the spate o f  a r t ic le s  appearing in the wake of the Poulson 
a f f a i r .  Further consideration o f  th is  problem forms part o f  the wider 
discussion presented in Chapter 8, but i t  is  advanced here tha t the two 
terms are not synonymous, nor can the term c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  be used 
to describe a weak form o f corruption.
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I t  is  now evident tha t c o n f l ic t  o f  in te re s t  is  a phenomenon which 
cannot eas ily  be defined and id e n t i f ie d .  Following Max Weber's guidance 
tha t soc io logica l concepts should be 'g radua lly  composed' through empir­
ica l research and th a t the place fo r  conceptual comprehension, i f  th is
21is  possible, can only be a t the end o f an in q u iry ,  no attempt is  made 
here to formulate a comprehensive d e f in i t io n  o f c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  in 
the House o f  Commons. However, most research involves adopting one or 
more working d e f in i t io n s  at least as a s ta r t in g  po in t. For th is  purpose 
th is  study adopts the short d e f in i t io n  advanced by Getz, tha t c o n f l ic t  
o f  in te re s t  'denotes a s itu a t io n  in which an o f f i c i a l ' s  conduct o f his 
o f f ic e  c o n f l ic ts  w ith his p r iva te  economic a f f a i r s ' .
Having established a working d e f in i t io n  o f c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t ,  we 
can examine what con tr ibu t ion , i f  any, l i te ra tu r e  on Parliament has made 
to an understanding o f the phenomenon in  the House o f Commons.
2. An Uncharted Issue in Parliamentary L i te ra tu re ?
Generally speaking, standard co n s t itu t io n a l or h is to r ic a l  works on
Parliament w r it te n  in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries contain
l i t t l e  e x p l ic i t  discussion o f  the issue o f c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  as we have
22p rov is iona lly  defined i t  above. However, as is evident in Chapter 3, 
we must o f course bear in mind tha t practices which would be c la s s i f ie d  as 
'c o n f l i c t  o f  in te re s t '  by modern standards would not necessarily have been 
seen as such in  the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Then, when deal­
ing w ith the unreformed House o f  Commons p r io r  to the Reform Act o f  1832,
23commentators were more concerned w ith  br ibery  and corruption a t e lec tions . 
This tendency to subsume discussion o f the pursu it o f  personal in te re s t 
(as opposed to class in te re s t ,  which has always been prominently discussed 
in the l i te ra tu r e  on representation, franchise reform e tc . )  under the sub-
24j e c t  o f  corruption a t e lections persisted well in to  the twentieth century.
In 1931 S ir  Ivor Jennings took a more d ire c t  approach to the subject and
included in h is te x t  on Parliament a chapter dealing with Members and th e i r
p a rt ie s ,  constituencies and in te re s ts ,  where he e x p l ic i t l y ,  a lb e i t  b r ie f l y ,
23alluded to the problem o f separating public and pr iva te motives. Follow­
ing Jennings, several texts  on Parliament w r it te n  since the 1950s have 
touched on the subject o f Members' in te res ts  and the po ten tia l problem of 
c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t ,  though usually only providing one short chapter ornr
reference w ith in  a chapter. Perhaps the most useful con tr ibu tion  has
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come from Professor P.G. Richards, who includes a chapter on Members and
th e i r  in te res ts  in his works on the ro le  o f the backbench Member in the
27B r i t is h  House o f Commons.
Although general texts on Parliament have paid scant regard to the 
c o n f l ic t  o f  in te re s t  issue, we should not disregard the con tr ibu tion  o f 
two sp e c if ic  categories w ith in  the broad range o f l i te ra tu r e  on Parliament 
to an understanding of c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  in the House o f  Commons.
• 28
F i r s t ,  there are those works such as Erskine May's Parliamentary Practice
and S ir  G ilbe rt Campion's in troduction  to the procedure o f the House o f 
29Commons, which can be c la s s i f ie d  as 'manuals o f parliamentary procedure' 
and which discuss c o n f l ic t  of in te re s t  in  purely procedural terms. Although 
l im ited  in scope, these manuals are invaluable to a charting o f  the c o n f l ic t  
o f  in te re s t  issue in tha t they provide comprehensive documentation o f the 
rules and conventions by which the House has attempted to regulate Members' 
f in a n c ia l in te res ts .
Second, some references to c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  can be found in l i t e r ­
ature discussing parliamentary p r iv i le g e  and contempt, the means by which 
the House regulates i t s  Members in the area o f f ina nc ia l in te re s ts .
Older works covering parliamentary p r iv i le g e ,  such as tha t by S ir  William 
Anson ,subsum e references to Members' personal in te rests  under the d is ­
cussion o f corrupt practices a t parliamentary elections, but more recent
con tr ibu tions in  th is  area have made the l in k  between the regula tion o f
31Members' in te res ts  and parliamentary p r iv i le g e  more tang ib le . Among
these S ir  Barnett Cocks, in his forward to Pachuri's study on the law o f
parliamentary p r iv i le g e  in the United Kingdom and India confirms the view
o f th is  w r i te r  tha t c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  is a continuing problem which
has been neglected:-
'Another aspect o f parliamentary p r iv i le g e  which is o f concern 
to many Commonwealth parliaments is  the practice governing the declar­
ation o f  in te res ts  by Members with which is  bound up the influence of 
pressure groups... the proper declaration o f in te res ts  is  cu rren tly  
the subject o f an inqu iry  by a Select Committee: and i t  is a con­
t inu ing  problem upon which l i t t l e  has been w r i t te n  t i l l  now. ' 22
Bearing in  mind the conceptual b lu rr in g  between 'c o n f l i c t  o f in te re s t '  
and 'representation o f  in te re s ts ' ,  a th i rd  id e n t i f ia b le  category o f l i t e r ­
ature on Parliament which is relevant to an understanding o f  c o n f l ic t  o f 
in te re s t  in the B r i t is h  House o f Commons is  tha t dealing w ith representa­
t ion  o f  in te res ts  in B r i t is h  Government. As argued both bÿ Robert Getz^^
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34and Barry McGill in  th e i r  separate investiga tions o f c o n f l ic t  o f 
in te re s t  in elected assemblies, the id e n t i f ic a t io n  o f the phenomenon o f 
c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  rests la rg e ly  on a p r io r  conception o f the proper 
function o f the le g is la to r .  This has demonstrably changed over time as 
have theories o f representation. Thus, as indicated in the h is to r ic a l  
review presented in Chapter 3, and as explored fu r th e r  in a contemporary 
context in Chapter 8, an understanding o f the representative ro le  of 
the le g is la to r  is  a prerequis ite  fo r  id e n t i fy in g  what constitu tes  a con­
f l i c t  o f in te re s t .  However, although there are several well researched 
texts  dealing w ith representation o f in te rests  - p a r t ic u la r ly  in eighteenth 
and nineteenth century B r i t is h  p o l i t ic s ^ ^  - w ith few exceptions'^ the 
relevance o f representation theory to an understanding o f c o n f l ic t  o f 
in te re s t  remains la rge ly  unexplored.
Not a l l  the l i te ra tu re  dealing w ith  representation which has a poten­
t i a l  bearing on the c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  issue takes a philosophical 
approach. J.F. Ross s p e c i f ic a l ly  argues th a t : -
' I suggest th a t we need f i r s t  and foremost to ascertain the facts  
o f representation. Instead o f s ta r t in g  w ith philosophical theories 
we should f i r s t  look, with our eyes open, a t these 602 men and women 
who are elected to represent u s . '^y
He presents a socio-economic p ro f i le  o f Membership o f the House o f Commons 
which provides the data fo r  a s ta t is t ic a l  and an a ly t ica l study o f p a r l ia ­
mentary representation as i t  has functioned in the in te r-w ar period in 
Great B r i ta in .  While he does not take up the issue o f c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t ,  
the socio-economic data on MPs is  useful in th is  context. Other valuable
sources o f reference fo r  socio-economic data on MPs are the books on the
38House o f Commons published by The Times a f te r  each General E lection.
S im ila r ly  useful data is  provided by more recent con tr ibu tions to the
l i te ra tu r e  on p o l i t ic a l  representation and recruitment, notably the N u ff ie ld
39e lec tion  studies since 1945, and most recently  a study o f the B r i t is h  MP 
by Colin Mellors.^^
Although the con tr ibu tion  o f general parliamentary l i te ra tu r e  to an 
understanding o f  c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  in the House o f Commons has been 
tenuous, a small amount o f  material dealing d i re c t ly  w ith aspects o f  th is  
problem emerged during the la te  1950s and early  1960s. The Poulson a f f a i r  
in  the early  1970s also provoked an upsurge in a r t ic le s  concerned with 
standards o f conduct in government.
The major con tr ibu tion  in th is  area in the 1960s was provided by 
Andrew Roth, a Lobby jo u rn a l is t  and author,and advocate o f a re g is te r  o f
2 0 .
Members' in te res ts . His p r iva te  enterprise approach to the exposure of
MPs' in te re s ts ,  begun in 1955, has resulted in a series o f ed it ions o f
41The Business Background o f MPs. Each ed it ion  contains a short commen­
ta ry  on a selection o f events in the f ie ld  o f Members' in te res ts  - con­
structed mainly from Hansard debates and newspaper cu tt ings  - which pre­
faces an alphabetical l i s t  o f MPs and th e i r  business in te re s ts . This 
information on Members' in te res ts  was co lla ted  in to  tabu lar form in order 
to  provide a p ro f i le  o f  the House in terms o f types o f  in te res ts  held by 
Members. However, Roth q u a l i f ie s  the value o f such da ta :-
'One must... warn against taking s ta t is t ic s  too l i t e r a l l y  or 
being worried about the discrepancies between ours and o the rs '.
MPs tend to be complicated people. Thus, a typ ica l Conservative MP 
tends to have a b i t  of inherited  money, q u a l i fy  as a B a rr is te r ,  pick 
up a couple o f d irectorsh ips in his fa th e r - in - la w 's  f irm  and dabble 
in a farm fo r  his country home. How do you c la s s i fy  him?'^2
Indeed, in  an ' in te rv ie w  with the w r i te r  Roth admitted tha t the complexi­
t ie s  and a rb itra r iness  o f c la s s i f ic a t io n  had led him to doubt the use o f 
s ta t is t ic s  and to abandon his tabular presentation o f information a f te r  
the 1972 ed it ion .
During the la te  1950s and early  1960s a small number o f case-studies
appeared dealing with spe c if ic  incidents o f  alleged c o n f l ic t  of in te re s t ,
43such as the Marconi a f f a i r  in 1913, but on the whole these tend to be 
descrip t ive  accounts which con tr ibu te  l i t t l e  to a systematic study o f the 
problem. Three a r t ic le s  dealing d i r e c t ly ,  a lb e i t  b r ie f l y ,  w ith aspects o f 
c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  in the House also appeared during th is  period. In 
his a r t i c le  concerning money and Party p o l i t ic s  in England^^ Frank Newman 
use fu l ly  presents extracts from Hansard, newspapers, e tc . to substantiate 
his premise tha t money is  by no means in s ig n i f ic a n t  in terms o f the a c t iv ­
i t i e s  o f pressure groups and th e i r  associations with MPs. However, as with 
much parliamentary l i te ra tu r e  his a r t i c le  is  heavily descrip tive  and lacks 
any attempt a t conceptual analysis. This c r i t ic is m  also applies to the 
a r t i c le  by Barry M cGill, which traces the c o n f l ic t  o f  in te re s t issue and 
the B r i t is h  House o f  Commons between 1782-1914.^^ McGill does, however, 
provide a useful h is to r ic a l  background to the contemporary issue o f con­
f l i c t  o f  in te re s t  in the House.
The th i rd  a r t i c le ,  w r it te n  by Francis Noel-Baker MP warns o f the 
'spreading grey zone' o f business influence in Pariiament.^^ He acknow­
ledges th a t the problem o f  business a f f i l i a t io n s  is  not new, but predicts
21 .
tha t w ith the growth in public re la t ions  and advertis ing a c t iv i t y  among 
MPs
'The door, in fa c t ,  is  wide open fo r  a new form o f  p o l i t ic a l  
corrup tion , and there is  an uneasy fee ling  in Parliament and out­
side tha t i t s  extent could be much greater than the known or pub- 
1 i shed.facts revea l. '
He concludes with a comment which, in the l ig h t  o f the Poulson a f f a i r ,  
would seem to be prescient, th a t : -
'One hopes i t  w i l l  not require a major public scandal in 
B r i t is h  P o l i t ic s  to persuade Ministers to take a c loser look a t 
the dangerous problem of the 'grey zone' which has developed in 
the House o f Commons.
Many o f the a r t ic le s  born o f the Poulson a f f a i r  touch on the subject 
o f c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  in the House o f Commons, though usually in a jo u r ­
n a l is t ic  or speculative way. The m a jo r ity  o f the a r t ic le s  appeared in 
response to two o f f i c ia l  investiga tions in the area, namely the Redcliffe
Maud Report on standards o f conduct in local government and the Salmon
49Commission on standards o f conduct in public l i f e .  A common observa­
t io n  in these reviews concerns the importance o f the Poulson a f f a i r  in 
developing both public and o f f i c ia l  recognition o f the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f con­
f l i c t  o f in te re s t  with the r is k  o f corruption in public  l i f e .  This view 
is  expressed most comprehensively by Michael Roberts, who argues th a t : -
'The Poulson a f f a i r  was probably qu ite  c r i t i c a l  to the develop­
ment o f a public awareness o f corruption in B r i ta in  today. I f  
Poulson had remained a successful businessman and not gone bankrupt 
i t  is  questionable whether some o f the important developments 'post 
Poulson' could have occurred. I am th ink ing  p a r t ic u la r ly  o f the 
Report on Conduct in Local Government, i t s e l f .  The Royal Commission 
on Standards of Conduct in Public L i fe ,  the Stock Exchange Regula­
to ry  body, the A .10 Department a t New ^Scotland Yard, the Report 
from the Select Committee on Members' In te re s ts . '
As observed above, a common fa u l t  o f these a r t ic le s ,  is  th e i r  tendency 
to  confuse, or at leas t f a i l  to d is t ingu ish  c le a r ly  between the terms 
c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  and corrup tion ; a discussion e sse n tia l ly  o f the 
former frequently  being subsumed under the more emotionally charged head­
ing o f corruption.
A second group o f a r t ic le s  stemming from the Poulson disclosures 
c lu s te r  more s p e c i f ic a l ly  around the campaign fo r  a re g is te r  o f  Members' 
f in a n c ia l in te res ts . In the early  1970s the House o f Commons L ibrary had 
issued a Background Paper g iving factual information on the f in a n c ia l 
in te res ts  o f m inisters and Members o f Parliament, and in 1974 Rt. Hon.
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Douglas Houghton (now Lord Houghton) published an a r t i c le  in  Thec o
Parliamentarian based on th is  document. As the campaign fo r  a re g is te r
o f in te res ts  gathered momentum, several other MPs contributed by way o f
a r t ic le s  to the d e b a t e , a n d  fo llow ing the Report o f the Select Committee
on Members' In terests  (Declaration) in 1975,^^ both the Chairman and the
Clerk o f tha t Committee published factual a r t ic le s  summarising the events
leading up to and inc lud ing the Select C o m m i t t e e . T h o u g h  providing
much needed empirical data on the subject o f Members' in te re s ts ,  these
factual summaries provide l i t t l e  or no ana ly t ic  in s ig h t in to  the problem
of c o n f l ic t  o f  in te re s t  or the events leading up to the in troduction  o f
the Register. More he lpfu l in th is  respect is  the summary o f  the early
stages o f  the campaign fo r  a re g is te r  provided by K. I .  Vi jay . He attempts
to draw out the various ideolog ica l assumptions and positions w ith in  the
debate, and lends support to the notion o f the Poulson a f f a i r  as a t r ig g e r
56to the demand fo r  declaration and a public  re g is te r .
A th i rd  c lutch o f  a r t ic le s  arose from the involvement o f MPs in the
Poulson a f f a i r ,  which eventually led to a Select Committee o f the House o f
Commons inves tiga ting  the conduct o f three o f i t s  M e m b e r s . T h e  Clerk o f
th is  Committee produced a short factual account o f some o f the problems
and procedures associated with the House's inves tiga tion  o f the p r iva te
58conduct o f i t s  Members. Graham Z e l l ic k  provided a more questioning
approach to these issues in one a r t i c le  which sought to c la r i f y  the posi-
59t io n  o f MPs who are imprisoned, and two fu r th e r  a r t ic le s  concerned more 
s p e c i f ic a l ly  w ith  the conduct o f Members and th e i r  f in a n c ia l in te res ts . 
Z e l l ic k 's  views on what fa te  should b e fa l l  an MP adjudged by his peers to 
be g u i l t y  o f improper conduct are discussed in Chapter 7. I t  is  s u f f ic ie n t  
here to note tha t his in q u ir ie s  signal the incursion of academic comment 
in to  a previously unexplored areaand question the House's jea lous ly  held 
exclusive r ig h t  to s e l f - d is c ip l in e .  F in a l ly ,  a short a r t ic le  which co in­
cides c lose ly  with the subject matter o f th is  study appeared while th is  
research was in progress. Using the Select Committee on Conduct o f  Members 
as a springboard, Alan Doig inquires in to  s e l f -d is c ip l in e  and the House 
o f Commons as i t  re la tes to Members' in te res ts  and expresses an argument 
s im ila r  to tha t which guided the w r i te r  in determining the scope and con­
ten t o f th is  s tudy:-
'The problems o f s e l f - d is c ip l in e  go deeper than the response o f 
ind iv idua l parliam ents ... because there is no one spe c if ic  set o f 
rules or procedures to cover a llegations o f misconduct or c o n f l ic t  
o f  in te re s t  against Members. To understand the problems, the re fo re .
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i t  is  necessary to take in to  account a l l  aspects - the law of 
Parliament, rules and customs on disclosure o f in te re s ts ,  the 
va r ia tions  in a tt itude s  to Members' outside in te re s ts ,  the choice 
o f method o f in q u iry , sanctions and so on - tha t may have a bear­
ing on the determination and maintenance o f  standards. 'g,|
I t  is  now evident tha t the experience o f  the House o f Commons in 
dealing w ith c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t ,  and the problems o f  de f in ing , id e n t i ­
fy ing  and regulating th is  phenomenon have been discussed only peripher­
a l ly  in academic l i te ra tu re  on Parliament. What l i t t l e  l i te ra tu r e  has 
appeared on th is  subject has tended to be heavily descrip t ive  w ith l i t t l e  
conceptual analysis or theore tica l content upon which to bu ild .  Samuel 
Patterson's general observation on l i te ra tu r e  concerning the House o f 
Commons would seem to be p a r t ic u la r ly  apposite here, th a t : -
' Although there are notable exceptions, in the main the study 
o f the House o f Commons has not involved grappling with conceptual 
problems or developing and try in g  to answer d isc ip l in ed  research 
questions.
In order to  avoid these shortcomings, and to accomplish a systematic 
study o f  c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  as experienced by the House o f Commons, the 
research, questions which form the basis o f th is  study are examined w ith in  
the theore tica l framework set out below.
3. Theoretical Framework
The emphasis on descrip tion in parliamentary l i te ra tu r e  and the lack 
o f conceptual analysis or theore tica l content is symptomatic o f a funda­
mental cleavage in social and p o l i t ic a l  science between normative and em­
p ir ic a l  a n a l y s i s . T o o  often normative theory is  the prisoner o f abstract 
ideas, remote from the actual workings o f  society th a t i t  could f r u i t f u l l y  
be harnessed to explore. At the same time, as has been seen w ith much 
parliamentary l i t e r a tu r e ,  s e l f -s ty le d  em pir ic is ts  often l im i t  the use fu l­
ness o f  th e i r  f ind ings fo r  such exp loration by shying away from value anal­
ys is and proclaiming descrip tion as th e i r  u lt im ate  goal. This study 
attempts to investiga te  the re la t ionsh ip  between the in te rre la te d  variables 
o f  values, in s t i tu t io n s  and behaviour in socie ty. There is a conscious 
a f f i n i t y  w ith Max Weber's p rescrip t ion  fo r  the tasks o f an empirical 
science although the study is  not intended to be s p e c i f ic a l ly  Weberian in 
a p p r o a c h . T h i s  means tha t the fac ts  to be explored and in terpreted 
include cu ltu ra l values and ideas which shape both the objectives o f the 
House in regula ting c o n f l ic t  o f  in te re s t ,  and the means by which th is  goal
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is achieved. A b r ie f  consideration o f Weber's recommendations c la r i f ie s  
some of the present research objectives and ind icates some o f the problems 
and questions which are l i k e ly  to ar ise .
A basic theme in Weber's method is  the conception o f analysis primar­
i l y  in terms o f  categories o f 'ends' and 'means'. He be lieves, 'We
desire something concretely e ith e r " fo r  i t s  own sake" or as a means o f
*65achieving something else which is more h ighly desired. The appropriate­
ness o f the means fo r  achieving a given end he deems amenable to s c ie n t i f i c  
ana lys is , but the task o f an empirical science is  not to provide binding 
norms and ideals from which d ire c t ives  fo r  immediate p rac tica l a c t iv i t y  can 
be derived. Rather, an empirical science can determine which means fo r  
the achievement o f a proposed end is  appropriate or inappropria te, and to 
th is  extent allows us to estimate the chances o f a t ta in in g  a certa in  end 
by ce rta in  ava ilab le  means. Furthermore, the consequences which the a p p l i ­
cation o f the means to be used would produce, in addition to those conse­
quent upon the possible attainment o f the proposed end can be determined. 
This provides the acting person or persons with the a b i l i t y  to weigh and 
compare the undesirable against the desirable consequences o f his action 
- eg. to assess what the ^attai nment o f  the desired end would 'co s t '  in terms 
o f  what Weber would ca l l  loss o f  other values.
This framework allows a more precise restatement o f one o f  the major 
research objectives - the attempt to  assess the appropriateness o f  the 
methods and procedures u t i l is e d  by the House (eg. parliamentary p r iv i le g e ,  
d isclosure ru le s , re g is t ra t io n  o f  in te re s ts ,  etc) fo r  achieving the 
desired 'end '. However, defin ing the nature o f the desired 'end' in  i t s e l f  
constitu tes  a dimension o f the research questions to be explored. Prelim­
inary reading o f se lect committee reports and parliamentary debates 
revealed a t leas t two possible objectives on the part o f p o l i t ic ia n s :  
f i r s t ,  to  avoid actual c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t ;  and second, to prevent the 
appearance o f c o n f l ic t  o f  in te re s t .  These two goals may be re lated but 
the attainment o f e ith e r  one does not necessarily en ta i l  the achievement 
o f  the other. Furthermore, a fundamental question which Weber's p rescrip ­
t io n  fo r  empirical science provokes is  whether the se tt ing  o f the end 
i t s e l f  is  p ra c t ic a l ly  meaningful or meaningless with reference to  e x is t ­
ing conditions. This involves asking whether c o n f l ic t  o f  in te re s t  w ith the 
r is k  o f corrupt a c t iv i t y  can be avoided and public confidence in the House 
restored w ithout making substantia l changes in the ex is t ing  conditions 
and procedures w ith in  which and by which the House operates.
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In essence th is  bo ils  down to a p o l i t ic a l  question, and as stressed 
by Weber the task o f empirical science is  not to provide binding norms 
and ideals from which d irec t ives  fo r  immediate p rac tica l a c t iv i t y  can be 
derived. However, research can attempt to explore and make more e x p l ic i t  
the 'cos t ' o f the various a lte rn a t ive  methods o f prevention and d is c ip l in e  
ava ilab le  to the House o f  Commons in terms o f the loss o f  other values 
such as, fo r  example, privacy o f the ind iv idua l Member. Weber believes 
th a t the in te rp re ta t io n  o f c u ltu ra l values does not overstep the bound­
aries o f  a science which s tr ives  fo r  an 'a n a ly t ica l ordering o f  empirical 
r e a l i t y T h e  empirical s c ie n t is t  can provide the person who has to 
make the choice between a lte rn a t iv e  courses o f action with in s ig h t in to  
the s ign if icance o f the desired ob ject by 'making e x p l ic i t  and developing 
in a lo g ic a l ly  consistent manner the "ideas" which ac tu a lly  do or which 
can underlie the concrete end '^^ :-
' . . .  the s c ie n t i f i c  treatment o f value judgments may not only 
understand and empathically analyse the desired ends and the ideals 
which underlie them: i t  can also "judge" them c r i t i c a l l y . . .  i t  can
ass is t him (the acting , w i l l in g  person) in becoming aware o f  the 
u lt im ate standards o f value which he must presuppose in order to be 
lo g ic a l .  The elevation o f these u lt im ate standards, which are mani­
fested in concrete value judgments, to the level o f exp lic itness is  
the utmost tha t the s c ie n t i f i c  treatment o f value judgments can do 
without entering the realm o f specu la tion .'^g
This study fo llows Weber in a t t r ib u t in g  a ro le  to ideas in the develop­
ment o f social l i f e .  Heeding the warning against engaging in speculation, 
i t  w i l l  attempt to make e x p l ic i t  some of the values and ideas underlying 
and shaping not only the concrete objectives o f the House in co n tro l l in g  
c o n f l ic ts  and po ten tia l c o n f l ic ts  o f  in te re s t ,  but also the means - eg. 
declaration and/or re g is tra t io n  procedures - by which th is  goal is  pursued.
Having acknowledged the influence o f Weber's general p rescrip t ion  fo r  
the tasks o f an empirical science in the formulation o f the research prob­
lem, the inqu iry  can be located more s p e c i f ic a l ly  at the juncture o f two 
approaches to the study of p o l i t ic s .  F i r s t ,  i t  in part l ie s  in the domain 
o f  e l i t e  theories. Second, i t  pursues a major premise o f  the p o l i t ic a l  
cu ltu re  approach to p o l i t ic s ,  tha t the character and development o f a 
p o l i t ic a l  system or in s t i t u t io n  are conditioned by 'the system o f empirical 
b e l ie fs ,  expressive symbols, and values which defines the s itu a t io n  in 
which p o l i t ic a l  action takes place.
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E l i te  the o r ie s : This study does not set as a sp e c if ic  ob jective an
examination of the d is t r ib u t io n  o f power and a u tho r ity  in socie ty. As 
ju s t i f i a b l y  argued by Robert Putnum, the proposition tha t in any 
p o l i t ic a l  system some actors have a more important ro le  than others and 
deserve scru tiny  does not necessarily e n ta i l  v e r i f ic a t io n  o f a second 
proposition , tha t these actors form a 's p e c i f ia b le ,  u n i f ie d ,  s e l f -  
conscious and autonomous group in control o f the p o l i t ic a l  system'. 
Neither does the possible f a ls i f i c a t io n  o f  the second proposition necess­
a r i l y  involve a f a ls i f i c a t io n  o f  the f i r s t .  Therefore, although recog­
nis ing the fa c t  th a t e l i t e  theories present various theore tica l and 
p rac tica l problems, the study accepts th e i r  general premise tha t p o l i t ­
ica l systems can use fu lly  be conceived as s t r a t i f ie d  - ' th a t  some people 
are much more in te res ted , much more involved, much more in f lu e n t ia l  in
Î  w l  
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71public a f fa i rs  than th e i r  fe l lo w s ',  and form a p o l i t ic a l  e l i t e ho
'observe ce rta in  values which should govern p o l i t ic a l  a c t i v i t y ' .
The focus of study are Members o f Parliament who, although impor­
tan t members o f  the B r i t is h  p o l i t ic a l  e l i t e ,  are, o f course, not i t s  
only members. Indeed, as acknowledged in Jean Blondel's notion o f the 
'establishment' in  B r i ta in ,  they share p o l i t ic a l  power and in i t i a t i v e
with a number o f other in s t i tu t io n s  - Government, the C iv i l  Service, and
73Party organisations to name but a few. I t  may even be argued tha t 
the modern ju s t i f i c a t io n  fo r  including them at a l l  in  the category o f 
the p o l i t ic a l  e l i t e  is  t ra d i t io n a l  and perhaps even emotional. As 
Richard Rose says:-
' Since i t s  medieval foundation. Parliament has aroused emo­
t iona l lo y a lt ie s  as well as performing e f f ic ie n t  functions in 
government.'
Although in recent decades i t s  e f f ic ie n t  ro le  has been increasingly 
ca lled in to  question, i t  can be argued tha t i t s  emotional ro le  p e rs is ts : -
' . . .  the in s t i tu t io n  remains prominent as a ch ie f symbol o f 
government in the mass media, in formal teaching about government, 
and in  conversation; M.P.s are much more v is ib ly  a part o f  govern­
ment than are c i v i l  servants or pressure group o f f i c ia ls .  The 
only national e lections are those fo r  Members o f  Parliament. The 
presence o f M.P.s provides symbolic assurance to voters tha t govern­
ment is  responsive and responsible to i t s  subjects, although in 
practice the government ( th a t i s ,  the Cabinet) in fo rm a lly  dominates 
Parliam ent. ' yg
And i t  is not ju s t  the e lec to ra te 's  emotions tha t are important. M in is te rs , 
c i v i l  servants and pressure groups may also have sentimental attachments
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to t ra d it io n s  o f  parliamentary power and importance - and such a ttach­
ments may have a d ire c t  impact on the con figuration o f power in society 
and on the outcome o f decisions. Further, although constrained by com­
peting e l i t e s .  Parliament, comprising both Houses, does s t i l l  re ta in  
vestiges o f  i t s  e f f ic ie n t  function as the l % a l l y  sovereign body.
The House o f Commons includes both backbench Members and those who 
have had, or presently hold. Executive posts. However, ra ther than see­
ing th is  as an obstacle, the study, while p r im a r i ly  concerned w ith back­
bench Members, exp lo its  the differences in  categories o f  Members to com­
pare and contrast the rules and conventions perta in ing to Members' 
in te res ts  with the detailed code applicable only to m in is te rs.
Much o f the l i te ra tu r e  on the more general concept o f 'p o l i t i c a l  
e l i t e s '  provides ins ights fo r  exploring the research problem. C. Wright 
M i l ls 's  'power e l i t e '  model suggests several l ines  o f thought worth 
considering in a study o f  Members' in te re s ts . He defines the power e l i t e  
as :-
' . . .  composed o f men whose positions enable them to transcend 
the ordinary environments o f  ordinary men and women; they are in 
positions to make decisions having major consequences. Whether 
they do or do not make such decisions is  less important than the 
fa c t  tha t they do occupy such p ivo ta l pos it ions: th e i r  fa i lu re  to
ac t, th e i r  fa i lu re  to make decisions, is  i t s e l f  an act tha t is  
often of greater consequence than the decisions they do make.
For they are in command o f the major hierarchies and organisations 
o f  modern socie ty. They ru le  the big corporations. They run the 
machinery o f the state and claim i t s  prerogatives. They d ire c t  
the m i l i ta r y  establishment. They occupy the s tra teg ic  command 
posts o f  the social s tru c tu re , in which are now centred the e f fe c ­
t iv e  means o f the power and the wealth and the c e le b r i ty  which 
they en joy.'yy
A fa c i le  app lica tion  o f  M i l ls 's  power-e lite model to Great B r i ta in  
is  not advocated, but the model is  valuable in ra is ing  a t least one fund­
amental issue. This is  the statement tha t the fa i lu re  o f the e l i t e  to 
act or make decisions is in i t s e l f  often o f  greater importance than the 
decisions they do make. This b e l ie f  underlies a school o f thought tha t
considérés 'the proper ob ject o f  inves tiga tion  is  not p o l i t ic a l  a c t iv i t y
78but p o l i t ic a l  i n a c t i v i t y . '  I t  f inds expression in what Steven Lukes 
c a l ls  a 'two-dimensional' view o f ' p o w e r . T h i s  approach to power 
involves examining both decision-making and nondecision-making and 
assumes th a t a l l  forms o f  p o l i t ic a l  organisation have a bias in favour 
o f the e xp lo ita t io n  o f some kinds o f c o n f l ic t  and the suppression o f 
others, because 'organisation is  the m obilisa tion  o f b ia s '.^ ^  According 
to th is  argument some issues are organised in to  p o l i t ic s  while others 
are organised out.
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This b e l ie f  prompts an exploration o f whether the issue o f c o n f l ic t  
o f in te re s t  among MPs has been organised in to  p o l i t ic s  or organised out. 
I f ,  as suspected, the issue - except fo r  spe c if ic  iso la ted incidents - 
has u n t i l  recently  been organised out o f p o l i t i c s ,  i t  w i l l  be necessary 
to ask why th is  has been so. Guidance may be derived from Bachrach and 
Baratz who suggest the existence o f : -
" . . .  a set of; predominant values, b e l ie fs ,  r i tu a ls  and i n s t i ­
tu t io n a l procedures ("ru les  o f the game") tha t operate system­
a t ic a l ly  and cons is ten t ly  to  the bene fit  o f  certa in  persons and
groups at the expense o f others. Those who benefit are placed in
a preferred position to  defend and promote th e i r  vested in te re s ts . 'g ^
However, fo r  parliamentary research th is  observation is  in s u f f ic ie n t .
82As pointed out by Lukes, i t  gives the impression tha t decisions are
choices which are consciously and in te n t io n a l ly  made by ind iv idua ls
between a lte rna t ives . In fa c t ,  ‘ the bias o f the system can be mobil­
ised, recreated and re inforced in ways tha t are ne ither consciously 
chosen nor the intended re s u lt  o f p a r t ic u la r  ind iv idua l choices.'
Indeed, taking cognizance both o f the p r iv i leged pos it ion  o f Parliament 
deriv ing from i t s  h is to r ic a l  o r ig ins  as the Hmgh Court o f  Parliament, and 
the strength of parliamentary t r a d i t io n ,  i t  should also be borne in mind 
th a t : -
' . . .  the bias o f  the system is  not sustained simply by a series 
o f in d iv id u a l ly  chosen acts , but a lso, most im portantly , by the 
so c ia l ly  structured and c u l tu ra l ly  patterned behaviour o f groups, 
and practices o f in s t i tu t io n s ,  which may indeed be manifested by 
in d iv id u a ls ' ina c t ion . 'g g
P o l i t ic a l  c u l tu re : The second theore tica l source to be tapped is  tha t
o f  p o l i t ic a l  cu ltu re ,  which is 'the set o f  o r ien ta tions  concerning the
p o l i t ic a l  process (eg. ideolog ies, a t t i tu d e s ,  b e l ie fs )  and th e i r  expres-
84sion, as they are re la ted to members o f a p o l i t ic a l  system'. The 
p a r t ic u la r  form o f p o l i t ic a l  cu ltu re  in any society does not e x is t  ou t­
side or independently o f ind iv idua ls  l i v in g  together in socie ty. I t  is  
a product o f the h is to r ic a l  experiences th a t have affected the p o l i t ic a l  
system and the resu lts  o f p o l i t ic a l  so c ia liza t io n  processes experienced 
by members o f  the p o l i t ic a l  system. One o f the cha rac te r is t ics  th a t has 
been a tt r ib u te d  to a p o l i t ic a l  e l i t e  is the observance o f a set o f 
p o l i t i c a l l y  re levant b e l ie fs ,  values and habits which, fo r  the purpose 
o f th is  study, are grouped together under the rubric  o f ' e l i t e  p o l i t ic a l  
c u l t u r e ' .
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The s ign if icance o f the la t t e r  in condition ing the character and 
development o f p o l i t ic a l  systems and in s t i tu t io n s  is  an underlying 
premise o f th is  study. Stated more p rec ise ly , and bearing in mind the 
h is to r ic a l  basis o f c u ltu re ,  i t  is  a presupposition o f th is  study tha t 
the approach o f Members o f Parliament towards the problem o f c o n f l ic t  
o f  in te re s t  may derive as much from h is to r ic a l  residues o f e l i t e  
p o l i t ic a l  cu ltu re  as from functiona l considerations and contemporary 
p r e s s u r e s . T h i s  is  because the components o f behaviour are 'a 
function o f  both environmental s itua tions  in  which actors f in d  them­
selves and the psychological predispositions they bring to these s i tu a ­
t io n s ' . ^ ^  A tt i tud e  and s itua tions  can be seen as operating in a kind 
o f push-pull re la t io n sh ip , ' ( t ) h e  stronger the a t t i tu d in a l  press fo r  a 
course o f ac tion , the less need fo r  s itua t iona l s t im u li and vice versa. 
This view o f behaviour need not, however, involve psychological explana­
t io n  because, as pointed out by Percy Cohen, both sets o f conditions 
governing behaviour (or social action) may be seen as given to the
oo
actor by soc ie ty . Thus, in addition to exploring the 'environmental 
fa c to rs ' (on the assumption th a t Parliament does not operate in a vacuum) 
th is  inqu iry  examines the b e l ie fs ,  values and habits o f  thought which 
have accumulated over time and which guide and inform Members' action 
and behaviour towards outside f ina nc ia l in te res ts  and more s p e c i f ic a l ly  
the problem o f c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t .
This ob jective  echoes Weber's contention tha t the in te rp re ta t io n  o f 
c u ltu ra l values does not overstep the boundaries o f  empirical science.
I t  should not however be in terpreted as a ffo rd ing c u ltu re ,  or the
on
narrower dimension o f ideology, an unqua lif ied ro le  as an independent 
var iab le  in in fluencing social development. Although there is  an in te r ­
vening variab le  between people and ob jective s itua tions  - i . e .  cu ltu re  
- any attempt to explain behaviour so le ly  in  terms o f  cu ltu ra l values 
comes up against the problem o f 'soc ia l i n e r t i a C u l t u r e  is not a 
s ta t ic  concept and has to be created anew in each generation. To take 
values or norms as a s ta r t in g  po int in analys is , w ithout considering the 
aspects o f transmission and maintenance, overlooks the p o s s ib i l i t y  tha t 
values do in fa c t  a l te r  in response to circumstance.
When discussing the c u ltu ra l values or be lie fs  th a t parliamentarians 
accentuate (e ith e r  e x p l ic i t l y  or im p l ic i t l y )  when approaching the problem 
o f c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  we need to ask whether we are ta lk in g  about the
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House as an organic un ity  w ith a common ethos ( i f  th is  is  indeed poss­
ib le  or cred ib le) or whether we are ta lk in g  about a loose c o l le c t iv i t y  
o f  ind iv idua l Members with d i f fe re n t  and perhaps c o n f l ic t in g  views.
Guidance can be found in W. Guttsman's study o f the B r i t is h  p o l i t ic a l  
e l i t e .  He concludes th a t : -
' Parliamentary l i f e  i t s e l f  becomes an educative and moderating 
influence. The mores o f the House lessen antagonism. The great 
formal ega lita r ian ism  o f the rules o f the House, the p r iv i leges  
which the Member o f Parliament enjoys, the deference shown to him 
by o f f ic ia ls  and servants o f the House strengthen the in d iv id u a l 's  
self-esteem, and do, no doubt, combat fee lings o f separateness'.g^
Labour MPs are not immune from th is  ambience. Guttsman found tha t with
the embourgeoisment o f the Labour Party as i t  widened s o c ia l ly  as well as
numerically in the early  1920s and came to regard i t s e l f  as a cred ib le
a lte rn a t ive  Party o f  government, i t  would seem tha t w ith few exceptions
'Labour M.P.s submit l ik e  others to the t ra d i t io n  o f  the place, and
92succumb to the genius l o c i ' .  Once members o f the House, MPs are
sucked in to  parliamentary l i f e  and, as observed by David Marquand,
' (p)arliaments are even be tte r a t indoc tr ina ting  th e i r  Members with the
93norms o f the in s t i tu t io n  than are public  schools or miners' lodges'.
With th is  in mind, a te n ta t ive  assumption which w i l l  be examined is  
th a t ,  despite both in t ra -  and in te r -p a r ty  d ifferences on the issues surround­
ing Members' in te re s ts ,  there does tend to be a 'common denominator'.
This takes the form of a t ra d i t io n a l  ethos which is both conservative and 
con s t itu t io n a l in character and which is  apparent in the House's dogged 
insistence on re ta in ing  the p r iv i le g e  o f regula ting the conduct o f i t s  
own Members. I t  is  perhaps in s tru c t iv e  to remember tha t th is  study is 
dealing with what is  considered by Parliament and governments to be a 
'House' issue ra ther than a 'p a r ty ' issue, and one which concerns in te r ­
nal d is c ip l in e  o f  Members ra ther than the formulation o f public  po licy .
On such issues Parliaments and governments tend to be pe cu lia r ly  in t r o ­
verted, w ith debate becoming submerged in issues o f p o l i t ic a l  e th ics and 
parliamentary manners.
Nevertheless, the assumptionof a common ethos does not mean tha t 
in t r a -  and in te r -p a r ty  d ifferences can or should be glossed over; nor 
does i t  imply tha t th is  ethos is  a s ta t ic  concept or tha t i t  can be 
re i f ie d  as a concept above and apart from the Members who create and 
partake o f i t .  Indeed, one ob jective is  to explore why and to what
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extent the House's approach has changed in recent years towards the 
problem of c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  among i t s  own Members. This involves 
investiga tion  o f the changing balance o f opinion on the subject w ith in  
the House. Although th is  is  not p r im a r i ly  a study o f  the a t t itu d e s  o f 
in d iv id u a ls ,  i t  does investiga te  aggregates o f a t t i tu d e  as expressed in 
the major in t ra -  and in te r -p a r ty  d iffe rences. Developing the propo­
s i t io n  stated above concerning the importance of h is to r ic a l  residues 
o f  e l i t e  p o l i t ic a l  cu ltu re  in shaping Members' behaviour, i t  is  a pre­
mise o f th is  study th a t these differences may stem la rg e ly  from under­
ly ing  predispositions on the part o f Members towards certa in  fundamental 
values or b e lie fs  (whether or not they are agreed among a l l  the p a r t i ­
c ipa ting  ind iv id ua ls ) which are accentuated in the debate on Members' 
in te re s ts ,  and which have a common source as cha rac te r is t ics  o f a 
phenomenon in English cu ltu re  often re ferred to as the ‘ gentleman e th ic '
94The 'gentleman e th ic '
' I t  is ,  as has been remarked before, hardly possible to over­
estimate the importance o f the socia l s truc tu re  o f the House o f 
Commons in developing and maintaining a l l  the great q u a l i t ie s  o f 
the English parliamentary system. For hundreds o f  years the House 
o f Commons has been a meeting place o f gentlemen, and is  so s t i l l ,  
though i t  may, perhaps, have lo s t  i t s  claim to be what i t  used to 
be ca lled , "the best club in London". Parliamentary behaviour, 
the conception o f what is permissible in Parliament and what is  
not, has, even in the days o f growing democracy, suffered l i t t l e  
change o f character. I t  has always been developed in harmony w ith 
the modes o f thought o f  men who have possessed wealth, education 
and cu ltu re , who have raised themselves to high places in the free 
competition o f professional l i f e ,  or who have inherited  the o b l i ­
gations o f a great h is to r ic  name; such men have been in one way 
or another brought in to  l iv in g  connection with the t ra d i t io n  o f the 
old ar is tocracy and have acquired from i t s  Members the moderation 
and sense o f re s p o n s ib i l i ty ,  learned during generations o f prac­
t ic e  in  parliamentary government, and indispensable to the main­
tenance o f th e i r  pre-eminence.' qr
Ooseph Redlich
The gentleman e th ic  or ideal has long persisted in English cu ltu re  
and is  'a composite product o f medieval ch iv a lry ,  o f Renaissance human­
ism and o f upward progress o f  the middle classes in B r i t is h  h is to ry  
Though associated in the sixteenth century with noble b ir th  and social 
rank, the gradual influence o f  merchants and bankers in noble c irc le s  
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries sh ifted  the c r i t e r ia  fo r  
being considered a 'gentleman' towards education and manners, so tha t 
the motto - 'Manners makyth man' - chosen by William o f Wykeham in the 
fourteenth century when founding Winchester co llege , became, two hundred 
years la te r ,  the most apt descrip tion o f  a gentleman.
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Much la te r ,  Thomas Arnold gathered together many o f  the facets o f the 
gentleman ideal in the spe c if ic  context o f  nineteenth century England and 
generated an ideal 'which imprinted i t s e l f  upon the in s t i tu t io n  o f the 
public school in such a way tha t i t  became an example fo r  the grammar 
schools o f England when they came in to  existence a f te r  1902 when local 
education a u th o r it ie s  were set up '.^^  The transmission and maintenance 
o f the gentleman e th ic  in V ic torian England can in fa c t  be la rg e ly  traced 
back to the vehicle o f the public schools, which in t ra in in g  fu tu re  p o l i t ­
ic ians from the ranks o f the a r is tocracy , did not simply transmit values 
but selected and reinforced the t ra d i t io n s  accepted and cherished by the 
class which sent i t s  ch ildren there. The public schools offered the best 
chance o f r is in g  to a pos it ion o f p o l i t ic a l  importance, and there were 
marked pa ra lle ls  between the values and mechanisms o f  a public school 
socie ty and those o f B r i t is h  Government. To borrow an image from Rupert
go
Wilkinson, the public schools provided, and do s t i l l  provide a useful 
'window* through which to view p o l i t ic a l  and bureaucratic behaviour.
The public schools were themselves in a process o f  t ra n s i t io n  in the 
middle o f the nineteenth century occasioned by the in f lu x  and gradual 
absorption o f the middle class re c ru its  in to  th e i r  ranks. However, 
w h i ls t  in the face o f competition from other schools the public schools 
ceased to be the absolute leaders in educational thought, they maintained 
and strengthened th e i r  hold over B r i t is h  moral and social education, 
extending the example o f the public school s p i r i t  to other educational 
in s t i tu t io n s .  In e f fe c t ,  the various facets o f the gentleman ideal 
'penetrated deeply in to  the moral consciousness o f  many d i f fe re n t  layers 
o f English soc ie ty ' and are s t i l l  'a pattern and example fo r  many people 
who would f in d  i t  very d i f f i c u l t  to define exactly what they meant
The appropriateness o f the idea o f  the 'gentleman' as a working hyp­
othesis in p o l i t ic a l  research has been questioned by some w r i te rs ,  inc lud ­
ing Harold Laski,^^^ who argue tha t i t  has become redundant. However, a 
presupposition o f  th is  study is  th a t various facets o f the gentleman 
ide a l,  such as honour, s e l f - r e s t r a in t ,  lo y a l ty ,  mutual t ru s t ,  the b e l ie f  
in p o l i t ic s  as an amateur pursu it and the associated t ra d i t io n  o f pa rt-  
time membership o f the House, do s t i l l  provide ' a pattern and example' 
fo r  MPs, although they themselves are u n like ly  to id e n t i fy  or describe 
th e i r  behaviour in these terms. As Ronald Fletcher has observed:-
'How many o f us know the o r ig ins  and many developments from cum­
u la t ive  con tr ibu tions o f generations o f men in the immemorial past 
o f our society o f the games we play, the s k i l l s  we use, the values
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we stand by, the b e lie fs  we adopt, the r i tu a ls  we f in d  meaningful 
and moving? I t  is  on the face o f i t ,  a strange th in g , tha t not 
one person, not one group, not one e n t ire  generation a l iv e  a t any 
one time, can f u l l y  know the many dimensions o f cu ltu re  which are 
active in the ways o f l i f e  they lead. Just as there are unfor- 
seen consequences fo r  the fu tu re  o f men's actions now, so there 
are unforseen consequences from the past, ac tive  w ith in  them, which 
are equally im po rtan t. '
A b e l ie f  in the persistence o f the gentleman ideal among parliament­
arians has led several commentators, frequently  on the issue o f  the House's 
treatment o f Members' in te re s ts ,  to draw an analogy between the character­
is t ic s  displayed by the House and the workings o f a V ic torian  Gentleman's 
102Club. While i t  would be naive and too s im p l is t ic  to  assume th a t no 
change has occurred in the gentleman e th ic  since the nineteenth century, 
or tha t i t s  various ingredients are present to the same extent or in the 
same combination in present day parliaments, these changes have to be set 
against what has already been id e n t i f ie d  as a strong t ra d i t io n a l  ethos, 
which displays many o f the cha rac te r is t ics  o f the gentleman e th ic ,  and is 
imbibed by succeeding generations o f parliamentarians. The research 
method discussed in Chapter 2 - p a r t ic u la r ly  the series o f random sample 
interviews - provides scope fo r  the id e n t i f ic a t io n  o f  fu r th e r  values and 
b e l ie fs  which may be p a r t ic u la r ly  re levant to  an understanding o f the 
research problem.
General hypotheses derived from other work: As stated in the in troduc­
t io n  the exploratory nature o f th is  research precludes the tes t ing  of 
precise hypotheses. However, even exploratory research requires some 
presuppositions fo r  as Weber argues:-
' . . .  a chaos o f "e x is te n t ia l  Judgments" about countless in d i ­
vidual events would be the only re s u lt  o f a serious attempt to ana­
lyse "w ithout p resuppos it ions". ' ^Qg
L ite ra tu re  outside the confines o f the f ie ld  o f study provided two very 
general hypotheses which th is  w r i te r  found useful to  explore in the spec­
i f i c  con text)0f  the research problem.
The f i r s t  o f these derives la rge ly  from the work by V. Subramaniam 
on the re la t iv e  status o f spe c ia l is ts  and generalis ts in B r i t is h  govern­
ment, and states tha t h is to r ic a l  residues are more important in de ter­
mining present practices, than functional considerations or immediate
104
pressures. This proposit ion , combined with the view tha t facts  to 
be examined here include cu ltu ra l values, prompted the f i r s t  very general
34,
working hypothesis which has already been developed above, tha t the 
approach o f  Members o f Parliament towards the issue o f c o n f l ic t  o f 
in te re s t  may derive as much from h is to r ic a l  residues o f e l i t e  p o l i t ic a l  
cu ltu re  as from a consideration o f contemporary pressures.
The second working hypothesis derives from an app lica t ion  o f the 
' issue-a ttention  cyc le ' model to the research problem, along w ith a 
general premise concerning the nature of privacy, secrecy and p u b l ic i ty  
in  society advanced by Edward Sh ils . Shils asserts tha t the three p r in ­
c ip les o f  p u b l ic i ty ,  privacy and secrecy maintain an equ il ib r ium  in the 
t ra d i t io n  o f  l ib e ra l  in d iv id u a l is t ic  democracy, but are not harmonious 
among themselves. The balance in which they co -ex is t is  e la s t ic  but 'can
be severely d is ru p te d .. .  when the pressure fo r  p u b l ic i ty  becomes d is t ru s t -
105fu l  o f  privacy, resu lt ing  in a d isequ il ib r ium  o f th is  t r i p a r t i t e  system'.
The consequence is  th a t the 'respect fo r  privacy gives way to an in s is ­
tence on p u b l ic i ty ,  coupled with s e c r e c y I n  order to e xp lo it  the 
usefulness o f th is  very general premise concerning the nature and e las­
t i c i t y  o f the t r i p a r t i t e  system of privacy, p u b l ic i ty  and secrecy fo r  
understanding the e f fe c t  o f incidents such as the Poulson case on the 
approach o f  the House to the problem o f c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t ,  S h i ls 's  
proposition is  here located in the context o f an 'issue -a tte n t io n  cycle ' 
model.
Variants o f  the ' issue -a tte n t io n  cyc le ' model have in the main been
developed in a number o f American studies concerned with environmental 
107problems. The po tentia l usefulness of th is  model is  also gradually
being recognised in the more general f ie ld  o f social po licy  research,
where i t  has been used to explore the 'emergence' or 'non-emergence' o f
issues on the p o l i t ic a l  agenda, as opposed to the processing o f issues
108th a t  have already emerged. In th is  context i t  has been linked with
the concept, introduced above, o f  'nondecision-making'.
The dynamics o f the ' issue -a tte n t io n  cycle ' model developed by
Anthony Downs in his study o f the way in  which 'the environment' has
become id e n t i f ie d  as a problem, consist o f f iv e  stages. These re f le c t
'a systematic cycle o f heightening public in te re s t and then increasing
109boredom with major issues '. Summarised, the sequence is  as fo llow s.
The pre-problem stage, where the problem ex is ts  but has not captured 
public a t te n t io n , is  followed by 'alarmed discovery and euphoric enthus­
iasm' as a re s u lt  o f some dramatic series o f  events. This is  followed 
by a gradual re a l isa t io n  o f the 'co s t '  o f  solving the problem. Increas­
ing recognition o f th is  cost e n ta i ls  a decline in the in te n s i ty  o f
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public in te re s t in the problem. The 'issue tha t has been replaced at
the centre of public concern moves in to  a prolonged limbo - a tw i l ig h t
110realm o f lesser a tten tion  o f spasmodic recurrences o f  in te re s t ' .
Applying th is  model more s p e c i f ic a l ly  to issues invo lv ing the re ­
form o f governmental operation or procedure, Francis Rourke gives a 
s im ila r  descrip tion o f  the cyc le :-
'As a general ru le  the public is not g rea tly  in terested in 
such questions and is aroused from i t s  ind if fe rence only when 
scandalous misconduct by an o ff iceho lder is  suddenly revealed. 
Dramatic exposure o f the wrongdoing usually does excite  widespread 
public in te re s t  and, while i t  pe rs is ts ,  the prospect fo r  reform 
o f the p o l i t ic a l  process brightens i f  the wrongdoing can be linked 
to some basic defect in the system. But th is  support fo r  change 
commonly recedes as the impact o f  the scandal wears o f f ,  and 
members o f  the public return to th e i r  customary p r iva te  concerns.
Underlying th is  proposition is  the assumption, shared with Downs, th a t 
any reform is  usually a trans ien t phenomenon in a p o l i t ic a l  system ord­
in a r i ly  ré s is ten t to change.
Both the above studies focus on American society and p o l i t i c s ,  but 
the ' issue -a tte n t io n  cycle ' model developed there in  has po ten tia l re le ­
vance fo r  B r i t is h  p o l i t ic s .  Embroidered with ins ights from S h i ls 's  work, 
a va r ian t o f the ' issue -a tten tion  cycle ' model has been adopted as the
second working hypotheses fo r  th is  exploratory study. B r ie f ly  s tated,
112and in ideal type form, the operation o f an ' issue -a tte n t io n  cyc le ' 
here is advanced as fo llow s. *
Generally, the public - and in th is  case, though perhaps fo r  d i f f e r ­
ent reasons. Members of Parliament also - are not g rea tly  in terested in 
questions o f  reform o f the House's in te rna l operation or procedures. They
are aroused from th is  ind if fe rence  only by dramatic exposure o f an event
113or series o f  events o f wrongdoing. While the in te re s t  - ins ide and 
outside o f the House - excited by the event pe rs is ts ,  the prospects fo r  
some reform look hopeful. At th is  peak in the cycle the proposition 
forwarded by Edward S h ils ,  concerning the re la t ionsh ip  between the three 
p r inc ip les  o f p u b l ic i ty ,  secrecy and privacy in  society become re levant. 
While public anxiety is  a t a high, a d isequ il ib r ium  between the three 
p r inc ip les  p o te n t ia l ly  creates a s i tu a t io n  where the pressure fo r  pub­
l i c i t y  gives r ise  to  a d is t ru s t  o f privacy. A s h i f t  is required - real 
or apparent, temporary or permanent - towards p u b l ic i ty  on the part o f 
the House to restore both public  and i t s  own confidence in i t s  image.
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However, th is  s h i f t  towards p u b l ic i ty  need not occur. Counter­
poised as an obstacle to th is  movement towards p u b l ic i ty  is  the mutual 
t ru s t  and in terna l s o l id a r i ty  o f the parliamentary e l i t e ,  which ' i s
accompanied by a greater in s e n s i t iv i ty  to the sentiments o f  those out- 
114s id e '.  This proposition may be helpfu l in explaining the apparent 
in s u la r i ty  and in s e n s i t iv i ty  o f parliamentarians to outside sentiments 
regarding the problem ( i f  they recognise i t s  existence) o f c o n f l ic t  o f 
in te re s t  among th e i r  membership and demands fo r  safeguards in th is  
area. However, th is  is  not to a t t r ib u te  the same ideological positions 
and assumptions to a l l  Members o f Parliament; in t r a -  and in te r -p a r ty  
d iffe rences, and possibly other factors as w e l l ,  need to be included in 
the equation.
The tendency towards mutual t ru s t  and in te rna l s o l id a r i ty  w ith in  the 
House, coupled both with i t s  recognition of the 'c o s t '  ( in  terms o f 
values such as privacy e tc . )  attached to the various a lte rn a t ive  methods 
o f  prevention and d is c ip l in e  ava ilab le , and a decline in demands or 
support fo r  action as the impact o f the scandal wears o f f ,  m i l i ta te  
against reform. The outcome, or f in a l  stage o f  the cyc le , is  more l i k e ly  
to be a gradual abatement o f in te re s t  in the issue, w ith both the House 
and the public re turn ing to  th e i r  customary concerns.
Although fo r  c la r i t y  o f  discussion these two working hypotheses are 
here presented separately, they are in  fa c t  in e x tr ica b ly  entwined. In 
practice the stages o f the ' issue -a tte n t io n  cyc le ' model, w ith i t s  
emphasis on contemporary events, cannot be considered in iso la t io n  from 
the b e l ie fs ,  values and habits o f  the actors involved. As we have 
already s ta ted, behaviour is  a function  o f both environmental s itua tions  
in which the actors f ind  themselves and the psychological predispositions 
they bring to these s i tu a t io n s .
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CHAPTER 2 
METHODS AND SOURCES
'As the i n i t i a l l y  vaguely defined problem is transformed in to  
one with more precise meaning, frequent changes in  the research 
procedureare^necessary in  order to provide fo r  the gathering o f 
data relevant to emerging hypotheses.'^
The data fo r  th is  study were gathered from a d iv e rs i ty  o f sources 
and by a va r ie ty  o f methods appropriate to the d i f fe re n t  stages in the 
research process. I t  was not i n i t i a l l y  planned to conduct a sample 
survey, but as Margaret Stacey advises, a sample survey may become appro­
p r ia te  ' to  a subject where the broad ou tlines have already been d is ­
covered by other means and about which certa in  ten ta t ive  hypotheses have
2
already been formed' .  Such was the case w ith th is  study. From docu­
mentary sources and key informant interviews i t  was possible to construct 
the broad ou tlines of the sub ject, but i t  became apparent tha t some form 
o f sample survey was necessary before any f irm e r conclusions could be 
drawn. This was p a r t ic u la r ly  true o f the information gathered with 
regard to Members' opinions in the area o f Members' in te re s ts ;  informa­
t io n  which dealt la rge ly  in the currency o f b e l ie fs  and values ra ther 
than observable facts and which needed to be checked and supplemented by 
a series o f random sample interviews o f Members.
The raw data co llected was o f two main types: F i r s t l y ,  parliamentary
documentation on Members' in te re s ts ,  which consisted p r im a r i ly  o f House 
o f Commons Debates, Parliamentary Questions, Early Day Motions and Select 
Committee Reports; secondly, responses to both key informant interviews 
and a small random sample survey. This was supplemented by some archival 
m a te ria l,  derived c h ie f ly  from Public Record O ffice f i l e s ,  and facts  and 
opinions on Members' in te res ts  cu lled from newspaper coverage o f the 
issue. As i t  is d i f f i c u l t  to  separate discussion about sources or types 
o f data from method o f data co l le c t io n  w ithout engaging in needless repet­
i t io n ,  a more comprehensive descrip tion o f the nature o f  data used is  
incorporated in to  the discussion o f  data co l le c t io n  presented below.
However, i t  is  f i r s t  prudent to make c lear the guidelines which 
shaped decisions about what data was to be extracted from these various 
sources. These guidelines consisted o f three variables centra l to the 
research objectives as set out in the in troduction  to th is  study:
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F i r s t l y ,  the extent of recognition and a r t ic u la t io n  o f the subject o f 
Members' in te res ts  and the potentia l problem o f c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  on 
the parliamentary agenda; secondly, the rules and conventions regu la t­
ing Members' in te re s ts ; and t h i r d ly ,  the climate o f opinion in the 
House regarding Members' in te rests  and the po ten tia l problem o f c o n f l ic t  
o f in te re s t .
Information, deriv ing p r im a ri ly  from parliamentary documentation and 
in te rv iew  responses, was gathered on the f i r s t  var iab le  in order to 
measure and explore the va r ia t io n  in the level o f  parliamentary a c t iv i t y  
on the issue o f  Members' in te re s ts ,  and more p a r t ic u la r ly  c o n f l ic t  o f 
in te re s t .  I t  was co llected with two spe c if ic  objectives in mind. F i r s t l y ,  
to see whether any patterns in the level o f parliamentary a c t iv i t y  
emerged which might support and re f in e  the working hypothesis proposed 
above, tha t the way in which the House approached the regulation of 
Members' in te res ts  fo llows some kind o f  issue a tten tion  cycle. Secondly, 
to compare the level o f parliamentary a c t iv i t y  on the subject p r io r  to 
the modern campaign fo r  a re g is te r  w ith tha t both during the campaign 
and a f te r  the resolutions o f 1974 and 1975 had been agreed. The find ings 
from th is  comparison contributed to estab lish ing whether the modern cam­
paign and the Resolution concerning declaration and re g is t ra t io n  o f 
in te re s t  s ig n if ie d  a change in Parliament's recognition o f ,  and approach 
towards, the problem Of c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t .  On the grounds tha t par­
liamentary a c t iv i t y  does not occur in a vacuum, and tha t behaviour can 
be viewed as a function o f both environmental s itua tions  and psycholo­
gica l p red ispositions, information was also extracted on environmental 
factors which may have influenced parliamentary a c t iv i t y  on the issue o f 
Members' in te re s ts . Of p a r t ic u la r  in te re s t  weretho'^e environmental s i t ­
uations which may have contributed to the emergence o f the modern cam­
paign fo r  a re g is te r  o f in te res ts  and the eventual resolutions concerning 
declaration and re g is tra t io n  o f  in te res ts  in  1974 and 1975.
Facts and opinions on the second variab le  were gathered fo r  three 
main reasons. F i r s t l y ,  to map out the rules and conventions which regu­
la te  Members' in te res ts  on the ground tha t one o f  the f i r s t  steps o f 
exploratory research is  to  provide adequate descrip tion . This descrip­
t ion  includes the o r ig in  o f the ru les , the way in which they operate 
and the sanctions fo r  th e i r  abuse. Secondly, to examine the p r in c ip le  
assumptions and underlying ideas tha t are embodied both in the House's
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approach toi regulating Members' in te res ts  and in the ru les and conven­
tions themselves, thereby exploring the working hypothesis suggested in  
Chapter 1, tba t the House's approach to  regula ting Members' in te res ts  is 
guided by h is to r ic a l  residues o f  p o l i t ic a l  cu ltu re . T h ird ly ,  to in v e s t i ­
gate whether the rules established by the resolutions on declara tion and 
re g is tra t io n  o f in te res ts  in 1974 and 1975 embodied d i f fe re n t  assumptions 
and indicated a d i f fe re n t  approach to the disclosure o f Members' in te res ts  
than the rules and conventions which existed p r io r  to th is  time.
The th i rd  variab le  deals more s p e c i f ic a l ly  w ith the currency o f 
b e l ie fs  and values and prompted the carrying out o f the small random 
sample survey. Information on Members' views and opinions on the subject 
of Members' in te res ts  and c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  was co llected w ith the 
fo llow ing  spec if ic  objectives in  mind. F i r s t l y ,  to fu r th e r  explore the 
p r in c ip le  assumptions and underlying ideas which shape the House's 
approach to the issue. As with the information co llected on the rules 
and conventions regula ting Members' in te re s ts ,  th is  data f a c i l i t a te d  
exploration o f the working hypothesis th a t the House's approach to 
Members' in te res ts  is guided by h is to r ic a l  residues. Secondly, to iden­
t i f y  in t r a -  and in te r-p a r ty  d ifferences in Members' views and opinions 
on the subject. T h ird ly ,  to examine the nature and extent o f any change 
in  recent years in the way in which the House perceives and deals w ith 
the problem o f c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  among i t s  own Members.
Sources and methods o f data co l le c t io n
By a combination o f  sources or methods o f data co l le c t io n  described 
below, i t  proved possible to surmount the problems o f  data c o l le c t io n  in 
the area o f  government so cogently described by Professor R id ley:-
'a major d i f f i c u l t y  tha t faces students o f government is  the 
lack o f information. This is  espec ia lly  true o f B r i ta in  where so 
much public business is  conducted in a secre tive , c lu b - l ik e  atmos­
phere tha t is  now spreading from Whitehall and Westminster to the 
powerful pressure groups, especia lly  the trade unions. So the 
gap is  widening between the rea l,w orld  o f p o l i t ic s  and academic 
p o l i t ic a l  s c ie n t is ts . 'g
This methodological problem o f  re s tr ic te d  access is also a s ig n i f ic a n t  
substantive ingred ient in the research since the 'c lu b - l ik e '  obstacles 
to access also go some way to explaining the House's own response to 
perceived problems o f  c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t .
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1. Written documentation
In addition to the l i te ra tu re  reviewed in Chapter 1, the main sources 
o f  w r it te n  documentation referred to were B r i t is h  government pub lica t ions , 
archives and the Press.
B r i t is h  government pub lica t io ns : Both parliamentary and non-parliamentary
publications were a major source o f raw data. For a f u l l  l i s t  o f  items 
included in  these two broad classes, the boundaries o f which are in d is ­
t i n c t ,  the reader is  re ferred to the guide on government publications
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w r it te n  by P. Ford and G. Ford. The most widely used House o f Commons 
publications were Hansard, the Journal o f the House o f Commons, Reports 
o f Select Committees^ and f i n a l l y  the Register o f Members' Interests 
i t s e l f . ^
Of these sources o f  parliamentary data, the most system atically ana­
lysed was Hansard, the O f f ic ia l  Report o f  the House o f Commons. Sessional 
and volume indexes o f Hansard were c a re fu l ly  scanned fo r  the period 1945 
to May 1979, and a l l  references under a selection o f  headings were card 
indexed, system atica lly consulted and th e i r  content noted. The subject 
headings were compiled by an incremental process. I n i t i a l l y  the search 
centred on headings d i re c t ly  re levant to the subject. These bas ica lly  
consisted o f b r ibe ry , co rrup tion , corrupt p ractices, conduct, standards 
o f conduct, honours, patronage. Members' in te re s ts .  Members' in te rests  
(dec la ra t ion ), p r iv i le g e ,  question o f p r iv i le g e  and complaint o f p r i v i ­
lege. However, as the indexes were system atica lly  searched other v a r ia ­
t ions  on these headings became apparent and necessitated the w r i te r  
re turn ing to e a r l ie r  volumes to ensure these new headings had not been 
overlooked.^ This systematic search and resu ltan t compilation of 
Hansard data, covering both Debates and Parliamentary Questions, revealed 
much about the way parliamentarians view and p u b l ic a l ly  a r t ic u la te  the 
po ten tia l problem of c o n f l ic t  o f  in te re s t .
Hansard- also provided the basis fo r  D iv is ion L is t  analysis. D ivis ions 
on the motions and amendments to  motions regarding declaration and re g is ­
t ra t io n  o f in te res ts  which were debated on 22 May 1974 and 12 June 1975 
were analysed in order to explore in t ra -  and in te r -p a r ty  d ifferences on
O  Q
the subject. For the same purpose Early Day Motions re la t in g  to
Members' in te res ts  and the conduct o f  Members, which were tabled during
1 (1the modern campaign fo r  the Register, were analysed.
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A broad c r i t ic is m  o f Hansard as a data source in  parliamentary 
research is  tha t i t  is  a dispassionate record o f what is  said in P a r l ia ­
ment, and as such takes no account o f the mood o f the House or the con­
te x t  o f events. As argued by Professor G.W. Jones:-
' . . .  p o l i t ic a l  s c ie n t is ts  w ith th e i r  focus on the w r it te n  word 
and on what is q u a n t if ia b le ,  often neglect the mood, atmosphere 
and emotional fee l o f a s i tu a t io n .  Hansard, a cold compilation 
o f words spoken, is  inadequate as a record o f  what happened in 
Parliament. I t  omits the f lavour tha t needs to be captured from 
jo u rn a l is ts  reports and d ia r ie s .
In an attempt to overcome th is  de fic iency, although i t  can never be e lim ­
inated a ltoge ther, newspaper reports were used as described below, and 
where possible biographies, d ia r ies  and memoirs were referred to ,  remember­
ing tha t these sources possess th e i r  own p a r t ic u la r  shortcomings in the 
form o f po tentia l bias and unrepresentativeness:
Archives : The main archival material consulted was tha t held by the
Public Record O ff ice . Due to the 30 year (or longer) re tention o f 
o f f i c ia l  documents under the Public Records Acts o f 1958 and 1967, the 
value o f  th is  source o f information was la rge ly  re s tr ic te d  to the provision 
o f  h is to r ic a l  background m ateria l. The main categories o f information 
which proved.vfelevant to the subject were f i l e s  o f the Prime M in is te r 's  
O ffice (PREM), the Cabinet Office (CAB) and the Home O ffice (HO).^^
The Press: Newspaper reports are the main documentary basis fo r  h is to r ­
ica l periods fo r  which o f f i c ia l  archives are not open, and here they 
proved p a r t ic u la r ly  he lpfu l in  mapping out the campaign fo r  a re g is te r  
o f Members' in te re s ts . This occurred during the 1960s and early  1970s, 
when Public Record O ffice material re levant to th is  period was closed.
In order to reduce inaccuracy and d is to r t io n ,  reports o f  the same events
13by national newspapers o f  d i f fe re n t  views were compared, and as fa r  as 
possible the d e ta i ls  o f the reports were checked with key informants 
(see below) who had pa rtic ipa ted  in ,  or were fa m i l ia r  w ith , the events in 
question.
2. Key Informant Interviews
'Concentration on a few key informants may... help the in v e s t i ­
gator to  acquire a be tte r  p ic tu re  o f  the norms, a t t i tu d e s ,  expecta­
tions o f  a p a r t ic u la r  group than he could obtain so le ly  from less 
in tensive observations or through conducting a greater number o f 
less intensive in te rv iews, by themselves. N a tu ra lly , i t  w i l l  often 
be preferable to combine the use o f  informants with other in te r ­
viewing and with other methods o f data co l le c t io n .
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This observation by Lewis Dexter in his study on e l i t e  and specia l­
ised interv iew ing provides a useful synopsis o f the ro le  o f  key informant 
interview ing in  th is  study, w ith the q u a l i f ic a t io n  th a t here key in fo r ­
mant interviews were used to inqu ire  in to  facts  as well as norms and 
a tt itudes  etc.
In to ta l  25 key informants were interviewed. Apart from a small 
number who were involved in local government, commercial o r professional 
p rac tice , pressure groups e tc . ,  these tended to be drawn from 4 main 
areas: the House o f  Commons Clerks, Members o f the House o f  Commons,
Members o f the House o f Lords, and c i v i l  servants from Government Depart­
ments.
The method o f key informant in terview ing performed a complementary 
ro le to the random sample survey described below. Used alone, random 
sample in terv iew ing would not have been s u f f ic ie n t  because, as explained 
by Sjoberg and Nett, ' . . .  the process o f in s t i tu t io n a l iz a t io n  w ith in  
large-scale systems induces an unequal d is t r ib u t io n  o f r ig h ts  and p r iv ­
ileges - and consequently of k n o w l e d g e . P e r s o n s  o f  supposedly equal 
rank - in th is  case MPs - may posses d i f fe re n t  kinds and amounts o f in fo r ­
mation. Also, some people - fo r  example. Leaders o f the House, Chairmen 
o f Select Committees, etc. - because o f th e i r  occupation o f a va r ie ty  o f  
roles in the House are able to perceive i t s  operation through a va r ie ty  
o f  lenses which gives them a unique perspective on Parliament. To have 
re lie d  on random sample in terv iew ing would almost in e v ita b ly  have excluded 
from the sample persons with special or s tra teg ic  knowledge o f the subject 
in hand.
To overcome th is  problem 'experts ' were interviewed who were known to 
possess such knowledge. As each person may have possessed a p a r t ia l  or 
biased view o f the subjects a number o f  informants were selected and th e i r  
in te rp re ta t ions  o f events checked one against another. Any person, 
issues or events tha t did not 'e x is t '  fo r  any one informant were considered 
as a possible source o f  bias in his report. In some cases th is  po ten tia l 
bias may have derived from forge tfu lness. Informants were often asked to 
reca ll events which had taken place a t leas t 10 years ago and i t  was some­
times noticeable e ith e r tha t the informant had d i f f i c u l t y  in re ca ll in g  
the sequence o f events, or tha t his oral account d if fe re d  from any 
recorded comments ( in  parliamentary pub lica tions , newspapers, e tc . )  he 
may have made at or about the time o f  the events in question. Where 
possible both documentary and in terv iew  material on the same events were 
co llected and compared.
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The interviews were conducted between A pril 1978 and A pr i l  1980 
inc lus ive . Their average length was 1 1/4 hours. Most o f  those who 
were contacted agreed to be interviewed. The small number o f  ou tr ig h t  
refusals or non-response came mainly from Conservative MPs who now held 
m in is te r ia l  o f f ic e  and a few MPs who gave lack o f  time as the reason fo r  
th e i r  refusal (some o f these did however provide valuable information 
in  the course o f  lengthy correspondence or telephone conversations). 
Although small, th is  non-response may have led to some events being 
underemphasised because less information was co llected on them.
The interviews were 'focussed ', in tha t spec if ic  topics or questions 
were intended to be covered, but open-ended questions were often used. 
This method proved useful where experiences, fee lings or motives were 
involved and where the lack o f comparability o f one in terv iew with the 
next did not present insuperable problems.
3. The Random Sample Survey
This was not the keystone o f the p ro jec t but emerged as a necessary 
adjunct to the extensive documentary research and key informant in te r ­
viewing tha t had gone before. For th is  reason, and because o f shortage 
o f  time, i t  was decided to accept the problems o f analysis and general- 
i s a b i l i t y  associated with samples o f less than 50, and to r e s t r i c t  the 
survey to 30 Members; roughly a 5% sample of the House o f  Commons. In 
ju s t i f i c a t io n  o f  th is  decis ion, i t  can be argued tha t the r isks  o f un­
r e l i a b i l i t y  encountered in generalis ing back to the ; parent population 
from a small sample are perhaps less when you are dealing with a known, 
f i n i t e  population such as the 635 Members o f  the House o f Commons, than 
when you are drawing a small sample from a population o f unknown size
and ch a ra c te r is t ic s .  The method o f random sampling was adopted fo r  the 
17survey. As a statement o f the sampling procedure is  set out in 
Appendix 1, along w ith a copy o f  the in terv iew schedule used and the 
in troductory  le t t e r  sent to  MPs, only a b r ie f  descrip tion o f the method 
is  presented here.
The House o f  Commons is  a well documented and known quantity  from 
which to draw a sample. A fa c to r  which created sampling problems fo r  
th is  study was the c a l l in g  o f a general e lec tion  in May 1979, prec ise ly  
at the time when the sample was being drawn. As a large part o f the 
research data was concerned with the campaign fo r  a re g is te r  o f Members'
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in te re s ts ,  a decision had already been taken tha t the sample should 
re f le c t  the composition and climate o f opinion in the House in 1974, 
the year when the House agreed to the motion to introduce the Register.
I f  the general e lec tion  had not occurred the m a jo r ity  o f MPs who had 
been s i t t in g  in the House in 1974 would s t i l l  have been there. How­
ever, a t the May e lection 61 Members took the opportunity to r e t i r e  
from the House, many lo s t  th e i r  seats and an in f lu x  o f new Members 
entered the House. I t  was decided tha t the most appropriate sampling 
frame would consist o f those MPs who had been in the House at the time 
o f the 1974 motion and who were s t i l l  Members in 1979. This sampling 
frame d id , however, carry the r is k  o f some bias associated with the 
group o f  MPs who re t i re d  from Parliament (many of whom tended to be o f 
the older generation o f MPs aged 60 and above) or those who lo s t  th e i r  
seats in  the May 1979 general e lec t ion . With regard to the la t t e r  group 
i t  is  l i k e ly  tha t there may have been some bias in the sample in favour 
of safe-seats as against say Labour marginals.
To increase the precision o f the sample as a re f le c t io n  o f the c limate 
o f  opinion o f the House in 1974 the sample was s t r a t i f ie d  according to 
voting behaviour in the D iv is ion on the motion to establish a Register 
o f Members' In terests  (Div. 31 o f 22 May 1974). I t  was f e l t  tha t voting 
behaviour (or abstention) in th is  D iv is ion would give some ind ica t ion , 
subject to q u a l i f ic a t io n s  which w i l l  be discussed in  subsequent chapters, 
o f a Member's pos it ion  on the general issue o f  Members' in te re s ts , and 
more s p e c i f ic a l ly ,  the Register. Although th is  technique increased the 
chances o f creating a representative cross-section o f opinion in the 
House, the warning given by one Conservative MP interviewed serves as a 
necessary reminder o f one o f the main problems in  t ry in g  to in terv iew  a 
representative sample o f MPs. Commenting from the experience o f va r ia ­
tions in  his own Party, p a r t ic u la r ly  the differences between new Tories 
and the old guard, he stressed tha t MPs have such varied opinions (par­
t i c u la r l y  on non-party issues) tha t i t  would be necessary to in terv iew 
a l l  635 Members to get a true p ic ture - and as he added, th is  would not 
be possible as some MPs make i t  a point o f p r in c ip le  not to ass is t with 
any requests fo r  assistance w ith research, regardless o f the subject 
matter.
In contrast to the key informant interviews the series o f random 
sample interviews did require a high degree o f comparability and were
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aimed to c o l le c t  data fo r  fu r th e r  systematic analysis. Therefore the
method o f structured in terview ing was used incorporating a 's truc tu red '
1 8 .or 'standardized' in terview schedule. This ensured tha t questions 
were presented to respondents with exactly the same wording and in 
exactly the same order. However, a degree o f f l e x i b i l i t y  was retained 
in the schedule by using a mixture o f open-ended and closed questions. 
Closed questions tended to be used where the possible a lte rn a t ive  rep lies  
were already known or where information co llected in e a r l ie r  stages o f 
the research indicated c lear categories o f opinion on a sub ject, or dimen­
sions o f the problem which needed to be explored fu r th e r.  Referring 
back to the a f f i n i t y  in the o r ien ta tion  of th is  study acknowledged in 
Chapter 1 to Weber's prescrip t ion  fo r  the tasks o f an empirical science, 
open-ended questions were p a r t ic u la r ly  valuable in providing information 
about the respondent's own formulation o f the issue o f Members' in te re s ts ,  
the factors  which were sa lie n t fo r  him and the ideas which underlay and 
shaped his action in th is  area. Prim arily  because of lack o f time, but 
also because the small-scale survey was not the main or singular method 
o f data c o l le c t io n ,  a fu l l - s c a le  p i lo t  survey was not conducted. How­
ever, as explained in Appendix 1, several Members were drawn in to  the 
d ra ft in g  stages o f the schedule. Further, when coding the responses 
great care was taken to e lim in ate any questions which had been singled 
out as ambiguous by respondents or which seemed to produce unre liab le  
rep lies .
MP's replies to an in troductory le t te r  asking fo r  th e i r  assistance 
confirmed the researcher's assumption tha t they were inundated with 
requests fo r  help with research. One MP went so fa r  as to say, 'there 
has recently been an epidemic, almost amounting to a plague, o f requests 
made by those who are carrying out researches in to  matters which touch 
and concern Members o f Parliament'. Another MP demonstrated the type o f 
resistence researchers are l i k e ly  to meet by stressing th a t,  ' a l l  le t te rs  
from researchers and a l l  "animal" le t te rs  go s tra ig h t in to  the b in ' .
What came through strongly from the rep lies was tha t MPs were more l ik e ly  
to react favourably to an 'a r t ic u la te '  le t t e r  which was personally typed 
ra ther than photocopied, and tha t persistence, in terms o f fo l low  up 
le t te rs  was often necessary to e l i c i t  agreement to an in terv iew. The 
response rate fo r  the sample as a whole was 57%. A de ta iled breakdown 
o f  th is  and the category o f non-response is contained in Appendix 1.
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The interviews were conducted during the 6 month period o f June to 
November 1979. The average length o f  the random sample interviews was 
55 minutes. Several interviews extended to 1 & hours, while a small 
number were l im ited  to 30 minutes because of lack o f time on the Member's 
part. Two potentia l problems associated with the in terv iew  programme 
deserve comment.
F i r s t ,  i t  seemed l i k e ly  tha t a p a r t icu la r  problem in in terv iew ing 
MPs would be tha t o f c o n f id e n t ia l i ty .  Members were assured a t the outset 
tha t any information they gave would be in confidence unless they agreed 
otherwise. The majority  o f MPs were w i l l in g  to have th e i r  help acknow­
ledged, providing th is  acknowledgment was disassociated from any views 
stated in the study. Predictably most backbench MPs came over as less 
anxious about c o n f id e n t ia l i ty  than the Clerks of the House or C iv i l  
Servants included in  the key informant interv iews.
Second, the decision to record the interviews by shorthand instead 
o f  tape-recording them was ju s t i f ie d .  Several Members confirmed that 
because o f the s e n s i t iv i t y  o f the subject o f 'c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t '  they 
would be ' less frank ' in th e i r  comments i f  they thought they were being 
tape recorded.
Data analysis
The data thus collected presented several d i f fe re n t  problems of 
c la s s i f ic a t io n  and in te rp re ta t io n .
1. Documentation and key informant interviews
Data collected from w r it te n  documentation and key informant in te r ­
viewing tended to be unstructured and non-quantif iab le , and gave r ise  to 
problems o f  c la s s i f ic a t io n .  The pr inc ip les  o f c la s s i f ic a t io n  were derived 
from two sources. F i r s t ,  from the various questions concerning c o n f l ic t  
o f in te re s t among Members o f Parliament which cons titu te  the research 
problèmes set out in the in troduction . Second, from the two working 
hypotheses suggested in Chapter 1 concerning, on the one hand, the assump­
t io n  tha t the way in which Parliament approaches and deals w ith the poten­
t i a l  problem o f c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  fo llows some kind o f ' issue -a tten tion  
c y c le ' ,  and on the other hand, tha t the nature of th is  approach derives 
as much from h is to r ic a l  residues as from functional considerations and 
contemporary pressures.
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While analysis o f Hansard data involved the problems associated 
w ith unstructured m ate ria l,  the systematic method o f i t s  co l le c t io n  pro­
vided the basis fo r  statements regarding the number and party a f f i l i a ­
t io n  o f MPs ra is ing  the issue o f Members' in te res ts  in the House over a 
given period o f time, the method by which i t  was raised and so on. As 
noted above, Hansard also provided the data fo r  D iv is ion L is t  ana lys is , 
which cast l ig h t  on in t ra -  and in te r -p a r ty  differences on the subject.
When analysing key informant responses i t  was necessary to  guard 
against imposing on the House the views o f the key informant. This prob­
lem existed whether the informant tended to be a 'conform ist' who t o t a l l y  
accepted the ideal norms o f  his group, ra re ly  countenanced change and 
guarded against jeopardising his own status or tha t o f his group, or 
whether he was a 'marginal man' whose peripheral pos ition in re la t io n  
to his peers made him more c r i t i c a l  and re f le c t iv e ,  but whose views and 
experiences could have been pecu lia r ly  id iosyn c ra t ic .  Although a d is ­
t in c t io n  is  here drawn between the 'conform ist' and the 'marginal man' 
i t  is  more accurate to view these categories a t e i th e r end o f a continuum 
along which the informants were ranged.
Even though i t  was not possible to categorize every aspect o f the raw 
(or non-quantifiable) data, the raw material was inva riab ly  useful both 
fo r  purposes o f i l l u s t r a t io n ,  and fo r  s tim ulating new ins igh ts  in to  the 
research problem by bringing neglected factors to the fo re . An aware­
ness o f these aspects o f the phenomenon tha t needed fu r th e r  study was 
helpful in gauging the l im i ts  to the g e n e ra l iz a b i l i ty  o f the f ind ings 
from th is  study.
2. Random sample survey
In c la ss ify in g  the random sample in terview material the pr inc ip les  
fo r  c la s s i f ic a t io n  were more c le a r ly  prescribed than those fo r  the 
re la t iv e ly  unstructured material derived from documentation and key in fo r ­
mant in terv iew ing. A structured questionnaire had been used and each 
question tended to provide a natural u n it  fo r  categorization. I t  is  not 
necessary to burden the present narra tive  with a detailed descrip tion 
o f the category sets employed during the coding and recorded on the coding 
schedule. These are set out in d e ta i l  in Appendix 2, which presents the 
in terv iew response data in the form o f a table o f frequencies. Further 
explanation both o f the problems encountered during coding and o f the 
application o f the coded data w i l l  emerge from subsequent discussion o f 
the conclusions i t  generates.
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PART 2
DISCLOSURE OF INTERESTS: THE ECLIPSE OF THE GENTLEMAN MP
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CHAPTER 3
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND:
THE TRADITION OF THE 'HONOURABLE' MEMBER
A tra d i t io n  o f outside f ina nc ia l in te rests
In 1911 Mr Lloyd George, Chancellor o f the Exchequer o f the Liberal 
Government, moved a motion fo r  the payment o f Members on the basis tha t 
parliamentary work and conditions had changed since the nineteenth 
century and Members could no longer consider Parliament as an adjunct 
to a business or professional career. The p o l i t ic a l  demand fo r  pay­
ment o f Members had been advocated p r io r  to th is ,  fo r  example by the 
C hartis t Movement, but had not been accepted by the House. Mr Lloyd 
George considered the in troduction o f payment would allow those to enter 
Parliament whose l im ited  means would otherwise prevent th e i r  taking up a 
p o l i t ic a l  career.
This measure, introduced by a Liberal government which had only 
narrowly won the two 1910 General Elections and which qu ick ly became 
dependent on Labour and I r is h  N a tio na lis t  support to maintain i t s  par­
liamentary m a jo r ity , was designed to help in p a r t ic u la r  Labour MPs whose 
jobs could hardly be combined with service in the House o f Commons. By 
providing fo r  public salaries o f £400 fo r  MPs, i t  re lieved the Labour 
Party o f paying each o f i t s  MPs £200 a year out o f the parliamentary fund, 
the main item of i t s  central expenditure.^
Mr Lloyd George affirmed tha t the only p r in c ip le  o f payment in the 
public service was tha t 'you should make an allowance to a man to enable 
him to maintain himself comfortably and honourably, but not luxu r ious ly , 
during the time he is  rendering service to the S ta te ',^  and stressed tha t 
the proposed payment to Members was ju s t  such a minimum allowance, not a 
recognition o f magnitude o f service. The Conservative party opposed the 
motion, mainly on the grounds tha t i t  v io la ted the p r in c ip le  of g ra tu i­
tous public service^ and tha t i t  would lead to the ex tinc t ion  of the 
independent, part-time Member. They feared the advent of a fu l l - t im e  
House o f Commons and questioned whether th is  was the in ten tion  of Mr 
Lloyd George's po licy :
'Let the argument be carried to a log ica l conclusion. I f  we are 
going to have th is  House composed e n t i re ly  o f professional p o l i t i ­
cians, and i f  none of them are to be men engaged in any business of 
any kind, i f  they are a l l  to devote as he argued, the whole o f th e i r  
time to the service o f th is  House, le t  us understand whether th is  
is  the po licy advocated by the Chancellor o f the E xcheque r... '.g
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In the event the motion was passed on a D iv is ion , 256 votes to 158,
and in the parliamentary session of 1911-1912 Members o f the House of
Commons became e n t i t le d  to draw a salary o f £400 a year.
However, the t ra d i t io n  o f part-tim e service and the presumption o f 
outside in te res ts  did not die w ith the in troduction o f o f f i c ia l  payment. 
Until the Boyle Report in 1971, which recommended MPs should be paid on 
a fu l l - t im e  basis,^ the f ix in g  o f the level o f remuneration was la rge ly  
influenced by two considerations, which were con tinua lly  buttressed by 
recommendations and opinions of successive Select Committee on Expenses 
reports .^  F i r s t ,  many Members s t i l l  believed membership was, and 
should be, part-t im e. Second, associated with th is ,  many MPs s t i l l  
possessed outside sources o f income. Consequently the salary level has, 
u n t i l  recently , remained low re la t iv e  to the necessary expenditure o f MPs, 
and i t  can be argued tha t th is  in turn has re inforced the tendency fo r
MPs to take on va r ie t ie s  o f occupations in addition to th e i r  parliamentary
duties.*^
The possession o f outside f inanc ia l in te res ts  by Members o f P a r l ia ­
ment has a long established t ra d i t io n .  As early  as the th ir te e n th  cen­
tury the representatives o f the sh ires, c i t ie s ,  and boroughs were remun­
erated by th e i r  constituents fo r  th e i r  attendance a t Parliament, knights
receiving four s h i l l in g s  a day and c it izens  and burgesses two s h i l l in g s  a
10day fo r  the term of Parliament. However, during the Tudor period,
th is  system o f wages fo r  Members was gradually undermined by the growing
number o f  people who were a ttrac ted  by the high prestige o f a seat in
Parliament. They were prepared to pledge to those who elected them they
11would defray th e ir  own expenses and forego th e i r  parliamentary wages.
Such agreements became increasing ly common in the seventeenth century, 
and by a reso lu tion o f the House o f Commons the payment of Members 
ceased in  1677. Membership o f Parliament remained an unpaid occupation 
u n t i l  1912.
In the intervening period the t ra d i t io n  o f the House o f Commons as
12a meeting place of gentlemen became well entrenched. This t ra d i t io n
encouraged the b e l ie f  tha t B r i ta in  could be governed by g if te d  amateurs:
' . . .  p o l i t ic s  was regarded as an amateur pu rsu it ,  one which 
ne ither demanded a man's en t ire  energies nor aroused so much pa rt­
isanship as to  in te r fe re  with the easy social re la t ionsh ip  w ith men 
o f the same class regardless o f th e ir  p o l i t ic s . '^ g
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The process o f enthroning the amateur in government and administration
was consolidated by what V. Subramaniam refers to as the 'two-step
14democratic evolution in B r i ta in ' .  Though a complex process, the 
essence o f th is  form of p o l i t ic a l  and h is to r ic a l  evolution was the 
wresting o f power from the monarch by an enlightened aris tocracy and 
landed gentry, who established a lay commonsense approach to matters 
o f government and administration before the second stage o f development 
- the enlargement and reform of the adm inistra tive s truc ture  - began 
in the mid-nineteenth century. Thus, 'the B r i t is h  lay t ra d i t io n  in 
p o l i t ic s  and administration was so thoroughly entrenched before the 
growth o f the adm inistra tive machine in the mid-nineteenth century tha t
1 Ri t  could fashion the machine in  keeping with i t s  assumptions.
B e lie f in p o l i t ic s  as an amateur pursu it was accompanied by the view
tha t service in Parliament ought to be honorary and tha t Members o f
Parliament ought to be persons who could pay fo r  the p r iv i le g e  and were
o f independent means. Members were presumed to l iv e  on th e i r  own
resources and barrie rs  existed to exclude from Parliament those w ithout
independent means. For example, by the middle o f the eighteenth century
enactments had been passed which established the p r in c ip le  tha t expenses
a t e lections were chargeable on candidates, and in 1710 an Act was
passed which imposed a property q u a l i f ic a t io n  fo r  membership o f the
House; a knight o f the shire had to possess an income o f £600 a year
derived from land, a borough representative an income o f £300 a year 
17from land. The theory behind the property qu a l i f ica t io n s  was to
preserve the dominance o f  the landed in te rests  in Parliament. As the
s a t i r i s t  Sw ift commented on the Tory reasons fo r  pushing the measure
through Parliament:-
" . . .  they have taken care in th e i r  f i r s t  session, by tha t noble 
b i l l  o f q u a l i f ic a t io n ,  tha t fu tu re  Parliaments should be composed 
o f landed men, and our ^properties be no more a t the mercy o f those 
who have none themselves, or a t least what is only trans ien t or 
imaginary'.^g
In view o f our concern with the re g is t ra t io n  o f Members' in te re s ts ,  
i t  is in te res ting  to note tha t an amending Act o f 1760 required Members 
to swear th e i r  q u a l i f ica t io n s  a t the tab le  o f the House and to provide
1 qthe Clerk with a signed schedule describing the property q u a l i f ic a t io n .
20A fu r th e r  amending Act o f 1838 allowed personal property as well as 
land to be considered in the assessment of income. Although, as shown
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by Edward and Annie P o r r i t t ,^ ^  the Act was frequently  evaded by those 
presenting f i c t i t i o u s  q u a li f ica t io n s  with regard to land or personal 
property, i t  was not repealed u n t i l  1858. Another fa c to r  favouring 
the entrenchment o f the f in a n c ia l ly  independent Member was the tre a ting  
and bribery o f ind iv idua l electors in the boroughs, which flourished 
in the seventeenth century and persisted in to  the eighteenth century, 
and which made i t  v i r t u a l ly  impossible fo r  a candidate to enter an
22election unless he had ample means and was prepared to spend them.
S w if t 's  confidence in the preservation o f the landed in te res ts  was
la rge ly  borne out in the social composition o f Pari aiment p r io r  to
franchise reform in 1832. Although there were even in the eighteenth
23century Members who depended upon fees and sa la r ies , they were fa r  out­
numbered by those with landed in te res ts . As Samuel Beer records:
'Of the 5,034 Members who sat in the House o f Commons from 1734 
to 1832, f u l l y  three-quarters had th e i r  p r inc ipa l economic in te re s t 
in land. In these Parliaments the landed in te re s t  was dominant and 
no-one questioned i t s  r ig h t  to dominate.
One can, however, question whether the t ra d i t io n  o f the 'independent' 
Member accurately re flec ted eighteenth century practice in terms o f 
independent action in Parliament. As pointed out by Samuel Beer, the 
existence of 'representatives o f f inanc ia l in te rests  anxious to secure 
contracts fo r  loans, remittances, or the supply o f goods, and the f r e ­
quency o f the patron-nominee re la t ion sh ip , which h igh-ligh ted  the 
economic in te res ts  o f the patron and which conferred a considerable 
burden o f dependence on the MP, suggest tha t i t  did not. However, in 
the eighteenth century the concept of 'independence' was narrowly in te r ­
preted, meaning only independence from the Crown. The form of c o n f l ic t  
o f in te re s t  which the Rockingham Whigs drew a tten tion  to was 'the con­
f l i c t  between the public in te re s t and the in te re s t  o f royal placemen and 
27pensioners' and i t  was generally accepted tha t MPs should be independent 
o f royal influence.
I t  is  in te res t in g  to observe tha t i t  is  in the patron-nominee 
re la t ion sh ip , which involved the patron in the payment o f e lection 
expenses as well as other kinds o f influence, tha t Beer locates the ante- 
ce dents o f the present day sponsored MP. He suggests tha t:
'While th is  re la t ionsh ip ,,bo rn  o f an a r is to c ra t ic  socie ty, had 
i t s  unique t r a i t s ,  the fa c t  o f importance to us is  tha t the House 
o f  Commons since tha t time seems never to have been w ithout 
Members bearing some re la t ion  to outside persons or bod ies...
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As aristocracy declined, new forms o f  patronage arose in the la t te r  
part o f  the nineteenth century. The form with which we are best 
acquainted today is  provided by the trade union MP.'gg
The extent to which 'sponsored MPs' in the eighteenth century acted
to promote the economic in te rests  o f th e i r  patrons has not been examined
in much de ta il and as Beer points out, would involve research in to  the
29re la t iv e ly  unexplored te r r i t o r y  of priva te b i l l  le g is la t io n .  During
the eighteenth century pr iva te  b i l l  procedure did not e x h ib it  the semi-
30ju d ic ia l  character which i t  acquired during the nineteenth century and
there was much opportunity fo r  the in tervention o f the interested MP.
As Pares observed, during th is  century:-
'Most . . .  le g is la t io n  was p r iva te , local and fa c u l ta t iv e ,  s e t t ­
ing up local agencies, such as turnp ike , paving, enclosure or improve­
ment commissioners where such things appeared to be desired by the 
preponderant local in te re s ts . . .  Even le g is la t io n  which was osten­
s ib ly  na tiona l, imposing customs duties or regulating overseas trade, 
often had local im plications and Members o f Parliament handled i t  
as agents o f local in te re s ts '
Eighteenth century p o l i t ic s  saw nothing amiss in the closs connec­
t io n  o f  an MP with in te res ts  being favoured by a B i l l  in which he was 
concerned. Indeed, Beer concludes tha t the Old Whig theory o f represen­
ta t io n  in the eighteenth century ac tua lly  condoned the pursu it o f  personal 
in te res ts  and may have e f fe c t iv e ly  cancelled out what would now be per­
ceived as a s i tu a t io n  o f c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s ts :-
'Groups with social and economic aims con tinua lly  used govern­
ment to promote th e i r  in te res ts  and th is  was f u l l y  leg it im ised by 
the norms o f Old Whig p o l i t ic a l  cu ltu re
The Old Whig theory o f  representation regarded MPs as elected represen­
ta t ive s  whose primary ob liga tion  was not to promote the in te rests  o f 
th e i r  e lectors but to promote the in te rests  o f the nation as a whole 
according to th e i r  personal judgment and convictions. I t  also involved 
a view o f what in te rests  were to be considered leg it im ate . Unlike la te r  
Liberal and Radical theories, the Old Whig theory assumed tha t represen­
ta t io n  was o f corporate bodies (not, as Beer points out, in  the s t r i c t  
legal sense o f  the term) ra ther than in d iv id ua ls , and on the whole such 
in te res ts  were e ith e r  o f  a local or functional nature.
As to whether the franchise reforms o f 1832, 1857 and 1884 substan­
t i a l l y  a ltered the dominance o f men with independent means,Redlich 
observed in 1908 tha t although one would expect a broader suffrage to
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re su lt  in the incorporation o f numerous classes in to  the le g is la t iv e  
body:-
" . . .  a glance at the actual conditions in present day p a r l ia ­
ments w i l l ,  even on casual inspection, reveal tha t nowhere has 
th is  consequence followed to the extent tha t might have been ex­
pected... P art ic ipa tion  in parliamentary l i f e  c a l ls  fo r  a to ta l or 
p a r t ia l  abandonment o f the work o f earning a l ive l ih o o d  and thus 
a substantial advantage fa l l s  to the share o f the higher and f i n ­
a n c ia l ly  independent classes.
Although the p r in c ip le  tha t 'the landowners were enfeoffed by Providence 
in order tha t they might govern the c o u n t r y c o u l d  not be maintained 
during the nineteenth century, outside in te rests  such as inherited  or 
acquired wealth, or at least membership o f a profession such as law, 
which could be combined with le g is la t iv e  duties, was s t i l l  necessary fo r  
membership o f the House o f Commons. The steady drop in landowners from 
464 in 1832 to 198 in 1901 was compensated fo r  during the same period 
by an increase in the representation o f lawyers and f inanc ia l in te res ts . 
A d d it io n a lly ,  the r ise  o f the l im ited  l i a b i l i t y  company provided the 
House with a new breed o f part-time le g is la to rs ,  who were also part- 
time d irec to rs  in commerce and industry. As observed by Redlich, at 
the turn of the century the House o f Commons was reserved fo r  those 
sections o f the population which were under the control o f the a r is to c -
o c
racy and plutocracy and were economically powerful. To i l lu s t r a te  his 
po in t he c ites figures from Pod's Parliamentary Companion to show tha t 
among the 670 Members o f the House o f Commons in 1904 were to be found: 
119 Lawyers, 77 large manufacturers, 11 railway d ire c to rs , 22 ship­
owners and marine engineers, 29 bankers and stockbrokers, 12 mine owners, 
52 merchants, 18 newspaper ed itors and p ropr ie to rs , 15 jo u rn a l is ts ,  6 
doctors, 7 authors, 7 professors and schoolmasters, 54 m i l i ta ry  and naval 
men, 10 former d ip lomatis ts and c i v i l  servants, 26 landed proprie tors 
and 47 country gentlemen.
Echoing Bagehot's views on England as a deferentia l nation,
Redlich a tt r ib u te s  the persistence o f the h is to r ic  structure o f the House 
o f Commons not ju s t  to f ina nc ia l considerations such as the high cost o f 
e lections and the non-payment o f Members, but also to the fa c t  tha t 'the
ever widening e lectorate in England has always preferred to give i t s
37votes to leaders o f socie ty, and s t i l l  prefers to do so. Once again 
drawing on the work of Samuel Beer, i t  can also be suggested tha t the 
r ise  o f Liberal theory in the nineteenth century, precise ly because o f
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i t s  stress on independence preserved the presumption o f outside in te r ­
ests, and meant tha t there was a continuing acceptance o f the p roprie ty
oo
of MPs holding outside in te res ts . Reflecting the ind iv idualism  of
th e ir  economic doctrines, the Liberals assumed tha t representation was
of ra tiona l independent ind iv idua ls  rather than corporate bodies,
in te rests  or classes. As argued by Beer, i f  a Member was not to receive
subventions from party or patron, not a salary from the executive, i t
39was necessary tha t he was w e ll-to -do  in his own account.
During the nineteenth century d isc ip lined  parties began to develop 
and a separate c lu s te r  o f assumptions and be lie fs  emerged to j u s t i f y  
the ro le  of organised party in the representative process. These s e n t i­
ments and ideas Beer groups together under the rubric  o f the c o l le c t iv is t  
theory o f representation. A major theme o f th is  is  party government 
and a subsidiary theme, functional representation.^^ The MP was no 
longer viewed as a trustee as under Old Whig and Liberal theories; 
instead his independence was reduced and he was considered to be a dele­
gate o f his party , expected to carry out the pledges o f his party 's  
e lection manifesto.
Payment fo r  Members was introduced by the Liberal Government in 1912, 
but as stated above th is  did not extinguish the t ra d i t io n  o f part-tim e
service and the presumption o f Members possessing outside financ ia l
41in te res ts . Published sources o f  socio-economic data on Members lend
support to Beer's conclusion tha t in the twentieth cen tury :-
'The interested MP continues to f lo u r is h ,  sometimes, as o f o ld , 
maintaining a connection w ith  an outside in te re s t  through a d ire c to r ­
ship or the ownership of property but also sometimes, as in the 
case o f trade union MPs serving as the parliamentary representative 
o f a vocational pressure group.
Rules on the priva te f ina nc ia l in te res ts  of Members
In tack ling  the c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t issue we are not simply con­
cerned with the mere possession of outside f inanc ia l in te res ts , even 
though th is  is  a prerequis ite  fo r  a c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  in the pecuniary 
sense, as defined in  Chapter 1, to ar ise . The issue is how fa r  such 
in te res ts  may influence the parliamentary actions and conduct of a 
Member. An MP is  properly subject to a number of influences: i t  is
only because his parliamentary action and conduct may be seen to be - 
and may ac tua lly  be - affected by these in te rests  tha t he is required
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to comply with rules o f disclosure. Unfortunate ly, as various select 
committees on p r iv i le g e  and procedure have discovered, i t  has proved 
d i f f i c u l t  to pin down the scope o f what constitu tes 'proceedings in 
Parliament'. However, a general idea o f what the term covers is given 
in the Report o f the Select Committee on the O f f ic ia l  Secrets Acts in 
Session 1938-39:-
' I t  covers both the asking o f a question and the g iv ing w r it te n  
notice o f such questions and includes everything said or done by a 
Member in the exercise o f his functions as a Member in a committee 
o f e i th e r House, as well as everything said or done in e ith e r  House 
in the transaction o f parliamentary business.
While Parliament has t r a d i t io n a l ly  promoted the ro le o f the f in a n ­
c ia l l y  independent Member, i t  has adopted a fa r  less in te rve n t io n is t  
ro le in ensuring a Member's disassociation from his personal in te res ts .
In 1973, a Green Paper presented to the Canadian Parliament on the sub­
je c t  of Members o f Parliament and c o n f l ic ts  o f in te rests  observed th a t : -
' In B r i ta in  no extensive l im i ts  are placed on the outside employ­
ment or business in te res ts  o f MPs . . .  Members are f u l l y  e n t i t le d  to 
enter the professions, undertake commercial work, enter in to  con­
trac ts  and w r i te  fo r  newspapers and journa ls . I t  is  only to res­
t r i c t  the more odious practices tha t Parliament has seen f i t  to 
adopt resolutions or establish s ta tu to ry  ru les. Even these rules 
are not extensive and in many cases have de libe ra te ly  avoided pre­
c is io n . .  . ' *44
The ind iv idua l Member has long been regarded the best judge in avoiding
c o n f l ic t  s i tu a t io n s , and, in contrast to the deta iled code drawn up fo r  
45m in is te rs . Parliament has provided no coherent code to guide Members' 
conduct in the areas of pecuniary in te res ts . Instead there has grown 
up incrementally a vague anthology of reso lu tions, speakers' ru lin gs , 
recommendations from committees o f p r iv i le g e ,  t ra d i t io n a l conventions 
and so on, which are intended as a guide to Members in exercising th e ir  
d isc re t ion . These may be c la ss if ie d  as preventative regulations in tha t 
they are intended to regulate the potentia l harm before the c o n f l ic t  
occurs, and in th is  sense can be distinguished from the remedial proce­
dures involved in the investiga tion  and punishment o f misconduct.
This d is t in c t io n  forms the organising p r in c ip le  fo r  the ensuing 
factual presentation o f  the ru les , regulations and procedures governing 
Members' pecuniary in te res ts  p r io r  to the in troduction of the Register. 
Inev itab ly  there is  some overlap between the two areas. This la rge ly  
derives from the fa c t  tha t the h is to ry  o f the regulation o f Members'
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conduct is in e x tr icab ly  entwined with the h is to ry  o f parliamentary 
p r iv i le g e ,  which not only provides the standards to be observed in 
parliamentary proceedings, but also affords Parliament the r ig h t  to 
regulate and, i f  necessary, punish the conduct o f i t s  Members who 
abuse i t s  p r iv i leges .
The p r iv i le g e  o f freedom of speech is  p a r t ic u la r ly  re levant to 
th is  study. F ir s t  claimed in  1541, and u lt im a te ly  given s ta tu to ry  
recognition in 1689 ,in a r t ic le  9 o f the B i l l  o f Rights th is  states
'That the freedom o f speech, and debates or proceedings in 
Parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court 
or place out of Parliament'
This provision has a t least two implications fo r  the regulation o f 
Members' f inanc ia l in te res ts . F i r s t ,  i t  protects the freedom o f speech 
in  Parliament and places a co ro l la ry  duty on each Member to re fra in  
from any course o f  action p re jud ic ia l to the p r iv i le g e  which he enjoys; 
a p r in c ip le  underlying many o f the preventative rules in the area of 
pecuniary in te res ts . Second, i t  conveys recognition o f the r ig h t  o f 
each House i t s e l f  to adjudicate upon the conduct o f i t s  Members in th e i r  
parliamentary capacity , a r ig h t  which was re-affirmed by a resolution 
o f the House in 1837:-
'That by the law and p r iv i le ge  o f Parliament, th is  House has 
the sole and exclusive ju r is d ic t io n  to determine upon the existence 
and extent o f i t s  p r iv i le g e s , and tha t the in s t i tu t io n  or pros­
ecution o f  any action , s u i t  or other proceeding, fo r  the purpose 
of bringing them in to  discussion or decision before any court or 
tr ibuna l elsewhere than in Parliament is  a high breach o f such 
p r iv i le g e  and renders a l l  parties concerned therein amenable to 
i t s  ju s t  displeasure, and to the punishment consequent thereon'.
The claim to th is  r ig h t  in part derives from the h is to r ic a l  or ig ins
of Parliament as the High Court of Parliament, the highest Court in the
land and the conception tha t i t  would therefore be contrary to every
p r in c ip le  fo r  i t s  proceedings to be regulated or challenged in any other
48court. An extension o f th is  p r in c ip le ,  as pointed out by Pachauri is  
tha t the House has the p r iv i le g e  o f ge tting  the in te rp re ta t io n  o f i t s  
rules and orders from i t s  own elected representative - the Speaker - 
and there is  no au tho r ity  outside the House which can in te r fe re  with 
the in te rp re ta t io n  except the House i t s e l f .
Parliamentary p r iv i le g e  rests on the law and custom o f Parliament 
and is  defined in Erskine May as :-
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" . . .  the sum of peculiar r igh ts  enjoyed by each House c o l le c ­
t iv e ly  as a constituent part o f the High Court of Parliament, and 
by each House in d iv id u a l ly ,  w ithout which they could not discharge 
th e i r  functions, and which exceed those possessed by other bodies 
or ind iv idua ls . Thus p r iv i le g e  though part o f the law o f the land, 
is  to a certa in extent one exemption from the ordinary law .'^g
This study is  p a r t ic u la r ly  concerned with the House o f Commons ra ther 
than with the House o f Lords and any references to p r iv i le g e  are to the 
p r iv i leges  of the Commons, which have been defined as:-
'The sum of the fundamental r igh ts  of the House and of i t s  
ind iv idual Members as against the prerogatives o f the Crown, the 
au tho rity  o f the ordinary courts of law and the special r igh ts
o f the House o f Lords.'^g
As th is  d e f in i t io n  in fe rs ,  the h is to ry  o f parliamentary p r iv i le g e  is  
la rge ly  the process o f the f ie rce  and prolonged struggle of the House 
o f Commons to win the r igh ts  and freedoms which they enjoy today. The 
practice o f claiming these r igh ts  - which include freedom from arrest 
and legal process, freedom of speech, debate and proceedings in the House, 
freedom from in tim ida tion  or molestation ( inc luding bribes or f inanc ia l 
inducements), freedom to punish as contempts breaches of p r iv i le g e  under 
the foregoing headings and an indeterminant class o f obstructions and
in d ire c t  interference whether by speech, action or w rit ing^^ - can be
traced back a t least to the f i f te e n th  century, i f  not before.
The d is t in c t iv e  mark of p r iv i le g e  is i t s  a n c i l la ry  character. The 
pr iv ileges claimed by Parliament are those which are 'absolute ly necess­
ary fo r  the due execution o f i t s  powers', and such r igh ts  and immunities 
are enjoyed by ind iv idua l members only as a means to ensure the e ffe c t ive  
discharge o f the functions o f the House.
Without the power to uphold compliance with i t s  commands, to punish 
offenders and to d is c ip l in e  i t s  own Members, the p r iv ileges o f Parliament 
would be ine ffec tua l in ensuring i t s  e f f ic ie n t  function ing and d ig n ity .  
Thus, when:-
" . . .  any o f these r igh ts  and immunities, both o f the Members, 
in d iv id u a l ly ,  and o f the assembly in i t s  co l le c t ive  capacity, which 
are known by the general name o f p r iv i le g e s , are disregarded or 
attacked by any ind iv idua l or a u tho r ity ,  the offence is  ca lled 
breach of p r iv i le g e ,  and is  punishable under the law o f Parliament. 
Each House also claims the r ig h t  to punish actions, which, while 
not breaches o f any spec if ic  p r iv i le g e ,  are offences against i t s  
au tho rity  or d ig n ity  . . .  any such actions, though often called 
'breaches of p r iv i le g e ' are more properly distinguished as "con­
tempts" '.gg
There is  no formal co d if ica t io n  in th is  area and, as recognised by 
Blackstone in the eighteenth c e n tu ry ,P a r l ia m e n t  emphasises the advan-
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tages to be gained from the in d e f in i te  and d iscre tionary  nature o f the 
law of Parliament. As S ir  Barnett Cocks, (former) Clerk o f the House, 
explained to the Committee o f Priv ileges in 1964:-
'The reason fo r  keeping the p r iv i le g e  o f Parliament undefined 
has been stressed in the Report o f the Select Committee on the 
O f f ic ia l  Secrets Act, in i t s  report o f 5 A p r i l  1939. They say:
"The pr iv i leges o f Parliament, l ik e  many other in s t i tu t io n s  o f 
the B r i t is h  C onstitu t ion , are in d e f in i te  in th e i r  nature and 
stated in general and sometimes vague terms. The e la s t ic i t y  thus 
secured has made i t  possible to apply ex is t ing  p r iv i leges  in new 
circumstances from time to time. Any attempt to trans la te  them 
in to  precise rules must deprive them o f the very q u a l i ty  which 
renders them adaptable to new and varying conditions, and new or 
unusual combinations o f circumstances, and indeed might have the 
e f fe c t  o f re s t r ic t in g  ra ther than safeguarding Members' p r iv i le g e s " '.g g
Preventative regulations
I t  would be an enormous task to ennumerate every Act, resolution 
Speaker's ru l in g ,  etc. which has contributed incrementally to the antho­
logy o f preventative regulations governing Members' pecuniary in te res ts . 
Bearing in  mind these are designed to uphold the general freedoms and
obligations deriv ing from parliamentary p r iv i le g e  in the spec if ic  area
o f Members' in te re s ts , i t  is  s u f f ic ie n t  to o u t l in e ,  and in some cases
i l lu s t r a te ,  the landmarks in  the nature and development of these
scattered ru les.
The Chapter w i l l  fo l low  the approach o f the 1969 Select Committee 
o f Members' In terests  (Declaration)^^ by considering the factual posit ion 
o f these ru les , conventions etc. in terms o f three elements: the s ta tu ­
to ry  requirements and resolutions o f the House governing the o f fe r  to ,  
and acceptance by. Members o f payments or rewards; the rules governing 
voting w ith a pecuniary in te re s t ;  and the custom requiring a declaration 
o f in te re s t .  In addition to th is  loose co llec t io n  of rules and conven­
t io n s , i t  should be pointed out tha t cons titu t iona l l im i ts  are set to 
Members' power to confer d ire c t  f ina nc ia l benefit on th e i r  constituents 
or other ind iv idua ls  or groups. The House's standing order no. 82, 
established more than 250 years ago, provides tha t no motion fo r  a grant 
or charge upon the public revenue is to be proceeded with unless 
recommended by the Crown. As the 1969 Select Committee observe, 
'M in isters subject to th e i r  own s t r i c t  rules o f conduct and a c i v i l  
service bred in  a t ra d i t io n  o f im p a r t ia l i ty  and in c o r r u p t ib i l i t y  dispose 
of tha t recommendation'.gy
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1. Payments and rewards to Members
Restrictions on a Member's freedom to  take up outside paid employ­
ment are few, and operate only when his outside in te res ts  influence the 
discharge of his duties as a Member.
In 1782 when the b e l ie f  tha t MPs should be independent o f royal 
influence was widely held, an Act was passed to exclude government con­
trac to rs  from the House o f C o m m ons .H o w eve r , by the middle o f the
nineteenth century the progress of in d u s tr ia l is a t io n ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  the
59growth of incorporated enterprises, rendered th is  act a dead le t te r .
The law on d isq u a l i f ic a t io n  fo r  membership o f the House o f Commons 
through holding certa in  posts, including m in is te r ia l and other o ff ice s  
under the Crown, remained exceedingly complicated u n t i l  the passing o f 
the House o f  Commons D isqua lif ica t ion  Act 1957 ( la te r  re-enacted as the 
House o f Commons D isqua li f ica t ion  Act 1975). This replaced a large number 
of statutory and common law provisions on d is q u a l i f ic a t io n  by a single 
code, and also repealed the ex is ting  le g is la t io n  d isqua lify ing  a Member 
on his becoming a public contractor. In recommending the la t te r  dele­
t io n ,  the Select Committee which considered the B i l l  in 1955-56 argued 
tha t the ex is ting  law was archaic - having been enacted a t a time when 
the great bulk o f trade and commerce was transacted by ind iv id ua ls , not 
companies or other incorporated bodies - and tha t the Clerk of the House 
had confirmed tha t there had been no knowledge o f corruption a ffec t ing  
Members in connection with government contracts fo r  the past hundred years. 
In repealing th is  provis ion, they did however stress tha t th is  would 
emphasise the ob liga tion  on Members to disclose any pecuniary in te res t 
when speaking or voting (see below).
A fu r th e r  d is q u a l i f ic a t io n  fo r  membership which holds some relevance 
fo r  th is  study is  corrupt ;p';ractices at e lec tions, dealt with by the pro­
visions now contained in s .s . 139 and 140 o f the Representation o f the 
People Act o f 1949.
In addition to s ta tu to ry  re s t r ic t io n s ,  the House has formally con­
demned the o f fe r  to and acceptance by Members o f bribes. Following 
the find ings o f an enquiry tha t some Members o f the House of Commons 
had been bribed in connection with matters concerning East India trade, 
the House resolved on 2 May 1695 th a t:
‘ The o f fe r  o f money, or other advantage, to a Member o f Parliament 
fo r  the promoting o f any matter whatsoever, depending or to be trans­
acted in Parliament is  a high crime and misdemeanour and tends to 
the subversion o f the English C on s t itu t ion ' .^2
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In the s p i r i t  o f  th is  resolution the House has regarded the o f fe r ­
ing o f a bribe to a Member o f e i th e r House in order to influence him 
in his conduct as a Member, or o f any fee or reward in connection 
with the promotion o f ,  or opposition to any b i l l ,  re so lu t ion , matter 
or th ing submitted or intended to be submitted to the House or a 
Committee thereof, as a breach o f p r iv i le g e .
However, as pointed out by Geoffrey Marshall, more recently 
'a lleged f inanc ia l impropriety has not invariab ly  been a matter of 
s t ra ig h t  forward b r ibe ry , but turned upon the re la tionsh ips between 
Members and special in te re s t  groups or th e ir  representa tives '.^^  Here 
a considerable degree o f uncerta inty s t i l l  remains. The House has tra d - 
t io n a l ly  attempted to draw a d is t in c t io n  between i l l i c i t  forms o f pay­
ment on the one hand, and on the other, f inanc ia l assistance from out­
side bodies - such as trade unions, public quoted companies etc. - the
payment and rece ip t o f which does not in i t s e l f  involve any breach o f 
65p r iv i le g e . However, d i f f i c u l t i e s  can arise from the la t te r  form of 
f ina nc ia l re la tionsh ip  i f  the sponsoring body withdraws or threatens 
withdrawal o f assistance on account o f the Member's a c t iv i t ie s  in P a r l ia ­
ment, and thereby r isks  the accusation of fe t te r in g  the complete indepen­
dence o f the Member. Following the investiga tion  o f one such case by 
the Committee of P riv ileges in 1947,^^ the House attempted to c la r i f y  
i t s  position by resolving th a t : -
' I t  is inconsistent with the d ig n ity  o f the House, with the duty 
o f a Member to his constituents , and with the maintenance o f the 
p r iv i le g e  o f freedom of speech, fo r  any Member of th is  House to 
enter in to  any contractual agreement with an outside body, con­
t r o l l i n g  or l im i t in g  the Member's complete independence and freedom 
o f action in Parliament or s t ip u la t in g  tha t he shall act in any way 
as the representative o f such outside body in regard to any matters 
to be transacted in Parliament; the duty o f a Member being to his 
constituents and to the country as a whole, ra ther than to any par­
t ic u la r  section the reo f '.gy
However, th is  reso lu t ion , based on one o f two pr inc ip les  governing 
Members' re la tionsh ips with outside bodies set out in the Committee's 
report, is  d i f f i c u l t  to  reconcile w ith the other p r in c ip le  expressed by 
the Committee and endorsed by the House, acknowledging the accepted fa c t  
tha t many Members do receive f inanc ia l assistance from outside bodies, 
and tha t not every action by an outside body which may influence the con­
duct o f a Member can be regarded as a breach of p r iv i le g e  even i f  i t  were 
calculated and intended to bring pressure on a Member to take or re fra in  
from taking a course of action.
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The House has not re s tr ic te d  i t s e l f  to safeguarding against pecun­
ia ry  corruption a r is ing  from d ire c t  payments to Members. I t  has addi­
t io n a l ly  sought to guard against in d ire c t  influence by forb idd ing 
Members to accept fees fo r  professional services connected with pro­
ceedings in Parliament. Members may not practice as counsel before 
the House or any o f i t s  committees; nor may they advise, as counsel, 
on a priva te b i l l  or parliamentary proceeding. These p r inc ip les  con­
cerning professional advocacy have been formally  recognised in several 
resolutions o f the House.
On 6 November 1666 the House resolved:
'That such Members o f th is  House as are o f the long robe shall 
not be counsel on e ith e r side, in any b i l l  depending in the Lords' 
House, before such b i l l  shall come down from the Lords' House to 
th is  House'.gg
I t  was declared on s im ila r grounds in  1830 tha t i t  was contrary to the 
law and usage o f Parliament fo r  any Member to be engaged, e ith e r by him­
s e l f  or any partner, in  the management o f pr iva te  b i l l s  before e ith e r 
House o f Parliament fo r  pecuniary r e w a r d . A g a i n  on 22 June 1858 the 
House ordered:
'That i t  is contrary to the usage and derogatory to the d ig n ity  
o f th is  House tha t any o f i t s  Members should bring forward, promote 
or advocate in th is  House any proceeding or measure in  which he may 
have acted or been concerned fo r  or in consideration of any pecuniary 
fee or reward'.yg
These proh ib it ions against professional advocacy arose during the 
centuries when private le g is la t io n  o f a lo c a l,  sectional or personal 
nature comprised the vast bulk o f the business o f the House. The 1660 
reso lu tion very obviously re lates to members o f the legal profession, 
and the 1858 reso lu tion , though couched in broad terms, was s im i la r ly  
reached by the House in the context of advocacy by members o f the bar.^^
2. Voting with a pecuniary in te re s t
' . . .  a personal in te re s t in a question d isq u a l i f ie d  a Member 
from voting. But th is  in te re s t ,  i t  should be fu r th e r  understood, 
must be a d ire c t  pecuniary in te re s t ,  and separately belonging to 
the persons whose votes were questioned, and not in common with 
the rest o f his Majesty's subjects, or on a matter of State p o l ic y '.y g
In response to a motion fo r  the disallowing o f votes o f certa in
Members on the Gold Coin B i l l  in 1811, Speaker Abbot gave th is  oft-quoted 
in te rp re ta t io n  o f  the House ru le , established since at least the seven­
teenth century, regarding voting w ith a pecuniary in te re s t.  His ru lin g
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expressed s ig n if ic a n t  q u a l i f ica t io n s  to the fundamental p r in c ip le  tha t
no Member with a d ire c t  pecuniary in te re s t  in a question may be allowed
to vote on i t ,  and these q u a l i f ica t io n s  have been fu r th e r  defined by
la te r  Speakers. A 'd i re c t  pecuniary in te re s t '  to be covered by the
ru lin g  must be private and p a r t icu la r  and not dependent on the possible
73exercise o f permissive powers by another body. Further, 'not in 
common with the res t o f His Majesty's subjects ' has meant tha t member­
ship o f a category or group which stands to benefit has not precluded 
a Member from voting. For example. Members are e n t i t le d  to vote on the
question o f  th e i r  own s a l a r i e s , a n d  a farmer or in d u s t r ia l is t  may
75vote on measures benefit ing the industry in which he is engaged. I f  
the expected benefit is  public or general, the personal private gain by 
the ind iv idua l Member is  i n c i d e n t a l L i n k i n g  to th is  c r i te r io n ,  the 
inc lusion of the words 'o r  on a matter of State p o licy ' explain the 
difference in the treatment of the House of questions of a personal 
in te re s t in priva te b i l l s  and in public b i l l s  respective ly .^^ I f  the 
in te re s t  is  on a matter o f State po licy , whether the question involves 
the pecuniary in te re s t  of a l l  members o f the community or only certa in  
groups, the benefit is  held to be general and therefore not disallowable 
Thus ne ither d irectors nor shareholders in public companies are excluded 
from voting fo r  or against a public b i l l  which might regulate that 
company, even i f  i t  is one p a r t ic u la r  company about which the B i l l  is 
concerned. Votes on Private B i l l s ,  not being matters o f State p o licy , 
are not covered by th is  proviso.
In 1896 the question o f whether i t  was desirable to define more 
precisely the nature and extent o f personal and pecuniary in te res t which 
should disable a Member from voting was remitted to a select committee 
of the House. This followed the second reading o f the London and 
North-Western Railway B i l l ,  where Lloyd-George had moved to disa llow 
the vote o f a Tory Member on the grounds o f personal pecuniary in te re s t 
in the B i l l  (the Member was a d ire c to r  o f the company). During the 
acrimonious debate which ensued i t  was alleged tha t the House had 
become 'too frequently the rendezvous o f guinea pigs, and o f ra ilway, 
and gas, and water company d i re c to r s ' ,  and suggested tha t the House 
should adopt a stronger ru le  on pecuniary in te rests  in l ine  w ith  local 
government where i t  was a municipally d isqua li fy ing  act fo r  a man to 
speak, and above a l l  to vote, in favour o f any scheme in which he had
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a d ire c t  personal i n t e r e s t . W h i l e  defending the vote o f his hon. 
Friend, the F irs t  Lord of the Treasury, Mr A.J. Balfour, agreed to 
appoint a commiteee to thrash out the matter. Mr Lloyd-George accord­
ing ly  withdrew his motion.
The Select Committee on Members o f Parliament (Personal In te res t)^^  
re s tr ic te d  themselves to inqu ir ing  in to  voting with a pecuniary in te re s t  
and made no reference to the generally recognised convention o f dec lar­
ing in debate a pecuniary in te re s t .  Stating tha t they considered ' i t  
would not be o f any advantage to in v i te  expressions o f opinion from any
80persons not well acquainted with the procedure of the House o f Commons', 
they were assisted by the (then) Speaker of the House (Rt. Hon. William 
Court G u lly ), a former Speaker of the House (Rt. Hon. Viscount Peel) 
and the Clerk o f the House (S ir  R. Palgrave). On the basis o f evidence 
produced by these House o f Commons personnel they reached the conclusion 
tha t a more precise d e f in i t io n  of in te re s t could only be arrived at 
and maintained by the enactment of a standing order, and tha t they could 
not recommend th is  because
' . . .  No Standing Order could include a l l  the possible v a r ie t ie s ,  
present or prospective, o f personal pecuniary in te re s t ,  and any 
Standing Order must necessarily be both s t r i c t l y  and narrowly in te r ­
preted by the Speaker or the Chairman. The enactment of a Standing 
Order might, therefore , ac tua lly  f a c i l i t a t e  such arrangements by 
any Members who might desire to make an improper use of th e i r  votes 
as would enable them to do so with impunity; while the very un­
ce r ta in ty  and width o f  the present d e f in i t io n ,  which admits of in ­
f i n i t e  degrees o f va r ia t io n ,  according to the judgment of the House 
on the merits o f each ind iv idua l case, would deter them from any 
attempt o f th is  k ind .'g^
The Committee did not respond to the suggested amendment to the 
standing order re la t in g  to priva te b i l l s  (contained in an appendix by 
Mr F.B. Palmer, B a rr is te r  a t Law), the acceptance o f which would have 
precluded a d ire c to r  o f a company from voting in Parliament on a f fa i r s  
o f  tha t company. I t  may be noted in passing tha t i t  has been suggested 
tha t th is  refusal o f the Committee to accept t ig h te r  re s tr ic t io n s  upon 
M.P.-d irectors l e f t  the way open to  MPs being d ire c t ly  subsidised by 
Trade Union funds:
'The refusal to impose new re s tr ic t io n s  upon private Members' 
in te res ts  in 1896, when the influence o f business on p o l i t ic s  
appeared dangerous to the public in te re s t ,  l e f t  no log ica l ground 
fo r  re s tr ic t io n s  upon the in te re s t o f organized Labour in the fu tu re . 
The r ise  o f the Labour Party with many o f i t s  candidates subsi­
dized by union funds c le a r ly  raised the question o f in te re s t.
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But i f  i t  had been a l l  r ig h t  fo r  business corporations to have 
d ire c t  representation, on what grounds could even a whole party 
o f Trade Union representatives be re s t r ic te d . 'g 2
The e f fe c t  o f the various ru lings since Speaker Abbott's ru ling
in  1811 is  tha t on a public b i l l  there is  no ob liga tion  fo r  a Member
to re fra in  from voting. Since tha t time there has only been one
recorded instance o f votes on a public matter being disallowed, when
in 1892 on a motion fo r  a grant in aid o f a survey fo r  a projected East
African Railway the votes o f three Members who were d irec to rs  or share-
83holders in the B r i t is h  East A fr ica Company were disallowed. There
is  no record o f  a vote being disallowed on a public b i l l .
However, as indicated above, the position is  d i f fe re n t  w ith regard
to pr iva te le g is la t io n .  The promotors o f a pr iva te  b i l l  are seeking
special r igh ts  or powers and therefore cannot be said to be ' in  common
with the rest o f His Majesty's sub jec ts ',  nor is  th e i r  b i l l  'a matter
o f State p o l ic y ' .  Nevertheless, even on a pr iva te  b i l l  the in te res t
which would disable a Member from voting would have to be a very d ire c t
84-personal in te re s t and not ju s t  o f a local nature. The case h is to ry  
o f votes on matters affected by personal pecuniary in te re s t  is  thoroughly 
set out in Erskine May,^^ and i t  is  s u f f ic ie n t  to record here tha t the 
la s t  occasion on which a motion to d isa llow a Member's vote on a private 
b i l l  was moved was in 1901, and the la s t  recorded occasion on which 
such a motion was carried was in 1836.
I f  a Member disregards the rules and votes on a matter in which 
he has a d ire c t  in te re s t  th is  would not be a breach of p r iv i le ge  but 
ra ther a breach o f c o n v e n t i o n . T h e  penalty resides in the motion 
to d isa llow his vote and th is  objection must be raised immediately a f te r  
the d iv is io n ;  i f  taken a t a la te r  stage the Speaker would not allow 
i t .  The same procedure applies to Standing Committees. The Speaker 
has to ru le  whether, in the circumstances of the case, the motion is  
in order, and i f  he does so, the House decides the matter. The Member 
whose vote is  impugned is  allowed to plead his defence, but must w ith ­
draw before the question is  proposed. I t  should be noted that the ru le 
applies only to the vote o f an M.P. and does not disable him from speak­
ing to or moving a motion in which he has a personal in te re s t .
The disallowance o f a vote on the grounds of personal in te re s t  is  
confined to pecuniary in te re s ts ,  although i t  was remarked by Speaker 
Gully in evidence to the 1896 Select Committee tha t Members:
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' . . .  also know tha t i t  is  desirable tha t they should abstain 
in some cases where th e i r  in te re s t is  not a pecuniary one, but in 
which the House would feel tha t i t  is be tte r tha t they did not vote, 
and in many cases of tha t kind they do abs ta in '.
The s p i r i t  o f th is  practice can be found in the current ed it ion  
of Erskine May, where i t  is  recorded tha t:
'Disallowance of a vote on the score o f personal in te re s t  is 
re s tr ic te d  to cases o f pecuniary in te re s t  and has not been extended 
to  those occasions when the d icta tes of se lf-respect and o f respect 
due to the House might demand tha t a Member should re fra in  from tak ­
ing part in a d iv is io n '.g g
F in a l ly ,  i t  should be reasserted tha t while pronouncements of the
Chair provide guidance fo r  Members as to what general precedents govern
the pratice o f voting with a pecuniary in te re s t ,  these do not override
the primary ro le given to the d iscre tion  o f the ind iv idual Member.
Members ' in d iv id u a l ly  must be the judges themselves on the question
of personal in te re s t '  said Mr Speaker F itz roy , 'bu t,  as a general Ruling,
89I would give the f o l l o w in g . . . ' ,  and again in 1946 Mr Speaker C lif ton  
Brown confirmed tha t:
'The question whether an hon. Member's in te re s t in the matter on 
which a Divis ion takes place, is of such a kind tha t he should 
re fra in  from voting is  a question o f which the Member himself is ,
in the f i r s t  instance, the judge. I t  can also be raised on a Motion
to disa llow the vote o f a Member immediately a f te r  the figures of 
a Division in which he voted are declared, and then i t  is a question 
fo r  the House to decide'.gg
3. Declaration o f in te res t
The only formal declaration of pecuniary in te re s t required by a 
standing order o f the House re la tes to opposed priva te  b i l l s .  This 
was adopted in the mid-nineteenth century when private b i l l  procedure, 
p a r t ic u la r ly  tha t concerning railway a c t iv i t ie s ,  was a t a peak. As 
alluded to above, p r io r  to 1844 Members were a llo ted  to pr iva te  b i l l  
committees s p e c i f ic a l ly  because o f th e i r  local or personal in te re s t 
in the issue, the ra t iona le  behind th is  system being tha t:
" . . .  the Members best q u a l i f ie d  to serve on the committee... 
were those who had some personal, lo c a l,  or professional knowledge 
o f the matter, and who represented in te res ts  l i k e ly  to be a ffec ted . 'g^
Growing opinion tha t the dangers o f vested in te res ts  more than counter­
balanced the advantages to be gained from local or personal knowledge, 
as well as the growth in public companies and volume of public business, 
which rendered the 1782 reforms an anachronism (above), led to a reform
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in private b i l l  procedure. In 1848 Gladstone required a declaration 
o f disinterestedness, local and personal, from Members serving on r a i l ­
way b i l l  committees, and in 1855 th is  p r in c ip le  o f im p a r t ia l i ty  was
92required o f members o f committees hearing any opposed priva te  b i l l s .
The wording of the declaration which Members have to sign before 
attending and voting on a committee on an opposed priva te  b i l l  is  as 
f 011ows:
' I ,  having been selected by the Committee of Selection to serve 
as a member o f the committee on the . . .  B i l l  or on Group . . .  o f  
Private B i l l s ,  hereby declare, tha t my constituents have no local 
in te re s t ,  and tha t I have no personal in te re s t ,  in the said b i l l  
or any b i l l  included in the said group; and tha t I w i l l  never vote 
on any question which may arise without having duly heard and 
attended to the evidence re la t in g  the re to . 'gg
I f  a Member who has signed th is  declaration subsequently finds he has
a d ire c t  in te re s t  he must withdraw from the committee and may be d is -
94charged from fu r th e r  attendance altogether.
In examination by the 1896 Select Committee Speaker Gully was asked 
whether the ru le  fo r  priva te b i l l  committees should be extended to gov­
ern votes in the House. He advised tha t:
' I th ink i t  would be extremely inconvenient to apply tha t in 
the House; i t  would raise in f in i t e  questions. I t  is a very d i f f e r ­
ent thing to impose a ru le of tha t sort on f iv e  or seven Members 
dealing with three or four p a r t icu la r  matters referred to them, 
and to impose i t  on 670 Members dealing with every question that 
may possibly come up before the House.'gg
Although there are on record occasional examples during the nine-
96teenth century o f declarations o f in te re s t ,  the ava ilab le evidence 
suggests tha t during th is  time personal pecuniary in te re s t  was seen 
mainly as ra is ing  a problem with regard to  vo ting , rather than as necess­
i ta t in g  a ru le  governing declaration in debate. However, w ith in  the 
House there has always been a t ra d i t io n  tha t Members should be frank 
in  debate about th e i r  pecuniary in te res ts  and there has evolved a con­
vention, o f uncertain o r ig in ,  tha t Members should declare th e i r  personal 
in te re s t  in a subject under debate. Describing th is  convention to the 
1969 Select Committee, the Clerk o f the House confirmed tha t th is  o b l i ­
gation is  only a convention and not a ru le such as a decision of the 
Chair or a standing order or reso lu tion o f the House:
'Erskine May only deals w ith the ru le a ffec t ing  the vote o f a 
Member and no mention is made in the whole o f th is  volume about 
speeches. This is a p re tty  recent convention. Again, i t  is  a con­
vention such as the convention o f addressing Members "hon. Member",
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i t  is  not a ru le  which is  la id  down by the House; i t  is  a con­
vention which is  observed by Members o f the House.'gy
Various Speakers have, however, given guidance on th is  convention.
In 1953 Mr Speaker Morrison confirmed i t s  existence by s ta t in g :
'There is a custom whereby hon. Members, in making speeches, 
i f  they have an in te re s t ,  declare i t .  I th ink myself tha t tha t 
has grown up as a matter o f custom because Members desire to be 
frank with th e i r  fe llow  Members and i t  is  sometimes a matter o f 
prudence, in case an hon. Member should be suspected of unavowed 
m otives.' gg
He also confirmed tha t the practice did not extend to Parliamentary 
Questions.
Subsequent Speakers have restated Speaker Morrison's view, but have
not been consistent among themselves. In 1956 the Deputy Speaker res-
99t r ic te d  the ambit o f declaration to 'a d ire c t  pecuniary in te re s t ' ,  
while in 1965 Mr Speaker Hylton-Foster appeared to widen the c r i t e r ia  
fo r  in te re s t  by including s h a r e h o l d i n g s . O n e  aspect on which succes­
sive Speakers have however been consistent is  on the exclusion of P a r l ia -
101mentary Questions from the convention of dec lara tion , and in 1969
Mr Speaker Hylton-Foster elaborated on th is  omission by explaining:
'For hon. Members to declare a personal in te re s t  when putting 
supplementary questions at Question Time regu la rly  would eat in to  
Question Time and slow i t  down'.^gg
Remarking on the apparent inconsistency and imprecision o f statements
from the Chair, the 1969 Select Committee suggested tha t th is  was because
the issue has been treated as a matter o f e t ique tte  ra ther than a ru le .
This treatment has also had the e f fe c t  o f enshrining the assumption
tha t i t  'has been and always must be tha t hon. Members can be re lied
upon to assess those de lica te  matters in  an honourable and proper way
103and tha t deta iled rules are undesirable and unnecessary'. As 
commented by K. Thompson M.P. in response to Speaker Morrison's c l a r i f i ­
cation of the convention in  1953:
'Now i t  is  quite recognised th a t any hon. Member o f th is  House 
is  able, and expected to be able, to separate his personal in te re s t  
from his public du ty . '^g^
The House has expressed i t s  displeasure a t Members who they believe 
to have transgressed the convention of disclosure (e.g. the Marconi 
case, 1913; the Boothby case, 1940). Consideration o f such action 
is  dealt w ith in the fo llow ing section on procedures and punishment.
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Procedures o f investiga tion  and punishment
There are several procedures ava ilab le to the House fo r  in ve s t ig a t­
ing a llegations o f misconduct against Members, each more appropriate 
fo r  a p a rt icu la r  type of inqu iry  and each possessing i t s  own p a r t icu la r  
shortcomings.
A formal complaint of breach o f p r iv i le g e  - including misconduct 
by Members - must be raised in the House by a Member as soon as possible 
a f te r  the event which he is c i t in g  in the complaint occurs, and i t  is 
fo r  the Speaker to pronounce whether th is  constitu tes a prima fac ie  breach 
o f p r iv i le g e . I f  he does so, i t  is normal fo r  the Leader o f the House 
to move a motion to re fe r  the complaint to  the Commons Select Committee 
o f  P riv ileges. This committee orig inated in the seventeenth century, 
and is  a House o f Commons not a Government committee. I t  is  appointed 
at the beginning o f each parliamentary session and comprises senior 
Members o f the House, usually including the Leader o f the House (who 
is  chairman), the Leader o f the Opposition and a law o f f ic e r  (who s i ts
1 fjr
in his capacity as a Member and not a Government representative).
The Committee deliberate upon the matter and issue a report, in
the l ig h t  of which the House decides what ac tion , i f  any, should be
taken against the Member (or stranger). There is no ob liga tion  on the
House to support the find ings of the Committee even when i t  is unanimous.
Partly  because o f the s e n s i t iv i ty  o f Members of Parliament to outside
c r i t ic is m  and c o m m e n t s a n d  p a rt ly  because o f the ease with which
complaints may be raised, the committee often f inds i t s e l f  dealing with
t r i v i a l  cases. This fa c t  may to some extent account fo r  the frequency,
revealed by a survey o f complaints referred to the Committee of
107Priv ileges since 1945, with which the Committee has recommended no 
fu r th e r  action, and the House has endorsed th is  recommendation by g iv ing 
t a c i t  ;or e x p l ic i t  acceptance to the Report (which may be c r i t i c a l )  
but pursuing the matter no fu r th e r .  However, i t  should also be pointed 
out tha t th is  frequency may also re f le c t  the problem observed below, 
tha t many o f the punishments ava ilab le to the House are ra re ly  considered 
appropriate fo r  the present day.
In the investiga tion  o f a llegations suggesting tha t a Member's con­
duct or a c t iv i t ie s  might amount to contempt of the House, or at least 
be inconsistent with the standards expected by the House, and tha t ra ise 
other issues besides tha t o f  p r iv i le g e ,  since the middle of the seven­
teenth century (and notwithstanding the Act o f 1921, see below) the
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House has often preferred to use 'ad hoc' select committees. This pre­
ference was explained by a former Prime M in is te r, Rt. hon. Winston 
C hu rch il l ,  when appointing a select committee in 1940 to investigate 
the conduct and a c t iv i t ie s  of Mr Boothby MP in connection with the pay­
ment out o f assets in B r i ta in  o f claims against the Government of and 
in s t i tu t io n s  in the Republic o f Czecho-Slovakia:
' I considered whether I should then move tha t i t  should be re­
ferred to the Committee o f Priv ileges but, a f te r  obtaining guidance 
as to the precedents, I came to the conclusion tha t as the case 
appeared to raise other issues besides tha t o f P r iv i lege , i t  was 
be tte r tha t i t  should go to a select committee, so tha t the tru th  
could be ascertained and the conduct o f the hon. Member considered'.^gg
To some extent the thoroughness o f th is  p a r t icu la r  Committee repaired 
the reputation of se lect committees as a method o f inq u iry , which had 
previously been badly d iscredited by the partisan proceedings o f the 
select committee appointed to investigate the Marconi a f f a i r  in  1913.^^^ 
That Committee had been set up to investigate a llegations tha t Ministers 
in the Liberal Government had used th e i r  p r iv ileged knowledge of the 
negotiations fo r  a government contract with the Marconi company to spec­
u late in Marconi shares. The Committee produced a m ajority  and m inority  
report - the former, which found in favour o f the M in is te rs , re f le c t in g  
the views o f the Liberal Members, and the la t t e r ,  re f le c t in g  the views 
o f the Conservatives. In the acrimonious debate which took place in 
the House on the m a jority  report partisan fee lings were r i f e .  Mr Cove 
(Cons) moved a vote of censure on the two Ministers fo r  th e i r  dealings 
in shares in the Marconi Company o f America and fo r  th e ir  'want o f frank­
ness' to the House. With the House voting on party l ines th is  motion 
was rejected in favour of a Government motion which acquited the M inisters 
o f acting otherwise than in good f a i t h ,  and reprobated charges of corrup­
t ion  brought against them which had been proved to be fa lse . The ques­
t ion  o f the e ff icacy  o f using ad hoc select committees fo r  th is  purpose 
was revived more recently in the House when, in 1976, a select committee 
was appointed as the appropriate body to inqu ire  in to  the conduct and
a c t iv i t ie s  o f Members of the House in connection with the a f fa i rs  of 
110
Mr J.G.L. Poulson. Consideration of th is  committee l ie s  outside the 
time period o f th is  chapter, but is  touched on in Chapters 6 and 7.
As an a lte rna t ive  to inqu iry  by se lect committee the House has in 
the past used special tr ibuna ls  to remove controversial matters from 
i t s  p o l i t ic a l  sphere; fo r  example, the 1888 Parnell Commission, the
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1893 Featherstone Riots inq u iry , and in 1915, the Dardanelles and 
Mesopotamia C o m m i s s i o n s . A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  when a llegations were made 
in 1921 against o f f ic ia ls  in the M in is try  o f Munitions, recent memories 
o f the partisan fa i l in g s  o f the select committee procedure associated 
with the Marconi a f f a i r  gave r ise  to demands fo r  new investiga to ry  mach­
ine ry , not ju s t  fo r  the munitions case, but fo r  s im ila r  issues in the 
fu tu re . The outcome was the Tribunals o f Inquiry (Evidence) Act in 
1921, providing, on a resolution of both Houses o f Parliament, fo r  a
112tr ibuna l to inqu ire  in to  a d e f in i te  matter o f urgent public importance.
The Act lays down no requirements as to the composition o f the t r ib u n a l ,  
but since 1948 the practice has been to appoint members o f the ju d ic ia ry  
and eminent Q.C.s. This instrument o f inqu iry  is  c h ie f ly  designed to 
investigate  a llegations of impropriety in public l i f e .  Examples o f 
i t s  use in re la t ion  to the Commons include the Budget disclosure inqu iry  
in 1936,^^^ and the Lynskey Tribunal in 1949;^^^ both of which involved 
government m in is te rs , not backbenchers.
Penal ju r is d ic t io n  o f the House
As stated above, although a select committee or tr ibuna l report 
may be condemnatory o f the conduct o f a Member (or m in is te r) ,  i t  is 
fo r  the House as a whole, as sole judge o f i t s  own proceedings, to decide 
what ac tion , i f  any, to  take on those f ind ings. Deriving from the medie­
val conception o f Parliament p r im ari ly  as a Court o f Justice , the House 
has a range o f sanctions at i t s  disposal i f  i t  decides tha t a Member 
or non-member is  g u i l ty  o f a breach o f p r iv i le g e  or an unspecified con­
tempt o f Parliament; some o f which though used to e f fe c t  in parliamen­
ta ry  h is to ry  are ra re ly  countenanced in present circumstances. With
regard to the d is c ip l in in g  o f i t s  own Members, these sanctions are l is te d  
115in  Erskine May as fo llows: the power o f commitment, which May des­
cribes as the 'keystone of parliamentary p r iv i le g e ' ,  but which has not
been exercised by the Commons since 1880;^^^ expulsion or suspension
117from the service of the House; and reprimand or admonition adminis­
tered by the Speaker. E a r l ie r  in h is to ry  the Commons had the additional
118r ig h t  to impose fines but th is  r ig h t  has not been exercised since 1666,
and, as remarked by the Clerk o f the House in his memorandum to the
Committee o f Priv ileges in 1977, the doubt as to whether the House o f
Commons, in contrast to the House o f  Lords, is a court o f record implies
119the fu r th e r  doubt as to whether they now possess th is  power.
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Patterns and Characteristics
While Parliament has t r a d i t io n a l ly  promoted the ro le  o f the f ina n ­
c ia l l y  independent Member, and jea lous ly  protected his independence 
from outside influences such as a corrupt e lectorate and undue in te r ­
ference from the Crown (as manifested in the o r ig ins  o f parliamentary 
p r iv i le g e ) i t  has been fa r  less in te rve n t io n is t  in  ensuring a Member's 
disassociation from his personal in te res ts . The t ra d i t io n  o f the f inan ­
c ia l l y  independent Member, with the accompanying view o f membership 
as a part-time occupation, carried with i t  the presumption tha t i t  was 
proper, and indeed before 1911 necessary, fo r  Members to possess outside 
f inanc ia l in te res ts . Both t ra d i t io n  and presumption to a large extent 
survived the in troduction o f o f f ic ia l  payment in 1911, and have been 
a continuing thread underlying the development o f the rules and conventions 
regulating Members' pecuniary in te res ts . The fundamental question of 
the existence and the extent o f the involvement o f M.P.s in outside 
in te rests  has ra re ly  been considered. An exception is  professional 
advocacy, but even here the p roh ib it ion  upon accepting fees fo r  profess­
ional services connected with proceedings in Parliament is l im ited  to 
the legal profession and is  therefore too narrow to cope with the modern 
forms o f advocacy. Accordingly a backbench or frontbench Opposition 
Member o f Parliament (as contrasted with a m in is te r) has not been pre­
vailed upon to d ivest himself o f those in te rests  which may conceivably 
prejudice his public duties. Instead, the House has addressed i t s e l f  
to  the question o f whether, and i f  so how, those outside in te rests  should 
be d isciosed, and has occasionally l im ited  the actions o f Members possess­
ing such in te res ts  eg. the re s tr ic t io n s  on voting with a pecuniary in te r ­
est. Protective o f the ind iv idua l Member's privacy, the House has trad ­
i t io n a l ly  required the disclosure o f in te rests  only a t the point in 
time of speaking or voting upon a matter upon which his action may be 
influenced by his personal in te re s t .
In th is  approach to the potentia l problem o f c o n f l ic t  of in te re s t
Parliament has tended to adopt the 'p r in c ip le  o f d isclosure ' in pre fer-
12flence to the 'p r in c ip le  o f avoidance'. The d i f fe re n t  emphases of 
these p r in c ip le s , which need not be mutually exclusive, support the 
statement made in the previous chapter tha t p o l i t ic ia n s  may have two 
objectives in th e i r  approach to c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t ;  f i r s t ,  to avoid 
actual c o n f l ic ts ,  and second, to restore public confidence in Parliament 
by reducing the appearance o f c o n f l ic t .  The p r in c ip le  o f avoidance.
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while ostensibly aiming to prevent c o n f l ic t ,  places emphasis on m in i­
mising the appearance o f c o n f l ic t ,  whereas in i t s  pure form the p r in ­
c ip le  o f disclosure has the primary purpose o f reducing actual c o n f l ic t .
With the la t t e r  p r in c ip le  c o n f l ic ts  may even appear to be condoned so 
long as they are disclosed. Defenders o f th is  pos it ion frequently  c i te  
the character and personal proprie ty o f those involved, and the House
o f Commons follows th is  pattern by in s is t in g  tha t the t ra d i t io n  o f frank-
121ness among Members about pecuniary in te res ts  is  deeply entrenched.
The marked preference by Parliament fo r  the p r in c ip le  o f disclosure 
suggests tha t p r io r  to the in troduction o f the Register, when P a r l ia ­
ment did intervene in the area o f Members' pecuniary in te rests  i t  was 
perhaps more with the in ten tion  o f avoiding actual c o n f l ic ts  o f in te re s t  
than with preventing the appearance o f c o n f l ic t .
The h is to r ic a l  survey also reveals tha t the reluctance o f Parliament 
to  intervene in the area o f  personal in te rests  has resulted in the lack 
of a cod ified approach towards the regulation o f in te res ts . Instead, 
there is  an anthology o f  rules and conventions, developed incrementdlly 
by the House and buttressed by the general p r inc ip les  o f the law o f 
parliament expressed in parliamentary p r iv i le g e . This pattern o f develop­
ment has several implications fo r  th is  study.
F i r s t ly ,  the House has shown no in ten tion  o f establishing or even 
an awareness o f any need to establish a coherent set o f rules or code 
o f conduct, p re fe rr ing  instead to introduce ad hoc measures to c la r i f y  
i t s  position fo llow ing spec if ic  instances o f misconduct. This pattern 
of proceding suggests tha t w ithout the stimulous o f periodic scandals 
and the resu ltan t parliamentary and public anxiety. Parliament would 
not o f i t s  own accord have taken the in i t i a t i v e  to regulate Member's 
in te res ts . The h is to ry  o f  th is  approach supports the working hypothesis 
presented in Chapter 1, tha t Parliament's method o f proceeding in the 
regulating o f Members' pecuniary in te res ts  has followed the course of 
a series o f issue-attention cycles.
Secondly, each act o f misconduct giving r ise  to c la r i f ic a to r y  ru lin g s , 
resolutions etc. involved spec if ic  h is to r ic a l circumstances and may 
have occurred centuries ago. Bearing in mind S ir  Ivor Jennings warning 
tha t ' (p)recedents a r is ing  before 1832 must be used in rare cases only,
\ i O O
f o r  the Reform Act altered the fundamental assumption o f the C onstitu tion , 
i t  would seem tha t many o f  the precedents which guide the Speaker and 
the House in th e i r  judgment on contemporary issues invo lv ing pecuniary 
in te res ts  are archaic and inappropriate to modern conditions. The
74.
narrow scope of the p roh ib it ion  against professional advocacy has already 
been noted, and to th is  must be added a broader c r i t ic is m  tha t many 
o f the rules and conventions regulating Members' in te rests  (p a r t ic u la r ly  
voting with a pecuniary in te re s t)  arose during the heyday o f priva te 
b i l l  le g is la t io n .  That era has now passed, and cognisance o f  the chang­
ing charcter o f le g is la t iv e  procedure is  o f relevance to an evaluation 
o f the adequacy o f  resolutions or Speakers' ru lings formulated in the 
period o f priva te le g is la t io n  to the present context o f predominantly 
public b i l l  procedure in the House o f Commons.
T h ird ly ,  the House places great store by the f l e x i b i l i t y  o f both i t s
p r iv ileges and precedents. As confirmed by the Attorney General in
a document c ircu la ted to the Cabinet during consideration of a case
o f alleged breach of p r iv i le g e  in 1947, ' i t  is  not necessary e ith e r
to follow precedent too s lav ish ly  in  th is  matter, or to re fra in  from
find ing  tha t the p r iv ileges o f the House are involved because there
123is  no exact precedent in p o in t ' .  This apparent disregard fo r  pre­
cedent means tha t even i f  Members look to precedent fo r  guidance they 
cannot be certa in  tha t a precedent a r is ing  from a p a r t icu la r  set of 
h is to r ic a l  circumstances w i l l  necessarily be followed in s im i la r ,  but 
ine v itab ly  not iden tica l circumstances at a la te r  date. Thus the price 
o f f l e x i b i l i t y  is  uncerta inty.
A consequence o f the lack o f a coherent code o f conduct, compounded 
by the archaic nature and a rb itra r iness  o f precedent has been the crea­
t ion  o f confusion among MPs as to what standards to observe in the area 
of pecuniary in te res ts . For example, in 1940 Robert Boothby raised 
th is  point in his defence in evidence to the Select Committee in v e s t i ­
gating his conduct (above);
" . . .  I do want to  say tha t I must confess I am not a t a l l  c lear 
in my own mind about the duties o f a Member of Parliament. I have 
sat here fo r  16 years, but i f  you ask me precisely what the duties 
o f  a Member o f Parliament are with regard to disclosure, I should 
f ind  i t  f r i g h t f u l l y  d i f f i c u l t  to answer tha t question. . . ' ^24
The f in a l  cha rac te r is t ic  to be id e n t i f ie d  from the h is to r ic a l  review 
is the unique claim of Parliament, deriv ing from i t s  h is to r ic a l o r ig ins  
as the High Court o f  Parliament, to be the sole judge o f i t s  own pro­
ceedings, including i t s  Members' conduct. A general statement on the 
research problem which can be in fe rred from th is  p r iv i le g e  is  tha t the 
h is to ry  of the House's approach to ,  and regulation o f ,  the potentia l
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problem o f c o n f l ic t  o f in te res t is essen tia lly  the h is to ry  o f a series 
o f loosely connected exercises in s e l f - d is c ip l in e ,  and the problems 
associated with such regulation are essen tia lly  ones deriv ing from the 
application o f s e l f -d is c ip l in e .
In using i t s  r ig h t  to exercise s e l f -d is c ip l in e  to the exclusion 
o f  external sanctions the House has given primacy to the d iscre t ion  
o f the ind iv idua l Member in separating his pr iva te  in te rests  from his 
public duty, and in doing so, has emphasised the ro le  o f the indivdual 
and co l le c t iv e  q u a l i t ie s  such as honour, s e l f - re s t ra in t ,  lo y a lty  and 
mutual t ru s t  in guiding Members' judgment. As explained in Chapter 
1, these q u a l i t ie s ,  along with the concepts o f part-time membership 
and the g if te d  amateur can be traced back to a common source in English 
cu ltu re  often referred to as the 'gentleman e th ic ' .  The question arises 
as to whether these underlying values have persisted in shaping the 
House's approach to: the regulation: o f Members ' in te re s ts ,  or whether the 
in troduction  o f  the Register indicated a departure on the part o f par­
liamentarians from the tenets associated with the tra d i t io n a l b e l ie f  
in  the House o f  Commons being a meeting place of gentlemen, with the 
h is to r ic a l  claim to being 'the best club in London'.
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CHAPTER 4
The 1969 Select Committee: 'A False Dawn'
'The subject o f Members' in te rests  is by no means new. I t  has 
been debated in the past from time to time when disclosures have 
been made or information has come to l ig h t  which disturbs the House, 
and the House then fee ls tha t i t  should examine once again th is  
d i f f i c u l t  matter. This occurred during the l i fe t im e  o f the Labour 
Government, and a Select Committee was set up presided over by my 
r ig h t  hon. Friend the Member fo r  Vauxhall (Mr Strauss). I t  spent 
a considerable period in close examination o f a complex problem, 
and i t  produced a report.
I t  is  true tha t the report was never debated here. Probably 
i t  should have been debated but, unhappily, there are times when 
the House, roused to indignation or apprehension and in a mood or 
s p i r i t  o f moral fe rvour, says tha t a Select Committee must be set 
up, tha t something must be done to inquire in to  whatever the subject 
may be, and tha t some remedy must be found, but by the time the 
Select Committee set up to deal w ith the matter produces i t s  report 
the House has lo s t  in te re s t  in the circumstance of i t s  appointment, 
and we wait u n t i l  the next inc ident occurs'. .
Mr Douglas Houghton M.P.
In a re f le c t iv e  piece o f parliamentary discourse Douglas Houghton 
captures the s p i r i t  o f the ' issue-attention cycle ' discussed in ideal 
type form in Chapter 1 and clothes i t  with the f lesh and bones o f a 
concrete parliamentary event. As he observes, and the previous chapter 
has a ttested, although the issue of Members' f inanc ia l in terests  is 
by no means new, i t s  status on the parliamentary agenda fo r  debate has 
not been consistent. Indeed the 1969 Select Committee on Members' In te r -  
ests (Declaration) was the most decisive move in the protracted and 
spasmodic debate on Members' in te res ts  since the Select Committee on 
Members o f Parliament (Personal In te res t)  carried out a l im ited  review 
in 1896. This chapter provides a ten ta tive  explanation o f the genesis 
o f the 1969 Select Committee and describes i t s  in te rna l dynamics, i t s  
Report and the reaction to i t s  f ind ings .
Part 1: The Background to the Committee
Parliamentary pressure
The Sunday Times records tha t the modern campaign concerning the 
regulation of Members' outside in te rests  re a l ly  began in  April 1963, 
w ith Mr Maurice Edelman (Lab) asking the then Conservative Prime M in is te r ,
Mr Harold Macmillan, to introduce le g is la t io n  requiring a l l  ind iv idua ls
and outside bodies profess ionally  concerned with the promotion or advocacy
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o f Parliamentary measures to re g is te r  themselves at the s ta r t  o f each 
parliamentary session as ' lo b b y is ts ' .^  Mr Macmillan's response was 
a sharp and predictable 'No s i r ' . ^  However, a suggestion o f increas­
ing parliamentary concern can be c le a r ly  detected before th is  exchange.
In June 1961 Mr Francis Noel-Baker (Lab), aware of the opportunities 
fo r  a new form o f p o l i t ic a l  corrup tion ,^ had asked Mr Macmillan i f  he 
would move fo r  the appointment o f a Select Committee to inqu ire  in to  
the business a f f i l ia t io n s  of a l l  hon. Members, and the payment o f 
reta iners and fees to them fo r  services to business in te re s ts , p a r t ic ­
u la r ly  in the f ie ld  o f advertis ing and public re la t io n s , w ith a view 
to  making a l l  such information read ily  and regu la rly  ava ilab le to the 
public. Mr Macmillan reminded Mr Noel-Baker th a t,  ' i t  is  our t ra d i t io n  
th a t a Member o f Parliament must be free to donduct his personal a f fa i rs  
h imself, subject to the accepted rules and conventions'.^ He alluded 
to the p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  any such regulation being the beginnings o f the 
s lippery slope to a fu l l - t im e  House o f Commons and concluded in the vein 
o f successive Prime Ministers o f  both parties by saying, ' I should be 
very sorry to see a House of Commons which included no hon. Members 
with outside in te rests  in work, functions and even re s p o n s ib i l i t ie s ' .
Another s ig n if ic a n t  event had been a supplementary question by Mr 
Harold Wilson complaining im p l ic i t ly  tha t in t ra v e l l in g  abroad Members 
were dependent upon public re la tions firms and other organisations f in a n ­
cing th e i r  t r ip s . ^  Two years la te r  he confirmed his concern about 
Members' in te rests  when in a Liverpool speech in March 1963, ju s t  a f te r  
becoming Leader o f the Labour Opposition, he argued tha t a Labour Govern­
ment should introduce le g is la t io n  requiring lobbies to re g is te r  and 
to make a public disclosure o f in te re s t .  Following th is ,  as a supple­
mentary to the exchange between Mr Macmillan and Mr Edelman in April 
1963 he requested Mr Macmillan to look fu r th e r  in to the matter o f some 
overseas Governments employing paid representatives, with a view to 
reg is te r ing  these representatives as lobby is ts , and to look in p a r t ic u la r  
a t the use o f pr iva te  dining rooms downstairs in the House o f  Commons.
Mr Macmillan, in a somewhat more c o n c i l ia to ry  tone than tha t used in 
addressing Mr Edelman, assured the Leader o f the Opposition he would 
look in to  the points mentioned, but gave no promise of immediate or 
fu tu re  ac tion .^
To trace fu r th e r  the events in Hansard in a s t r i c t  chronological 
fashion would be as unrewarding as i t  would be d is jo in ted . The
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continuing discussion o f parliamentary concern concentrates on analys­
ing and in te rp re t ing  the trends and questions which emerged from a sys­
tem atic : search o f Hansard as described in Chapter 2.
Parliamentary Questions, both oral and w r i t te n ,  were the main overt
vehicle by which parliamentarians raised the issue o f Members' in te res ts
in the House during th is  period. At least as important as the main
Questions were the supplementaries, the present use o f which Chester
and Bowring, in th e i r  study o f Question Time, describe as a 'safe ty
valve' w ith Question Time i t s e l f  being 'one o f the rare occasions when
backbenchers can create an opportunity botn to address the House and
1Dto deal with a spe c if ic  matter tha t in te res ts  them'. The issue o f 
Members' in te rests  during the period 1960/1961 - 1969/1970 produced 
about 30 Questions and supplementary Questions from 15 Members (10 Labour 
and 5 Conservative). An analysis o f these Questions by party indicates 
d is t in c t  differences in the approach to the issue by the two main pa rt ies , 
though the number o f  Questions is not large and any suggestion o f  f irm  
trends must await the analysis o f additional data. I t  also gives some 
ind ica tion  of the Government's conception ofthe problem during th is  
period.
11The 10 Labour MPs asked between them 25 o f the Questions or supple­
mentary Questions. Two o f these Members - Mr Arthur Lewis and Mr William 
Hamilton - asked over h a lf  o f th is  t o t a l ,  with 6 and 9 Questions respec­
t iv e ly .  Mr Lewis, who fo r  many years held the record as the most pers is- 
12ten t questioner, focussed his Questions on o f f i c ia l  v is i t s  or p a r l ia -
1 3mentary delegations overseas. Mr Hamilton, on the other hand, concen­
tra ted  his e f fo r ts  on pursuing demands fo r  a Register o f Members' f ina n ­
c ia l  in te res ts . The continuing theme o f his Questions was to press 
the Prime M in is te r o f  the day fo r  le g is la t io n  to establish such a re g is te r .  
He also foreshadowed an issue considered by the Select Committee in 
1969, by asking the Lord President to amend the Standing Orders o f the 
House, ' to  ensure tha t at Question Time hon. Members shall declare any 
pecuniary in te re s t  in Questions asked'. Before th is  he had asked 
the Prime M in is te r whether, in the l ig h t  o f recent developments, he 
would appoint a Royal Commission to inquire  in to  the p o s s ib i l i ty  of 
a reg is te r o f pecuniary in te res ts . Mr Wilson had replied tha t such 
machinery would be inappropriate, and had indicated tha t his conception 
o f the problem was mainly one o f the public re la tions a c t iv i t y  by adding:-
14
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' I th ink tha t the in c o r ru p ta b i l i ty  o f the B r i t is h  Parliament 
is  widely recognised a l l  over the world, whether there is such a 
re g is te r  or not. I th ink  tha t the only problem which has arisen 
from time to time, and i t  has been debated and discussed, is  the 
need fo r  hon. Members on both sides o f the House to know, i f  they 
are approached by another Member, or entertained by him, whether 
he has any p a rt icu la r  in te re s t on the public re la tions s ide . '^g
A cha rac te r is t ic  o f the Labour Questions on Members' in te res ts  is
tha t they a l l  asked fo r  some kind of action on the part of the Government.
The invariab le  response o f the Government - regardless o f party - was
17to stonewall such questions.
Only 7 Questions on Members' in te res ts  were asked in the same period
by Conservative MPs. The to ta l comprised one Oral Question and 6 supple-
18mentaries, spread between 5 MPs. With only one exception (see below)
they were not requests fo r  changes in the regulation of Members' in te res ts ,
but were mostly supplementaries endorsing the in te g r i ty  and honour o f
the House, and drawing a tten tion  to the impropriety o f the o r ig ina l
Labour Questions.
In 1966 the philosophy underlying Mr Hamilton's (Lab) questioning
was challenged by S ir  R. Cary (Cons), who regretted the im plica tion
tha t an association w ith a union, company, or in s t i tu t io n  outside the 
19House was wrong. This l in e  o f argument was pursued and given a sharper
p o l i t ic a l  edge by S ir  G. Nabarro (Cons), who, fo llow ing S ir  R. Cary,
disassociated himself from the im purit ies alleged by Mr Hamilton, but
asked whether the Prime M in is te r agreed tha t useful progress in the
matter could be made i f  the f ina nc ia l subventions o f Members o f the
House acting on behalf o f and with trade unions were pu b lic ly  declared.
A d is t in c t  party pos it ion , despite t ra d i t io n a l government claims tha t
Members' in te rests  are a House and not a party issue, was equally v is ib le
in Mr Wilson's reply:
' I th ink  tha t one o f the basic facts  of the p o l i t ic a l  s i tu a t io n , 
p a r t ic u la r ly  in regard to trade union re la tions with the Labour 
Party and the Parliamentary Labour Party on the one hand and the 
business a f f i l i a t io n s  o f the Conservative Party on the other, is 
tha t the facts are a l l  known about the Labour Party. They are not 
known with regard to the Conservative Party.'gQ
The one Conservative Member to ask c r i t i c a l  questions requesting 
pos it ive  action upon the issue o f Members' in te rests  was S ir  Derek Walker- 
Smith, who was la te r  to become a member o f the 1969 Select Committee. 
Possibly drawing upon his experiences as a former chairman of the National
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Advisory Committee on Local Government, in successive years he asked
supplementary Questions pointing out the marked discrepancy between
the rules governing Parliament in the area o f f in a n c ia l in te re s t  and
those re la t ing  to local government; the la t t e r  being much more s t r in -  
21gent. To some extent glossing over the im plica tion  o f a double stan­
dard, Mr Wilson sought to j u s t i f y  the discrepancy by locating the d i f f e r ­
ence in the nature of the bodies, the House being a le g is la tu re  whereas
members o f a local au tho rity  are responsible fo r  executing as well as
22fo r  making po licy . He argued tha t th is  functional d ifference s e l f -
ev idently  ju s t i f ie d  the need fo r  s t r i c te r  rules fo r  local government.
In addition to Parliamentary Questions, 3 Early Day Motions on the
subject o f Members' in te res ts  were tabled during th is  period. Two of
these expressed a wish fo r  a re g is te r  o f Members' f inanc ia l in te re s ts ;
while the th i rd  sought to formalise the convention o f declaration o f
in te re s t  and extend i t  to Parliamentary Questions. A ll were sponsored
23by Labour Members, and the small number o f signatures they attracted 
s im i la r ly  belonged, with only one e x c e p t i o n , t o  Labour Members.
Frustrated in  his attempts to persuade the Government to introduce 
le g is la t io n  establish ing a re g is te r  of outside business in te res ts  o f 
MPs, in 1967 Mr Hamilton introduced a Private Member's B i l l  under the 
ten minute ru le  (S.O. 13) with th is  o b j e c t i v e . A l t h o u g h  not an in ­
t r in s ic a l l y  s ig n if ic a n t  step forward in the sporadic campaign fo r  a 
re g is te r ,  the p u b l ic i ty  function o f th is  B i l l  renders i t  a useful 
i l l u s t r a t io n  o f extremes o f opinion on the issue o f the reg is te r . I t
also had the e f fe c t  o f provoking the Liberals in to  establishing a reg is te r
27l im ite d  to th e i r  own party.
Introducing the B i l l ,  Mr Hamilton accepted tha t B r i t is h  public p o l i t ­
ica l l i f e  was probably f re e r  from corruption than any other country
in the world, but c r i t ic is e d  the tendency ' to  accept tha t a l l  too smugly
28as a se lf-ev iden t proposition, without requiring pos it ive  proof o f i t ' .
His assessment o f  the s itu a t io n  led him to conclude th a t : -
'The mere observation o f the House's convention to declare one's 
in te re s t when speaking in debate is  not enough. That is  so because, 
f i r s t l y ,  the interested Member may not choose to speak; secondly 
he can exert greater influence behind the scenes than he can in 
public debate; and th i r d ly ,  he does not have to declare an in te re s t  
in asking questions in  the House.'gg
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Mr Tom Iremonger (Cons) in asking the House to refuse Mr Hamilton 
leave to introduce the B i l l  argued tha t moves to establish a re g is te r  
would impugn the in te g r i ty  o f the House by casting an aspersion upon 
the honour of the House c o l le c t iv e ly ,  and:-
' i f  there is one q u a l i ty  which the House has demanded from i t s
Members - i t  is the q u a lity  which i t  has made a synonym fo r  Member­
ship - tha t is  the q u a l i ty  tha t a Member has when he is  e n t i t le d  
to be named by other Members in the term "honourable Gentleman" . ' ^ q
His argument extended from p r in c ip le  to procedural de ta il and played
on the d e f in i t io n a l problems surrounding the concept o f ' in te r e s t ' .
Expressing confidence in ex is t ing  conventions, he argued th a t,  ' in  so
fa r  as in te rests  and actions in th is  House are definable and demonstrable,
31Erskine May is both c lear and f u l l  on the sub jec t '.
During the 1960s two cases o f alleged breach o f parliamentary p r i v i ­
lege occurred which also drew a tten tion  to the issue of Members' in te r ­
ests. The f i r s t ,  concerning Mr William Warbey (Lab), arose in February 
1965 and ventila ted  some of the potentia l problems and areas fo r  mis­
in te rp re ta t io n  surrounding MPs v is i t in g  foreign countries or accepting
32h o s p ita l i ty  from foreign Governments. The second concerned words
and sentiments uttered by the then Chancellor o f the Exchequer (Mr James
Callaghan) in a speech made in Swansea in July 1965. Raising the com-
33p la in t  in the House, S ir  R. Cary (Cons) c ited  the Daily Telegraph, 
which reported the Chancellor, when re fe rr in g  to certa in  Members' c o n t r i ­
butions during the passage o f the Finance B i l l ,  as saying:-
' . . .  he did not th ink  o f them as the honourable Member fo r  X, 
or Y or Z. " I  look a t them and say Investment Trusts , Capital 
Speculators or That is  the fe l low  who is the Stock Exchange man 
who makes p r o f i t  on G i l t  Edge. I have almost forgotten th e i r  con­
s t i tue nc ies , but I shall never fo rge t th e i r  in te res ts . I wonder 
sometimes whom they represent? The constituents or th e i r  own fr iends 
p a rt icu la r  in te res ts? " '
The Speaker ruled there was a prima fac ie  breach o f p r iv i le g e . However, 
the House was seriously divided on re fe rra l to the Committee of P riv i leges , 
with several Members (Mr Michael Foot included) c r i t i c is in g  the House 
fo r  being fa r  too sensitive  about such matters and recommending tha t 
the whole issue o f p r iv i le g e  be re-examined. On a narrow m ajority  the 
matter was referred to the Committee o f  Priv ileges who found the Chan­
c e l lo r 's  words ambiguous, but a f te r  fu r th e r  explanation on his part - 
tha t nothing in his speech was intended to be derogatory to Parliament - 
did not f ind  a contempt o f the House and recommended no fu r th e r  action.
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A change in d ire c t io n ?
Against a background o f successive m in is te r ia l refusals to meet 
increasing but s t i l l  sporadic requests fo r  action , a d is t in c t  change 
in the tempo o f  the campaign can be detected in the Prime M in is te r 's
reply to a Question from Mr Hamilton in October 1968. In answer to
whether he would now reconsider the d e s i ra b i l i t y  o f introducing le g is ­
la t io n  to provide fo r  a public re g is te r  o f Members' outside in te res ts  - 
especia lly where such in te rests  involved foreign Governments - the Prime 
M in is te r assured the House tha t the Government were urgently inqu ir ing
O r
in to  the issues raised. Considering tha t three months e a r l ie r  he
had s p e c if ic a l ly  refused to countenance any change in the arrangements
regulating Members' in te re s ts , the question arises as to why th is  apparent 
change in d irec t ion  occurred.
The Prime M in is te r 's  statement of 26 March 1969, concerning the 
resu lts  o f the Government's inqu iry , gives some ind ica tion  o f the o f f i c ia l  
explanation fo r  the change in Governmental th ink ing and th e i r  eventual 
decision to recommend se tt ing  up a Select Committee on Members' in te res ts . 
He stressed tha t the Government had found two separate strands to the 
problem. One was the position o f Members of Parliament who, by v ir tu e  
o f a p r io r  connection with a domestic or overseas body, were involved 
in matters which were the concern o f Parliament and o f Government. The 
position o f such Members, he ins is ted , should be made clear in a l l  matters 
which affected th e i r  re s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  to the House and to th e ir  P a r l ia ­
mentary colleagues. This was an issue fo r  Parliament, and a f te r  consul­
ta t ions with Opposition Parties the Government had decided to set up 
a Select Committee to consider the rules and practices o f  the House 
o f Commons in re la t io n  to the declaration o f Members' in te rests  and 
to report.
The second issue o f concern re lated to the operation of public re la ­
t ions and other organisations holding an account or commission on behalf 
o f an overseas Government, or an overseas p o l i t ic a l  in te re s t .  This 
concern existed whether or not they employed MPs on any basis. With 
respect to bringing such a c t iv i t ie s  in to  the open the Prime M in ister 
pointed to the problem of re f le c t in g  'a f a i r  balance between the protec­
t io n  of Parliament and the public on the one hand and a free and le g i t -
37imate expression o f  opinion on the o th e r '.  In an e f fo r t  to f in d  th is  
balance he proposed to in i t ia t e  discussions with Opposition parties 
regarding proceedings on th is  issue.
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On behalf of the Opposition Mr Heath s ig n if ie d  his w ill ingness to 
pa rt ic ipa te  in discussions - via the usual channels - both on the form 
of the Select Committee and on the second po in t,  but sought assurance 
from the Prime M in is ter tha t the purpose of the Select Committee was 
to consider the e ff icacy of present arrangements fo r  declaration o f 
in te re s t by MPs, not to imply tha t there was anything improper about
Members having outside in te rests  as such. Wilson replied in the a f f i rm -
38a t iv e , ' ( t ) h a t  is exactly the position as I see i t ' .
During the predominantly backbench exchanges which ensued from th is
statement, the relevancy o f  Members' remuneration and f a c i l i t i e s  to a
review o f Members' outside in te res ts  was raised by Mr Eric Lubbock (L ib ) ,
but dismissed out o f court by the Prime M in is ter as taking the issue,
39'w ider than is  necessary'. S im ila r ly  the controversy concerning 
fu l l - t im e  versus part-time membership surfaced momentarily with Mr Norman 
Atkinson (Lab) pressing the Prime M in is te r to re fu te  Mr Kenneth Lewis's 
(Cons) suggestion th a t ,  'we are part-time Members, and are paid as such'. 
In l in e  with successive Prime M in is te rs, and lacking the guidance of 
the recommendations o f the Boyle Report in 1971, tha t MPs should be 
regarded as working on a fu l l - t im e  b a s i s , M r  Wilson replied diplomat­
ic a l l y ,  though somewhat inconclusive ly, 'some are part-time while others
41have no other outside in te re s ts ' .
Extra-parliamentary pressure
Whilst se tt ing  out the problem as seen by the Government, Mr Wilson's 
statement gives l i t t l e  ind ica tion  o f the reasons fo r  the apparent change 
of mind. Certain clues are evident in Mr Hamilton's Question in October 
1968; p a r t ic u la r ly  in his framing his request in the words 'w i l l  the 
Government now reconsider the matter' ( i . e . ,  w i l l  they reconsider i t  
in the l ig h t  o f recent events) and in his stress on in te res ts  which 
involve foreign governments. For fu r th e r  clues, the search must turn 
to extra-parliamentary sources.
In 1961 the Sunday Telegraph had reported th a t,  ' i t  is  strongly 
f e l t  in government c irc le s  tha t some MPs have fa i le d  to make clear the 
d is t in c t io n  between th e i r  private roles as businessmen and th e i r  public
42
positions as Members o f Parliament*. This fear was evoked by a Labour
MP, Mr Francis Noel-Baker, in a controversial a r t ic le  fo r  Parliamentary
43A ffa irs  appearing in the same year. He referred to the 'grey zone' 
o f business in te rests  in Parliament; p a r t ic u la r ly  developments in
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public re la tions a c t iv i t y  and advertis ing which highlighted new aspects 
o f the problem and l e f t  the door open ' fo r  a new form o f p o l i t ic a l  corrup­
t io n ' .  The theme o f d isqu ie t in the House o f Commons about the extent 
to which MPs were beholden to ,  and used by, outside in te rests  o f a commer­
c ia l or p o l i t ic a l  character, was revived sporad ically  in newspaper re ­
ports and was confirmed re trospective ly  by Mr Hamilton, who pointed 
out how MPs could be hired by P.P. firms engaged by foreign countries 
to  promote th e i r  image - to present an obnoxious foreign power in a 
favourable l i g h t : -
'by asking Questions, in i t ia t in g  debates, making representations 
to government departments, establishing a parliamentary group to 
bu ild  up fr ie n d ly  re la tions via cockta il pa rt ies , d inners, and lunch­
eons, and even free t r ip s  to the countries concerned.
During the 1960s several academic w r i te rs ,  notably Professor S.E. 
Finer^^ and Professor P.G. Richards^^ responded to such d isqu ie t by 
advocating a reg is te r o f in te res ts . This ob jective was also strongly 
countenanced by Andrew Roth, lobby jo u rn a l is t  and author on the grounds 
th a t : -
'The answer l ie s  not in the researches o f  priva te enterprises 
such as our own, but in pub lic ly -ava ila b le  f u l l  d isclosure by each 
M.P. o f a l l  his private business connections.
The newspapers generally lagged behind in the demand fo r  a re g is te r ,  
and in 1967 The Times e d ito r ia l  s t i l l  came out against a re g is te r  argu­
ing th a t : -
'For the Commons to declare tha t a re g is te r  o f i t s  Members' pec­
uniary in te res ts  is  now needed would be fo r  the Commons to imply 
tha t i t s  Members can no longer be trusted to behave with honour 
and d iscre tion in a way tha t once they could. I t  would be corpor­
a te ly  s e l f - in s u l t in g . '^ g
However, by March 1968 confidence and t ru s t  in the corporate honour 
o f Parliament seems to have waned at The Times, who now grudgingly admitted
'Any system o f th is  sort must, o f course be d is ta s te fu l .  But 
a position has now been reached where i t  is regre ttab ly  necessary 
to r is k  th is  unpleasantness [a re g is te r ]  fo r  the sake o f Parliament's 
good name. Unless information about such lobbying is brought in to  
the open. Members who are completely d is in terested are l ia b le  to 
f in d  th e i r  enthusiasm and th e i r  judgment under t o ta l l y  u n fa ir  sus­
p ic ion, '^g
Thus, as was s im i la r ly  apparent from the parliamentary data analysed 
above, certa jn  events seem to have occurred during 1968 and early 1969 
which in te n s if ie d  demands fo r ,  or changed a tt itudes towards, the regula­
t ion  of Members' in te res ts .
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While Hansard casts l i t t l e  l ig h t  on these events, the newspapers 
themselves are more revealing. In August 1968 the Sunday Telegraph 
'leaked' tha t Cabinet Ministers were considering le g is la t io n  to force 
in to  the open p o l i t ic a l  pressure group operators and professional lobby­
is ts  who t r y  to put pressure on MPs or c i v i l  servants, commenting gener­
a l l y  tha t what had brought the issue to the fo re fro n t was the growing 
suspicion tha t vested in terests were financing the welter o f  propaganda 
and counter propaganda about the war in N igeria; the Biafrans in par­
t ic u la r  were believed to be assisted by heavily-financed public re la tions 
50firm s. The newspapers also made a good deal of parliamentary v is i t s  
to Rhodesia in th is  same w inter, during which the position o f the white 
m ino rity  was f u l l y  explained. However the incident which aroused most 
press in te re s t  at th is  time, and which the Sunday Times re trospective ly  
singled out as the event provoking the controversy which prompted Wilson 
to  set up the Select Committee was the Bagier a f f a i r . T h i s  event 
would also seem to be a plausible explanation fo r  Mr Hamilton's p a r t ic ­
u la r reference to in terests  involving foreign Governments.
The Bagier a f f a i r
The Bagier inc ident highlighted the problem th a t : -
' While foreign travel is o f great value fo r  informing M.P.s about 
world problems, circumstances frequently arise when such t r ip s ,  
organised and paid fo r  by foreign in te re s ts , raise de lica te problems 
o f proprie ty and personal judgment.'gg
In mid-1967 the Greek colonels, s u f f ic ie n t ly  concerned about the
tarnished image o f th e i r  regime fo llow ing th e i r  coup, decided to employ
a public re la tions  f irm  - Maurice Fraser and Associates - to ' s e l l '
Greece in Western Europe. Among his various a c t iv i t ie s  on behalf o f
the Greek colonels, Fraser arranged fo r  groups o f people - including
11 MPs (6 Labour, 4 Conservative and 1 L ibera l) - to v i s i t  Athens on
t r ip s  paid fo r  by the Greek Government. Included among these MPs was
Mr Gordon Bagier (Lab. Sunderland South). Bagier was la te r  put on
the payroll o f  Maurice Fraser and Associates as a consultant a t £500
per annum with a formal task to look fo r  new business fo r  the f irm ;
the re la tionsh ip  was not disclosed. In the course o f events Fraser
had to j u s t i f y  his costs to the Athens regime, and i t  was his ' f i f t h
report ' to Athens which led to legal action between Fraser and the Sunday
Times before the la t te r  were able to p r in t  the document. Along with
the Sunday Telegraph they produced one o f several versions o f  the report
54which were cu rren tly  c irc u la t in g .
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The report became dynamite because o f one en try , p a r t ly  m is-spe lt, 
under the f i r s t  section, headed 'o rgan isa tion '.  In l i s t in g  people con­
cerned i t  included reference to 'A B r i t is h  M.P., Lobb ie s t '(s ic )  ; and 
commented th a t : -
'We have to disguise the id e n t i ty  o f the B r i t is h  M.P. who is 
our lobbiest as th is  would compromise him. His name w i l l  be made 
available to the [Greek] Prime M in is te r . '
In other versions o f the report the sentence read, 'A B r i t is h  M.P. work­
ing behind the scenes with the object o f in fluencing other B r i t is h  M.P.s'.
Fraser maintained tha t the MP was not being paid and tha t his main 
ro le  was acting as 'linkman' between the Commons and Fraser's own o f f ic e ;  
a l le r t in g  him whenever tlTef top ic o f Greece cropped up in the House. As 
one o f the MPs suspected o f being Fraser's ' lo b b y is t '  Bagier was approached 
by the Press. He denied his involvement and fu r th e r suggested the claim 
tha t Fraser had a B r i t is h  MP in the pay of the Greek Government was 
'qu ite  fa n ta s t ic ' .
In September 1968 The Times reported tha t Mr Ivor Richard (Lab) 
intended to ra ise as a prima fac ie  breach o f parliamentary p r iv i le ge  
the allged employment o f an unnamed B r i t is h  MP to bring secret influence 
to bear on his fe llow  MPs on behalf o f the Greek m i l i ta ry  Government.
The issue was not ac tua lly  raised as a breach o f p r iv i le ge  as i t  was 
held to involve the consideration o f 'wider issues'. However, the reve­
la tions  o f the a f f a i r  did re su lt  in Maurice Fraser Associates losing 
th e i r  account with the Greek Government, and more s ig n i f ic a n t ly  the 
In s t i tu te  o f Public Relations suspending Fraser from membership o f the 
In s t i tu te  on the grounds tha t he had v io la ted the standards o f professional
conduct as la id  down by the In s t i tu te  and had brought the In s t i tu te  
57in to  disrepute.
The case surfaced again in March 1969 when, because o f continuing 
in te re s t in the problem the This Week programme run by Thames Television 
produced a programme (somewhat emasculated by the Independent Television
Co
Authority) during the course o f which they intimated Bagier may have
59been the secret lobby is t in the Fraser Report. The Times the next 
day^^ reported tha t Bagier had made a statement to the press admitting 
tha t he had v is i te d  Greece a t Fraser's in v i ta t io n  and tha t in May 1968 
he was inv ited  by Fraser to accept a re ta ine r as a Parliamentary Consul­
ta n t ,  resigning in October 1968. This salary and commission, he stressed, 
re lated purely to new business in the f ie ld  o f public re la tions  which
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resulted in contracts and was not connected in any way w ith  the Greek 
regime - ' I have made no speech in the House with reference to the s i t u ­
a tion  in Greece, nor have I made any representations to any Government 
department
He also widened the issue himself by going on to say:-
' There are many M.P.s who combine th e i r  Membership w ith  business 
or professional a c t iv i t ie s  outside and th is  does not in any way 
a f fe c t  th e i r  conduct as Members.'
This broadening o f the sp e c if ic  case to wider issues is  s ig n i f ic a n t  
because as explained in  Chapter 1, i t  has been suggested tha t the pros­
pects fo r  reform o f the p o l i t ic a l  process brighten i f  the alleged act 
o f wrongdoing can be linked to some basic defect in the s y s t e m . I n  
th is  case the sp e c if ic  inc iden t o f the Bagier a f f a i r  occurred on the 
t id e  o f ,  and served to hasten, the growing lack o f  confidence in P a r l ia ­
ment's ex is t in g  methods fo r  regula ting Members' in te re s ts .  As the p a r l ia ­
mentary and extra-parliamentary data above suggest. Members (and certa in  
organs o f the media) who had previously been content to re ly  upon the 
cons tra in t o f 'mutual t r u s t '  were stung in to  reconsidering the need 
fo r  a re g is te r ,  and previous demands fo r  such a device became more voc i­
ferous.
Was then the expose o f the Bagier a f f a i r  the event, i f  not the 'pub lic  
scandal' in  B r i t is h  p o l i t i c s ,  which persuaded ministers to set up the 
1969 Select Committee on Members' in te rests?  The Crossman Diaries lend 
some support to th is  view but also show the hesitancy o f the Labour 
Government's response to the Bagier reve la tions. Crossman records 
tha t when he looked in to  the Bagier scandal as Lord President he had 
f e l t  tha t the subject was not one on which the Government could act 
alone because i t  would involve parliamentary p r iv i le g e  and would be 
unpopular. He had w r it te n  to the Prime M in is te r recommending the whole 
issue o f public re la t ions  firms working fo r  fo re ign powers and of MPs 
declaring an in te re s t  i f  they worked fo r  such firm s should be submitted 
to  a Special Select Committee to advise the Government on whether le g is ­
la t io n  was required. The minute was, however, lo s t  on i t s  way to No.10 
and Crossman suspected th a t his proposal would have stood no chance 
a t the Cabinet's Procedure Committee.
Crossman records tha t Mr Wilson had wanted to act along the lines 
he proposed but tha t two Cabinet M in is te rs , Mr James Callaghan and Mr 
Richard Marsh, had argued:
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'What do we get out o f th is?  A ll  we sha ll do is  expose the two 
or three other Labour M.P.s who may well have been working fo r  P.P. 
f irm s. I f  we set up a Committee o f Inquiry in to  th is ,  don 't  we 
merely damage the Government a t  th is  stage?'g^
This is  an in te re s t in g  in s ig h t fo r ,  despite government rh e to r ic  tha t 
Members' in te res ts  are an issue fo r  the House as a whole to decide, 
th is  c le a r ly  shows tha t the in i t i a t io n  o f any action on which the House 
may have had to  decide was c le a r ly  considered ta c t ic ly  in  terms o f Govern­
ment and Party advantage - not th a t th is  comes as any great surprise.
Crossman himself wanted to expose public  re la t ion s  f irm s ' a c t i v i t i e s ,  
not MPs, and advised the Cabinet
'L e t 's  get the House o f  Commons to have a special look a t public 
re la t ion s  firms acting fo r  fore ign governments. Le t's  have an ex­
posure o f th is  American public re la t ions  f irm  in Geneva and what 
the y 're  a c tu a l ly  up to not an inqu iry  about the Members.'gg
As we have seen, when the Government eventually announced th e i r  in ten ­
t io n  i t  was fo r  a Select Committee on Members' in te re s ts ,  w ith the spec­
i f i c  top ic o f  public re la t ion s  firms somewhat relegated to in te r -p a r ty  
discussions.
Further evidence o f  the s ign if icance  o f  the Bagier case as the pre­
c ip i ta t in g  fa c to r  in the se tt in g  up o f th is  Committee is  to be found 
in i t s  Report. When discussing the proposal o f a re g is te r  re s tr ic te d  
to  Members who acted as consultants fo r  public re la t ion s  f irm s , the 
Committee, w ithout naming Bagier, alluded to the a f f a i r  saying:
'A re g is te r  o f these a c t i v i t i e s ,  an example o f which led to the 
appointment of Your Committee, would, i t  was sa id , a le r t  the House 
to th e i r  existence so tha t they could be taken in to  account.'gg 
(my emphasis)
The Clerk to the Committee, when interviewed, confirmed th is  statement.
He reco llected th a t both parties had been worried about MPs with public 
re la t io n s  connections, or v is i t in g  fore ign countr ies , accepting hosp it­
a l i t y ,  and then 'advocating' the cause o f the regime in Parliament.
He reca lled  the Bagier case as the sp e c if ic  problem which occasioned 
the se tt in g  up o f  the 1969 Select Committee.
Motion to set up the 1969 Select Committee
On 14th May 1969 the Government tabled the motion to set up the 
Select Committee on Members' In terests  (D ec la ra t io n ):-
'That a Select Committee be appointed to  consider the rules and 
practices o f  the House in re la t io n  to the declaration o f Members' 
in te res ts  and to report thereon.'gy
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This was accompanied by the second motion nominating the members o f 
the Committee.
The f i r s t  motion was not moved u n t i l  11.6p.m. When interviewed 
the Chairman o f  the Committee pointed out th a t motions o f  th is  kind 
are usually  taken a t the end o f the day and tha t w ith a crowded agenda 
the Chief Whip would tend to put 'non-controvers ia l' items a f te r  main 
business. However, although a tte s t in g  to a crowded agenda - p a r t ic u ­
la r l y  the Parliament (No. 2) B i l l  which dislocated the session, the 
proposed In d u s tr ia l  Relations B i l l  and the House of Commons (R e d is tr ib ­
ution o f Seats) (No. 2) B i l l  - other key informants suggested th a t the 
tim ing o f  the motion re f lec ted  the fa c t  th a t the 'Whips smelt t ro u b le '.
The debate on the motions lasted fo r  l i t t l e  more than 2 1/4 hours, 
and, perhaps re f le c t in g  the fa c t  tha t by May 1969 i t  was generally agreed 
tha t a Select Committee was ine v itab le  (a f te r  the Bagier a f f a i r ) ,  both 
motions were agreed w ithout d iv is io n .  The debate revealed once more 
the p r io r  assumptions with which the Government (and many backbenchers) 
approached the issue and a d d it io n a l ly  allowed in terested backbenchers 
to v e n t i la te  th e i r  views.
Moving the f i r s t  motion to  establish the Select Committee the Leader 
o f  the House (Mr Peart) gave recognition to the growing d isqu ie t among 
Members regarding the adequacy o f present ru les and procedures on the 
d isc losure o f Members' outside in te re s ts .  Indeed an exchange between 
the Leader o f the House and S ir  Harmer N icho lls  (Cons) on an in te rp re ­
ta t io n  o f Erskine May - whether the provis ion fo r  declaration re ferred 
to  speaking to  an issue or voting in a debate - i l lu s t ra te d  the disagree­
ment and confusion which existed even among long-serving Members. In 
con trast to Mr Iremonger (Cons) who two years e a r l ie r  had commended 
the comprehensiveness and c la r i t y  o f Erskine May on the subject o f  Members' 
in te re s ts ,  on th is  occasion Mr Peart remarked th a t : -
' . . .  considering the importance o f th is  matter, the outstanding 
feature o f Erskine May in  th is  f i e ld  is  i t s  narrowness, i t s  impre­
c is ion  and i t s  extreme b re v i ty . 'g g
However, he d e f t ly  removed the s ting  from his c r i t ic is m  by a ff irm ing  
the pe rs is ten t theme in the h is to ry  o f the declaration o f Members' in te r ­
ests th a t u l t im a te ly  the so lu t ion  l ie s  not in  rules but in the honesty, 
in te g r i t y  and s e l f - d is c ip l in e  o f ind iv idua l Members
'E sse n t ia l ly  o f course, the underlying assumption has been and 
always must be tha t hon. Members can be re lie d  upon to assess these 
de lica te  matters in an honourable and proper way and th a t de ta iled
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rules are undesirable and unnecessary. From my long experience 
in  th is  House I believe tha t th is  is  r ig h t . 'g g
He stressed th a t the establishment o f the Select Committee did not 
imply in  any way th a t Members should not have outside in te re s ts ,  nor 
d id i t  ind ica te  a lowering o f the high standards t r a d i t io n a l ly  observed 
by the House. I t  merely s ig n if ie d  tha t there had been a recent growth 
in the extent and complexity o f 'borderland' Members' in te re s ts .  With 
th is  in mind he indicated the proposed Select Committee would be com­
posed o f senior and experienced Members o f  the House, on s im ila r  l ines
to the Committee o f  P riv i leges . Referring to the second part o f the
Prime M in is te r 's  statement, he reported tha t discussions were s t i l l  
continuing through the usual channels. Although the Leader o f  the House 
had acknowledged the growing d isqu ie t among Members, his speech had 
made no reference to growing fears concerning the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f corrup­
t io n  or corrupt p ractices. These terms, however, gained currency in 
the debate via backbench comments. Mr Hamilton asserted tha t the only 
way to convince the public tha t Parliament was uncorrupt and in co rru p t ib le
was to provide a public  r e g i s t e r , w h i l s t  S ir  Douglas Glover (Cons)
argued tb the contrary tha t the very fa c t  th is  debate was being held 
showed th a t many honourable Members did not th in k  the House was inco rrup t-  
ib le T ’
Members speaking both fo r  and against the motion frequently  sought
72refuge in arguments o f privacy and p u b l ic i t y ,  w ith  Mr English (Lab) 
advocating the case fo r  greater p u b l ic i ty  on the grounds tha t government 
in th is  country has changed:-
' I t  is  not a l i t t l e  House o f  Commons th a t s i ts  in secret and 
does not allow i t s  matters to be pub lished... I t  is a public repre­
sen ta tive  body which represents the whole o f the people o f the 
United Kingdom.'yg
Therefore he argued th a t : -
'The important po in t surely is  not whether hon. Members know 
the interests^of other hon. Members... The important th ing surely 
is  whether members o f the public  know the in te res ts  o f  hon.
Members.'y^
The recurrent controversy over the d e s i ra b i l i t y  of f u l l “ time or 
part-t im e MPs surfaced, w ith Mr Michael English recommending a combination 
o f  fu ll- t im e and part-t im e M e m b e r s S i r  Harmar N icholls (Cons) promot­
ing the continuance o f part-t im e Members as bringing ' f i r s t -h a n d  exper­
ience' to the House;^^ and Mr James Dickens (Lab) in s is t in g ,  to  the 
con tra ry , tha t the requirements o f  modern government necessitated f u l l -
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time membership o f the national le g is la tu re .^ ^  Mr John Pardoe (L ib) 
voiced support fo r  the la t t e r  view and in doing so attempted to include 
in  the debate discussion o f Members' remuneration; h imself be liev ing 
th a t inadequate pay fo r  backbenchers encouraged, i f  not forced, them 
to take outside in te re s ts : -
'The method o f remuneration and the need fo r  outside in te res ts
has a real a f fe c t  on the q u a l i ty  o f Members o f Parliament. We tend
to  be a shrine to the c u l t  o f the amateur and i t  does not do the
country ,any oood, nor the balance between the Executive and the le g is la tu re  any good.'yg '
The Leader o f the House res is ted such attempts to widen the debate, 
and in  defence o f con fin ing discussion w ith in  narrow l im i ts  he attempted 
to  m o l l i fy  his opponents by saying tha t he agreed w ith many o f  the com­
p la in ts  made but th a t ,  ' ( a ) l l  I say is  tha t th is  is  not the occasion 
on which we should debate those m a t t e r s H o w e v e r ,  as Mr Hamilton 
re to r te d :-
' I t  is  a l l  very well fo r  my r ig h t  hon. fr iend  the Leader o f the 
House to make favourable noises and say tha t we have had a good 
debate and th a t many valuable points have been made. They have 
been made fo r  years, w ith no obvious e f fe c t ,  because I do not th ink  
th a t the Government - any Government - are interested in providing 
f a c i l i t i e s  fo r  backbenchers the more adequately to challenge the 
Executive.'gg
When interv iewed, Mr Peart (now Lord Peart) re trospec tive ly  argued 
th a t the roo t o f the problem was the low pay o f Members which necess­
i ta te d  them taking outside in te re s ts ,  and he claimed tha t as Leader 
o f  the House he had been in favour o f providing MPs with an adequate 
sa lary . However, as shown, on th is  occasion he dismissed, or was himself 
compromised on, the issue o f Members' remuneration, perhaps i l lu s t r a t in g  
the problem o f the duel-capacity o f Leaders o f  the House who have to 
work both fo r  the good of the House and fo r  the good of the Executive.
To have allowed inqu iry  in to  Members' remuneration and f a c i l i t i e s  may 
have favoured the lo t  o f  Members, but may also have rebounded on the 
Executive by a l te r in g  the balance between the Executive and Legis lature 
to the advantage o f the la t t e r .  This problem o f the duel-capacity o f 
Leaders o f the House invo lv ing po ten tia l c o n f l ic t  between a lleg iance 
to backbenchers and to the Government was affirmed by another former 
Leader o f the House, Mr Edward Short (now Lord Glenamara). When in te r ­
viewed, he i l lu s t ra te d  the problem by re fe rr in g  to the practice o f the 
Leader o f  the House announcing the next week's business at the end o f 
Prime M in is te r 's  Questions on Thursday afternoons. Although he makes
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th is  announcement as Leader o f the House informing backbenchers, th is  
time has almost become an extension o f Question Time w ith MPs asking 
most questions on government po licy  ra ther than on the nature o f next 
week's business and th is  forces the Leader o f the House in to  the ro le  
o f  party p o l i t ic ia n  defending Government po licy .
Imputations o f u l t e r io r  motives on the part o f the Government ex­
tended to  c r i t ic is m  o f the second motion, nominating the members o f 
the Committee. Several Members objected to the composition o f the 
Committee and wished to know more about the manner o f  se lec t ion ;^^  Mr 
Arthur Lewis moving two amendments to give the Leader o f  the House the 
opportun ity  to  explain why - with the one exception o f the Liberal Chief 
Whip (Mr Eric Lubbock) - a l l  the members were Privy C ouncil lo rs , and 
a l l  except one, had, or had had, outside in te res ts . The la t t e r  c r i t i ­
cism was s p e c i f ic a l ly  taken up by Mr John E l l i s  (Lab) who noted some 
o f  the Committee had already discussed the f i r s t  meeting and tha t ' . . . a t
leas t the f i r s t  meeting w i l l  be held in the afternoon, because they
82a l l  have jobs or something to do in the morning.'
Mr Lewis wished to see several backbenchers among the membership 
and several other backbench Members, though not objecting in p r in c ip le  
to  the inc lus ion  o f Privy Council lo rs , supported his demand.
Such support came not only from the m ino r ity  o f ' le f t -w in g '  Labour 
MPs who had cons is ten t ly  championed the cause o f a re g is te r  of Members' 
in te re s ts ,  but also from more moderate Labour Members, Mr Michael English 
among them. He too considered the Select Committee, denuded o f MPs 
w ithout in te res ts  and packed with Privy Councillors was not representa­
t iv e  o f the House. He wished to know where the suggestion to appoint 
Privy Councillors came from, and in response to Mr William Whitelaw's 
(Opposition Chief Whip) re to r t  tha t the Opposition were inv ite d  to chose 
whom they l ik e d ,  Mr English cy n ic a l ly  remarked:-
' I can only suggest th a t  i t  is one o f the most extraordinary 
coincidences o f th is  Parliament th a t on so many issues . . .  the minds 
o f both f ro n t  benches have come to th ink  a l ike  when the backbenches 
have not. In th is  case, i t  is  an extremely strange co-incidence 
th a t my r ig h t  hon. Friend and the Opposition Chief Whip, e n t i re ly  
independently, arrived at the conclusion tha t a l l  the members o f 
the Committee should be Privy C o u n c il lo rs . '^ ^
The pessim istic conclusion drawn by these dissenting Members was th a t 
the Committee would be a 'safe committee' comprising Members who would 
tend ' to  preserve the status quo, would ra ther things went on as they 
always have. They are status quo people '.
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In the event Mr Arthur Lewis's amendments were negatived and the
House resolved w ithout a d iv is io n : -
'That Mr George Darling, Mr Patrick Gordon Walker, S ir  Eric 
F le tcher, Mr Eric Lubbock, Mr James Ramsden, Mr G.R. Strauss, S ir  
John Vaughn-Morgan, S ir  Derek Walker-Smith and Mr George W i l l is  
be Members o f the Committee.'gg
Part 2: The 1969 Select Committee and i t s  Report
The in te rna l dynamics o f the Select Committee
' . . .  the choice o f  a chairman and the other members o f a committee 
is  c le a r ly  a matter o f great importance from the point o f view o f 
the way in which the committee approaches i t s  task and the kind 
o f  report which i t  produces, as well as ind ica ting  the motives behind
i t s  appointment.' Gerald Rhodes®®
Much has been w r i t te n  and much remains to be w r it te n  about the in te rna l
87dynamics o f  se lec t committees. A ll  members o f th is  Committee (com­
p r is in g  5 Labour MPs, 3 Conservative MPs and 1 Liberal MP) with the 
exception o f  the Libera l Chief Whip, were Privy Councillors and they 
were indeed senior Members o f  the House, predominantly with m in is te r ia l  
experience. Two-thirds o f them were aged 60 plus at the time o f the
Committee and, again with the exception o f the Liberal Member, the average
88length o f  service in the House was 24 years. Almost a l l  the Committee 
members had some kind o f in te re s t  (eg. they included d ire c to rs ,  ex­
d ire c to rs ,  b a r r is te r ,  underwriter, P.R. adv iser, author, sponsored Member, 
e tc . ) .
As usual (except on committees th a t the Opposition cha irs) the senior 
Member o f  the Government side was nominated as Chairman. I t  emerged 
from in terv iew  data th a t some ob jection to th is  choice had been voiced, 
but th a t the Prime M in is te r (Mr Harold Wilson) had apparently favoured 
Rt. hon. G.R. Strauss on the additiona l ground tha t he was, 'a m i l l io n a ire  
with no axe to g r in d ' .  When interviewed, Mr Strauss described his leader­
ship function  as one o f  'adv is ing ' ra ther than 'd i re c t in g '  the Committee. 
Another Member o f  the Committee described him as the 'motor' o f the 
Committee; an active  chairman o f an inves tiga to ry  se lect committee, 
not l ik e  the chairman o f  a standing committee who, l ik e  the Speaker 
in  the Commons i t s e l f ,  is  an umpire applying the ru les . Put a t i t s
i r re d u c ib le  minimum the chairman's ro le  as 'moderator or t r a f f i c  po lice -
89man o f  the discussion, as guardian of points o f o r d e r ' , provides the
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opportun ity fo r  i n i t i a t i v e ,  in te rven tion  and leadership denied to  other
members o f the committee and 'q u ite  le g it im a te ly ,  a chairman may by
the use o f his d iscre t ion  ass is t or retard some p a r t ic u la r  course o f 
on
a c t io n ' .
Mr Strauss himself described the essential feature o f a committee's
function ing  as the ' in te rp la y  between the c le rk ,  the chairman and the
committee', w ith the c le rk  being the 'lynchp in ' in the process. The
c le rk  is  both the servant o f  the whole committee and adviser to  the
chairman, d ra f t in g  the chairman's report and anything else which is
required ( in  th is  case he drafted the Liberal 'm in o r i ty '  report) and
h ig h lig h t in g  any points a t the request o f the committee. However, in
the la s t  analysis '(a )  secretary may give his advice, a chairman may
91give his ru l in g  but the committee has the la s t  word ', and th is  brings 
us back to the membership question. Two views o f the membership o f 
th is  Committee have been encountered so fa r :  f i r s t l y ,  tha t the Committee
would benefit from th e i r  background as long-serving Members and from 
th e i r  f i rs t-h a n d  experience o f problems which may a r ise ; and secondly, 
th a t  o lder Members in f a i r l y  safe seats would be s ta id , less ready fo r  
change and would thus be esse n tia l ly  's ta tus quo' people. Further comment 
must wa it u n t i l  a f te r  a consideration both o f the procedure o f the Comm­
i t t e e  and o f i t s  Report.
The Committee held a to ta l  o f 11 meetings ' to  consider the rules 
and practices o f the House in  re la t io n  to the declaration o f Members' 
in te re s ts  and to report thereon'. At the f i r s t  meeting the motion was 
made and the question put by S ir  J. Vaughn-Morgan, th a t the Committee 
should meet on Tuesdays a t ha lf-pas t four o 'c lock . An amendment was 
proposed by Mr Eric Lubbock to leave out 'Tuesdays a t ha lf-pas t fou r ' 
and in s e r t  'Wednesdays a t ha lf-pas t te n ' .  In the l i g h t  o f e a r l ie r  com­
ments by Mr John E l l i s  (Lab) tha t the Committee had already decided 
to  hold a t leas t the f i r s t  meeting in  the afternoon because they a l l  
had outside in te res ts  o f  some sort to pursue in the morning the question 
arises as to whether Mr Lubbock's amendment was a 'gesture ' ind ica ting
his disapproval o f outside in te re s ts . When interviewed Mr Lubbock (now
92Lord Avebury) confirmed tha t th is  was so. The amendment was defeated 
by 5 votes to 3 and the Committee resolved to meet on Tuesdays a t h a l f ­
past fo u r o 'c lock  (the only dissenter to the main question being Mr 
Lubbock).
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When interviewed, the Chairman o f the Committee refuted the sugges­
t io n  tha t the Committee had been set up with narrow terms o f reference, 
and ins is ted  th a t these had been based on issues raised by backbenchers 
and th a t inany case the Committee could go outside i t s  rem it and ask 
questions on any re la ted matter. The Clerk, however, departed s l ig h t ly  
from th is  view and said tha t the Committee had been bound by i t s  terms 
o f reference, but tha t there had been scope fo r  in te rp re ta t io n  eg. the 
terms were wide enough to enable discussions o f  the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f a 
re g is te r .  He acknowledged the l im ita t io n s  o f the Committee's Report, 
but given the fa c t  tha t even with a re s tr ic te d  perspective the Committee 
had produced a substantia l document suggested tha t p rac tica l constra in ts  
cast the Committee in  the ro le  o f a 'se a rch l ig h t ' fo r  an area giv ing 
troub le  ra ther than an exhaustive inqu iry  providing d e f in i t iv e  answers.
Q3The 1969 Select Committee Report
The Committee opened th e i r  Report by e x p l ic i t l y  spe lling  out the 
l im i ts  they chose to place on the scope o f th e i r  order o f  reference. 
Evidence was received on fou r 're la ted  matters' which in the Committee's 
view lay outside th e i r  remit. S ig n i f ic a n t ly  these areas included two 
aspects o f the problem which, as shown above, had been cons is ten tly  
raised by backbenchers and dismissed out o f court by the Government.
The f i r s t  was the issue o f Members' remuneration which the Committee 
acknowledged as an important top ic  but beyond th e i r  proper concern which 
was s p e c i f ic a l ly  w ith the declaration of Members' in te res ts^^  (thus 
disregarding the possible connection between the low-pay o f Members 
and th e i r  pursuing outside in te re s ts ) .  Again i t  must be remembered 
th a t th is  Committee sat before the f i r s t  Report o f the Top Salaries 
Review Body in 1971, which looked a t M in isters o f  the Crown and Members 
o f  Parliament.
The second area to be excluded was the fundamental question whether 
MPs ought to have outside occupations in add ition  to th e i r  duties as 
MPs. The Committee had been advised by the Leader o f  the House th a t ,
' I  hope i t  w i l l  not be thought tha t Parliament or myself as Leader o f 
the House, or indeed I th ink  the Prime M in is te r ,  ob ject to Members having 
outside i n t e r e s t s T h e y  concluded tha t most witnesses (with the 
sp e c if ic  exception, however, o f Mr E.J. Milne MP who argued the contrary 
case)^^ had te s t i f ie d  to  the bene fit  derived by the House from the va r ie ty  
o f knowledge and expertise gained from outside in te re s ts ,  and therefore
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they f e l t  i t  unnecessary to pass judgment on the issue. Thus b u i l t  
in to  the Report was the question-begging p r io r  assumption o f the pro­
p r ie ty  of MPs having outside in te re s ts . ,
The other two areas s p e c i f ic a l ly  ruled out were consideration o f 
the rules and practices which govern, or should govern, the p r iva te  
in te res ts  o f  m inisters e ith e r  while holding o f f ic e  or subsequently, 
and the spec if ic  workings o f  domestic or fore ign organ isations, f i rm s , 
companies etc. except to the extent tha t the personal pecuniary in te res ts  
o f  Members were involved. Presumably, the in te r -p a r ty  ta lks  announced 
a t the same time as the Select Committee were intended to look fu r th e r  
in to  the la t t e r  area.
In o u t l in in g  the problem as they saw i t  the Committee drew heavily 
on the Prime M in is te r 's  statement o f 26th March, and s im i la r ly  id e n t i ­
f ie d  (and u lt im a te ly  b u i l t  in to  th e i r  two main recommendations) two 
separate issues: f i r s t l y ,  the recent doubts about Members having a
paid connection w ith  an outside in te re s t  involved in matters which are 
the concern o f Parliament and o f Government; and secondly the a c t iv i t ie s  
o f  organisations (p a r t ic u la r ly  public re la t ion s  firm s) holding an account 
on behalf o f  an overseas Government or p o l i t ic a l  in te re s t ,  whether or
not they employed B r i t is h  MPs. In a climate o f a l l - p a r ty  anx ie ty , ampli-
97f ie d  by Members g iv ing  evidence, they confirmed th a t : -
'Your Committee recognise these apprehensions. A number o f recent 
inc idents seem to them to  ra ise the question not only whether the 
in te re s ts  concerned should have been disclosed but also how fa r  
a c t iv i t ie s  on behalf of those in te res ts  are w ith in  the ex is t in g  
ru les o f  the House governing the proper scope o f a Members pecuniary 
i n te r e s t . ' gg
The remainder o f the Report was presented in three parts : a survey
o f the re levant law, practice and procedure o f Parliament and considera­
t io n  o f i t s  adequacy today; consideration o f new machinery which might 
improve present p ractices; and consideration o f a code o f conduct fo r  
Members. The ensuing discussion o f the Report w i l l  re ta in  these d iv is ions
The present law, practice and procedure
Much o f  the substance o f th is  section o f  the Report has been docu­
mented in  Chapter 3 o f th is  study and w i l l  therefore not be repeated 
here. However, the Committee's comments on the adequacy o f ex is t ing  
rules and conventions provide a valuable in s ig h t in to  th e i r  perception 
o f  the problem.
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( i ) Payments and rewards to Members
The Committee were in s is te n t  tha t the t ra d i t io n a l  d is t in c t io n  
between i l l i c i t  forms o f payment which had been the subject o f  action 
by the House in the past and the f in a n c ia l assistance received by 
Members (eg. payments made to  the constituency parties  o f certa in  
Members by Trade Unions and Co-operative Societies) remained va l id  - 
the essential d iffe rence being tha t payments in  the f i r s t  category were 
offered or accepted in re la t io n  to sp e c if ic  measures coming before the 
House; the second category were not.
They concluded th a t  the resolutions o f  the House re s t r ic t in g  pro­
fessional advocacy were too narrow in re la t io n  to  modern conditions 
and could not be held to provide a c lear code o f conduct fo r  Members 
who belonged to professions other than the Bar, and s t i l l  less fo r  Members 
with more tenuous connections with outside in te res ts . This c r i t ic is m  
formed the basis o f the Committee's second recommendation (see below).
( i i )  Voting
The Committee re in forced the c r i t ic is m  previously voiced by the
go
Select Committee on the House o f  Commons D isq u a l i f ica t io n  B i l l  1956 
th a t the practice  and procedure o f the House on voting w ith a pecuniary 
in te re s t  was obscure and not well understood by Members - a common con­
fusion occurring between the practice governing voting w ith  a pecuniary 
in te re s t  (which the Committee found c le a r ly  described in Erskine May 
but o f  l im ite d  app lica t ion ) and the custom o f declaring an in te re s t  
p r io r  to speaking in  debate (which they found imprecise and o f uncertain 
o r ig in ) .  They met the c r i t ic is m  th a t successive in te rp re ta t io ns  o f 
Mr Speaker Abbot's ru l in g  o f  1811 had rendered the ru lin g  fo r  p rac tica l 
purposes n u ll  and void with s im ila r  arguments to those used by the 189(? 
Select Committee on Members' In te re s ts , th a t to replace the ru l in g  with 
a standing order de fin ing  a pecuniary in te re s t  would be im prac tica l,  
too r ig id  and might even f a c i l i t a t e  the improper use o f  votes. There­
fore they recommended no change in the current system based on Mr Speaker 
Abbot's ru l in g ,  commending i t  as 'an appropriate framework w ith in  which 
Members can carry out th e i r  primary representative function o f voting 
on issues o f  National scope and extent
( i i i )D e c la ra t io n  o f in te re s t
The th ru s t  o f  t h e i r  c r i t ic is m  was reserved fo r  the ex is t in g  custom 
o f declara tion o f in te re s t ,  which they considered lacked comprehensiveness
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and c la r i t y .  Current practice raised two p a r t ic u la r  problems - f i r s t  
what kind o f in te re s t  should be declared, and secondly when should an 
in te re s t  be declared? With regard to the la t t e r  problem they noted 
the Leader o f the House's suggestion tha t the present practice  was defec­
t iv e  in not extending to advocacy by Members at informal committees
101or gatherings, or matters fo r  which they were receiv ing payment.
Unlike the practice governing voting with a pecuniary in te re s t ,  the 
custom o f declaration has not been^dealt with by Erskine May or the 
Manual o f  procedure, la rg e ly  because o f the prevalent assumption tha t 
hon. Members can be re l ie d  upon to assess such de lica te matters in an 
honourable way and tha t de ta iled  rules are undesirable and/or unnecess­
ary. Although agreeing in p r in c ip le  with th is  assumption, the Committee 
nevertheless f e l t  th a t i f  rules had to e x is t ,  then i t  was fa r  be tte r 
th a t they should provide a c lear and comprehensive guide. Thus they 
recommended c la r i f y in g  and extending the present practice and tackled 
th is  task in th e i r  f i r s t  recommendation (see below).
Register o f Members' in te res ts
P rio r to formulating th e i r  recommendations the Committee d e l ib e r­
ated on how such c la r i f i c a t io n  and enlargement could be achieved. As 
noted above th e i r  terms o f reference were f le x ib le  enough to enable 
them to consider the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f a re g is te r ,  which, as has been seen, 
was the ob jective canvassed both by a small but vociferous group o f 
predominantly Labour Members and by extra-parliamentary sources, notably 
the press.
Encouraged by Andrew Roth's judgment tha t a re g is te r  o f Members'
in te re s ts  'would make i t  easier fo r  honest spokesmen o f serious in te res ts
102to conduct th e i r  necessary d ia logue ',  the Committee were w i l l in g  
to inqu ire  in to  th is  possible so lu t ion . They received evidence which 
f e l l  la rg e ly  in to  two groups - proposals fo r  Members' to  re g is te r  th e i r  
in te re s ts ;  and proposals fo r  outside persons or organisations to re g is te r  
d e ta i ls  o f payments or benefits  made ava ilab le  to Members.
In the f i r s t  category they considered a proposal tha t the re g is te r  
should be a duplicate  o f  the re levant part o f each Member^s income tax 
form. Much o f f i c i a l  argument, including tha t o f the Leader o f the House 
and the Clerk o f the House, had been lodged against th is  suggestion 
on the grounds tha t i t  would be an invasion o f  privacy and 'would place 
a Member in a position d i f fe re n t  from any other o f her Majesty's
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103subjects by revealing his e n t ire  f in a n c ia l arrangements'. The
Committee also believed tha t th is  procedure would involve insuperable
p rac tica l problems.
A fu r th e r  suggestion, fo r  a re g is te r  based on sources and level
o f income, was furnished both by Mr Andrew Roth and Mr W illiam
Hamilton MP, who produced two a lte rn a t ive  s c h e m e s . B o t h  schemes,
though d i f fe r in g  in emphasis, included shareholdings above a basic
minimum and th is  c r i te r io n  was s im i la r ly  challenged on the grounds o f
invasion o f  privacy and o f d i f fe re n t ia t in g  MPs from other c it izen s
' in  an unusual and perhaps undesirable way'.^^^ I t  was also pointed
out in evidence th a t th is  category could be eas ily  evaded unless wives
and ch ildren were s im i la r ly  subject to disclosure. On th is  issue the
Leader o f the House had informed the Committee tha t ' I do not th ink  tha t
the House is  th ink ing  in terms o f people l ik e  th is ' . ^ ^ ^
A more l im ite d  proposal was made which would r e s t r i c t  re g is tra t io n
to MPs who acted as consultants. The Committee acknowledged th is  would
cover the type o f a c t iv i t y  which had led to th e i r  appointment ( i . e .  the
Bagier a f f a i r )  but expressed doubt on how the association o f  a Member
107with  a public re la t ion s  f irm  could be defined.
As a general comment on enforcing or maintaining any type o f  reg is ­
te r  o f Members' in te res ts  the Committee concluded tha t a voluntary 
re g is te r  would be an impracticable basis fo r  re g is te r ing  the in te res ts  
o f  Members generally ( in  contrast to one confined to Members o f a small 
party i . e .  the Liberal Party reg is te r^^^) but tha t a compulsory re g is te r ,  
w ith i t s  im p lica t ion  o f sanctions would carry the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f placing
the House in the d i f f i c u l t  pos ition o f having to d is c ip l in e  i t s  own 
109Members.
The Committee also considered the experience o f other Parliaments
in  dealing with Members' in te res ts . They looked a t Canada, France,
110Sweden and the U.S.A., be lieving these to represent reasonable cover­
age o f d i f fe re n t  kinds o f Parliament and region, and found tha t o f 
these four countries only the U.S.A. had a formal procedure fo r  declara­
t io n  o f Members' pecuniary in te res ts .
On balance the Committee concluded:-
'A l l  the reg is te rs  so fa r  considered would expose to the public 
view much more information than is  declared under the House's 
present custom o f  declaring an in te re s t .  The object o f th a t  
custom is ,  or should be, to inform Members and the public o f any 
f in a n c ia l in te re s t  touching an issue which is  cu rren tly  the
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subject o f a Member's speech or action. I t  does not require dec­
la ra t io n  o f f in a n c ia l in te res ts  i r re le v a n t  to th e i r  purpose...
(A) general re g is te r  is  directed to the contingency th a t an 
in te re s t  might a f fe c t  a Member's action . The House's practice is ,  
or should be, aimed at revealing an in te re s t  when i t  does a f fe c t  
i t .  In Your Committee's view th is  is r ig h t .  The public  scru tiny  
o f the whole range o f  Member's f in a n c ia l in te re s t  may be a proper 
a c t iv i t y  fo r  jo u rn a l is ts ,  compilers o f reference books and academics; 
i t  is  not essential to the way in which the House conducts i t s  
business»
Thus they dismissed the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f a re g is te r  not on le g a l is t ic  
or technical grounds - though they said they could have l is te d  even more 
o f  such grounds than those given in evidence - but on objections o f p r in ­
c ip le ,  the choice in th e i r  view being 'e i th e r  to estab lish a cumbrous 
in q u is i to r ia l  machinery which is  l i k e ly  to be evaded by the few Members
i t  is designed to enmesh or to improve and extend the t ra d i t io n a l  prac-
112tices  o f the House. They chose the la t t e r  course.
With regard to the second category o f proposals - fo r  outside organ­
isa tions  to re g is te r  d e ta i ls  o f  payments or benefits made ava ilab le  to 
Members, the Committee noted tha t although the In s t i tu te  o f Public 
Relations had a prescribed code o f  conduct fo r  members and machinery fo r  
enforcing the code (v iz .  th e i r  suspension o f Maurice Fraser) th e i r  e f fo r ts  
were hampered because not everyone in th is  l in e  o f business had to be 
a f f i l i a t e d .  Largely because o f th is  fa c t  the Committee doubted the value 
o f  t ry in g  to develop in  conjunction w ith the In s t i tu te  a re g is te r  and 
code o f conduct re qu ir in g , among other th ings , a declaration o f the 
employment o f  a Member o f Parliament. They considered even i f  the re g is te r  
were confined to lobbying in which there was a pecuniary element - as is 
the case in  America under the Federal Regulation o f Lobbying Act 1946 - 
i t  would s t i l l  be d i f f i c u l t  to devise a sa t is fa c to ry  basis fo r  a code o f
conduct in the absence o f any generally accepted code w ith in  the f ie ld  o f
113public  re la t io n s .
The Committee had no au tho r ity  to  inqu ire  in to  the s ta tus , r igh ts  
and powers o f the In s t i tu te  o f Public Relations, but they noted tha t the 
In s t i tu te  intended to seek le g is la t io n  which would require a l l  public 
re la t ion s  consultants to obtain a licence to practice . The Committee ex­
pressed a hope th a t when Parliament was inv ite d  to consider such le g is la ­
t io n ,  a s ta tu to ry  code o f  conduct would be included which would s p e c i f i ­
c a l ly  require the public d isclosure o f the employment on parliamentary
matters o f an MP ind ica ting  the ob ject of the employment and the remuner-
114ation  to be paid.
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A code o f conduct
Having opposed the in troduction  o f  a re g is te r ,  the Committee 
returned to the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  providing a comprehensive code o f con­
duct to guide Members in the discharge o f th e i r  du ties . They stated 
tha t in  t h e i r  view the executive character o f the re s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  o f 
members o f  local a u th o r it ie s  rendered local au tho r ity  practice  in th is  
area inappropriate as a model fo r  a code o f conduct su itab le  fo r  the 
duties o f a Member of Parliament.
They re-affirm ed the Leader o f the House's suggestion tha t the 
convention o f declaration o f in te re s t  should be extended; the log ic  o f  
t h e i r  argument encompassing Question Time. However, fo r  what they con­
sidered to be reasons o f  p r a c t ic a l i t y ,  the Committee chose not to include 
Questions, thereby perpetuating a gap in  the procedures regula ting : 
Members' in te re s ts ,  and neglecting what some back benchers considered 
(and s t i l l  consider) to be the most cruc ia l area where in te res ts  could 
be misused. The Committee recommended tha t the House should adopt the 
general re s o lu t io n :-
'That in any debate or proceeding o f the House or i t s  committees 
or transactions o r communications which a Member may have with other 
Members, or w ith Ministers or servants o f the Crown, he shall d is ­
close any re levant pecuniary in te re s t  or bene f it  o f  whatever nature, 
whether d ire c t  or in d ire c t ,  tha t he may have had, may have or may 
be expecting to have.'^^g
This would have the e f fe c t  o f form alis ing and extending practices 
which had a h is to r ic a l  base, by turn ing the convention o f declaration 
in to  a reso lu tion  o f  the House. The words 'o r  bene fit  o f whatever nature' 
included in the reso lu tion  were in d ica t ive  o f the Committee's desire to 
broaden the in te rp re ta t io n  o f  ' in te re s t '  to cover the growing spectrum 
o f  modern rewards, and were expressly intended to cover journeys abroad 
and associated benefits (the practice o f Members making v is i t s  overseas 
not coming w ith in  the ambit o f the proposed reso lu tion  re la t in g  to 
advocacy).
In tack l in g  what they had e a r l ie r  indicated to be the second strand 
o f  the problem, the Committee repeated th e i r  c r i t ic is m  o f the l im ite d  
app lica tion  o f  the House's resolutions concerning professional advocacy. 
Once more they h igh lighted the problem o f public re la t ions  a c t iv i t y ,  
dwelling p a r t ic u la r ly  upon the temptation to extend the ro le  o f the 
retained Member from one o f advice (which was acceptable) to one o f 
advocacy (which was no t) .^^^  They recommended tha t the House should
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extend i t s  p ro h ib it io n  on advocacy to  a l l  forms o f professional and 
analogous a c t iv i t ie s  by adopting the re s o lu t io n :-
'That i t  is  contrary to the usage and derogatory to the d ig ­
n i ty  o f  th is  House tha t a Member should bring forward by speech 
or question, or advocate in th is  House or among his fe l lo w  Members 
any b i l l ,  motion, matter or cause fo r  a fee, payment, re ta ine r 
or reward, d i re c t  or in d ire c t ,  which he has received, is  rece iv ­
ing or expects to receive.
As indicated above the v ia b i l i t y  o f th is  reso lu tion turned upon 
the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f d is t ingu ish ing  between advocacy o f a cause in P a r l ia ­
ment fo r  a fee or re ta ine r and the advancement o f an argument by a 
Member who, through a continuing association w ith an indus try , service 
or concern from which he may obtain some remuneration, is  able to draw 
upon s p e c ia l is t  knowledge o f the subject under debate. This was a f in e  
d is t in c t io n  but one which the Committee thought could be construed (by, 
say, the Committee o f P riv ileges i f  i t  came to th a t p o in t) .
The Committee concluded tha t the two resolutions together, backed 
up by the penal ju r is d ic t io n  o f the House i f  they were b la ta n t ly  con­
travened, would 'prove a re l ia b le  guide in a l l  but the most exceptional 
118circumstances'. I f  the code was adopted by the House they recommended
a copy should be sent by the Clerk o f the House to every Member, and sub­
sequently every new Member. The se tt ing  up o f a sessional committee on 
standards o f  conduct was considered unnecessary, but i t  was proposed 
th a t the Committee o f Priv ileges be inv ite d  to  comment once a session on 
the e ff ica cy  o f the code and report to the House.
The Committee vindicated the pessimism of some of the more ardent 
campaigners fo r  a re g is te r  o f Members' in te res ts  by closing the Report 
w ith  the somewhat conservative assessment th a t : -
'A code o f  conduct comprising these two reso lu tions, kept under 
period ic  review by the Committee o f Priv ileges and backed up by the 
u lt im ate  sanction tha t a serious breach could be held to  be a con­
tempt o f  the House, is  the most e f fe c t iv e  way o f regula ting the par­
liamentary a c t iv i t ie s  o f Members where these may overlap w ith th e i r  
personal f in a n c ia l in te res ts .
With h inds igh t, i t  is  easy to c r i t i c i s e  the Committee's assessment 
o f  the problem and th e i r  recommendations as unduly complacent. However, 
the Clerk o f  the Committee explained to th is  w r i te r  th a t a t  the time the 
u lt im ate  answer - a re g is te r  - did not ever look l ik e  commending i ts é T f ,  
even a f te r  the Committee had looked c lose ly  a t the U.S.A. experience.
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A perusal o f the proceedings o f the Committee reveals however th a t 
a re g is te r  was preferred by one member o f  the Committee. Mr Eric 
Lubbock, the maverick o f the group, tabled an amendment to  the d ra f t  
report e sse n tia l ly  replacing the Committee's recommendations fo r  a code 
o f conduct w ith a proposal fo r  a re g is te r  o f Members' in te res ts  con s is t­
ing o f a duplicate o f th e i r  tax re turns, and a record o f  journeys over­
seas paid fo r  by any government, organisation or in d iv id u a l.  In support 
o f  his amendment Mr Lubbock reversed the o f f i c ia l  argument about privacy 
and claimed th a t : -
' . . .  once an ordinary c i t iz e n  becomes a Member o f Parliament, 
he can no longer expect the same measure of personal privacy.
His re l ig io n ,  his codêi o f conddct and behaviour and even such 
personal decisions as the way in which he chooses to educate his 
ch ild ren become the subject o f leg it im a te  public knowledge and 
sc ru t iny . He has chosen de lib e ra te ly  "to l iv e  in a glass bowl" 
and by so doing he accepts a d i f fe re n t  status from th a t o f other 
c i t iz e n s .  The exposure to public view o f his p r iva te  f in a n c ia l 
in te re s ts ,  which would be a fa c to r  in his p o l i t ic a l  th in k in g , 
would be consistent w ith tha t special status.
This somewhat provocative argument was backed up by the proposition 
th a t an ob jective  statement o f a Member's f ina nc ia l in te res ts  would pro­
vide the essential basis fo r  anyone else assessing how fa r  a p a r t ic u la r  
in te re s t  in a p a r t ic u la r  context has to be taken in to  account. The 
amendment was defeated by 7 votes to 1 and the Report was passed in the 
form ou tlined above.
The 1969 Select Committee drew heavily upon the information provided
121in  both oral and w r i t te n  evidence but in e v ita b ly  in th e i r  conclusions 
and recommendations they u t i l is e d  th is  evidence s e le c t iv e ly .  They gave 
greater credence to evidence which found the so lu tions to c o n tro l l in g  
Members' in te res ts  in the extension and form alisa t ion  o f t r a d i t io n ,  ra ther 
than in any form o f re g is t ra t io n .
This p r o c l iv i t y  fo r  privacy and t ra d i t io n  re f le c ts  the tenor o f e v i­
dence provided both by the Leader o f the House and the Opposition Chief 
Whip. The la t t e r ,  Mr Whitelaw, g iv ing whole-hearted support to the ade­
quacy o f  e x is t in g  conventions, cast doubt on whether any rules o f the 
House could : solve the problem. Foreshadowing the position tha t he was 
to  take towards the Report when Lord President in 1970 he s ta te d :-
' I  believe tha t in the end th is  must be a matter fo r  the d isc re ­
t io n  o f  ind iv idua l Members, but a c lear statement by the Committee 
o f the dangers involved might go a long way towards making Members 
feel aware o f  th e i r  personal re s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  in such cases. '^22
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Making a more subtle stand fo r  t ra d i t io n  the Leader o f the House in ­
formed the Committee:-
' I f  you could a rr ive  a t a so lu tion where you re a l ly  allowed 
Erskine May to be applied to the new conditions and thereby re- 
adapting i t  here and the re , you w i l l  have an evo lution which I 
th in k  is  in keeping with Parliamentary t r a d i t io n .  I f  i t  is  necess­
ary to  have a re g is te r  in certa in  circumstances th is  is  what you 
have to consider; but I would hope tha t you would be able to do 
i t  the f i r s t  way. '^^3
How fa r  did the Chairman d ire c t  the course o f the Committee and to 
what extent did the composition o f the Committee determine the f lavou r 
o f the recommendations? A careful examination o f both the Report and the 
proceedings o f  the Committee has suggested a fu r th e r  aspect o f the poten­
t i a l  leadership function o f the Chairman to those noted e a r l ie r .  Mr 
Strauss's questioning o f  witnesses generally indicated a p re d i l ic t io n  fo r  
parliamentary t ra d i t io n  on his p a r t ,  as two p a r t ic u la r  statements made 
during his examination o f Mr Hamilton confirm. In place o f  a re g is te r  
he put the a l te rn a t iv e  to Mr Hamilton o f having a code o f conduct fo r  
MPs going wider than the present loose practice and suggested tha t the
code should be adopted by re so lu t ion , a breach o f which would be subject
124to  ad judication by the Priv ileges Committee. A co rro la ry  to th is  
statement was his observation th a t : -
'You w i l l  agree tha t however desirable a re g is te r  may be, i t  
does b r is t le  w ith great d i f f i c u l t i e s  i f  i t  is  to operate e ffec ­
t i v e ly  and in a way tha t does not in te r fe re  in a re a l ly  unaccept­
able way w ith the privacy which every in d iv id u a l,  including a 
Member, should enjoy? ' ^25
The a l te rn a t iv e  so lu tion  proffered to Mr Hamilton was so close to 
the recommendations eventually embodied in the Report tha t i t  lends 
weight to the view th a t committees, guided by th e i r  chairman, often form 
a view early  on in  the proceedings and subsequently tend to seek support 
f o r  th is  in preference to counselling other so lu tions. Frequently they 
take th e i r  cue from early  witnesses, in th is  case most probably from the 
Clerk o f  the House who provided the documentation (but who was re luc tan t 
to  give any view about what the House should do) and the Leader o f the 
House.
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Reaction to  the 1969 Select Committee Report 
( i ) Newspaper comment
'The report is  a b r ie f  fo r  the status quo... Like so many o f  the 
House's dealings with i t s e l f ,  the report smacks powerfu lly  o f the 
gentleman's club: Strangers, Keep Out.'
The Sunday Times (21.12.1969)
Thus the Sunday Times greeted the pub lica tion  o f the Select Committee 
Report, the fundamental weakness o f which they located in the Committee's 
adherence to the assumption tha t MPs should be treated no d i f fe re n t ly  
from priva te  c i t iz e n s .  Such an assumption rendered the Committee u n w il l ­
ing to acknowledge what was basic to the whole case fo r  d isc losure,
' ( t )h a t  MPs are public men elected by the public to serve the public 
in te re s t
The Financial Times found the second o f the proposed resolutions
e ith e r  'absurdly s t r i c t '  or else 'meaningless', and pointed out tha t 'The
Libera ls  have demonstrated tha t i t  (a re g is te r)  can be done w ithout o ffen- 
127sive p ry in g '.  Mr Ian Waller o f the Sunday Telegraph also saw 'no
reason why d ire c to rsh ips , consultancies and other appointments., should .
128not have to  be re g is te re d '.  The Times, who commented tha t the Report
had not succeeded in showing th a t a re g is te r  was t o t a l l y  impractical
or tha t i t  may not in the end prove necessary, also reserved s tr in gen t
c r i t ic is m  fo r  the new advocacy clause. This, they said , was based on a
d is t in c t io n  which, even i f  possible was somewhat unreal. The stronger
safeguard was to be found in the refurbished declara tion reso lu tion and
129the claim th a t th is  made on the 'honour' o f  MPs. Their confidence
was not however shared by the Guardian, who pointed out tha t the real 
d i f f i c u l t y  lay in the fa c t  th a t MPs had d i f fe re n t  views o f  what co n s t i­
tuted an in te re s t ;  a d i f f i c u l t y  which could undermine the main proposal
to formalise the custom requ ir ing  MPs to declare an in te re s t  when a re le -
130vant subject is  being discussed.
On balance, the tenor o f press comment was generally c r i t i c a l ,  
though few were as s tr id e n t  in th e i r  c r i t ic is m  as the Sunday Times who, 
although conceding the p rac tica l problems associated with a re g is te r ,  con­
cluded g loom ily :-
' I f  the Select Committee had t r u ly  believed in d isc losure, 
i t  could have mastered the d i f f i c u l t i e s .  What i t  lacked was not 
the means but the w i l l  to spike the narcissism of Parliament.
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Parliamentary response
The reaction o f Parliament i t s e l f  to the Report, narcissism notw ith­
standing, and the s ign if icance  of the Report fo r  subsequent parliamentary 
action is  d i f f i c u l t  to assess. Whilst no sp e c if ic  action followed in the 
immediate aftermath of the Report, many o f  the ideas o f the 1969 Select 
Committee (w ith the notable exception o f  the advocacy clause) were picked 
up in la te r  years. This la te n t e f fe c t  led the Chairman o f the Committee 
to  comment, perhaps somewhat g l ib l y ,  tha t the Committee Report during 
th is  time was not dead but 'sem i-ope ra t ive '; i t s  recommendations possess­
ing a 'fo rce  o f argument' though not a 'fo rce  o f  law '. Nevertheless 
no immediate action or decisions followed the pub lica tion  o f the Report.
A parliamentary question directed by Mr Hamilton to the Lord President 
in February 1970, e l ic i te d  a statement tha t the Government were s t i l l  con­
s idering  the recommendations o f the Select Committee - which had reported
in December 1969 - and would bring proposals before the House as soon as 
132possible. Whether the Report was squeezed out d e l ib e ra te ly ,  as some 
backbenchers suspected, o r whether, as stressed by the then Lord President 
and Leader o f  the House, the pressure o f business, fo llow ing  the p a r t ic ­
u la r ly  tu rbu len t 1968-1969 session, coupled with p re -e lec tion  euphoria, 
relegated the Report to the bottom of a busy agenda, the fa c t  remains 
th a t  the Labour Government took no action on the Report before the June 
1970 General E lection . Nor did they report any conclusions o f the in te r ­
party ta lks  on overseas public re la tions  a c t i v i t y ,  which although a n t i ­
cipated in the Prime M in is te r 's  statement on 26 March 1969, received no 
fu r th e r  mention. As Mr Douglas Houghton adjudged, by the time the 
Select Committee reported the s p i r i t  o f moral fervour which surrounded 
i t s  inception had subsided, to be replaced by lack o f  in te re s t  and sheer 
in e r t ia .
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CHAPTER 5
The 1974 Resolutions: A new Era in S e l f -d is c ip l in e
'The subject tha t we are to debate today is one which in recent 
years, both before and since the pub lica tion  o f the 1969 report o f 
the Select Committee on Members' In te rests  has been discussed at 
great length almost everywhere except on the Floor o f  th is  House.'
Rt. hon. Edward Short, 1974^ 
Following the publication o f the Select Committee Report in December 
1969, no changes occurred in the rules and conventions regula ting Members' 
outside f in a n c ia l in te res ts  u n t i l  May 1974, when the House agreed to three 
Government motions concerning the re g is tra t io n  and declaration o f  Members' 
in te re s ts .  In trac ing  th is  phase o f the 'modern campaign' fo r  a re g is te r  
o f Members' in te re s ts ,  th is  chapter has two main ob jectives. F i r s t ,  bear­
ing in mind the importance a tt r ib u te d  in  Chapter 1 o f  th is  study to p o l i t ­
ica l in a c t iv i t y  and non-decisionmaking as objects o f  in ve s t ig a t io n , i t  
examines parliamentary and Government in a c t iv i t y  fo llow ing  the pub lica tion  
o f  the 1969 Select Committee Report. Second, i t  traces the events which
the
culminated in/1974 Resolutions.
A change o f Government and a reassertion o f t ra d i t io n
The General E lection of 18 June 1970 returned a Conservative Govern­
ment, led by Rt. hon. Edward Heath, w ith an overa ll m a jo r ity  o f 31 seats. 
This represented a net gain fo r  the Conservatives o f 68 seats and a net
o
loss fo r  Labour o f 60 seats. The L ibera ls , the only party to operate 
a re g is te r  o f in te re s ts ,  suffered a loss o f 7 seats w ith  no gains. In c lu ­
ded among these losses was Mr Eric Lubbock, the Liberal Chief Whip, who 
had been the only member o f the 1969 Select Committee to argue fo r  a reg­
i s t e r  o f  in te re s ts .  Given that support fo r  a re g is te r ,  where i t  ex is ted, 
derived la rg e ly  from Labour and Liberal Members, the Conservative m a jo rity  
secured at the e lec tion  augured i l l  fo r  the chances o f any form o f reg is ­
te r  o f in te res ts  being introduced by the House.
The large number of Members in the new Parliament possessing outside 
business in te res ts  also appeared l i k e ly  to be an obstacle to any changes 
in  the d isc losure o f Members' in te re s ts .  A business p ro f i le  o f the 
new Parliament^ revealed 218 Members, or ju s t  over one-th ird  o f the 
House o f  Commons, w ith read ily  id e n t i f ia b le  business in te re s ts .  The 
overwhelming m a jo r ity  o f these, a l l  but 29 Members (27 o f whom were 
Labour), were Conservative MPs.^ Further, as one commentator in The^  
Times remarked:-
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'Looking a t the overa ll economic p ro f i le  o f the House o f 
Commons, the most remarkable fa c t  is the large number o f M.P.s 
with in te res ts  in p o l i t i c a l l y  sens it ive  ind us tr ie s . The Con­
s tru c t io n  indus try , fo r  one, is  heavily represented in P a r l ia ­
ment: on my estimate there are 18 M.P.s who before the new
Government were formed held d irec torsh ips in construction com­
pan ies .. .  Another p o l i t i c a l l y  sens it ive  in d u s tr ia l  area, well 
represented in Parliament, is  pharmaceuticals.. . 'g
The former Labour Government had been slow in reacting to the 1969 
Select Committee Report, but the new adm in is tra tion , as expected, was 
even less inc lined  to favour any changes in the regulation o f Members' 
in te re s ts .  Their negative reaction to the Select Committee Report in d i ­
cated unwillingness to give the subject any p r io r i t y .
Nor did they come under much pressure to upgrade the issue. Only 
8 Parliamentary Questions or supplementaries concerning Members' in te r ­
ests were asked during the Session 1970-1971, Of these, a l l  but one^ 
were asked by Labour Members who were already known to be vociferous on 
the sub ject; Mr W. Hamilton asking 5 questions, and Mr A. Lewis and Mr 
N. Tebbit asking one apiece. Most o f these questions pressed the Govern­
ment fo r  information or action on the recommendations o f the 1969 
Select Committee on Members' in te re s ts .  In reply to a Parliamentary 
Question by Mr W. Hamilton in July 1970, the Leader ofthe House, Mr White­
law, informed the House tha t the 1969 Select Committee Report, along w ith 
other se lec t committee reports o f the la s t  Parliament, was under consider­
a tion  and tha t the Government would bring forward proposals i f  they 
thought them appropria te .^
In October 1970, in response to another Question by Mr Hamilton, 
the Leader o f  the House revealed the Government's opinion of the Select 
Committee's recommendations by s ta t in g : -
' I am sure tha t the House is indebted to the Committee fo r  i t s  
statement o f the p r inc ip les  which should guide the conduct o f 
Members. This I g lad ly endorse. But the Resolutions proposed by 
the Committee have defects which I can see no means o f curing and 
I could not recommend them to the House.'g
In p a r t ic u la r  he found fa u l t  with the second reso lu tion of the Select 
Committee which in e f fe c t  was a reworking o f the t ra d i t io n a l  ru les and 
reso lu tions regarding advocacy. As explained in the proceeding chapter 
the v i a b i l i t y  o f th is  reso lu tion turned upon the p o s s ib i l i t y  of d is t in ­
guishing between advocacy o f a cause in Parliament fo r  a fee or re ta ine r 
and the advancement o f an argument by a Member who, through a continuing
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association with an indus try , service or concern from which he may 
obtain some remuneration, is  able to draw upon s p e c ia l is t  knowledge of 
the subject under debate (eg. a trade union MP). Mr Whitelaw f e l t  th a t 
th is  d is t in c t io n  would not hold up and th a t the reso lu tion  would be too 
r e s t r ic t iv e .  No doubt engaging in a c lever piece o f in te r -p a r ty  jo u s t ­
ing w ith Mr Hamilton, he argued:-
' . . .  one o f the troubles tha t the House must face is  tha t tha t 
formula would c e r ta in ly  mean tha t any Member sponsored by a trade 
union would not be able to ta lk  on matters concerned w ith trade 
unions - and I do not th ink  th a t tha t would be in the general 
in te re s t  o f the House.'g
As observed by Andrew Roth, ‘ i t  took an imagination to th ink  a Conserva­
t iv e  Government was worried about the increasing ly Le ft wing and vocal 
trade unions losing th e i r  Parliamentary vo ices '.
Mr Whitelaw was s a t is f ie d  with the fa c t  tha t the Committee had 
thoroughly investigated the s i tu a t io n  and had not considered i t  appropri­
ate to recommend a re g is te r .  As he had hoped would be the case, he saw 
the Committee as having performed a useful information exercise in making 
MPs aware both o f  the ex is t ing  rules and conventions regula ting Members' 
in te res ts  and the po tentia l dangers associated w ith possessing such in te r ­
ests.^ ^
In February 1971, pressed by Mr Hamilton to provide time fo r  a 
debate the Leader o f  the House agreed to consider the p o s s ib i l i t y  but 
would not promise time in the near fu tu re , kir Hamilton renewed his 
request the fo llow ing  month, th is  time making reference to the fo r th ­
coming in troduction  o f Commercial radio and saying tha t there were vested
in te res ts  concerned with th is  on the opposite benches and tha t the public
13should know what these were. Mr Whitelaw refused to accept the premises 
o f  Hamilton's question, and, echoing the sentiments underlying the e v i­
dence he had given to the Select Committee in 1969 when he had been Con­
servative Chief Whip,^^ be s ta ted :-
'Having considered th is  matter very c a re fu l ly ,  I th ink  th a t there 
is  widespread support in th is  House fo r  the view th a t i t  is  r ig h t  to 
re ly  on the good sense o f hon. Members ra ther than on formalised 
ru les . That is  c e r ta in ly  the view o f the O f f ic ia l  Opposition, and 
I be lieve tha t i t  is  the view o f many r ig h t  hon. and hon. Members.
Thus, po in ting to  common ground shared with the O f f ic ia l  Opposition, 
he endorsed the t ra d i t io n a l  approach o f the House towards the regula tion 
o f  Members' in te re s ts ,  with i t s  emphasis on the in te g r i t y ,  t r u s t  and d is ­
c re t ion  o f the ind iv idua l Member - another manifestation o f the fa m i l ia r
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tendency fo r  MPs to allude to the House o f Commons in terms reminiscent 
o f  those applicab le to gentlemen's clubs.
The issue o f  Members' in te res ts  remained dormant u n t i l  the Top 
Salaries Review Body reported in December 1971,^^ and accepted the argu­
ment tha t Members should be regarded as working on a fu l l - t im e  basis.
In May 1971 the Review Body, chaired by Lord Boyle, had been asked to 
review and recommend what changes were desirable in the emoluments, 
allowances and expenses o f M inisters o f the Crown and Members o f the 
House o f Commons. In th e i r  Report the Review Body looked a t the prob­
lem of choosing the basis upon which MPs' remuneration should be assessed 
- whether th e i r  job should be treated as fu l l - t im e  or part-t im e in  de te r­
mining the level o f pay - and acknowledged tha t while the p r in c ip le  o f 
remuneration was no longer disputed as i t  had been in 1911,^^ th is  ques­
t io n  had never received an a u th o r i ta t ive  answer.
Nor was there an abundance of empirical data upon which a u th o r ita ­
t iv e  judgments could be made. In formulating th e i r  opinion on the sub­
je c t  the Review Body conducted a survey o f the circumstances o f Members
1 qo f  Parliament and o f th e i r  views on remuneration, and in th e i r  Report 
recorded th a t : -
'Our survey... has shown . . .  tha t 70 per cent o f  Members other 
than o ff ice -ho lde rs  pursue some other regular or occasional occupa­
t io n ;  though in  many cases the amount o f time spent on the other 
occupation is  qu ite  small. Nearly 60 per cent o f the Members con­
cerned spend under 10 hours per week pursuing th e i r  other occupa­
tions  while Parliament is  s i t t i n g ,  and a fu r th e r  29 per cent spend 
from 10 to 19 hours per week. Two-thirds o f these Members earn 
over £1,000 per year from th e ir  other occupations, over one-th ird  
more than £3,000, and o n e - f i f th  earn over £5,000, w ith the higher 
f igu res  tending to be earned by Members with constituencies in or 
near London. As is  to be expected. Members with other occupations 
spend less time both in attending the House and on other P a r l ia ­
mentary business. We found tha t involvement in  an outside occupa­
t io n  was regarded by a t least three out o f fou r Members as benefic ia l 
to  the work o f Parliament by keeping Members in touch with other areas 
o f  l i f e  and providing expertise helpful to the work of Parliament.
Only a small number o f those pursuing other occupations f e l t  tha t i t  
was a disadvantage which was forced on them by f in a n c ia l necessity. 
Many Members, however, have been a t pains to point out to us tha t 
the job o f  an M.P. is  increasing ly becoming fu l l - t im e  and tha t i t  
becomes progressively more d i f f i c u l t  to combine i t  s a t is fa c to r i ly  
w ith another regular occupation.'gg
To th is  they added tha t while some three-quarters o f Members con­
sidered th a t the ex is t ing  degree o f involvement in other occupations was 
benef ic ia l to the House, most Members f e l t  tha t the salary should be 
assessed on a fu l l - t im e  basis. They estimated tha t only one out o f 16
I l l
Members spent, or admitted to spending, less than 40 hours per week on
parliamentary work, while the average fo r  a l l  Members included in the
21survey was, or was claimed to  be, 63 hours.
On the basis o f th e i r  review they concluded th a t the present cen­
tu ry  has seen a change in the ro le  o f  Members o f Parliament, both in 
terms o f  what th e i r  constituents expect o f them and in terms o f  the way 
in  which tha t ro le  is  viewed by Members themselves, and they recommended 
tha t :-
'One e f fe c t  o f these changes is tha t the job o f an MP has 
become increas ing ly  f u l l - t im e ,  and in our view i t  is essential 
th a t  the level o f remuneration should be adequate to provide fo r  
fu l l - t im e  Members w ithout other sources o f income. We consider 
th a t the minimum f ig u re  to which the salary o f Members should 
fo r th w ith  be raised is  £4,500.22 (My emphasis)
When the Leader o f the House announced the publication o f the Review
23Body Report to the House on 6 December, and intimated the Government's 
in te n t io n  to accept the proposals, two back bench Members were prompted 
to  seek fu r th e r  information about the Government's po licy  on Members' 
in te re s ts .  Mr Wellbeloved (Lab), disturbed by the facts  disclosed in 
the Report in connection w ith  Members' outside a c t iv i t ie s ,  asked the Lord 
President whether he would consider bringing forward w ith his proposals 
to  implement the Boyle Committee's report a programme fo r  'the  f u l l
24and compulsory d isc losure o f  Members' outside in te res ts  and remuneration.' 
While reminding Mr Wellbeloved th a t the Report o f the 1969 Select Committee 
had been discussed a t the time through the usual channels and i t  had 
been agreed th a t no fu r th e r  action should be taken, Mr Whitelaw indicated 
th a t he was prepared to re-open discussion on the subject. S ir  D.
Walker-Smith inquired whether he was to understand from Mr Whitelaw's 
rep ly  th a t not only had the Government agreed not to implement the 
1969 Select Committee recommendations, but tha t they had decided action
pr
o f any kind was unnecessary or undesirable in th is  regard. Mr Whitelaw 
re jected th is  in te rp re ta t io n  and argued tha t the Government had so 
fa r  taken no action in  th is  f ie ld  because o f  the immense d i f f i c u l t i e s  
in doing so.
Thus, there appears to have been a s h i f t  in the a t t i tu d e  o f the 
Leader o f  the House a f te r  the Boyle Report. However, th is  apparent 
s h i f t  in a t t i tu d e  was not ra p id ly  trans la ted in to  overt action. In 
response to 2 Labour Parliamentary Questions tabled in January 1972,^^
Mr Whitelak indicated tha t the Government were s t i l l  luke-warm towards
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the idea o f reconsidering the 1969 Select Committee Report but would 
do so ' i f  i t  were the general wish o f the House'. He also implied 
that the Government remained f i rm ly  opposed to the idea o f a re g is te r  
o f  in te re s ts ,  whether compulsory or vo luntary. Nothing more occurred 
on the subject u n t i l  rumours concerning the involvement o f Members 
o f  Parliament in  the Poulson a f f a i r  began to  surface in  July 1972.
Since the events surrounding th is  case undoubtedly played a major part 
in  es tab lish ing  Members' in te res ts  f i rm ly  on the p o l i t ic a l  agenda, 
we must now examine them in some d e ta i l .  Whilst extra-parliamentary 
a c t iv i t y  is  not ignored, a tten tion  is  focussed on the response o f  Members 
o f  Parliament to the Poulson reve la tions.
71The Poulson a f f a i r
Mr John Poulson was an a rc h ite c t  who expanded his practice to 
es tab lish  a s tr in g  o f  business companies, property management consultants, 
a construction company. Open Systems Bu ild ing , and export promotion.
Poulson managed to expand from a s ing le a rch itec tu ra l practice in Ponte­
f r a c t  to owning the la rgest a rch ite c tu ra l practice in Europe, w ith
28a turnover o f £1 m i l l io n  a year and a s ta f f  o f  750 people; an empire 
which f e l l  with the f i l i n g  o f  his bankruptcy p e t i t io n  on 4 January 
1972. I t  then emerged tha t th is  remarkable business achievement owed 
much to an elaborate network o f p o l i t ic ia n s  and public sector employees.
On 13 June 1972 his public examination in bankruptcy began and 
in  Ju ly  the Prime M in is te r announced th a t the D irecto r o f Public Prosecu­
t ion s  had, in  consulta tion w ith  the Attorney General and the Lord Advocate, 
ins truc ted  the Metropolitan Police to conduct an investiga tion  in to
the a f f a i r .  In November 1972 Poulson was expelled from the Royal I n s t i -
29tu te  o f B r i t is h  A rch itec ts  fo r  professional misconduct. In June
1973 the then Attorney General (the Rt. hon. S ir  Peter Rawlinson) signed
f ia t s  au thoris ing proceedings under the Prevention o f  Corruption Acts
30against Mr John Poulson and a c i v i l  servant, Mr George Pott inger, 
thus e f fe c t iv e ly  s i lenc ing  the bankruptcy hearings (subsequent hearings 
had to be in p r iv a te ) ;  the press (because o f  the law o f  contempt), 
and Parliament (because o f  the sub jud ice  ru le ) .
On 11 February 1974 Mr Poulson and Mr Pottinger were convicted 
on various offences under the Prevention o f  Corruption Acts and, w ith 
subsequent prosecutions, a vast network o f corruption was gradually 
revealed, invo lv ing  Local Government a t  both d i s t r i c t  and county le v e l .
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nationa lised in d u s tr ie s ,  the National Health Service, the C iv i l  Service,
Central Government Departments and, although none was prosecuted. Members
o f Pariiament.^^
The f i r s t  h in t  o f Poulson's a c t iv i t ie s  appeared in an a r t i c le
e n t i t le d  'The Master Bu ilder: a p ro f i le  on Power', carr ied in the
32Bradford Telegraph and Argus. I t  caused l i t t l e  comment a t the time, 
but sparked o f f  a series o f foraging a r t ic le s  by Private Eye. When
the public bankruptcy hearing began, and the r is k  o f l ib e l  diminished, 
the re s t o f  the media began to convey the rumour of corruption to the 
pub lic . In addition to ra is ing  the question o f payments to people 
in public  l i f e  and creating anxiety about the apparent involvement o f 
the c i v i l  service and local government, the Poulson revelations also 
rekindled concern about the vexed question o f Members' business in te re s ts .
On 9 July 1972 the Observer carr ied  the headlüne 'PR men say 20 
to 30 MPs are "bendable"'. The same ed it ion  carried a feature a r t ic le  
on MPs' public  ro les and pr iva te  in te res ts  which emphasised the ro le 
th a t 'scandals' played in s t im u la ting  Parliament to take action on the 
issue o f Members' in te re s ts :-
'NOT AGAIN! Every few years, scandalous a llegations o f corrup­
t io n  and f ina nc ia l malpractice by MPs are made. There is a great 
fuss, and an inqu iry  is  set on foo t to a l la y  public d isqu ie t. I ts  
report may or may not exculpate the MP concerned, but i t  nearly 
always raises in te res t in g  issues about the re la t ion sh ip  o f MPs and 
outside in te re s ts ,  whether they are commercial f i rm s , foreign Govern­
ments or public  re la t ion s  consultants. There is  desultory d is ­
cussion about what should be done to regularise matters, then the 
issue is  dropped u n t i l  the next scandal breaks'.
The a r t i c le  commented th a t the la s t  time th is  had happened was in
1969 w ith the Bagier a f f a i r ,  and now the Poulson a f f a i r ,  invo lv ing among
33others the names o f  a p r ivy  c o u n c i l lo r ,  Mr Maudling, and three other 
MPs,^^ promised to have a s im i la r  c a ta ly t ic  e f fe c t .
Parliamentary response to the Poulson revelations
On 5 July Mr J. Thorpe, then Leader o f  the Liberal Party, tabled 
an Early Day Motion, supported by 5 o f  his party colleagues, expressing 
grave concern a t the alleged payments by Mr Poulson of substantia l sumsOr
o f  money to MPs and other persons in public l i f e ,  and demanded an immed­
ia te  inqu iry  in to  the matter. During Business Questions on 6 July Mr 
Thorpe pressed the Leader o f the House (now Rt. hon. Robert Carr) fo r  
e i th e r  a statement or an early  debate on the matter.
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During July and August the Poulson a f f a i r  and the more general top ic
o f  Members' in te res ts  a ttrac ted approximately 21 Parliamentary Questions
or supplementary Questions from 9 Members. The 7 Labour MPs, who asked
between them 19 o f the Questions, once again tended to be those already
id e n t i f ie d  as supporters o f reform in the regulation o f Members' in te re s ts .
Of these, Mr, Lewis was the most ac t ive , asking a to ta l  o f  10 Questions,
most o f which however were designed to e l i c i t  information on technical
or procedural aspects o f the Poulson a f f a i r  as i t  re la ted to the c i v i l
serv ice , and were not d irected at Parliament. Other Questions e i th e r
sought information on the Poulson a f f a i r ,  demanded an inqu iry  in to  the
a l le g a t io n s , or used the a llegations as ammunition fo r  fu r th e r  requests
fo r  a re g is te r  o f  in te re s ts .  A ll three o f these ch a ra c te r is t ic s ,  in
add it ion  to the suggestion tha t the Government should appoint an Ombudsman
to investiga te  corruption in public l i f e ,  were embodied in another Early
38Day Motion tabled during th is  period. This motion, sponsored by the
pers is ten t Mr Hamilton, fa i le d  to a t t ra c t  more than 7 signatures, a l l
o f  which were Labour Members.
So fa r  as the spe c if ic  issue o f the Poulson a f f a i r  was concerned,
39on 13 July the Prime M in is te r made a statement on matters a r is in g  out 
o f  the public examination in bankruptcy. He informed the House tha t 
the Government's Law O fficers were examining the evidence and were await­
ing the pre lim inary report o f  the O f f ic ia l  Receiver. The Leader o f 
the Opposition, Mr Wilson, asserted th a t nothing short o f  a ‘ f u l l  and
open public in q u iry '  would s a t is fy  both the House and the p u b l i c . O n  
4118 Ju ly  the Prime M in is te r made a fu r th e r  statement announcing tha t 
a po lice  inve s tiga tio n  in to  the conduct and a f fa i r s  o f Mr Pouson had 
been set in motion in  order to discover whether grounds existed fo r  i n s t i ­
tu t in g  any crim inal proceedings. In these circumstances the Prime M in is te r 
advised Members th a t : -
' . . .  i t  would c le a r ly  be wrong fo r  the Government to establish 
any other form of in q u iry ,  a t least u n t i l  the outcome of the 
po lice  inves tiga tion  is  ava ilab le  and a decision has been made upon 
any prosecution'
On th is  occasion he also informed the House o f the resignation o f 
the Home Secretary, Mr M a u d l i n g . A s  commented e a r l ie r ,  Mr Maudling's 
name had been mentioned during the bankruptcy hearings and although he 
stressed th a t h is  connections with Poulson were above reproach, he f e l t  
i t  inappropriate to  continue as Home Secretary (and therefore Police
37
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A u thority  fo r  the Metropolis) while the Metropolitan po lice  conducted
th e i r  inves tiga tion  in to  Mr Poulson's a f fa i r s .
On the more general problem o f Members' in te re s ts ,  no debate took
place u n t i l  Mr Hamilton exp lo ited the early term ination o f business on
4 August^^ to  ra ise the matter o f  Members' expenses and f in a n c ia l
45in te res ts  on the Adjournment. Although, even then, over h a l f  the 
time was devoted to a consideration o f  the Boyle Committee's recommen­
dation fo r  a trave l grant fund fo r  MPs. Mr Hamilton took the opportun ity  
to  make a major speech se tt in g  out the case fo r  a compulsory public 
re g is te r  o f  the f in a n c ia l outside in te res ts  o f M e m b e r s . F o r  the 
Government, Mr Kenneth Baker^^ acknowledged tha t the Government were 
prepared to consider the matter again, but indicated th e i r  antipathy 
to  the in troduc tion  o f a re g is te r .
In January 1973 Mr Hamilton, c a p ita l is in g  on the continued anxiety 
over the Poulson reve la t ions , pursued his demand fo r  a public re g is te r  
o f  in te res ts  in an Early Day M o t i o n . E n d o r s e d  by 28 Labour MPs and 
1 L ib e ra l,  Mr C yr i l  Sm ith ,th is  M o tion ,l ike  the Private Members B i l l  
f o r  a public  re g is te r  o f business in te res ts  introduced by Mr T. Cox (and 
co-sponsored by 8 other Labour MPs) la te r  in the session^^ gave some 
ind ica tion  o f the d ire c t io n  in which Labour MPs' thoughts were moving.
During Business o f  the House on 1 February the Leader o f the House 
(now Mr J. P r io r)  ind icated tha t the Government viewed the problem p r i ­
m arily  as a House matter, and announced th e i r  in ten tion  to hold consul­
ta t ions  through the usual channels and in a l l  parts o f the House 'to  
see how best we can deal w ith  a very d i f f i c u l t  and complicated problem'. 
While promising no sp e c if ic  ac t io n , th is  statement did at least ind icate 
th a t the Government were now w i l l in g  to concede tha t the possession o f 
outside f in a n c ia l in te res ts  carr ied  with i t  the potentia l problem of 
real or apparent c o n f l i c t  o f  in te re s t .  However, Mr P r io r 's  reply to 
a Supplementary Question by Mr Wellbeloved (Lab) suggested tha t the Govern­
ment, in  contemplating any reform in the regula tion o f Members' in te re s ts ,  
were more concerned w ith  the protection o f MPs than in providing informa­
t io n  on Members' in te re s ts :-
'What we are a l l  concerned to see is  tha t the good reputation 
o f  the House and of i t s  Members is  protected from u n fa ir  imputa­
t ions  from outside. That, to my mind, would be the main purpose 
o f  having any re g is te r  or any change in the rules as we now have 
them. ' g-j
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Against a background o f pe rs is ten t anxiety about the Poulson regula­
t io n s , in te r -p a f ty  ta lks  on the matter continued throughout the res t 
o f  the session, extended in to  the 1973-74 session, and were s t i l l  in  
progress when Parliament was dissolved in February 1974. During th is  
period the resolute Mr Hamilton accused the Government of p rocras tina tion . 
The Leader o f the House ins is ted  tha t the Government were taking the 
matter se r io us ly , but tha t i t  was a d i f f i c u l t  matter and negotia tions 
were in e v ita b ly  protracted.
When the Leader o f the House had announced the commencement o f  in t e r ­
party ta lks  in February 1973, he had stressed th a t : -
' I t  is  very much a matter fo r  the House as a whole and fo r  hon. 
Members in a l l  parts o f the House to consider what fu r th e r  ac t io n , 
i f  any, we can take tha t w i l l  he lp . 'g^
From th is  comment, many MPs thought th a t the Parliamentary Labour Party 
and the Conservative 1922 Committee would each review the s itu a t io n  and 
attempt to  frame proposals to form a basis or guideline fo r  fu ture action . 
This was done by the Labour Party, bu t, as is shown below, the Conservative 
1922 Committee was less enthusiastic  in i t s  approach to the task.
The Labour Party proposals
The Poulson revelations fue lled  a long-standing concern in the 
Labour Party about Members', p a r t ic u la r ly  Conservative Members', outside 
f in a n c ia l i n t e r e s t s . P r e s s u r e  from Labour backbenchers on the P a r l ia ­
mentary Labour Party early  in the 1970-1974 Parliament to  look a t the
th 
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56problem o f outside in te res ts  and to make recommendations, led to e
formation o f a j o in t  f ro n t  and backbench committee on 27 July 1972.
Under the Chairmanship o f  the Deputy Leader, Mr Short, th is  P.L.P. Sub- 
Committee on Members' outside in te res ts  set about formulating recommend­
ations which, i f  agreed by the P .L .P ., ,  could be put forward by Mr Short
in  ta lks  on Members' in te res ts  w ith the Leader o f the House.
While th is  Committee was s t i l l  d e l ib e ra t in g , the Scottish Council 
o f  the Labour Party was committed in March 1973 - against the advice 
o f  i t s  executive - to compile a re g is te r  o f  f in a n c ia l in te res ts  held 
by Labour MPs and counc il lo rs  in Scotland. The Guardian on 24 March 
1973 reported th a t the fo llow ing  reso lu tion  had been approved:-
' Conference asks the Scottish Council o f the Labour Party to 
compile a re g is te r  o f the in te res ts  o f Scottish Labour MPs and
Councillo rs. This should be a comprehensive re g is te r  not only o f
paid in terests ,such as consultancies and d ire c to rsh ips , but also 
o f  benefits  in  k ind, such as ho lidays, and trave l paid fo r  by others. 
The re g is te r  should be p u b l ic . '
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Two months la te r ,  on 9 May 1973, the P.L.P. Sub-Committee pre­
sented i t s  Report a t a sparsely attended meeting o f the Parliamentary 
58Labour Party. Interviews with the chairman and members o f the Committee 
revealed tha t they had not been unanimous in deciding upon a l l  t h e i r  
proposals. During discussions there had been disagreement between those 
who argued fo r  p u b l ic i ty  and those, inc lud ing Mr Short, who argued 
fo r  privacy and could not see why MPs should be singled out to declare 
th e i r  in te res ts  p u b l ic ly .  U ltim ate ly  there was agreement on a compro­
mise recommendation fo r  a compulsory re g is te r  o f a l l  MPs' f in a n c ia l 
in te res ts  to be kept in conditions o f 's e c u r i ty '  by the Speaker; thus 
enabling the Speaker to  know whether a Member p a r t ic ip a t in g  in a debate 
had a re levant in te re s t .  I f  agreement' to th is  could not be reached among 
p a r t ie s ,  they proposed the fa l l -b a c k  position o f a Labour re g is te r  to 
be maintained in  secrecy by the P.L.P. O fficers - a system already oper­
ated by the Libera l Party. The information required fo r  the re g is te r  
included company d ire c to rsh ips , remunerated professional a c t iv i t ie s ,  
associations w ith public re la t ions  f irm s , companies where the MP has 
a bene fic ia l in te re s t  over 10% o f the c a p i ta l ,  and a l l  g i f t s  and spon­
sored t r ip s  worth over £50. In a d d it ion , the Committee were in favour 
o f  a code o f  conduct fo r  MPs such as tha t recommended by the 1969 Select 
Committee on Members' in te re s ts : -
'That in  any debate or proceeding o f the House or i t s  Committees 
or transactions or communications which a Member may have with other 
Members or w ith Ministers or servants o f the Crown, he shall d is ­
close any re levant pecuniary in te re s t  or bene fit  o f  whatever nature, 
whether d ire c t  or in d ir e c t ,  tha t he may have had, may have or may 
be expecting to  have.'gg
However, they recognised tha t such a code would have to be made by the 
House as a whole and, unlike the re g is te r ,  could not be adopted by one 
party only.
Members were divided in th e i r  reaction to the p r o p o s a l s . T h e  
proposal fo r  the code was overwhelmingly a p p r o v e d , b u t  in tra -p a r ty  
d iffe rences were r i f e  on the issue o f the re g is te r .  Once again argu­
ments about pr ivacy, p u b l ic i ty  and secrecy surfaced. While Alex Lyon^^ 
contended th a t the proposal constitu ted an u n ju s t i f ie d  erosion o f privacy, 
other Labour MPs objected to the plan fo r  a re g is te r  held in p r iva te  
by the Speaker or O ffice rs  o f  the P.L.P.; an arrangement which they 
contended would give an unfortunate impression o f secrecy. In the event
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the proposal was modified by an amendment moved by Mr John Prescott and 
Mr Stanley Orme, and the Party voted 28 votes to 9 in  support o f a public 
compulsory re g is te r  o f  Members' in te res ts . With th is  one important mod­
i f i c a t io n ,  the Sub-Committee's Report was approved by the Parliamentary 
Labour Party and, as amended, formed the basis o f the Labour Party 's  
pos it ion  in  the protracted in te r -p a r ty  ta lks  on the matter.
Conservative Party proposals
Opinion w ith in  the Conservative 1922 Committee indicated th a t the 
Conservative Party were re luc tan t to formulate proposals which would 
involve a departure from the t ra d i t io n a l approach o f the House to  deal­
ing w ith  Members' i n t e r e s t s . N o b o d y  supported a proposal fo r  a f u l l  
dec lara tion  o f in te re s ts ;  p a r t ly  because they f e l t  th a t the House could 
re ly  on the strength o f  mutual t ru s t  and could judge i t s  own Members, 
and p a r t ly  because they considered any attempt a t co d if ica t io n  would 
be an invasion o f privacy. Members o f  the Conservative 1922 Committee 
informed Mr P r io r ,  Leader o f  the House, tha t the Conservative Party were 
against any proposals fo r  depositing copies o f income tax forms or any 
exposure o f  remuneration or spec if ic  shareholdings. Their p r in c ip le  
ob jection was th a t : -
'Any such requirement would bu ild  up moral pressure on public 
men to d ives t themselves o f a l l  outside connections, and thereby 
speed the day, when the House o f  Commons would consist o f f u l l ­
time p o l i t ic ia n s  with l i t t l e  or no experience o f the consuming end 
o f  le g is la t io n . ' gg
Although the Conservative Government had cons is ten t ly  shown i t s e l f  
to  be against the in troduction  o f any kind o f  re g is te r ,  on 29 June 1973 
the Times revealed th a t against the background o f public  d isqu ie t about 
'the  degree to which money may ta lk  in central and loca l government',
Mr Heath and the Cabinet had authorized the Leader o f the House to lay 
before Leaders o f  the Labour and Liberal parties proposals fo r  a voluntary 
re g is te r  o f Members' outside in te res ts . The proposals were tw o-fo ld .
F i r s t ,  the Government recommended a code o f conduct form alis ing the estab­
lished custom o f the Commons th a t MPs should declare any f in a n c ia l in te r ­
ests being discussed by the House. Secondly, they proposed a re g is te r  
o f  f in a n c ia l in te res ts  on which Members would be expected to record a l l  
forms o f  paid employment, consultancies, d irectorsh ips and so fo r th .
In con trast to Labour's view on shareholdings, th is  proposal exclude^ share­
holdings unless these cut across a subject being discussed by the House.
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For example. Members would only be expected to re g is te r  th e i r  share­
holdings in say ICI i f  and when the House was debating matters concern­
ing the chemical industry . No compulsions or sanctions lay behind these 
proposals except the moral one th a t Members were l i k e ly  to incur the 
Opprobrium o f th e i r  colleagues i f  they fa i le d  to disclose a re levant 
in te re s t  and th is  la te r  became p u b lic ly  known. In th is  sense the Govern­
ment's proposals were an extension o f  the ex is t ing  practice o f the House 
regarding declara tion o f in te re s ts . They argued tha t the p rac tica l d i f f i ­
c u l t ie s  o f f in d in g  a precise d e f in i t io n  o f ' in te re s ts '  would render a 
compulsory re g is te r ,  such as th a t recommended by the Labour Party, as 
inoperable.
Mr P r io r had surprised Conservative MPs with these proposals at 
a meeting o f the backbenchers 1922 Committee, and he had received a rough 
r id e .  Although no voting takes place in the 1922 Committee, The Times on 
29 June 1973 reported tha t o f the 17 Conservative backbenchers who com­
mented on or questioned Mr P r io r 's  announcement, only 3 gave unreserved 
support. Once more t r a d i t io n a l is t s  reminded him tha t even a modest volun­
ta ry  re g is te r  was the beginning of the s lippery  slope ./ t o '  ac f u l l -  
time House o f  Commons devoid o f outside in te rests  of any kind. Mr Enoch 
Powell was one o f the f ie rc e s t  c r i t i c s  o f the proposals.
Newspaper comment^^ speculated tha t the impact o f diverse scandals 
such as the Lonrho a f fa i r ^ ^  and the ram ifica tions o f the Poulson bank­
ruptcy case had led the Government to change i t s  mind about the re g is te r  
o f  MPs' f in a n c ia l in te re s ts .  However, M inisters ins is ted tha t the Govern­
ment's plans were not a panic move, but tha t they were the product o f 
long m in is te r ia l  consideration set in motion by the Prime M in ister on 
14 August 1972.^^ Information sources at Whitehall^^ expressed a middle 
view, and suggested th a t although there had not been a sudden change 
in  th ink ing  on the part o f the Conservative Government, the scandals 
which had occurred hastened the general d r i f t  towards the view th a t i t  
would be a reassuring gesture to take some action to restore the good 
name o f the House. Senior m inisters were aware tha t the m ajority  o f 
Conservative MPs would not welcome the idea o f a re g is te r ,  but were coming 
to  re a l is e ,  as Mr P rio r had Suggested to the House in April 1973,^^ tha t 
such a step might be necessary to protect hon. Members against gossip 
and innuendo. The Government's plan was intended to provide a basis 
fo r  discussion during the in te r -p a r ty  ta lks .
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Thus, two sets o f proposals were formulated before the February 
1974 General E lection. The main in te r -p a r ty  d ifferences turned on whether 
the re g is te r  should be voluntary or compulsory and also on the types 
o f  categories to be included. The sharpest d iv is io n  was between the 
Labour Party 's view th a t the re g is te r  should be compulsory and the Con­
servative view th a t i t  should be voluntary. However, as confirmed by 
Whitehall sources, there was ac tua lly  less d iv is ion  between Members than 
appears a t f i r s t  s ig h t ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  among those who thought hard about 
the issue. Those pu tt ing  forward proposals fo r  a re g is te r  on a voluntary 
basis rea lised th a t i t s  existence, confirmed by a reso lu tion o f the House, 
would contain an element o f compulsion, while those who put forward com­
pulsory plans rea lised th a t i t  would ac tu a lly  be voluntary because o f 
in e v ita b le  loopholes. D iv is ion on the content o f the re g is te r  centred 
on the Labour Party 's view tha t a precise l i s t  o f categories o f in te re s t  
should be set down, and the Conservative preference fo r  a whole range 
o f  in te res ts  to be defined in broad categories.
A change o f  Government - and a change in d ire c t io n ?
The in te r -p a r ty  ta lks  on Members' in te res ts  were s t i l l  in progress 
when, in February 1974, during a period o f acute economic c r is is  and 
in d u s tr ia l  c o n f l i c t .  Parliament was dissolved. In the General Election 
on 28 February ne ithe r o f  the two major parties gained an overa ll m a jo r ity  
in  the Commons; the Labour party winning 301 seats and the Conservative 
party 296 seats. A fte r  f a i l in g  to achieve a c o a l i t io n  w ith  the L ibe ra ls , 
who on th is  occasion had captured 14 seats as opposed to 6 in 1970, Mr 
Heath resigned as Prime M in is te r. On 4 March Mr Harold Wilson took O ffice  
as Prime M in is te r o f  a m inority  Labour Government.
With a Conservative Government the chances o f a re g is te r  being in t r o ­
duced had been s lim . Now, with the campaign fo r  a re g is te r  in te n s if ie d
71by the prosecutions fo r  corruption resu lt ing  from the Poulson t r i a l s ,  
and with a Labour Government, supported by the L ibe ra ls , the chances 
were higher. Nevertheless, the new Cabinet were reported to be s l ig h t ly  
more lukewarm towards proposals fo r  a compulsory re g is te r  than they had 
been when in O p p o s i t i o n . I n  reply to a Parliamentary Question by Mr 
Hamilton (Lab) in M a r c h , t h e  new Leader o f the House, Mr Short, con­
firmed tha t discussions were s t i l l  continuing with the Oppo s i t io n  on 
the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f formulating a re g is te r  o f i n t e r e s t s , b u t  he in d i ­
cated tha t there were problems concerning Members' p r iva cy :-
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' I t  is  extremely d i f f i c u l t  but very important to hold a balance 
between the need fo r  privacy - and Members o f Parliament are as 
e n t i t le d  as anyone else to privacy - and the public in te re s t  in 
d isc losure o f some in te re s ts . We have to hold the balance between 
the tw o . ' yg
Following the Prime M in is te r 's  announcement to  the Commons o f his
in te n t io n  to appoint a Royal Commission to inqu ire  in to  standards of
conduct in public  l i f e , ^ ^  Mr Ashton (Lab) asked the Prime M in is te r fo r
comment on newspaper speculation^^ tha t proposals fo r  a voluntary re g is te r
were l i k e ly  to come before the House. Mr Wilson said Members would have
to w a it f o r  announcements a r is ing  from the re su lt  o f  the in te r -p a r ty  
7 8discussions. Mr Heath (Cons) sought reassurance from the Prime M in is te r 
t h a t : -
" . . .  whatever proposition is  put before the House as a re s u lt  
o f  discussions w ith a l l  parties and ind iv idua l Members, the House 
should have a free  vote and s e t t le  i t s  own a f f a i r s . 'y g
Mr Wilson confirmed tha t while he believed i t  had been r ig h t  to hold 
such discussions i t  would be a matter fo r  the House i t s e l f  to decide.
On 2 May 1974 the Financial Times reported tha t Government discus­
sions w ith Leaders o f the other two main parties about a public re g is te r  
had been completed and tha t the Cabinet were to consider what action 
( i f  any) to take. On the same day, Mr Short announced th a t during the 
next week he hoped to send proposals to the parties fo r  a re g is te r  in
81order tha t the House could debate the matter before the Whitsun Recess.
While he ins is ted  tha t the decision as to whether the re g is te r  should
be compulsory or voluntary was one fo r  the House to decide on a free
vote, the press hinted tha t some Senior m inisters were expected to urge
fo r  a compulsory re g is te r  in the knowledge th a t most Conservative MPs
favoured a voluntary re g is te r  and tha t a Commons vote on the issue could
82brand the Opposition as secretive. The Governemnt was also under 
pressure from i t s  own backbenchers to make re g is tra t io n  compulsory. On 
2 May Ms. Colquhoun (Lab) a ttrac ted 57 signatures (54 Labour, 1 Conser­
v a t iv e , 1 L ibera l and 1 Plaid Cymru) in support of an Early Day M o tion^^ 
urging the in troduction  o f a compulsory re g is te r  o f Members' in te re s ts .
In add it ion  to the Poulson t r i a l s  and continued Press a c t iv i t y  con­
nected with them, several events occurred a t th is  time which served to 
maintain the climate o f d isqu ie t about Members' f in a n c ia l in te res ts  and 
to  in te n s i fy  the campaign fo r  a compulsory re g is te r .  On 29 April 1974 
a complaint o f breach o f p r iv i le g e  was raised in the House by S ir  Harmer
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N icho lls  (Cons) concerning statements re f le c t in g  on the conduct o f Members 
made by Mr J. Ashton during a broadcast in terv iew given on 26 A p r i l .
Fearing po ten tia l misuse of the practice o f invoking parliamentary p r iv ­
i le g e , some Members f e l t  tha t re fe rr in g  the matter to the Committee of 
P riv ileges would preclude open discussion o f a matter o f public concern 
and argued tha t public confidence in MPs would be restored more e f fe c t iv e ly  
by a free debate on Ashton's a llegations tha t a number of MPs had surren­
dered th e i r  freedom o f action as parliamentarians to outside bodies.
However, both the Government and the o f f i c ia l  Opposition f e l t  tha tthe 
Committee o f P riv ileges was the body best equipped to  deal w ith the matter 
and the motion to re fe r  the matter was carried by 283 votes to 94 votes, 
w ith  the Opposition supporting the Government.
In using the Committee o f P riv ileges the Labour Government faced 
the embarrassment tha t in  1974 the Leader o f the House, Mr Short, who 
had chaired the P.L.P. Sub-Committee on Members' outside in te re s ts ,  had 
conducted in te r -p a r ty  ta lks  about a re g is te r  and who would normally have 
chaired the Committee, had issued a public statement th a t in  January 
1963 he had accepted payment from Mr T. Dan Smith who was la te r  ja i le d  
fo r  corruption during the Poulson t r i a l s . A m i d  the h ighly charged 
controversy over Mr Short's continued ro le  as Leader o f the House which
followed th is  admission, Mr Strauss assumed Chairmanship o f the Committee.
88Although Mr Ashton eventually withdrew his a l leg a tio ns , the Committee
89found him g u i l t y  o f  serious contempt. Mr Short retained his pos it ion
as Leader o f the House.
As well as occurring against the background o f  the Poulson t r i a l s ,
Mr Ashton's remarks also coincided w ith the Report from the Prime M in is te r 's
Committee on Local Government Rules o f Conduct, which was submitted to
the Prime M in is te r on 17 May 1974 and published on 23 May. While concerned
w ith  loca l government, th is  Report p u b l ic ly  set out many o f the arguments
fo r  and against a re g is te r  o f in te rests  which were also being raised
w ith  regard to  Parliament and came out in favour o f  estab lish ing a com- 
90pulsory re g is te r .
In add ition  to  these by-products o f the Poulson a f f a i r ,  a fu r th e r  
minor 'scandal' occurred at th is  time which s t i r re d  up fresh concern 
about MPs and f in a n c ia l in te re s ts . Both the Guardian on 11 May 1974 
and the Sunday Telegraph on 12 May carried news o f Mr Brian Walden's 
(Lab) admission th a t he was retained by the National Association o f
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Bookmakers, a t a fee o f £5,000 a year fo r  f iv e  years, to act as a p o l i t ­
ica l consultant. Mr Walden had played an active  part in  arguing the 
bookmakers' case against proposals in the Tote B i l l  in the previous Par- 
1 iamentwhich they f e l t  would harm th e i r  in te res ts . He had not concealed 
his work fo r  the bookmakers, but the size o f the payment - £25,000 over 
f iv e  years - may have surprised MPs and constituents a l ike  because i t  
was more than Mr Walden was paid in his representative capacity as an 
MP. Also in connection w ith th is  inc iden t, the former Labour Party Pay­
master General, Lord Wigg, who as Chairman of the Horse-race Betting 
Levy Board had played an important ro le  in toning down the Tote B i l l ,  
ca lled fo r  a compulsory re g is te r  in the House o f Lords arguing:-
' I f  MPs are to be forced to make public th e i r  in te re s ts ,  the 
same rules should apply to  active peers who could ask questions, 
promote B i l l s ,  ta lk  to M in is te rs , and generally advance th e i r  
in te r e s ts . . .  ' g-j
In the second week o f  May 1974 the Government c ircu la ted  to Labour 
MPs a notice o f  the Motion on Members' in te res ts  which had been approved 
by the Liaison Committee and which, i f  accepted by the Parliamentary 
Labour Party, would be proposed to the House as a whole. The Motion 
included proposals fo r  both declaration and compulsory re g is t ra t io n  o f 
in te res ts  and, because senior M inisters had recognised there were grounds 
fo r  genuine differences o f views about the scope and content o f the reg is ­
te r ,  recommended th a t a select committee be set up to consider the compo­
s i t io n  o f the re g is te r ,  i t s  method o f operation and appropriate penalties 
fo r  d e fa u lt .  Mr Short confirmed, when interviewed, tha t the motion was 
based on the amended recommendations o f  the Labour Party 's Sub-Committee 
on Members' in te res ts  which had been approved by the Parliamentary Labour 
Party in  1973. He recalled tha t he had had discussions with the Attorney 
General and House o f  Commons Clerks to make sure the proposals were work­
able and th a t he had had no p a r t ic u la r  problems in steering the proposals 
through the Cabinet. He remarked th a t as usual at the beginning o f a 
new Parliament, there had been a shortage o f  prepared le g is la t io n  owing 
to  the l im ite d  number o f parliamentary draftsmen. Hence, there was an 
opportun ity  to  pursue the proposals on Members' in te res ts  as these were 
already formulated. Also, he commented th a t against a background of 
pub lic  d isqu ie t concerning Members' in te re s ts ,  and with the l ike l ih o o d  
o f  another General Election in the near fu tu re ,  i t  was e le c to ra l ly  impor­
ta n t  fo r  Labour to take the i n i t i a t i v e  and to establish a re g is te r .
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The motion was presented to a meeting o f the Parliamentary Labour 
92Party on 15 May 1974 along with notice o f  several amendments tabled 
by Labour Members. An amendment moved by Alex Lyon to  omit the para­
graphs g iv ing e f fe c t  to a compulsory re g is te r  was defeated by a substan­
t i a l  m a jo r ity . S im ila r ly  re jected was an amendment moved by Mr J. 
Prescott, to bar MPs from maintaining outside in te res ts  and e f fe c t iv e ly  
recommending a fu l l - t im e  House o f Commons. Mr Andrew Bennett moved an 
amendment asking tha t a Speaker's conference should be convened to d is ­
cuss ways o f ge tting  a l l  e lection candidates to  declare th e i r  in te re s ts ,  
but th is  was withdrawn on the understanding tha t the issue was to be 
considered by the Party 's National Executive. The meeting also con­
sidered several propositions by Mr W. Hamilton. His amendment to  include 
Peers and Lobby Journa lis ts  in the proposals was ca rr ied , but reply ing 
on behalf o f the Liaison Committee Mr Short said tha t although they did 
not ru le  th is  out, they wanted to resolve the matter as qu ick ly  as poss­
ib le .  In th e i r  view, a reso lu tion fo r  MPs would be dea lt w ith in te rn a l ly  
by the House, whereas a re g is te r  fo r  Peers and Lobby Journa lis ts  would 
require le g is la t io n  and would take longer. Having considered these amend­
ments, the Parliamentary Labour Party approved the resolution from the 
Party 's Liaison Committee.
While Labour backbenchers had the opportunity to discuss and vote 
on the proposals. Opposition MPs were not even to ld  what the proposals 
were. On 16 May Mr M. Clark-Hutchinson sponsored an Early Day Motion 
expressing the unfairness and incompetence o f  the Government by not mak­
ing ava ilab le  to the Opposition the texts o f the motions intended fo r
no
debate on 22 May. On the fo llow ing  day The Times reported tha t Con­
servative  backbenchers were resentfu l over the Government's delay in 
making the proposals ava ilab le  and th a t the 1922 Committee had requested 
the postponement o f the debate u n t i l  the f i r s t  week a f te r  the Whitsun. 
This request was resisted by the Cabinet and in response a special meet­
ing of the 1922 Committee was ca lled , the tone o f which was re flec ted  
in  the amendments the Conservatives intended to make to the Motions 
tabled by the Government.
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The 1974 Debate on Members' In te res ts : a so rt o f gentlemen
versus players match' .
On 22 May 1974 the Leader o f the House, Mr Short, moved the three 
Government motions on Members' in te rests^^^ which the Speaker ruled 
should be discussed together
1. 'That, in any debate or proceeding of the House or i t s  commit­
tees or transactions or communications which a Member may have 
with other Members or with Ministers or servants o f the Crown, 
he shall d isclose any re levant pecuniary in te re s t  or benefit
o f whatever nature, whether d ire c t  or in d ire c t ,  tha t he may have 
had, may have or may be expecting to have.'
2. 'That every Member o f the House o f Commons shall furn ish to a 
Registrar^of Members' Interests such pa rt icu la rs  o f his re g is ­
t ra b le  in te res ts  as shall be required, and shall n o t i fy  to the 
Registrar any a lte ra t io n s  which may occur the re in , and the Regis­
t r a r  sha ll cause these pa rt icu la rs  to be entered in a Register
o f Members' In te res ts  which shall be ava ilab le fo r  inspection 
by the p u b l ic . '
3. That a Select Committee be appointed to consider the arrangements 
to  be made pursuant to the Resolutions o f the House th is  day 
re la t iv e  to  the declaration o f Members' in te rests  and the re g is ­
t ra t io n  the reo f, and, in p a r t ic u la r : -
(a) what classes o f pecuniary in te re s t  or other benefit are to  
be disclosed;
(b) how the re g is te r  should be compiled and maintained and what 
arrangements should be made fo r  public  access thereto ;
(c) How the resolutions re la t in g  to declaration and re g is t ra t io n  
should be enforced;
(d) what classes o f person ( i f  any) other than Members ought 
to be required to re g is te r ;
and to make recommendations upon these and any other matters 
which are re levant to the implementation o f the said Resolu­
t ion s . '
These proposals were modelled on those agreed by the Parliamentary Labour 
Party a week e a r l ie r .
95From the several amendments standing on the Order Paper the Speaker 
selected fo r  debate the two Conservative amendments standing in the names 
o f Mr P r io r ,  former Leader o f the House; S ir  Michael Havers, former 
S o l ic i to r  General; and Mr Edward du Cann, Chairman o f the 1922 Committee. 
These amendments, re f le c t in g  the fee ling  o f the 1922 Committee (above), 
were not o f f i c ia l  Shadow Cabinet amendments because l ik e  the Labour Party 
the Conservatives had decided to allow a free vote, and on a free vote 
the Opposition has no o f f i c ia l  a t t i tu d e .  The f i r s t  o f these amendments
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was addressed to the Government's f i r s t  proposal, concerning dec la ra tion , 
and was to the e f fe c t  tha t in te res ts  should be declared i f  the Member 
judged his in te re s t  as one which would be regarded by the House 
as re levant to the matter under consideration. The reason behind 
th is  amendment was to preserve the ro le o f d isc re tion  and honour 
o f  the ind iv idua l Member himself in  assessing which in te res ts  were 
re g is tra b le  and which were not. I t  also deleted reference to fu ture 
and re trospective  in te res ts  and was therefore less comprehensive 
than the Government's intended measure.
The second o f the two amendments selected referred to the th i rd  
Government proposal and proposed tha t the substantive choice between 
compulsory and voluntary re g is tra t io n  should be l e f t  to the considera­
t ion  o f the Select Committee as w e ll.  I t  also aimed to exclude the 
Government's f i r s t  proposal on declaration of in te re s t  from the ambit 
o f the Select Committee.
Opening the debate, Mr Short assured Members th a t : -
'The issue today is  not whether Members should have outside 
in te re s ts ,  but whether and how we should make them known to 
our colleagues and to our c o n s t i tu e n ts . ' gg
Having l im ite d  the scope o f the debate to the issue o f disclosure 
o f in te re s ts ,  he id e n t i f ie d  two d i f fe re n t  approaches to d isc losure :-
'Some people take the view tha t there is  nothing improper in a 
Member having outside in te res ts  as long as those in te res ts  are 
made known p u b lic ly .  Others take the view tha t they should be 
declared only when some action is  taken by a Member to fu r th e r  
those in te re s ts . 'g y
These two approaches had been recognised by the 1969 Select Committee, 
but in contrast to tha t Committee Mr Short acknowledged the increasing 
necessity o f general public d isc losure, unconnected w ith any p a r t ic u la r  
speech or action by the Member. This, he stated, would a ffo rd  Members 
complete protection against any un fa ir  a llegations or innuendos and
98had been 'the philosophy behind' the long series of in te r -p a r ty  ta lks .
Turning to the spe c if ic  proposals, he explained tha t the f i r s t  
Motion re la ted p r in c ip a l ly  to the verbal declaration by Members o f 
re levant f in a n c ia l in te res ts  when p a r t ic ip a t in g  in debate or other 
proceedings. He said tha t the motion, iden tica l in form to the f i r s t  
recommendation o f the 1969 Select Committee^ would c la r i f y  and also 
extend the present convention. F i r s t ,  i t  would extend not only to 
debate on the Floor o f the House, but to a l l  committee proceedings
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and to Question Time. Second, i t  would extend the practice o f declara­
t io n  to cover a l l  dealings between Members themselves and between Members 
and m in isters or o f f i c ia ls .  Third, i t  would amplify the range o f poten­
t i a l l y  re levant in te res ts  to include other benefits , such as g i f t s  
or free h o s p i ta l i ty ,  in addition to d ire c t  pecuniary benefits . F in a l ly ,  
i t  would involve Members in declaring past and expected as well as 
present in te res ts  i f  they were re levant.
He recognised that motions establish ing a compulsory re g is te r  
were more controversia l and explained;-
'What the Government are proposing in  th is  matter is twofold. 
F i r s t ,  we are proposing to the House tha t i t  should endorse the 
p r in c ip le  o f  the establishment of a compulsory re g is te r  o f  Members' 
in te re s ts .  Secondly, tha t the major questions of scope and enforce­
ment o f such a re g is te r ,  and the p ractica l arrangements fo r  access 
and custody, should be remitted to a Select Committee o f the House 
fo r  urgent consideration ' . qq
In defence o f these proposals he argued tha t increasing public anxiety 
and concern about Members' f ina nc ia l in te re s ts ,  much o f which had been 
generated by the Press, had created a s i tu a t io n  where:-
' . . .  we believe tha t the balance o f advantage fo r  the House 
has now swung dec is ive ly  in  favour o f the establishment o f a re g is te r  
o f  Members' in te res ts . I f  th is  is  to command public confidence 
i t  c le a r ly  must be a compulsory re g is te r .  The long-term disadvan­
tages to the House and i t s  reputation o f not establish ing such 
a re g is te r  are, in  our view, more important than the minor imper­
fections and inequ it ies  tha t may arise . . .  we believe tha t any 
disadvantages o f the kind I mentioned are now c le a r ly  outweighed 
by the need to reassure the public tha t we as a Parliament are 
doing a l l  we can to a l la y  public anxiety in  th is  matter and th a t ,  
in  order to do so, we must c o l le c t iv e ly  recognise tha t we are 
prepared to pay the price by giving up a certa in  amount of privacy 
in  these matters. That is  greatly  to be regre tted , but i t  is 
the case today. Having arrived a t tha t conclusion, the Government 
hadd.to consider how best to proceed.
We should not miss the p a rt icu la r  irony o f events, by which the Register 
was commended to the House by a Member whom, as we have seen, had him­
s e l f  had to admit to having received a g i f t  from one o f Mr Poulson's 
associates.
Although they had taken the lead and put forward proposals fo r  
a compulsory re g is te r ,  Mr Short ins is ted  tha t the Government took the 
view th a t th is  was a House ra ther than a Government matter, and fo r  
th is  reason had decided to recommend the establishment o f a select 
committee to consider how the decision in p r in c ip le  to establish a 
compulsory, public re g is te r  should be implemented. I f  the Motions 
were agreed, he hoped the Select Committee could report i t s  recommenda­
tions in time fo r  fu r th e r  debate to take place before the Summer Recess.
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Moving the amendment to the f i r s t  motion, Mr P rio r defended both 
the privacy and honour o f the ind iv idua l Member and argued:-
'Much o f the motion must be t o t a l l y  i r re le v a n t ,  could be mis­
leading and could involve a breach o f privacy which we would regard 
as quite in to le ra b le .  I pre fer to place more emphasis on the 
word 'honourable' before a Member's name, and tha t is  why we seek 
to introduce the concept " in  his judgment". I th ink  tha t i t  is  
fa r  b e tte r  to leave these matters as fa r  as we can to the judgment 
o f  an hon. Member.
C r i t ic is in g  the Government's second motion estab lish ing a compulsory 
re g is te r  he claimed:-
' . . .  i t  bears a l l  the hallmarks o f a decision under pressure 
in order to meet the outcry o f the moment. I t  would be much be tte r 
i f  th is  motion were withdrawn fo r  the time being, and fo r  us to 
w a it u n t i l  the Select Committee has reported and then to reach 
a d e c is io n . '
He said tha t i t  was th is  view which underlay the amendment to the th i rd  
Government motion, turn ing over the decision o f p r in c ip le  on the type 
o f re g is t ra t io n  to the Select Committee, and not, as some opponents 
had im plied, a desire to delay a decision.
About 50 Members took part in the ensuing debate. Although the 
main issues were clouded by a w e lte r o f c o n f l ic t in g  motivations and 
pressures.- Members tended e ith e r  to revive arguments and themes which 
had been prominent throughout the modern campaign fo r  a re g is te r  or 
to in te r je c t  w ith spec if ic  c r i t ic ism s  o f or support fo r  the Government's 
motions. Mr P r io r 's  speech was c lose ly followed by tha t o f Mr Strauss, 
who had been the chairman o f the 1969 Select Committee on Members' 
in te re s ts  He warned Mr P rio r tha t i t  would be unwise to emasculate 
the f i r s t  Government motion which, 'had the unanimous support o f a 
Select Committee, w ith a l l  i t s  considerable a u t h o r i t y ^ H e  also 
thought i t  unwise to overturn tha t Committee's decision not to recommend 
a re g is te r  and he echoed Mr P r io r 's  view tha t i t  was r id icu lous  to 
ask Members to accept the p r in c ip le  o f a compulsory re g is te r  before 
they had any idea o f what the re g is te r  was to be.^^^ He pointed to 
the in e v ita b le  problem of people who refused to re g is te r  or who re g is ­
tered inaccura te ly and asked who would deal with them. He queried 
whether there would be a special committee o f  the House or whether 
the Committee o f Priv ileges would be entrusted w ith  the task. He pointed 
out th a t i f  the re g is te r  was s ta tu to ry  (an option Mr W. Hamilton had 
suggested to the 1969 Select Committee) then i f  i t  were alleged tha t
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a Member had fa i le d  to disclose an in te re s t  the courts would be involved
and the matter would then be 'outside the control of the House'; a
s itu a t io n  which he did not th ink  the House would accept.
In contrast to Mr Strauss, Dr. Michael Winstanley, speaking on
behalf o f  the Liberal party , commended the in troduction  of a compulsory
re g is te r  and s ig n if ie d  his pa rty 's  support fo r  the Government's motions.
He went on to re fe r  to a statement made by the Leader of the House
the previous day, recommending tha t discussion of the question o f Members'
107pay be held over to a la te r  date. While he considered th is  was 
r ig h t ,  he stressed tha t in his view i t  was the background of low pay 
and poor f a c i l i t i e s  tha t made the v u ln e ra b i l i ty  o f a Member o f P a r l ia ­
ment to f in a n c ia l pressures p a r t ic u la r ly  dangerous, and i t  was to th is  
po in t tha t he considered the House should be d irec t ing  i t s  a tten tion .^  
Despite the Leader o f the House's early  contention that the debate 
was not concerned w ith the question o f whether Members should have 
outside in te re s ts ,  the matter o f whether hon. Members should be f u l l ­
er part-t im e Members emerged as a central theme of the debate. As 
on e a r l ie r  occasions. Members were sharply divided on th is  issue, both 
on i t s  substance and on i t s  relevancy or otherwise to the debate. With 
few exceptions. Conservative Members tended to defend the possession 
o f  outside in te re s ts ,  arguing tha t a Parliament consisting of whole­
time professional p o l i t ic ia n s  would lose both i t s  character and i t s  
independence and would become out o f touch w ith the l ives  o f those 
fo r  whom i t  l eg i s l a t es . Labour Members were divided as to the 
extent to which the House should be fu l l - t im e  ,but, in contrast to the 
Conservatives, grav ita ted towards the conception o f a fu l l - t im e  House 
o f Commons. Mr J. Prescott (Lab) pointed out tha t the Boyle Committee 
had decided tha t Members' salary should be calculated on the basis 
o f fu l l - t im e  Membership and he argued:-
'That is  an important po in ter. I f  we adopt tha t view, the 
chance o f c o n f l ic ts  o f in te re s t ,  proper or improper, w i l l  lessen.'
This controversy over fu l l - t im e  or part-t im e Membership was c lose ly  
entwined w ith the notions o f amateurism and professionalism in  P a r l ia ­
ment, and in  recognition o f the influence o f these c o n f l ic t in g  ideals
in  shaping Members' views on the matter o f Members' outside in te re s ts ,
Mr Max Madden (Lab), himself an ardent supporter o f a fu l l - t im e  House
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o f Commons, commented towards the end o f the debate, 'an attempt has 
been made to present th is  debate as a so rt o f gentlemen versus players 
match
Another recurrent theme apparent in the debate was tha t o f Members' 
privacy. Mr Short and Mr P rio r had provided Members w ith opposing 
views on th is  issue as i t  was effected by the in troduction  o f a re g is te r  
and th is  division o f opinion was re flec ted  in the debate. At one ex­
treme Mr Hamilton (Lab) contested the assumption of the 1969 Select 
Committee tha t MPs should be treated no d i f fe re n t ly  from priva te  c i t i ­
zens and argued:-
'We had be tte r face the fa c t  tha t men and women in  national
or local government v o lu n ta r i ly  come in to  public l i f e .  None o f
us is a pressed man or woman. A l l  o f  us are here because we wanted 
to be here, and - by Godl - we c l in g  on once we get here. We 
must expect to put up with a g rea te r! in trus ion  in to  our a f fa i rs  
than in to  the a f fa i r s  o f those who choose to remain pr iva te c i t i ­
zens. ' ^^2
At the other extreme, Mr Michael Clark-Hutchinson, who had e a r l ie r
sponsored an Early Day Motion expressing opposition to declaration
113o f in te re s ts  and s a t is fa c t io n  w ith present practices, exclaimed:-
' I f  we were to re g is te r  our in te re s ts , we could immediately 
put ourselves in a category d i f fe re n t  from a l l  others. Ours is  
an old and famous Parliament tha t is  respected throughout the
world. I f in d  i t  incred ib le  tha t we should be discussing th is
absurd r e g is te r . ' ^
A d i f fe re n t  perspective on the problem o f privacy was adopted by Brian
Walden (Lab). He argued tha t the concept o f privacy had become mixed
up w ith  connotations o f secrecy because:-
'A sincere concern fo r  public in te re s t  has to co-ex is t with
a sincere concern fo r  public m ischief. A proper regard fo r  privacy
has to bed down w ith a desire fo r  concealment, usually based on 
a fear o f misrepresentation.
Although he viewed a re g is te r  as a 'gross and palpable in tru s io n ' 
in to  aiiMember's privacy he advocated disclosure on the grounds th a t : -
' I f  my experience o f l i f e  is any guide, there is  nothing so 
disappointing to the prur ien t as a reve la tion . Once they ac tu a lly  
know what is  going on, th e i r  in te re s t in i t  w i l l  subside rap id ly . 
The suspicious w i l l  go to lusher pastures where someone is  try in g  
to conceal something . . .  once we have a public re g is te r  the whole
th ing w i l l  die in a year or two. ' ^^g
I t  emerged from the random sample interviews conducted fo r  th is  study
th a t Mr Walden's speech prompted some o f the ta c t ic a l voting which
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took place during the d iv is io n  on the compulsory re g is te r ,  whereby 
some Members voted fo r  the re g is te r  not because they wanted one, but 
because they thought th is  would be the quickest way to k i l l  o f f  the 
whole idea.
Mr Walden's speech also included a c r i t ic is m  o f the use o f the 
word corruption in the context o f a debate on Members' outside in te re s ts .  
He argued:-
'The whole issue has got mixed up with the issue o f corrup­
t io n  because i t  is  very much in some people's in te res ts  th a t i t  
should be. They are anxious to see the two things presented side 
by side . . .  Many people use the word "corruption" when what they 
re a l ly  mean is  "A practice of which I personally d i s a p p r o v e " ^ ^ ^
Other Members, inc lud ing the Attorney General Mr S.C. S ilken, who argued
th a t 'We are now concerned with the smoke o f suspicion which surrounds
118the f i r e  o f real or imaginary c o r ru p t io n ',  tended to be less re f le c ­
t iv e  in th e i r  use o f  the term.
The t ra d i t io n a l  values o f honour, s e l f - re s t ra in t  and mutual t ru s t  
were frequently  evoked during the debate. Mr Strauss's speech was 
c ite d  by Mr Ian Lloyd(Cons) as i l lu s t r a t in g  an important d iffe rence 
between the philosophy of the 1969 Select Committee and the philosophy 
which underlay the Government motions. Whereas the Committee had held 
th a t Members were honourable, in his view the Government motions implied
th a t  in ce r ta in  circumstances and under certa in  conditions and a t ce rta in
119times hon. and r ig h t  hon. Members were not honourable. This c r i t i ­
cism was shared by several, mainly Conservative, Members who f e l t  tha t 
the Government's proposals were detrimental to  the honour, in te g r i ty  
and d isc re t ion  o f the ind iv idua l Member, and indicated a decline in 
Parliament as a meeting place o f gentlemen. A strong defender o f th is  
viewwas Mr John Stokes (Cons) who refused to vote fo r  any o f the motions 
and in s is te d , ' I believe tha t we are a l l  hon. Members, and to me th is  
is  s t i l l  a kind o f c lu b '.^ ^^  Im p l ic i t  in th is  b e l ie f  was the idea 
th a t disclosure o f  in te re s t was o f relevance to colleagues only and 
not fo r  public  consumption. However, an opposing view was argued by 
Mr T. Rathbone (Cons) who recognised two objectives fo r  introducing 
a re g is te r ;  f i r s t  to avoid actual c o n f l ic ts ,  and second, to restore 
pub lic  confidence and t ru s t  in Parliament by reducing the appearance 
o f  c o n f l ic t .  A llud ing to the cynicism with which he f e l t  people regarded 
p o l i t ic s  and p o l i t ic ia n s ,  and stressing the public re la t ions  function 
o f  a re g is te r ,  he argued:-
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' . . .  we cannot a llow ourselves the luxury o f  contemplating 
the pros and cons o f re g is tra t io n  of in te res ts  so le ly  from the 
standpoint o f the working re la t ions  among ourselves. With almost 
instantaneous communication, people outside the House know more 
o f  what we do, what we say and even what we th ink  . . .  I f  by estab­
l is h in g  a re g is te r  o f Members' in te res ts  we can i n s t i l l  ju s t  a 
l i t t l e  more in the minds o f the B r i t is h  people tha t Parliament 
is  th e i r  in s t i tu t io n  and tha t i t  is inhabited by people in whom 
they may place th e i r  t r u s t ,  we may be taking quite a step back 
towards the proper operation o f a form o f government which has 
been trus ted  and t r ie d  but which in many people's minds is  now 
found lack ing . '^21
In addition to these recurrent themes or arguments. Members discussed 
both the question o f what in te res ts  should or should not be included 
in a compulsory re g is te r ,  and the controversia l issue o f whether the 
p r in c ip le  o f  re g is t ra t io n  should be extended to other classes o f persons 
besides MPs. While expressing no opinion, Mr Short had acknowledged 
th a t  a great many Members and people outside the House had recommended 
th a t parliamentary jo u rn a l is ts ,  candidates, spouses and ch ildren o f 
hon. Members should be required to re g is te r  th e i r  in te rests  and he 
had therefore included the question w ith in  the Select Committee's terms 
o f reference.
Closing the debate the Attorney General summarised the d iffe rence 
between the Government's motions and the amendments as turn ing on whether 
i t  was s u f f ic ie n t  to  re ly  e n t i re ly  on each in d iv id u a l 's  judgment or 
whether i t  was be tte r to re ly  on the c o l le c t iv e  wisdom of the House.
He advised the House to support the Government motions, and attempted 
to l in k  the intended reforms in the area o f Members' in te res ts  to the 
wider cause o f  open government:-
'We are seeking to achieve a climate in which openness w i l l  
be taken fo r  granted so tha t hon. Members, by tha t openness which 
we seek to  establish about in te rests  re levant to th e i r  work in 
Parliament, w i l l  make th e i r  f u l l  con tr ibu tion  to tha t open Govern­
ment which is  an essential part o f  a modern parliamentary democracy. '^22
Voting on the motions and amendments
'L ike so many debates in th is  House in which the conclusion 
is  to be on a free vote, th is  debate is  turning in to  what seems 
to  be a good one, something which insp ires trep ida tion  in  any 
Speaker. We know tha t at the end o f the day every Member w i l l  
be voting according to his conscience and perhaps his in te re s t . '
171
Michael English MP.
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Although the o f f i c ia l  party whips were o f f  duty during th is  debate, 
party d is c ip l in e  rests at least p a r t ly  on group opinion and group lo y a lty .  
To the extent tha t th is  is  so, MPs' voting behaviour may have been 
less voluntary than the theory o f  a free vote im plies, or MPs, such 
as Michael English, b e l i e v e d . A n  analysis of the voting behaviour 
on both the Government's motions and the amendments, though complicated 
by the problem o f ta c t ic a l  voting mentioned e a r l ie r ,  reveals a strong 
re la t io n sh ip  between party a f f i l i a t i o n  and opinion on the issue o f 
Members' outside in te res ts . I t  also suggests tha t despite Government 
rh e to r ic  claiming Members' in te rests  to be a House issue ra ther than 
a party issue, there is  in practice party c lus te r ing  in terms o f opinions 
on th is  subject.
Mr P r io r 's  amendment to the Government's f i r s t  motion was defeated 
by 336 votes to 221 votes(Appendix 4 , Table 10). There was a sharp 
d iv is io n  o f opinion between pa rt ies , with approximately 75% o f the 
Conservative Members e l ig ib le  to  vote voting fo r  the amendment and 
96% o f Labour Members e l ig ib le  to vote voting against i t .  No Labour 
Members supported the amendment. An analysis o f voting w ith in  the 
Conservative party on th is  amendment indicated a tendency fo r  re la t iv e ly  
'new' Conservative Members ( i . e .  those entering the House a t the February 
1974 e le c t ion ) to be more l i k e ly  to vote against the amendment than 
those Conservatives w ith longer service in Parliament (Appendix 4 ,
Table 11). The Government's motion on declaration o f in te re s t  was 
then carried  w ithout d iv is ion .
The motion estab lish ing a compulsory re g is te r  was carried by 365 
votes to 170 votes (Appendix 4 , Table 12) and resulted in a la rger 
Government m a jority  than expected. As with the f i r s t  motion there 
was a d is t in c t  d iv is io n  o f opinion between the pa rt ies , w ith 94% o f 
the Labour party e l ig ib le  to vote voting fo r  a compulsory re g is te r  
as compared to  21% o f the Conservative party. Of the Conservative 
pa rty , 57% voted against the motion, inc lud ing Mr E. Heath and a t least 
7 members o f  the Shadow Cabinet; Mr A lick  Buchanan-Smith, Mr Ian Gilmour, 
S ir  Keith Joseph, Mr Maurice MacMillan, Mr James P r io r,  Mr Francis 
Pym and Mrs Margaret Thatcher. Mr Reginald Maudling, former Home Sec­
re ta ry  also opposed the motion. Only 2 Labour Members voted against 
the motion; Mr Alex Lyon, who throughout the campaign fo r  a re g is te r  
had revealed himself as a champion o f  the r ig h t  to pr ivacy, and Mr
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George Lawson, who was described to the w r i te r  by a former Leader o f 
the House, as 'a highly in d iv id u a l is t ic  MP'.
An analysis o f voting w ith in  the Conservative party again suggested 
a d iffe rence  between 'o ld '  and 'new' Conservatives, ind ica ting  a tendency 
fo r  those Conservatives who entered the House in February 1974 to be 
more l i k e ly  to vote fo r  a compulsory re g is te r  than those Conservatives 
with longer service in  Parliament (Appendix 4 , Table 13). However, 
the 62 Conservatives who jo ined the 208 Labour Members in supporting 
the re g is te r ,  thus ind ica ting  tha t by May 1974 some Conservative Members 
had gradua lly , i f  u n w il l in g ly  accepted tha t i t  would be a reassuring 
gesture to take some action to restore the good name o f the House, 
did include some f ro n t  bench spokesmen: Mr Peter Walker - Trade and
Industry ; Mr Geoffrey Rippon - Foreign A f fa i r s ;  Mr Peter Thomas - 
Wales; and Mr W. Van-Straubenzee - Education. Those in favour also 
included 10 L ib e ra ls , Mr D. Tavern^Mr E. Milne and 8 N a tiona lis ts .
The th i rd  motion, se tt ing  up the Select Committee, was agreed 
w ithout a d iv is io n .  With a m a jo rity  fo r  the Government's motion estab­
l is h in g  a compulsory re g is te r ,  Mr P r io r 's  amendment to th is  motion, 
intending to re fe r  the substantive decision between compulsory and 
vo luntary re g is t ra t io n  to the Select Committee, automatically f e l l .
The to ta l  number o f Members voting was extremely high fo r  a free  
vote. Including t e l le r s ,  557 o f the to ta l  number o f Members e l ig ib le  
to vote took part in the f i r s t  vote, and 531 in the second. Those 
who were absent from the debate or abstained from voting did so fo r  
a va r ie ty  o f reasons which are d i f f i c u l t  to categorise. However, the 
random sample interviews indicated tha t in addition to Members who 
had p r io r  engagements or who abstained because they saw the re g is te r 
as a non-event, they included some, who, l ik e  Mr Strauss (Lab), chose 
to abstain ra ther than vote against the re g is te r  because the la t te r  
action could have been misinterpreted as a vote against the end p r in c ip le  
o f d isc losure o f which they approved, ra ther than a vote against the 
means o f a re g is te r  o f which they disapproved.
At the end o f  a 7 hour debate the House o f Commons had resolved 
to turn the t ra d i t io n a l  convention o f declaration o f in te re s t in to  
a more comprehensive ru le  o f the House, and had agreed to the p r in c ip le  
o f  p u b lic ,  general disclosure o f  in te res ts  in the form o f a compulsory 
re g is te r  o f Members' outside f ina nc ia l in te re s ts . The task o f making 
these p r in c ip le s  adopted by the House operational was re ferred to a 
Select Committee, who were instructed to report to  the House w ith in  
the shortest possible period.
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CHAPTER 6
The Register: To be a Gentleman is  Not Enough
'We decided . . .  to recommend the establishment o f a Select 
Committee from both sides of the House to give urgent consideration 
to the way in  which the decision in p r in c ip le  to estab lish  a com­
pulsory and public re g is te r  o f Members' in te res ts  should be put 
in to  p rac tica l e f fe c t .  The Select Committee would consider what 
types o f in te re s t  should be re g is tra b le ,  how the re g is te r  should 
be kept and what sanctions, whether le g is la t iv e  or procedural, 
should be applied i f  the provisions o f the re g is te r  are not observed.'
Mr E. Short, 1974'
In passing the three Resolutions on 22 May 1974 concerning the dec la r­
a tion  and re g is t ra t io n  o f Members' in te re s ts ,  the House had agreed 
to appoint a se lec t committee to consider the way in which the decision 
in  p r in c ip le  to establish a compulsory and public re g is te r  o f Members' 
in te re s ts  should be implemented. This Committee comprised 14 Members
p
o f the House;" 7 Labour, 6 Conservative and 1 L ibera l.
The most s t r ik in g  d iffe rence between the composition o f th is  Committee 
on Members' in te res ts  and tha t which had been set up in 1969, is tha t 
whereas a l l  but one of the members of the 1969 Select Committee had 
been Privy C ounc il lo rs , only 3 members o f the 1974 Select Committee 
had th is  standing. While several backbenchers interviewed fo r  th is  
study intimated tha t the absence o f Privy Councillors re f lec ted  the 
fa c t  tha t the Government had taken heed o f backbench c r i t ic is m  which 
had surrounded the membership o f the 1969 Committee, the Chairman of 
the Comittee, Mr F. W il le y , pointed out tha t much more s ig n if ic a n t  
was the nature o f  the job th a t the Committee was set up to do. Whereas 
the Strauss Committee in 1969 had been concerned with the p r inc ip les  o f 
dec lara tion and re g is t ra t io n  and had therefore been composed more l ik e  
a p r iv i le g e  se lec t committee, w ith  a predominance o f Privy Councillo rs, 
th is  Committee was more o f a working committee, concerned with putting 
in to  operation decisions already taken by the House.
The Committee were unable to report before the Summer Recess, 
and as i t  happened, before Parliament was dissolved in September. The 
Conservative Party made no reference to  Members' in te rests  in th e ir  
e lec t ion  manifesto, while the Labour Party, in the context o f th e i r  
professed b e l ie f  tha t the process o f government should be more open 
to the p u b lic ,  pledged themselves to : -
' Establish compulsory reg is te rs  o f in te re s t  fo r  a l l  MPs, coun­
c i l l o r s ,  peers, senior c i v i l  servants, senior council o f f i c ia ls  
and others in the upper reaches o f the public se rv ice .^
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At the General Election o f October 1974 the Labour Party was re ­
turned w ith  a narrow m a jo r ity  o f 3 seats over a l l  other Members. At 
the beginning o f the new Parliament the Select Committee on Members' 
In te res ts  (Declaration) was reappointed with la rge ly  the same member­
ship and id e n t ica l terms o f reference.
The Committee did not receive a great deal o f evidence, la rg e ly  
because so much had already been submitted to the 1969 Select Committee 
which had dea lt w ith  the p r in c ip les  o f re g is tra t io n  and dec lara tion .
A ll  the evidence received was published, except tha t re la t in g  to American 
and German practices.
Like George Strauss in 1969, Frederick W illey was required to 
assume the ro le  o f an ac tive  chairman o f an investiga to ry  se lec t committee. 
When interviewed he singled out 'patience' as the s ing le most important 
q u a l i ty  required o f him as chairman; patience to work towards obtaining 
unanimous decisions among a great d iv e rs i ty  o f Members. The Committee 
contained both Members who had voted fo r  the motion to establish a 
compulsory, pub lic  re g is te r  and some who had voted against.^ Although 
the unanimous report was in e v ita b ly  a compromise document, both the 
Chairman and the Clerk to the Committee ins is ted  tha t no c lear party 
d iv is io n  had emerged. The Clerk suggested tha t as the House had already 
taken the decision to  estab lish a re g is te r ,  so presumably the Conservative 
Members who had voted against the re g is te r  f e l t  bound by th is  decision 
and by the function  o f the Select Committee to make the resolutions 
workable.
The Report o f the 1974 Select Committee^
In th e i r  terms of reference the Committee id e n t i f ie d  two d i f fe re n t  
types of issue on which they were required to make recommendations:
'There are the adm in is tra tive  and procedural problems involved 
in both Resolutions; these are la rg e ly  technical and are un­
l i k e ly  to prove co n tro ve rs ia l. . .  There are a lso , however, the 
quite separate p o l i t ic a l  problems o f the scope o f  the re g is te r ,  
what classes o f  pecuniary in te re s t or benefit should be reg is tered, 
and also what classes o f persons other than Members might be re­
quired to r e g is t e r ' . g
Their consideration o f adm in is tra tive and procedural problems 
provided more scope fo r  the Clerk of the House to influence th is  Committee 
than was possible in 1969, although he was careful to po in t out the 
d iffe rence  between procedural matters on which he could advise, and 
p o l i t i c a l  matters, such as the scope o f the Regi s te r ,  on which he 
preferred not to express a view.^
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Purpose o f  the Register
The Committee recommended tha t the form fo r  the Register o f  In terests  
to be sent to Members should contain the fo llow ing  d e f in i t io n  o f the 
Register's  purposes
'The purpose o f  th is  Register is to provide information o f 
any pecuniary in te re s t  or other material benefit which a Member 
o f Parliament may receive which might be thought to a f fe c t  his 
conduct Las a Member o f Parliament or influence his actions, speeches 
or vote in P a r l iam en t '.g
They ins is ted  tha t in carry ing out his parliamentary duties an 
MP was properly subject to  a number o f influences and tha t i t  was because, 
and only because, his parliamentary action and conduct may be seen 
to be a ffected by these tha t he was required to disclose any such pecun­
ia ry  in te re s t  or be ne fit  re levant to the parliamentary action he was 
tak ing . The re g is te r  was intended 'to  record generally and to give 
public  no tice ' o f those in te res ts  which on occasion might be seen to 
e f fe c t  the discharge o f  a Member's parliamentary du ties .^
Against th is  apparent concession towards greater openness and 
p u b l ic i ty  concerning Members' in te res ts  through compulsory re g is tra t io n  
must be seen the Committee's rea ff irm ation  o f a Member^s r ig h t  to privacy. 
Although they f e l t  th a t  a Member must be expected to be subjected to 
thorough pub lic  sc ru t iny  in the performance o f his public duties, they 
also argued th a t : -
'He is  . . .  however, a pr iva te  ind iv idua l and is  e n t i t le d  to 
a proper degree o f  privacy. His w ife  and ch ildren are equally 
e n t i t le d  to such p r iva cy '.
Accordingly, they considered i t  was unnecessary to require the 
d isc losure o f the amounts o f any remuneration or benefits received.
This was to be a re g is te r  o f the sources or nature of pecuniary in te res ts  
and bene fits ; not a public  income tax return designed to ind icate 
the magnitude o f a Member's income.
The Committee also q u a l i f ie d  the element o f compulsion associated 
w ith  the Register. They recognised, as. did the 1969 Select Committee, 
th a t the re g is te r  could not guarantee against evasion. Evoking the 
ind iv idua l and c o l le c t iv e  q u a l i t ie s  o f in te g r i t y ,  s e l f -d is c ip l in e  and 
above a l l  t r u s t ,  they admitted:-
' In  the end, re s p o n s ib i l i ty  must res t on the Member h imself t o  
disclose those in te res ts  tha t might a f fe c t  his parliamentary 
actions/^ ^
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Scope o f the Register
17As evidenced by the Clerk o f the House, the most d i f f i c u l t  task
which faced the Committee was to determine the scope o f  the Register.
Pointing out th a t remuneration included not only d ire c t  income but
also taxable expenses, allowances or benefits , they recommended the
re g is t ra t io n  o f 9 sp e c if ic  classes o f pecuniary in te re s t  or benefit
which they emphasised should be taken as broad guidelines w ith in  which
Members should 'proceed w ith good sense and re s p o n s ib i l i t y ' .  These 
13were
1. remunerated d irec torsh ips o f companies, public or p r iva te ;
2. remunerated employments or o f f ic e s ;
3. remunerated trades, professions or vocations;
4. the names o f c l ie n ts  when the in te res ts  re ferred to above 
include personal services by the Member which ar ise out o f  or 
are re la ted in any manner to his membership of the House;
5. f in a n c ia l sponsorships, (a) as a Parliamentary candidate where 
to the knowledge o f  the Member the sponsorship in any case 
exceeds 25 per cent o f the candidate's e lec tion  expenses, or
(b) as a Member o f Parliament, by any person or organisation, 
s ta t in g  whether any such sponsorship includes any payment to the 
Member or any material bene fit  or advantage d ire c t  or in d ire c t ;
6. overseas v is i t s  re la t in g  to or a r is ing  out o f membership o f the 
House where the cost o f  any such v i s i t  has not been wholly borne 
by the Member or by public funds;
7. any payments or any material benefits or advantages received 
from or on behalf o f fore ign Governments, organisations or 
persons;
8 . land and property o f substantia l value or from which a substan­
t i a l  income is  derived;
9. the names o f companies or other bodies in which the Member has, 
to his knowledge, e i th e r  himself or w ith or on behalf o f his 
spouse or in fa n t ch i ld ren , a benefic ia l in te re s t in shareholdings 
o f  a nominal value greater than one-hundredth o f the issue share 
c a p ita l .
Stressing the importance o f categories (6) and (7 ), concerning over­
seas v is i t s  and fore ign Governments, they confirmed tha t i t  was anxiety 
on th is  score tha t had led to the appointment o f th e i r  predecessor se lect 
committee in 1969. They conceded tha t the in te rp re ta t io n  o f  the phrase 
' re la t in g  to  or a r is in g  out o f  Membership o f the House' in category
(6) might create d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  but as w ith the problem of in te rp re t in g  
what constitu ted  ' material benefits or advantages' in category (7) 
and 'subs tan tia l value' or 'substan tia l income' in category (8) ,  they 
preferred to leave th is  to the judgment o f  the ind iv idua l Member to
in te rp re t  in the l i g h t  o f his own knowledge o f the circumstances, ra ther
14than laying down f ixed  rules or amounts.
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While they believed th e i r  d e f in i t io n s  o f  reg is trab le  in te res ts
would command general support, they considered these might require
amendment in the l ig h t  of experience. For th is  reason, the essence
o f t h e i r  proposals was a permanent se lect committee on Members' in te res ts
charged w ith monitoring how the proposed scope o f the re g is te r  operated
in  p r a c t i c e . T h i s  committee would deal w ith ad hoc problems and
complaints a r is in g  from the working o f  the Register, such as those
o f deciding whether a p a r t ic u la r  in te re s t should be reg is te red , or
whether a Member has fa i le d  to re g is te r  a relevant in te re s t ,  and would
also have the wider task o f keeping under review the whole sub jec t'
o f  Members' in te res ts  and o f making recommendations.
The Committee also proposed tha t the Registrar o f Members' In terests
should be Clbrk to the Committee, and would then act on the ins truc tions
o f the Committee as well as under the au tho r ity  o f the Resolutions
o f the House. They endorsed the Clerk o f the House's proposal tha t
the Registrar would need to be a senior member o f his Department,
and provided de ta iled  guidelines fo r  the Registrar which they set out
in Annex 1 to th e i r  Report.
The procedures fo r  compilation and maintenance o f the Register
were s tra igh tfo rw ard . Each Member would receive a form to complete
incorporating the various classes o f reg is trab le  in te re s ts ,  together
17w ith  a le t t e r  from the Registrar. I t  would be the re sp o n s ib i l i ty
o f Members to complete the form, the contents o f which would be edited
by the Registrar and published from time to time as a House o f Commons
Paper, ava ilab le  from H.M.S.O. This pub lica tion  arrangement would
not, however, preclude the r ig h ts  o f the public and o f Members to inspect
an up-to-date copy o f the Register. I t  would be the re sp o n s ib i l i ty
o f Members to n o t i fy  the Registrar o f  any changes o f  reg is trab le  in te res ts
which might occur.
In discussing the enforcement o f the requirements to re g is te r ,
the Committee made i t  c lea r tha t the philosophy o f the House was one
o f t r u s t .  I t  should be observed th a t ,  un like the position in America
18w ith  the House and Senate eth ics committees , the Registrar and his
s ta f f  were not to be seen as enforcement o f f ic e rs .  Referring to the
sanction o f possible penal ju r is d ic t io n  by the House, the Committee
19confirmed the view expressed by the Clerk o f  the House, th a t : -
'The u lt im ate sanction behind the ob liga tion  upon Members to 
re g is te r  would be the fa c t  tha t i t  was imposed by Resolution o f 
the House... There can be no doubt tha t the House might consider e ith e r 
a refusal to re g is te r  as required by i t s  Resolutions or the w i l fu l  
fu rn ish ing  o f misleading or fa lse  information to be a contempt.'
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Declaration o f in te res ts
The Committee had less to say on the Resolution concerning d is ­
closure o f in te re s ts ,  which had changed an ex is t ing  convention o f d is ­
closure in to  a ru le  o f the House, and imposed th is  ru le  over a wider 
area than th a t to which the former convention applied.
Following the Redd i f f e  Maud Committee on local government rules 
20o f Conduct, they emphasised tha t the new requirement to re g is te r
in te res ts  did not exempt a Member from having to declare his in te res ts
in any p a r t ic u la r  proceeding, although they realised tha t in many cases
where in te res ts  should be registered they would not have to be declared
because they were not re levant to the p a r t ic u la r  debate or a c t iv i t y
21in  which a Member was p a r t ic ip a t in g .  They also emphasised tha t 
as well as proceedings o f the House or committees, the Resolution re ­
ferred to  'transactions or communications which a Member may have with 
other Members or w ith  M inisters or servants o f the Crown'. While stress­
ing th a t the ob liga tion  on Members to declare th e i r  in te res ts  in these 
circumstances was ju s t  as binding as fo r  proceedings o f the House, 
they were content to leave th is  to the personal judgment and honour 
o f the ind iv idua l
They also re l ie d  upon the good sense o f Members to in te rp re t  how 
fa r  past or fu tu re  in te res ts  should be disclosed. Taking in to  account 
the possible d i f f i c u l t i e s  created by the element o f c o n f id e n t ia l i ty  
in fu tu re  expectations, the Committee did not expect in te res ts  to be 
registered unless they were actual ra ther than p o te n t ia l.  However, 
they did not expect a Member to take part in  any re levant proceedings 
u n t i l  the element of c o n f id e n t ia l i ty  had been removed; i f  he did pa rt-  : 
ic ip a te ,  then he would be required to declare his in te res ts  and sa c r i­
f ic e  the c o n f id e n t ia l i ty .^ ^
The Committee considered a number o f procedural problems which 
arose from the extension o f the practice o f declaration o f in te res ts  
to proceedings other than debate. With regard to Questions and Notices 
o f Motions or Amendments ( inc luding Amendments to a B i l l )  they proposed 
a complex scheme, invo lv ing the use o f ce r ta in  symbols on the Notice 
Paper, which would vary according to whether or not the in te re s t  declared 
was already r e g i s t e r e d . T o  overcome the problem o f making public 
the declarations o f in te re s t  which are made during the customary p r iva te  
de libe ra t ions  o f  se lect committees, they proposed tha t such declaration
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should be recorded and published in the minutes o f proceedings o f the
25
Committee. F in a l ly ,  so fa r  as voting was concerned, they regarded
i t  as impracticable and time-wasting fo r  a l l  in te res ts  to be declared.
On the question o f what classes o f persons ( i f  any) other than
.Members ought to be required to re g is te r ,  the Committee pointed out
th a t apart from the case o f parliamentary candidates, no evidence or
representations had been received by them fo r  the re g is te r  to be extended
beyond Members to inc lude, fo r  example, ' lo b b y is ts ' ,  parliamentary
26jo u rn a l is ts ,  or close re la t ive s  o f Members. In the case o f parliament-i
ary candidates, although they considered i t  was un fa ir  tha t a candidate
who happens to have been a Member o f Parliament should have his pecuniary
in te res ts  and benefits  recorded and made available to the e lec to ra te
while the other candidates were under no ob liga tion  to disclose anything,
they concluded tha t th is  problem was not one fo r  them to resolve. They
recommended tha t the question o f reg is te r ing  the in te res ts  of a l l  p a r l i -
mentary candidates be re ferred to the next Speaker's Conference on
Electoral Law, w ith  a view to introducing le g is la t io n  before the next 
27general e lec t ion .
Reaction to the 1974 Select Committee Report
'On i t s  pub lica t ion  the se lect committee's Report had a good
reception and a ttrac ted  favourable comment. I t  was not debated 
by the House o f Commons u n t i l  11 June when i t  was accepted by 
a substantia l m a jo r ity . I am confident tha t i t s  acceptance w i l l  
re s u lt  in the new concept o f the declaration and re g is tra t io n  
o f Members' in te res ts  becoming a recognized and accepted part 
o f  our parliamentary procedure'. p 28
( i ) Newspaper comment
Generally speaking, the Press were more favourably disposed towards 
th is  Report than they had been towards i t s  predecessor in 1969, although 
they were not e n t i re ly  w ithout c r i t ic is m .
The Times (9.1.1975) judged the proposals contained in the Report 
to be workable. I t  recognised tha t 'no re g is te r  could act as an automatic 
detector o f  the f i r s t  signs o f p o l i t ic a l  co rrup tion ' but i t  could s t i l l  
see an argument fo r  re g is t ra t io n : -
'The purpose of a re g is te r  is  to make an MP disclose a l l  re levant 
in te res ts  or to take a conscious decision to conceal them. I f  
he takes tha t decision he w i l l  know th a t he is abusing his pos it ion .
A l in e  w i l l  have been drawn and i t  w i l l  mean tha t an MP must be 
prepared to disclose to public scru t iny  any arrangement he makes 
w ith  outside f in a n c ia l in te res ts  unless he takes a de libera te  
decision to be evasive'.
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However, i t  also found the proposals unclear and warned tha t on 
some key points i t  was a ‘ recipe fo r  confusion '. I t  was p a r t ic u la r ly  
c r i t i c a l  o f the Committee's fa i lu re  to c la r i f y  such terms as 'materia l 
b e n e f i t s ' ,  'subs tan tia l value' and 'substan tia l income', and ins is te d  
th a t although the Committee had not set out f ixed  rules or amounts 
because i t  f e l t  these would be a rb i t ra ry  and in need o f constant re v is io n , 
th is  approach would have been no more a rb i t ra ry  than the f igu res  f ixed  
by ind iv idua l MPs acting in  good fa i th .
The Guardian (9.1.1975) was c r i t i c a l  o f the Committee's standpoint 
on privacy, p a r t ic u la r ly  th e i r  view tha t any disclosure o f g i f t s  or 
money by an MP's w ife  would be an u n ju s t i f ia b le  in trus ion  o f p rivacy, 
but nonetheless conceded tha t the Report reconciled fo r  the f i r s t  time 
fo rm a lly  two desirab le cha rac te r is t ics  o f the House o f Commons, namely
' . . .  the existence o f a diverse and valuable expertise among 
i t s  Members and an exact knowledge o f whose case is being p u t. '
The Financial Times (9.1.1975) stated bo ld ly tha t in taking the
decision to set up a re g is te r : -
" . . .  the House broke sharply w ith i t s  own past and recognised 
tha t in modern conditions the old "honour system'' which l e f t  the 
dec lara tion  o f an in te re s t  e n t i re ly  to the d iscre tion  o f the in d i ­
vidual Member no longer afforded the House s u f f ic ie n t  protection 
from su sp ic io n . '
The Daily Telegraph (9.1.1975), however, was not convinced tha t 
the in troduc tion  o f  re g is t ra t io n  would or could usurp the tra d it io n a l 
re liance on honour. I t  argued th a t : -
' In one sentence the a l l - p a r ty  se lect committee on the re g is t ra ­
t io n  o f MP's in te re s ts   sums up what may be thought to be the
strongest argument against i t s  own recommendations: " in  the end"
the committee says " re s p o n s ib i l i ty  must res t on the Member himself 
to d isclose those in te res ts  tha t might a f fe c t  his Parliamentary 
a c t io n s " . '
Obligations o f honour. The Daily Telegraph argued, were often more com­
p e l l in g  fo r  not being co d if ie d . Nevertheless, i t  grudgingly conceded 
tha t a re g is te r  might be necessary to quell public suspicions, however 
groundless or malic ious, about the motives o f MPs.
( i i )  Parliamentary response
I t  was apparent from the Government's rep lies to several Parliament­
ary Questions from th e i r  own backbenchers tha t whatever th e i r  response 
to the report,  they did not intend introducing le g is la t io n  e ith e r  fo r  
a compulsory re g is te r  o f Members' in te re s ts ,  or to make i t  ob liga to ry
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29fo r  MPs when elected to give up a l l  other forms o f paid employment.
The Government also showed th e i r  fa i lu r e ,  or unwillingness, to l in k  
the problem of Members' in te res ts  w ith  Members' remuneration when, 
in  response to a request from Mr Tugendhat (Con) to discuss the whole 
question o f Members' in te res ts  alongside, i f  not at the same time as, 
the consideration o f the Report o f the Boyle Committee in to  Members' 
remuneration, Mr Short admitted tha t tha t point o f view had not occurred 
to him.?'^ Although he said he would consider i t ,  he intimated tha t 
i t  might be some months before the Boyle Committee reported and tha t 
the m a jo r ity  o f Members would probably want to consider the Members' 
in te re s ts  report sooner. He was intending to arrange fo r  the debate 
on the Report to take place before Easter. In the event, the House 
did not debate the Report u n t i l  June, s ix  months a f te r  i t  had been 
published.
31Debate on implementing the 1974 Resolutions
On 12 June 1975 Mr Short moved the main Government motion, agree­
ing w ith the recommendations o f the Select Committee and recommending
th a t ai re g is te r  o f in te res ts  be established as soon as possible in
32accordance w ith the proposals made in  the Report. To regularise 
thepos it ion  w ith  regard to voting w ith an in te re s t and to c la r i f y  th e i r  
view on w r i t te n  notices and supplementary questions, which departed
from the Committee's recommendations, the Government moved a second
motion:-
'That, fo r  the purposes o f the Resolution o f the House o f 22 
May 1974 in re la t io n  to disclosure o f in te res ts  in any proceedings 
o f  the House or i t s  Committees -
( i )  any in te re s t  disclosed in a copy o f the re g is te r  o f Members' 
In te res ts  shall be regarded as s u f f ic ie n t  d isclosure fo r  the pur­
pose o f taking part in any D iv is ion in the House or in any of 
i t s  Committees;
( i i )  the term "proceeding" shall be deemed not to include the 
g iv ing  of any w r it te n  no tice , or the asking o f a supplementary 
q u e s t io n '. gg
The Speaker selected fo r  debate two amendments. One, tabled by
Mr N. Spearing (Lab) and la te r  withdrawn, was addressed to the f i r s t
motion, and was to the e f fe c t  tha t there should be a tenth 'c a tc h -a l l '  
category o f re g is tra b le  in te res ts  to allow fo r  in te rests  which a Member 
might th ink  necessary to re g is te r ,  but which were not covered by the 
proposed 9 spe c if ic  categories.
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The Second amendment stood in the name o f Mr J. Golding (Lab) 
and attempted to a l te r  the second motion to the e f fe c t  th a t a Member 
would be required to declare an in te re s t  when g iv ing notice o f a question 
in  re la t io n  to which he had an in te re s t which was recorded in the Register.
Opening the debate Mr Short reminded the House tha t the debate 
in hand was not on the general p r in c ip le ,  which had already been decided, 
o f whether there should be a public compulsory re g is te r ,  but was concerned 
w ith the Committee's recommendations as to how these general p r in c ip les  
should be put in to  e f f e c t . H e  drew a tten tion  to the problem o f 
de fin ing  ' f in a n c ia l  in te re s ts '  and the consequences th is  had on formula­
t in g  sp e c if ic  categories o f in te re s t .  He endorsed the Committee's 
view tha t these categories could not be e n t i re ly  comprehensive, but 
would act as broad guidelines fo r  the ind iv idua l Member upon whom rested 
the f in a l  re s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r  re g is t ra t io n .  He also agreed tha t the 
re g is te r  was supplementary to ,  and not in place o f ,  the ob liga tion  
on a Member to declare his in te res ts  where required. I f  th is  were 
recognised, he believed Members could take a more relaxed view o f the 
Register.
He defended the Committee's avoidance o f laying down precise l im i ts  
w ith in  which p a r t ic u la r  forms o f f inanc ia l in te re s t would need to be 
reg is tered by emphasising the need to preserve personal privacy and 
the House's t ra d i t io n a l  re liance upon ind iv idua l in te g r i t y : -
' . . .  the House w i l l  want to consider whether some degree of 
imprecision is ine v itab le  i f  Members are to re ta in  the f in a l  res­
p o n s ib i l i t y  fo r  judging whether or not a p a r t ic u la r  in te re s t ,  
o f  whatever nature or amount, should be disclosed to the House, 
and i f  Members are allowed a reasonable degree o f privacy in the 
handling o f  th e i r  own personal f ina nc ia l a f fa i r s .  For example, 
i t  would seem inev itab le  and r ig h t ,  as proposed by the Committee, 
th a t Members should be l e f t  to judge fo r  themselves whether bene­
f i t s  received from an overseas Government are material or n o t ' .^ g
He approved the Committee's recommendations fo r  the appointment 
o f a Registrar o f Members' in te res ts  and gave Government support to 
the proposals fo r  the establishment of a permanent Select Committee 
to which issues of doubt or d i f f i c u l t y  could, i f  necessary, be re ferred 
on a con fiden tia l basis. He pledged tha t i f  these motions were agreed 
by the House the Government would bring forward as soon as possible 
the necessary motion fo r  the establishment o f the Select Committee.
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He commented b r ie f ly  on three subsidiary aspects o f the Report
wh'ildh were re f lec ted  in  the wording o f the second motion before the 
37House. F i r s t ,  he fu r th e r  explained the Government's decision to 
accept the Committee's advice on voting with an in te re s t  and to recommend 
■ tha t the re g is t ra t io n  o f  an in te re s t  should be s u f f ic ie n t  disclosure 
fo r  the purpose o f taking part in any D iv is ion . Second, he commented 
th a t ,  s t r i c t l y  in te rp re ted , the resolutions passed in 1974 would mean 
th a t i f  a Member had a re levant in te re s t  th is  ought to be indicated 
on any Notice which he tab led, whether or not the in te re s t  had already 
been reg is tered. The Government considered the complex scheme proposed 
by the Committee to cover th is  procedure to be, as the Committee them­
selves admitted, cumbersome and esse n tia l ly  time wasting. For th is  
reason they had formulated the second motion which would have the e f fe c t  
th a t  an in te re s t  would not have to  be disclosed in tab ling  a w r it te n  
no tice , whether o f a Question, motion or amendment. Th ird, the second 
motion also excluded supplementary Questions from the scope o f what 
cons titu tes  'proceedings' fo r  the 1974 reso lu tion ; again on the grounds 
tha t i f  an in te re s t  had to be declared when asking a supplementary 
Question the e f fe c t  would be cumbersome and would in e v ita b ly  slow up 
Question Time.
Mr J. Enoch PoweîU (UUUC) spoke fo rc ib ly  against the Register.
He had not been a Member o f the House when they had agreed to the p r in ­
c ip le  o f compulsory re g is t ra t io n .^ ^  Although he accepted tha t th is  
debate was fo rm ally  concerned with the machinery o f  implementing the 
reso lu t ions , he considered tha t i f  the House now disagreed with the 
machinery then th is  presented a way in which they could revise th e i r  
view, i f  they so desired, as to the p r in c ip le .  Indeed, because the 
context in which the House was now discussing Members' f inanc ia l in te res ts  
was d i f fe re n t  to the 's ta te  o f near hys te r ia ' which he considered had 
existed a year or so ago, he submitted to the House that they had a 
duty maturely to reconsider what they were doing. Evoking the s p i r i t  
o f  the issue -a tten tion  cycle model discussed in Chapter 1, and demonstrat­
ing tha t there are genuine differences o f opinion among Members as 
to what ac tio n , i f  any, on the part o f the House is  appropriate at 
each stage o f  the cyc le , he argued:-
' . . .  there is  a great contrast between the background and atmos­
phere in which we are s i t t in g  ton igh t and tha t which surrounded 
the e a r l ie r  discussion on th is  sub ject. I t  is  often the experience 
th a t quite suddenly a subject becomes of almost overpowering in te re s t
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i f  not to the House i t s e l f ,  to the Press and the media - more 
to  the Press, usually than to  the public a t large - and the House 
fee ls  impelled to  some extent to give way, against i t s  be tte r 
judgment to tha t clamour, but always reserving, fo r  we have a 
s o r t  o f in s t in c t  o f se lf-p rese rva tion , the means o f reconsidera­
t io n  a t a la te r  da te . '^g
Mr Powell stated tha t i f  the House divided on the f i r s t  motion 
he would vote in  the 'No' Lobby fo r  two separate and d is t in c t  reasons. 
F i r s t ,  because he believed the proposal to be in e f fe c t iv e ,  degrading 
and 'r id d le d  with lacunae'. I t  was unnecessary because the climate 
o f  mutual t ru s t  and fa m i l ia r i t y  among Members already enabled them 
to judge what motives and what c r e d ib i l i t y  may attach to th e i r  c o n t r i ­
butions to 'debate. I t  was degrading because i t  undermined the h a l l ­
mark o f  the convention o f declaration since time immemorial. I t  was 
his b e l ie f  tha t the House could 'no t change what (was) a requirement 
o f  honour in to  a mere fo rm a lity  o f re g is t ra t io n ' .^ ^
Second, and in h is view more important, he believed the proposal 
to be unlawful and unconst itu t iona l. He agreed tha t the House has 
an absolute r ig h t  to regulate by reso lu tion i t s  own procedures and 
fo r  th is  reason, although he did not l ik e  i t ,  he did not object in 
p r in c ip le  to the f i r s t  Resolution passed in May 1974 converting in to  
a ru le  what had previously been a convention o f the House. However, 
he considered th a t the Resolution the House were now considering was 
not fo r  the purpose o f regulating th e i r  procedure and ensuring Members 
complied w ith the t ra d i t io n s  o f  the House, In his view:-
'What we are purporting to do by th is  reso lu tion  is  to create 
a binding condition fo r  being a Member o f  Parliament. We are 
in troducing a new q u a l i f ic a t io n  to be f u l f i l l e d  before a c i t iz e n  
who is  elected a Member o f  Parliament can operate as a Member 
o f Pari iament; '^>j
In other words, he considered the House were purporting to change 
the law o f  the land and r e s t r i c t  e l i g i b i l i t y  to the House by mere resolu­
t io n  o f the House. This was, he said, unconstitu tional because ' i t  
confus(ed) the e f fe c t  o f a resolution o f the House, which is  in te rna l
to the House, w ith le g is la t io n ,  which changes the law o f  the land and
4?in which the House only p a r t ic ip a te s . '  These arguments are examined
more f u l l y  below in the context o f Mr Powell's refusal to comply with
43the re g is te r ;  an action which he threatened during the debate.
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0 Several MPs echoed Mr Powell's remarks concerning the s a c r i f ic e  
o f  honesty and ind iv idua l in te g r i ty ,  but nobody d i re c t ly  tackled his 
arguments concerning 'u n c o n s t i tu t io n a l i ty ' .  Mr William Hamilton (Lab) 
took up what he considered to be a c la r i f i c a to r y  statement made by 
Mr Powell la te r  in the debate,^4 tha t i f  le g is la t io n  were passed which 
a lte red  the law of the land so as to make th is  a condition o f being 
a Member o f  Parliament he, Mr Powell, would obey i t .  But, when in te r ­
viewed fo r  th is  study Mr Powell said tha t Mr Hamilton had missed the 
p o in t.  He explained he was indeed sincere in avering tha t he would 
obey the law duly made, but in fa c t  he believed i t  would be discovered 
when attempting to le g is la te  th a t the re levant in te rests  could not 
be given the precise d e f in i t io n  required in a s ta tu te .
Mr F. W illey (Lab) who had been Chairman o f the 1974 Select Committee 
on Members' In te rests  explained how the Select Committee had perceived 
the problem re ferred to  them and emphasised tha t ' . . .  the important 
th ing is  tha t we have provided a parliamentary solu tion to the problem 
which faced the House. By th is  he was p r im ar i ly  re fe rr in g  to the 
permanent Select Committee which they had singled out as the essence 
o f  t h e i r  proposals.
During th is  l i v e ly ,  i f  short, debate many o f the arguments and
themes which had dominated the modern campaign fo r  a re g is te r  were
re a r t ic u la te d . Once again c lea r differences o f  opinion became v is ib le
on contentious issues such as privacy, honour, mutual t r u s t ,  ind iv idual
in te g r i t y  and so on. Members were frequently  reminded by the Speaker
or his Deputy, c a l l in g  fo r  b re v ity ,  tha t not a l l  who had indicated
a desire to p a rt ic ip a te  could be f i t t e d  in . Mr Joe Ashton objected
to  th is  because he f e l t  th a t as he had not spoken on the subject since
he was personally reprimanded by the Select Committee on P riv i leges ,
he was e n t i t le d  to extra time in which to comment on the Report and
to pursue his argument th a t a loophole in the procedures re la t ing  to
disclosure o f in te res ts  allowed the catering f a c i l i t i e s  of the House
to be abused. He asked tha t the books o f the Catering Sub-Committee
be made ava ilab le  to any hon. Member, a matter which Mr William Price,
fo r  the Government, said ought to be decided by the Select Committee
on Members' In te re s ts , and which he said heuwould pass on with Mr Ashton's
46request tha t i t  should receive urgent consideration.
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Like th e i r  predecessor's Report in 1959, the Select Committee's 
Report was c r i t id s e d  fo r  embracing what some, predominantly Labour,
MPs considered to be the question-begging assumption tha t i t  was proper 
fo r  MPs to  have outside in te res ts . Arguing the case fo r  fu l l - t im e  
Members o f Parliament, which he reminded the House had been endorsed 
by Lord Boyle, Mr John Prescott (Lab) commented:-
'A fundamental concept behind the report is  th a t i t  s t i l l  unholds 
the view tha t Members o f Parliament can maintain two types o f 
occupation. They can be employed as a Member o f Parliament and 
donduct th e i r  parliamentary du ties , but at the same time they 
can pursue other paid remunerative occupations outside the House.
I believe the nature o f these outside occupations brings with 
i t  a c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  - not ju s t  in a pecuniary sense but 
as a f fe c t in g  the ro le  o f  the Member, confidence in him and his 
image to  his consituency.^y
Opposing th is  view several, predominantly but not exclusive ly
Conservative MPs defended the possession o f in te res ts  on the fa m i l ia r
ground tha t they provided MPs w ith knowledge and experience valuable
to th e i r  parliamentary work and tha t they played an important part
in  securing the independence o f  Members from the Whips.
Members were also divided in th e i r  comments on the scope o f the
Register and the adequacy o f the categories o f  reg is trab le  in te rests
as defined by the Select Committee. Several Members pointed to the
po ten tia l ambiguity o f some o f the categories, w ith Mr G. Strauss arguing
the extreme view th a t the Register would create more problems than i t  
48would solve. When interviewed fo r  th is  study, he gave two main
reasons fo r  his d is l ik e  o f the Register. F i r s t l y ,  he believed tha t
the Register as i t  stood was a 'sham', g iv ing useless information
on the pretence o f being important. Secondly, in his view an 'e f fe c t iv e '
re g is te r  would be ' in to le ra b le '  fo r  reasons given in the 1969 Report,
namely th a t i t  would be a piece o f  cumbrous in q u is i to r ia l  machinery
which would u n ju s t i f ia b ly  require a s a c r i f ic e  o f Members' personal privacy,
Members were also divided on the issue as to whether the p r in c ip le
o f  re g is t ra t io n  should be extended to classes o f  persons other than 
49MPs.
Summing up for, the Government, Mr William Price concluded tha t 
i t  had long been apparent th a t there were two extreme views on the 
d isc losure o f Members' f ina nc ia l in te re s ts . One believed in l i t t l e  
or no d isclosure o f information while the other held tha t Members should 
d isc lose every s ing le  d e ta i l .  He believed tha t the view o f the m a jority
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o f Members was located somewhere in the middle, and in accordance w ith
th is  the: a l l - p a r ty  Select Committee had found a compromise formula 'which
(gave) the appropriate amount o f information w h i ls t  protecting some o f
50the privacy o f Members'. He agreed w ith Mr Powell tha t Members knew 
enough about each other to be able to judge motives, but pointed out 
tha t what the House were seeking to do by introducing the Register was 
to  enable the pu b lic ,  too, to judge motives. He stressed tha t the impor­
ta n t  consideration was whether a public re g is te r  would give the e lectora te  
more fa i th  in Members and Parliament as an in s t i tu t io n .  He believed 
th a t i f  Members re jected the motions before the House the public would 
in e v ita b ly  th ink  tha t there were matters on which the House preferred 
they should not have information. Therefore, he impressed on the House, 
'Tonight we have the chance to  improve our i m a g e ' , a n d  in so saying 
provided fu r th e r  ammunition fo r  the somewhat cynical view tha t in essence 
the establishment o f the Register was la rge ly  a public re la tions exercise.
At the close o f  the debate, which had lasted ju s t  a l i t t l e  over 
3 hours, the House divided on the main motion agreeing with the recommend­
ations o f the Report and proposing to establish a re g is te r  in accordance 
w ith those proposals as soon as possible. The motion was carried by 
183 votes to 23, inc lud ing te l le r s  (Appendix 4 , Table 14). Although 
taken on a free vote, as in 1974 there were d is t in c t  party c lus te r ings , 
w ith  three-quarters o f those voting in the 'yes' lobby being Labour Party 
Members, and, w ith  the exception o f  3 Members, a l l  o f those voting 'no' 
being Conservative Members. However, in contrast to 1974 when over 
80% of Members e l ig ib le  to vote had taken part in both d iv is io n s , the 
p a r t ic ip a t io n  rate in th is  d iv is io n  was extremely low, w ith only one- 
th i r d  o f  Members e l ig ib le  to vote doing so. Less than h a lf  o f Labour 
Members ac tu a lly  voted fo r  the Select Committee's recommendations (which 
meant th a t over h a l f  o f  Labour MPs were e ith e r  absent or abstained) and 
less than one quarter o f Conservative Members e l ig ib le  to  vote did so, 
w ith  approximately 11% of the Party voting fo r  the recommendations and 
7% voting against.
The second d iv is io n  took place on Mr Golding's amendment which was 
defeated by 96 votes to 78, including te l le r s  (Appendix 4, Table 15).
Again some sharp party differences were apparent, w ith a l l  but 2 o f the 
78 Members supporting the amendment being Labour M e m b e r s . H o w e v e r ,  
Labour Members also accounted fo r  more than h a lf  o f the 96 Members who
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voted against the amendment. The p a r t ic ip a t io n  rate in the d iv is io n  
was even lower than the f i r s t ,  w ith less than a th i rd  o f the House taking 
p a rt.  Under h a lf  o f  the Labour Party e l ig ib le  to vote did so (26% voting 
fo r  the amendment and 17% voting against) while the Conservative Party 
were noticeably less en thus ias tic , w ith only around 12% o f Members bother­
ing to vote.
Following th is  the main Members' In terests (Declaration)(No.2) Motion 
was agreed to by the House w ithout a d iv is io n .
Compilation and Publication o f the Register
Shortly  a f te r  the House had agreed to the recommendations o f the 
Select Committee Mr David Pring, Clerk o f Select Committees, was appointed 
f i r s t  Registrar o f Members In te res ts . He proceeded to arrange fo r  the 
compilation and pub lica tion  o f the f i r s t  ed it ion  o f the Register.
In the in tervening period between the June debate and the publica­
t io n  o f the Register the Government were asked whether they now intended 
bring ing fo r th  le g is la t io n  to estab lish a compulsory re g is te r  o f in te res ts  
fo r  'a l l  peers, co u n c i l lo rs ,  senior c i v i l  servants, senior council o f f ic ia ls  
and others in the upper reaches o f public l i f e ' .  They confirmed they 
were not and tha t a proposal o f  th is  kind wouTd come w ith in  the remit
o f  the Royal Commission on Standards o f Conduct in Public L i fe ,  whose
54work was s t i l l  in  progress. They were also questioned as to whether
they would introduce le g is la t io n  to ensure MPs were subject to the same
conditions as c i v i l  servants in respect o f the Corrupt Practices Acts.
Mr A. Lyon rep lied  on behalf o f the Government tha t the Prevention o f
Corruption Acts were cu rren t ly  being considered by the Royal Commission
and th a t the Government believed tha t the House would want to await th e i r
55views before considering any changes in th is  area of the law. I l l u s ­
t ra t in g  th a t i t  is  a b i t  doubtful how fa r  m in is te r ia l  re sp o n s ib i l i ty  
operates in th is  so r t o f area, the Government ducked questions s p e c i f ic a l ly  
on the Register by saying tha t in accordance w ith the Resolutions of 
the House passed on 12 June, questions concerning the compilation and 
pub lica t ion  o f the Register were matters fo r  the Registrar o f Members' 
In te re s ts ,  in conjunction w ith the Select Committee on Members' In terests  
(D ec la ra tion).^^
By the time the House rose fo r  the Summer Adjournment, enough pro­
gress had been made fo r  a d ra f t  Register to  be prepared. When the House 
reassembled in October the Registrar la id  th is  before the Select Committee 
so th a t they could consider any p a r t ic u la r  problems which had arisen
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during i t s  compilation. Following th is  the Registrar c ircu la ted  some 
o f  the Committee's conclusions to each Member, together w ith the proof 
entry re la t in g  to th a t Member. The Register was amended and prin ted 
in accordance w ith the rep lies  the Registrar received.
When interviewed, Mr Pring recalled tha t at the beginning several 
problems arose concerning the categories o f reg is trab le  in te re s ts .  The 
requirement regarding land was very imprecise, invo lv ing subjective 
decisions by Members, and apparently gave r ise  to many questions. Sim­
i l a r l y ,  there were problems concerning the re g is tra t io n  of c l ie n ts .  A 
d is t in c t io n  had been drawn in the Register between c l ie n ts  who come to 
an MP because he is  an MP, and which should be reg is tered, and those 
who consult a Member not as, or because he is  an MP but as a p r iva te  
ind iv idua l and therefore need not be registered. In practice i t  proved 
d i f f i c u l t  in  some cases to decide whether a Member had been contacted 
in  his public  or 'ex tra-parliam entary ' ro le . A th i rd  problem was tha t 
although general statements about the purpose o f the re g is te r  indicated 
the inc lus ion  o f g i f t s ,  the spec if ic  category o f g i f t s  from domestic 
sources had been overlooked. This omission gave r ise  to several queries 
about the re g is t ra t io n  or otherwise o f g i f t s .
Most o f  these problems and ,more were considered by the Select Committee 
who, in  th e i r  Second Report, came to several fu r th e r  conclusions about 
re g is tra b le  i n t e r e s t s . F i r s t ,  they agreed tha t M in is te r ia l  o f f ic e ,  
and membership o f  the European Parliament, Council o f Europe, Western 
European Union, the North A t la n t ic  Assembly and the Northern Ireland 
Convention, did not need to be registered. Second, they took up the 
problem concerning c l ie n ts .  They recognised tha t the requirement concern­
ing c l ie n ts  had caused some d i f f i c u l t i e s  fo r  those Members who practiced 
as a member o f  a profession in  th e i r  constituencies, and who had no means 
o f knowing whether c l ie n ts  came to them as a Member or not. They re ferred 
to th e i r  F i r s t  Report where they had stated tha t there would be no general 
o b l ig a t io n  to re g is te r  names o f c l ie n ts ,  and considered tha t th is  would 
be a case where the House would not expect a l l  c l ie n ts  to be registered.
The Memberwas not, however, released from the requirement to re g is te r  
the name where he was in no doubt tha t his services to the c l ie n t  arose 
out o f his Membership o f the House, and he was c e r ta in ly  not released 
from his ob liga tion  to declare his in te re s t  in any proceeding o f the 
House which involved his pr iva te  practice . Th ird , they agreed tha t i t
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was unnecessary fo r  a Member to re g is te r  the fa c t  tha t he was supported 
at an e lec t ion  by his local constituency party. Fourth, they agreed 
tha t overseas v is i t s  undertaken on behalf o f the In ter-Parliamentary 
Union, the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, the Council o f  Europe, 
the Western EuropeanUnnon, and the North A t la n t ic  Assembly, or any Select 
Committee o f the House, and any v i s i t  paid fo r  by Her Majesty's Govern­
ment or by any in s t i tu t io n  o f the European Economic Communities, need 
not be reg is tered. They also agreed tha t in reg is te r ing  an overseas 
v i s i t ,  a Member should disclose the sponsor o f his v i s i t .
The Committee recognised the confusion surrounding the re g is tra t io n  
or o therw ise jo f g i f t s  and issued a c la r i fy in g  statement to the e f fe c t  
th a t 'any pecuniary in te re s t  or other material bene f it '  as defined in 
para. 11 o f the Report o f December 1974 and referred to in para. 3 o f 
the in troduc tion  to the F i r s t  Edition o f the Register (Nov. 1975), c le a r ly  
included g i f t s . W i t h  certa in  exceptions, such as state pensions, 
th is  phrase was also said to include pensions and a n n u i t i e s . T h e  
Committee also considered a procedural matter regarding d iv is ions which 
arose from the decision taken by the House on 12 June. While the Reso­
lu t io n  o f  tha t date held tha t re g is t ra t io n  o f an in te re s t was s u f f ic ie n t  
d isc losure for the purposes of taking part in  a d iv is io n ,  i t  made no pro­
v is ion  fo r  circumstances in which the in te re s t  was not registered but 
where the Member had not had an opportunity o f  declaring i t .  In such 
circumstances, the Committee recommended tha t a Member could inform the 
Registrar o f the in te re s t ,  a f te r  which, in so fa r  as i t  affected the 
d iv is io n ,  i t  could be noted in the Register.
The Committee advised the House tha t a l l  Members had entered d e ta i ls  
o f th e i r  re g is tra b le  in te re s ts ,  w ith the exception o f Mr Enoch Powell.
The f i r s t  e d it io n  o f the Register recorded Members' in te rests  as 
on 1st November 1975.^^ An ind ica tion  o f the te n ta t ive  nature o f the 
f i r s t  Register was contained in the statement tha t the format o f the 
Register - p a r t ic u la r ly  the balance tha t had been struck between what 
should be p u b l ic ly  known about an MP, and the proper r ig h t  o f tha t Member 
to some privacy - was open to revis ion at any time, since a Select Committee 
would be monitoring the working o f the Register and could suggest changes 
i f  experience revealed any imperfections in the sytem.^^
Members were reminded tha t i t  was the re s p o n s ib i l i ty  o f the ind iv idua l 
Member, w ith or w ithout the advice o f the Reg is trar, to give the necessary 
in formation. Any inconsistencies in s ty le  or content o f the entries 
in the Register are a t t r ib u ta b le  to th is  fa c t .
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Following a b r ie f  resume of the ra t iona le  and purpose o f the Register 
came the meat o f the document; the Members' ind iv idua l en tr ies  presented 
in a lphabetical order. A systematic examination o f these en tr ies  revealed 
the extent o f  Members who judged tha t they had in te res ts  which they were 
obliged to re g is te r .  (Appendix 5, Table 17). Approximately 87% o f the 
House made an entry under one or more o f the 9 spec if ic  categories o f 
re g is tra b le  in te re s ts .  The balance o f Members registered ' n i l ' ,  w ith 
the exception o f  Mr Enoch Powell. The entry against his name stated 
simply th a t he had nort returned the form fo r  the re g is t ra t io n  o f in te re s ts .
Of the 84 Members who registered ' n i l '  in te res ts  (a f u l l  l i s t  c f  
whom is  included in Appendix 5 , Fig. 4) 63 were Labour, 10 Conservative,
2 Libera l and 9 belonged to parties other than these three. In terms 
o f  the percentage o f each o f  the two main parties who registered ' n i l '  
in te re s t ,  th is  was approximately 20% o f the Labour Party and 4% o f the 
Conservative Party (Appendix 5 , Table 18). These ' n i l '  in te re s t  en tr ies 
were checked against the 1975/76 ed it ion  o f  Mr Andrew Roth's Business 
Background o f  MPs, and while no s ta r t l in g  instances o f non-disclosure 
emerged, a category o f in te re s t  which was frequently  omitted was tha t
64o f authorship, w ith  the p o te n t ia l ly  associated f in a n c ia l benefit o f ro y a lt ie s .
A record o f the number o f  en tr ies made under each c la s s i f ie d  entry 
in the Register is contained in Appendix 5, where th is  information is 
presented both in terms o f the whole House (Table 19) and in terms o f 
c la s s i f ie d  en tr ies  in the Register by Party (Table 20). In in te rp re t in g  
these tables i t  must be borne in mind tha t the to ta l  under each o f the 
9 sp e c if ic  c la s s i f ic a t io n s  is  the number o f MPs who have made one or 
more en tr ies  under th a t heading. I t  does not record the scope and size 
o f en tr ies  each MP made under tha t heading. These s ta t is t ic s  derived 
from the Register are subject to many l im ita t io n s  and q u a l i f ic a t io n s  
(discussed below) and any attempt to conduct s ta t is t ic a l  analysis on 
them in terms o f s ign if icance tests  fo r  party d ifferences would be a t t r i ­
buting to  them more importance than is  warranted. Nevertheless, they 
do give some ind ica tion  o f the spread o f  Members' f in a n c ia l in te res ts  
as i l lu s t ra te d  by the Register, however imperfect a recording device 
thiis might be.
On the whole, these tables bear out ex is t ing  pre-conceptions con­
cerning the spread o f  Members' f in a n c ia l in te re s ts ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  in terms
o f party d if fe rences, which derive from published data on Members socio-
65economic backgrounds.
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As on 1st November 1975, the percentage o f each o f the two main 
parties  recording at least one entry under each heading was as fo llows
Abbreviated heading in 
Register
% Labour MPs % Cons. MPs % Whole House
1. D irectorships 7.9 54.5 29.4
2. Employment or O ffice 11.9 32.9 21.4
3. Trades or Professions etc. 30.2 56.0 42.2
4. C lients 2.2 5.8 3.6
5. Financial Sponsorship 49.4 0.7 25.2
6. Overseas v is i t s 20.4 23.1 20.8
7. Payments from abroad 3.8 5.1 '14.6
8. Land and Property 4.4 22.0 12.8
9. Declarable Shareholdings 5.3 31.8 17.0
Source : Derived from Appendix 5, Tables 19 and 20
With the one exception o f category 5, f in a n c ia l sponsorship, where 
the higher percentage o f Labour Members than o f Conservative Members 
re f lec ted  th e i r  t ra d i t io n a l  l in k  w ith the trade unions, a la rger percen­
tage o f  Conservative Members than Labour Members recorded a t least one 
entry under each o f  the 9 sp e c if ic  categories o f reg is trab le  in te res ts .
The long association o f  the Conservative Party with Business was well 
in evidence with approximately 55% of Conservative MPs as opposed to 
8% of Labour MPs making an entry under category 1, D irectorships; Con­
servative MP Mr Arthur Jones topping the league table o f d irectorsh ips 
with 36. Party d iffe rences were less evident under category 6, with 
approximately 20% of the Labour Party and 23% o f the Conservative Party 
recording one or more overseas v is i t s .  Few Members o f e ith e r Party had 
in te res ts  to d isclose under category 4, c l ie n ts ,  or category 7, payments 
from abroad. Correspondingly, these two categories were the lowest in 
the league tab le  o f categories as measured by the percentage o f the House 
as a whole who recorded at least one entry. Top o f the league was category 
3 ,Trades or Professions, e tc . ,  w ith approximately 42% o f the whole House 
recording an entry here.
While g iv ing  some ind ica tion  o f  the p ic tu re  o f  Members' in te res ts  
as provided by the Register, these tables and s ta t is t ic s  provide only 
some o f the d e ta i l .  They show the quantity  o f Members who have made 
an entry  under a ce rta in  heading but say nothing about the nature o f
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those in te re s ts .  As i l lu s t ra te d  below, a survey o f the content o f the 
en tr ies  revealed vast d ifferences in the nature or extent o f in te res ts  
which in  the tables are c la s s if ie d  equally as one or more en tr ies  under 
a p a r t ic u la r  heading. Further, there is  the problem already alluded 
to  o f s e l f -a l lo c a t io n  by MPs, and the associated problem o f d ifferences 
o f  perception or judgment as to  what does or does not cons t itu te  a re g is ­
t ra b le  in te re s t ;  and i f  i t  does, what c la s s i f ic a t io n  i t  should be entered 
under. There is  also the problem o f inconsistency in the s ty le  or content 
o f the en tr ies . A l l  these l im ita t io n s  and q u a l i f ica t io n s  have to be 
taken in to  account when assessing the usefulness o f the information 
provided by the Register.
Newspaper comment regarding Members' en tries in the Register was 
generally sce p t ica l,  the Sunday Times of 30 November 1975 observing tha t 
'because o f  the way the Commons Select Committee drew up the questions 
th a t MPs had to answer, i t s  report probably conceals more than i t  revea ls '.  
They concluded tha t the Register appeared to be l i t t l e  more than a 'pub lic  
re la t ion s  exe rc ise '.  The Press speculated tha t several Members had been 
able to circumvent the c r i t e r ia  o f the Register and quite le g it im a te ly ,  
though against the s p i r i t  o f the Register, e i th e r give a deceptive p ic tu re  
o f th e i r  in te res ts  or re g is te r  no in te res ts  at a l l .  While jo u rn a l is t ic  
exposes o f  th is  kind belong more properly in newspaper commentary than 
in an academic study, some discussion o f the examples seized upon by 
the press, along with others taken d i re c t ly  from the Register, helps 
to i l l u s t r a te  the l im ita t io n s  o f the Register as mentioned above.
The most obvious gaps and anomalies were as fo l lo w s :-  
Pi rectorsh ips : This category was widely in terpreted by Members and encom­
passed en tr ies  re fe r r in g  to paid d irec to rsh ips , unpaid d irec to rsh ips , 
non-executive d irec to rsh ips and chairmanships; the exact nature of these 
was not always made c lea r. More importantly there was the problem o f 
d irec to rsh ips  o f Holding Companies. Some MPs, fo r  example Mr John Cope 
(Cons) who held a d irec to rsh ip  in Godfrey Syrett Holdings Ltd. judged 
i t  s u f f ic ie n t  simply to record the name o f the company. Others, an 
example being Mr David Crouch (Cons), f e l t  obliged to provide a f u l l  
c l ie n t  l i s t  o f the company; in Mr Crouch's case Burson-Marsteller Ltd.
A fu r th e r  l im i ta t io n  o f  th is  category was i l lu s t ra te d  by Mr Tom Normanton's 
(Cons) comment to Andrew Roth,^^ tha t although he held 14 chairmanships 
and d irec to rsh ips only 4 were l is te d  in the Register. A ll the others 
were non-remunerative posts and therefore none o f them'Tiad to be included 
in  the Register.
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Employment or O f f ic e : In some instances Members appeared to f in d  tha t
t h e i r  en tr ies  under th is  category overlapped w ith  those under D ire c to r­
ships. For example, having l is te d  'S la te r  Walker (Middle East) (Managing 
D ire c to r ) '  and 'S la te r  Walker (Lebanon) (Managing D ire c to r) '  under D irec to r­
ships, Mr Jonathan Aitken (Cons) then recorded 'as above' under the next 
heading o f  Employment or O ffice . Also, Members who were parliamentary 
advisers or who were consultants appeared to be divided as to whether 
these in te res ts  should be recorded under Employment or O ffice (as, fo r  
example, did Mr James Boyden (Lab) Parliamentary Adviser to the Inland 
Revenue S ta f f  Federation, and S ir  Bernard Brain (Cons) who l is te d  3 con­
su lta nc ies ) ,  or a l te rn a t iv e ly ,  whether they should be entered under Financial 
Sponsorship (as, fo r  example, did Mr Geoffrey Finsberg (Cons) Parliamentary 
adviser to National and Local Government O fficers Association and Licensed 
V ic tu a lle rs  London Central Board, and Mr Michael Roberts (Cons) Consultant 
to the National Union o f Teachers).
C lients : Here there appeared to be confusion over whether MPs should
l i s t  the c l ie n ts  o f  companies w ith which they were associated. For example, 
while  Mr Patrick McNair-Wilson (Cons) l is te d  the 15 c l ie n ts  of his public 
re la t ion s  company, Mr Michael Roberts (Cons) adjudgedhthat a statement 
o f his connection w ith  a public  re la t ions  f irm , John Addey Associates, 
was s u f f ic ie n t  d isc losure. S o l ic i to r  Bruce Douglas-Mann (Lab) i l lu s t ra te d  
the p rac t ica l problem, alluded to above when discussing the in troduction 
op the Register, o f t r y in g  to d is t ingu ish  c le a r ly  between those c l ie n ts  
w ith whom a Member has a re la t ion sh ip  qua Member, and those who deal 
w ith  a Member in  hi s p r iva te  capacity. A f te r  l i s t in g  the c l ie n ts  o f his 
law f i rm  he added:-
'No remuneration received from c l ie n ts  fo r  anything done in my 
capacity as a Member. But the c l ie n ts  occasionally supply informa- 
t io n th a t  is  useful in my parliamentary work or express views which, 
when I agree w ith them, I may r e i t e ra te . '
Financial Sponsorship: This category mainly a ttracted entries concerning
trade union sponsorship, although as mentioned above, some Members also 
in te rp re ted  i t  to include parliamentary advisers and consultants. MPs 
seemed unclear about how much they should reveal. I l lu s t r a t in g  th is  
po in t,  the Sunday Times (30.11.1975) observed tha t Eric Moonman (Lab) 
l is te d  ' f in a n c ia l  sponsorship by the National Graphical Association both 
as a candidate and as a Member', w ithout pu tt ing  a f igu re  on the sponsor­
ship , while in con tras t, Mr John Cronin (Lab) said tha t the Confederation
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o f Health Services Employees contributed £500 per annum to  his c o n s t i t ­
uency Labour Party.
Material Bene fits : While obliged to record th e i r  remuneration from employ­
ment or d ire c to rsh ips . Members were unot required to d isclose other 'materia l 
benefits  or advantages' unless these came from abroad. So, as the Sunday 
Times (30.11.1975) pointed out, i f  an MP was the re c ip ie n t ,  Mr John Poulson's 
p rac tice  o f providing free  a rch itec tu ra l services and in some cases b u i ld ­
ing houses, would not have to be recorded under any o f the 9 spe c if ic  
categories in  the Register.
Land and Property: Anomalies concerning land and property derived la rge ly
from the fa c t  th a t the appropriate ru le  did not define what constitu ted 
land o f 'subs tan tia l value' requ ir ing  d isc losure. While some Members 
f e l t  obliged to record th e i r  homes as property in te re s ts ,  other Members 
with more valuable properties and with a d i f fe re n t  assessment o f what 
amounted to substantia l value were able le g it im a te ly  to record a ' n i l '  
in te re s t ;  the Sunday Times o f 30.11.1975 l is te d  in p a r t ic u la r  three Cabinet 
M in is te rs , Mr Edward Short, Mr Anthony Crosland and Mr Denis Healey.
Even where ce rta in  Members did provide information regarding th e i r  sub­
s ta n t ia l  property holdings th is  was frequently  deceptive. For example, 
although Mr W illiam Whitelaw (Cons) was w ith in  the requirements o f the 
Register when he recorded tha t ' I s t i l l  re ta in  a comparatively small 
amount of land near Glasgow, the ownership being mainly in the hands 
o f my daughters', the value o f  his entry appears dubious when compared 
w ith the fo l low ing  ex trac t o f  his in te res ts  contained in Andrew Roth's 
1975-76 e d it io n  o f The Business Background o f  MPs:-
' Landowner: Woodhall estate near K i r k in t i l lo c h ,  near Glasgow (with
w ife  made three app lica tions fo r  ou tl ine  planning per­
mission in 1973).
Farmer: 300 Acres, Ennim, near Penrith, Cumberland (raises beef).
Co-owner: Mount Pleasant a t Blencowe, near Penrith (with one o f
Europe's leading heards o f Charolais c a t t le ) . '
Declarable Shareholdings: The Register required Members to declare th e i r
shareholdings only when th is  amounted to more than one per cent of the 
company's nominal value. Thus, Mr Alan Clarke (Cons) whose shareholdings 
were l is te d  in  Andrew Roth's book as 'nothing over the value o f £10,000 
in any one company, apart from s ix  $10,000 shares in Woods Petroleum 
f ie ld  in Brunei' did not need to record any o f  his shareholdings in the 
Register. S im i la r ly ,  under the one per cent ru le  Mr James Callaghan 
(Lab, then Foreign Secretary) who according to Andrew Roth in 1975 owned
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w ith his w ife £5,000 worth of shares in  the Commercial Bank o f Wales 
was not obliged to reveal th is .
In add it ion  to these gaps and anomalies, the value o f  the informa­
t io n  contained in the Register was d ilu ted  fu r th e r  by the more general 
problem tha t some Members treated the Register l ig h t-h e a r te d ly  to r i d i ­
cule i t .  The entry made by Mr Andrew Faulds (Lab) under Trades and Pro­
fessions which began, 'Actor w ith a valuable vo ice ',  ap tly  i l lu s t ra te s  
th is  po in t.
Later Editions o f the Register: The Enoch Powell case.
Whereas the f i r s t  e d it io n  o f the Register had required Members to 
re g is te r  in te res ts  which had been e f fe c t iv e  at any time since the beginn­
ing o f the then present Parliament, and had therefore included in te res ts  
which had lapsed before the Register was p r in ted , the second ed it ion  
o f the Register l is te d  in te res ts  tha t existed on 26 May 1976.^^ Members 
could take o f f  in te res ts  provided they had been i n i t i a l l y  recorded in 
the f i r s t  Register. This produced a s l ig h t ly  d i f fe re n t  approach to reg is ­
t ra t io n .  As before in te res ts  did not have to be registered u n t i l  they 
were ac tua l, ra ther than p o te n t ia l .  The Register stated tha t i t  was 
the in te n t io n  o f the Select Committee to publish a new ed it ion  o f the 
Register at the s ta r t  o f  each parliamentary session.
The F i r s t  Report from the Select Committee on Members' Interests
68fo r  the 1975-76 Session, which accompanied the pub lica tion  o f the Register, 
recorded two fu r th e r  conclusions which the Committee had reached regarding 
d e ta i ls  o f  re g is t ra t io n .  F i r s t ,  they recommended tha t where a Member's 
d ire c to rsh ip  o f a company required him to be a d ire c to r  o f other subsid­
ia ry  companies, i t  was advisable tha t he should disclose in the Register 
the names of the subsidiary c o m p a n i e s . S e c o n d ,  they concluded tha t 
information about registered v is i t s  should be allowed to accumulate in 
the Register; but th is  would not prevent the Committee from reviewing 
the subject a t a la te r  date to decide whether such information, having 
once been registered could not be omitted from the Register a f te r  a certa in  
p e r i o d . ■
The Committee noted in th e i r  Report tha t they had received no com­
p la in ts  from Members, or from the public tha t information contained in 
the f i r s t  e d it ion  was in co rre c t ,  but they drew a tten tion  to the problem 
th a t one Member, Mr Enoch Powell, had continued to disobey the in junc tion  
o f  the House to re g is te r .  In March 1976, on behalf o f the Committee
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the Registrar had w r it te n  to  Mr Powell asking him to explain why he had 
not complied w ith the Order o f 22 May 1974. In rep ly  Mr Powell had re ferred 
the Registrar to his le t t e r  of 1 July 1975 in which he had alluded to 
his speech in the House on 12 June 1975 where he hadafgued tha t the Orders, 
not having been imposed by le g is la t io n ,  were uncons t itu t iona l. Mr Powell 
had asked the Registrar to lay th is  le t t e r  before the Committee. The 
correspondence concerning th is  matter was attached as Appendix 1 to th e i r  
Report.
The Committee reminded the House tha t in in s t i tu t in g  a Register 
w ithout powers to support i t  the House had expected tha t a l l  Members 
would comply w ith i t s  Orders. C it ing  para. 37 o f the December 1974 Report r' 
o f  the Select Committee on Members' In terests (Declaration), they acknow­
ledged tha t the House might consider the refusal o f Mr Powell a contempt. 
However, th ink ing  i t  more s a t is fa c to ry  i f  the House made general provision 
by exercising i t s  r ig h t  to  regulate i t s  own proceedings in a way which 
would be binding on a l l  Members, they recommended tha t the House should 
do so v ia  a new standing order modelled on, though d i f fe r in g  from the 
ex is te n t Standing Order no. 24 (Order in Debate). Proposals fo r  such 
a standing order, which would provide fo r  the suspension o f a Member
who fa i le d  to re g is te r  his in te rests  wholly or in p a r t , ,  were contained
71in Appendix I I  o f  the Report. The Committee stated tha t in reporting 
to the House the fa i lu re  o f  a Member to obey i t s  Orders they expected 
the House to be prepared to  uphold the Register which i t  had instructed 
should be compiled and maintained.
Mr Enoch Powell's pos it ion  - a review
Before examining the reaction to the Select Committee Report, i t  
is  convenient to examinemmore c lose ly  Mr Enoch Powell's reasons fo r  refusing 
to  comply w ith  the Register. During an interv iew fo r  th is  study he elab­
orated on the two main reasons which he had given during the debate on 
12 June - namely th a t the Register was degrading to the House, and more 
im portan tly , tha t i t  was uncons t itu t iona l. Mr Powell ins is ted tha t he 
could have offered several arguments against the resolution even i f  i t  
had been c o n s t i tu t io n a l ,  but he f e l t  th a t he had to be careful not to 
argue these reasons a t length or to give them too much emphasis because 
tha t would de trac t from the l ike l iho od  o f his cons titu t iona l pos it ion 
being understood.
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He stressed th a t his 'p ro te s t '  pos it ion , which rested on the grounds 
th a t the Register was unlawful and un cons t itu t iona l, was in a way separate 
from and independent o f  the reservations which he would have supposing 
the reso lu tion was . c o n s t i tu t io n a l.  The nub o f his argument was tha t 
the House was imposing by reso lu tion a new q u a l i f ic a t io n  fo r  Membership, 
namely having to make a re turn in the Register i f  they wanted to s i t  
and vote and speak as Members o f Parliament. This he said was unconsti­
tu t io n a l because the House could not by i t s  own reso lu tion a l te r  the 
conditions o f Membership. This was a confusion between the e f fe c t  o f 
a reso lu tion  o f the House, which is  in te rna l to the House, and le g is la t io n ,  
which changes the law o f the land and in which the House only pa rt ic ipa tes . 
He argued th a t  the fa c t  tha t the o r ig ina l Select Committee on Members' 
In te res ts  (Declaration) in 1974 had found themselves led on to consider 
candidates, p a r t ic u la r ly  the unfairness in the caseuof an e lection a t 
which the ex-Member who was standing had to declare his in terests  while 
the other candidates were under no ob ligations to disclose anything, 
le n t  support to his argument tha t the reso lu tion o f the House attempted 
to a l te r  the law o f the land and not ju s t  to regulate procedure o f the 
House.
He pointed out tha t there was an 'unresolvable paradox' in his position, 
On the one had, he was saying tha t the House o f Commons has the r ig h t  
as the House o f Commons to pass any reso lu tion and to punish any Member 
e i th e r  f o r  disobedience or fo r  no cause shown. This pos it ion asserts 
the un res tr ic ted  power o f the House o f Commons over i t s  Members on the 
grounds th a t 'you cannot uphold the sovereign ty  o f Parliament unless 
you accord to each House o f  Parliament unlim ited power'. Here he means 
unlim ited in the sense o f not being l im ited  by the p o s s ib i l i ty  o f appeal 
to  any other a u th o r i ty .  There is  an appeal - in a metaphorical sense - 
to  the e lec to ra te . But th is  appeal is only in d ire c t ,  i . e .  i f  the e lec­
to ra te  so wish they can make nonsense o f the House's r ig h t  to expel a
72Member by repeatedly re -e lec t in g  him as in the case o f  John Wilkes.
From th is  pos it ion  o f the unlim ited ju r is d ic t io n  o f the House over i t s  
own Members, he would agree tha t the House could expel him fo r  not com­
ply ing w ith  the reso lu t io n , whether or not his cons titu t iona l contention 
was co rrec t.
On the other hand, he was asserting th a t the House o f Commons was 
attempting to do something tha t itucou ld  not do without 'betraying i t s
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own essence'. In his words, ‘ you cannot, as maker and upholder o f the 
law,’ purport to make law in a way tha t law cannot be made'. He was, 
he sa id , in 'the c lass ic  pos it ion  o f  a person who disobeys in the name 
o f  a higher r ig h t  while f u l l y  acknowledging the au tho r ity  which he d is ­
obeys'. He likened his posit ion to tha t o f Saint Thomas More who, in 
1534, refused to accept King Henry V I I I 's  supremacy over the Church.
More did not dispute the omnicompetence o f Parliament but would not obey 
because i t  was doing something which judged from another standpoint i t  
could not do. More's proposition re lated to the universal Church and 
i t s  nature, while he was faced with a c o n f l ic t  between, on the one hand, 
the r ig h t  of the House to enforce upon i t s  Members any resolutions tha t 
i t  pleases, and on the other hand, the r ig h t  o f a l l  c it izens  to l iv e  
under the ru le  o f  the law, and more s p e c i f ic a l ly ,  in th is  case, to have 
the conditions and q u a l i f ic a t io n s  fo r  Membership o f the House o f Commons 
determined and f ixed  by the law. He held tha t th is  c o n f l ic t  of r ig h t ,  
and the associated c o n f l ic t  o f lo y a l ty  - c o n f l ic t  between the lo ya lty
tha t a Member owes to the House and tha t which is owed to the consti­
tu t io n  - can be resolved only from the standpoint o f the c o n s t i tu t io n , 
v iz .  th a t the conditions and q u a l i f ic a t io n s  fo r  Membership o f the House 
must be determined and f ixed  by the law. Mr Powell added tha t his objec­
t iv e  was d i f fe re n t  from More's. Whereas More objected on grounds related
to  the content o f the Act, his ob jection was ir respect ive  o f the wisdom 
or otherwise o f the reso lu t ion . He saw no so lu tion to the paradox. He 
ins is ted  th a t he would not consent to making a return to the Register, 
whatever the consequences. Whether the House should, or could as a matter 
o f  p r a c t ic a l i t y ,  punish him, he saw as another issue; but he agreed 
th a t ,  i f  i t  wished, the House did have the power to punish him.
Reaction to  the recommendations o f the Select Committee
One month a f te r  the Select Committee had reported the refusal of
Mr Enoch Powell to comply w ith  the Register, Mr D. Skinner (Lab) asked
73the Leader o f  the House, now Mr Michael Foot, what steps he was taking 
to  ensure the recommendations o f the Select Committee were f u l l y  imple­
mented. Mr Foot rep lied  t h a t i i t  was fo r  the Houde to consider the recom­
mendations: made in the Report, but tha t i t  was un like ly  tha t time could 
be found fo r  the Report to be debated before the Summer r e c e s s . I n  
fa c t ,  the by now m inority  Labour Government (having suffered a series 
o f  by-e lec tion  defeats since th e i r  e lec tion  w ith an overa ll m a jo r ity  o f
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three seats in October 1974) was experiencing great d i f f i c u l t i e s  in man­
aging the parliamentary timetable. Under the new leadership of Mr James 
Callaghan^^ i t  had weathered by a m a jority  o f 19 votes a motion o f no 
confidence moved by Mrs Thatcher on 9 June 1976, but w ith  the breakdown 
o f pa ir ing  and o f the usual channels during the passage o f the A ir c ra f t  
and Shipbuild ing Industr ies B i l l ,  had been forced to postpone some le g is ­
la t io n .  Lack o f time had led the Government to 'g u i l lo t in e '  debate on 
f iv e  major controvers ia l b i l l s  in one day,^^ thereby in je c t in g  fu r th e r  
controversy in to  an already tu rbu len t and overloaded session. During 
th is  period, the Royal Commission on Standards o f Conduct in Public L i fe  
completed i t s  inve s t iga t io ns , and in July presented i t s  Report to P a r l ia ­
ment.^^
The Government d id not f in d  the time to debate the Select Committee 
Reportbefore the Summer recess. Shortly a f te r  Parliament reassembled 
i t  d id , however, propose to tack le  one unresolved aspect o f the Poulson 
a f f a i r ,  by in troducing a motion to appoint a Select Committee to inqu ire  
in to  the conduct and a c t iv i t ie s  o f Members o f the House in connection 
w ith  the a f fa i r s  o f  Mr J.G.L. Poulson.^^ On 19 October 1976 the Attorney 
General had informed the House tha t the crim inal investigations in to  the 
a f fa i r s  o f  Mr Poulson had come to an end, thus c learing the way fo r  any 
parliamentary in q u iry  th a t was considered appropriate.^^ The Committee, 
which was to consider whether any conduct or a c t iv i t ie s  o f Members in 
connection w ith  the Poulson a f f a i r  amounted to a contempt o f the House 
or were incons is ten t w ith the standards which the House was e n t i t le d  to 
expect from i t s  Members was ordered to s i t  in p r iva te ; no person not 
being a member o f the Select Committee was permitted to be present fo r  
the purposes o f th e i r  in q u iry . The Committee also had d iscre tion  over 
what oral and documentary evidence should be la id  before the House.
The Government decis ion, supported by the Conservative Opposition, 
to  hold the in q u iry  in p r iva te  was taken a f te r  several days o f protracted 
discussion between the parties on the nature o f  the proposed Committee, 
and l e f t  the Government open to charges of u n ju s t i f ie d  secrecy and closing 
ranks in th e i r  handling o f the inves tiga tion  o f a llegations against MPs. 
L ibera l MP, Mr John Pardoe commented, 'the only th ing Labour and Conser­
vative  part ies  ever agree about is  secrecy. They are a l l  fo r  i t ' . ^ ^
A j o in t  operation between the Conservative and Labour f ro n t  benches ensured 
tha t a Labour backbench amendment proposing that the proceedings o f  the
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Committee should be held in public was defeated by 256 votes to 35, and 
a Libera l amendment suggesting the Committee should s i t  in  public  whenever 
i t  considered ju s t ic e  or public in te re s t  required i t  to do so was thrown 
out by 219 votes to 63.
Although th is  inqu iry  constitu tes the most substantia l parliament­
ary inves tiga tion  o f Members' conduct in recent times, i t  concerned events 
which occurred p r io r  to the establishment o f a re g is te r  and the conversion 
o f the convention o f  declaration o f in te re s t in to  a ru le  o f the House.
The Committeee in  reaching th e i r  judgment upon the conduct o f Members 
sought to apply the te s t  tha t the House would have applied to i t s  Members' 
conduct had i t  been aware o f  the facts at the time; namely the custom 
o f  dec la ra tion . I t  is  not, the re fo re , a case study o f how the House 
would judge i t s  Members' conduct in the l ig h t  of the 1974 Resolutions
concerning re g is t ra t io n  and declaration o f in te re s ts . The Committee reported 
81in  Ju ly 1977 and, evoking some i l l -d e f in e d  standards concerning ind iv idua l 
in te g r i t y  and the reputation o f  the House found tha t the conduct o f Mr 
John Gordie (Cons) amounted to a contempt o f the House, while th a t of 
both Mr A lbert Roberts (Lab) and Mr Reginald Maudling (Cons) was considered 
to have been inconsis ten t w ith the standards which the House was e n t i t le d
to  expect from i t s  Members. Mr Cordle resigned from the House on 22 July
821977. Four days la te r ,  during the debate on the Report from the Select
Committee the House simply agreed to 'take note' o f the Report o f the
83Committee inso fa r as i t  re lated to Mr Roberts and Mr Maudling with
the re s u lt  th a t : -
' . . .  there is  no a u th o r i ta t iv e  guidance fo r  the fu ture on "the
standards the House is  e n t i t le d  to  expect from i t s  Members".'g^
However, th is  cursory treatment o f the fa te  o f the Select Committee Report 
is  not intended to  underplay the drama o f what was in fa c t a great House 
occasion. The fa c t  th a t the House only took note o f the Report, in  so 
fa r  as i t  re la ted to Mr Maudling, followed a d iv is ion  which reversed the 
very d i f fe re n t  proposals put to the House by Mr Foot, tha t the House should 
agree w ith  the Select Committee Report. The same also appliedJto Mr Roberts. 
D iv is ions also took place on amendments to expel the Members (proposed
by Mr W. Hamilton) or to suspend them from the House fo r  s ix  months
(proposed by Mr G. Strauss).
The Government continued in i t s  unwillingness to provide time fo r  
debate on the Report from the Select Committee on Members' In terests  and 
th e i r  intransigence led the Select Committee to issue a Special Report
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in December 1976. This drew a tten tion  to the recommendations o f th e i r  
e a r l ie r  Report and stated b lu n t ly  th a t : -
‘ Your Committee are o f the opinion tha t u n t i l  the House has en­
forced i t s  o r ig in a l Resolutions and upholds the in te g r i ty  o f the 
Register, by th is  or other means, i t  w i l l  diminish Your Committee's 
standingt# publish a fu r th e r  e d it io n . They are not, the re fo re , 
prepared to commend such a fu r th e r  Register u n t i l  the House has 
expressed a view on the force o f i t s  Resolutions.'gg
In e f fe c t ,  the Committee, no doubt embarrassed by Mr Powell's n o t i ­
f ic a t io n  o f his refusal to comply w ith the 1974/75 Resolutions, had unani­
mously decided to meet the Government's fa i lu re  to allow the House time 
to  reach a decision on the enforcement o f i t s  o r ig ina l Resolution by going 
on s t r ik e .  Although th e i r  action prevented the publication fo r  sale o f 
fu r th e r  annual ed it ions  o f  the Register fo r  the remainder o f tha t Parliament, 
w ithout abrogating a reso lu tion  o f the House they could not prevent the 
Register from being compiled and maintained. Thus, the Registrar continued 
to keep an up-to-date manuscript ed it ion  o f the Register both in his O ff ice , 
where i t  remained open fo r  public inspection, and in the House o f Commons 
l ib ra r y  fo r  consulta tion by Members.
The Select Committee were re ly ing  on the Leader o f the House to 
take up th e i r  ultimatum and tab le  a new standing order making the penalty 
suspension from Membership o f the House i f  an MP refuses to declare his 
in te res ts  as required. However, the s itu a t io n  remained unresolved a t 
the time o f the Summer Adjournment debate in July 1977, during the course 
o f  which several Members raised the issue o f Members' in te res ts ; e ith e r 
w ith  reference to the debate on the Report from the Select Committee on 
Conduct o f Members, which had occurred two days before, and which had 
allowed Members some opportun ity  to  s tray on to the top ic o f the Register, 
or w ith regard to the reca lc itrance o f  Mr Powell and the lack o f Govern­
ment i n i t i a t i v e  in allowing the House the opportunity to reach a decision 
on the issue.
Worried th a t the Register was ' in  grave danger o f becoming devalued' 
and tha t in operating i t  the House had become hamstrung by the defiance 
o f one p a r t ic u la r  Member, Mr W. van Straubenzee (Cons) argued th a t in ­
s u f f ic ie n t  a tten t io n  had been given to the Special Report from the Select 
Committee on Members' In terests which had reported to the House in December 
1 9 7 6 . He had been informed by Mr Foot in May tha t although he thought 
the House would want to return to the question o f debating the Register, 
perhaps in the wider context o f standards o f conduct in public l i f e
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genera lly , he could not promise time in the near fu tu re . Mr van Strau­
benzee was aggrieved tha t the House should reach the end o f the term w ith ­
out having had th a t debate. At th is  time (as now) the House o f  Commons 
had discussed ne ither the Report from the Select Committee on Members' 
In te re s ts , nor the Report from the Royal Commission on Standards o f  Con­
duct in Public L i fe .^ ^
In dealing with the usual wide va r ie ty  o f  issues raised during the 
adjournment debate Mr Foot informed Members tha t the Government were s t i l l  
considering th e i r  a t t i tu d e  to the Report o f  the Salmon Commission. Re­
fe r r in g  to the one recommendation concerning Parliament made in the Report, 
namely th a t 'Parliament should consider bringing corrup tion , br ibery  and 
attempted bribery o f  a Member o f Parliament acting in his Parliamentary
go
capacity w ith in  the ambit o f  the crim inal l aw' ,  he expressed his own 
personal doubts as to whether th is  recommendation took f u l l  account o f
go
the requirements and the r igh ts  o f the House. He preferred to reserve 
what else he had to say on the matter u n t i l  i t  was debated by the House, 
but he gave no ind ica t ion  o f  when th is  would be. He d id , however, remind 
the House o f h is b e l ie f ,  expressed in a d i f fe re n t  context in  the earlier 
debate on the conduct o f Members, th a t the House had to be very careful 
about in terventions between hon. Members and th e i r  constituen ts ; an a l lu ­
sion to  the p o s s ib i l i t y  th a t a Member who refused to re g is te r  his in te res ts  
would face suspension or expulsion from the House i f  the standing order 
recommended by the Select Committee on Members' In terests was accepted 
by the House.
The matter remained undecided when Pari aiment was dissolved in A pril 
1979 a f te r  the Labour Government had been defeated in the House of Commons 
by one vote on a motion o f no confidence. In the General Election on 
3 May the Conservative Party, under the leadership o f Mrs Margaret Thatcher, 
was returned to O ff ice  w ith  a m a jo r ity  o f 44 seats over a l l  other pa rt ie s , 
excluding the Speaker, and a m a jo r ity  o f 71 over the Labour Party. Shortly 
a f te r  the new Parliament assembled the two remaining manuscript copies 
o f the Register were withdrawn, creating a s i tu a t io n  whereby no copy was 
ava ilab le  fo r  inspection e ith e r  in the L ib ra ry  or in the R eg is trar 's  O ff ice , 
and no up-to-date published copy existed (the la s t  published ed it ion  appeared 
in 1976). The copies were removed by the Registrar on the grounds tha t 
they contained information on persons no longer Members, notwithstanding 
the fa c t  th a t i f  the Powell inc ident had not arisen the Register would 
have been published annually as intended and th is  information would have
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been p u b l ic ly  ava ilab le  via Her Ma je s ty 's  Stationery O ff ice ; an observation 
which caused the pers is ten t Mr Rooker to ask whether copies would then 
have been removed from public l ib ra r ie s  and government bookshelves.^^
The Registrar was obliged by the Resolutions o f 1974 and 1975 to  send 
out the declara tion forms to a l l  Members and produce a Master copy of 
the Register w ith in  a month o f the new Parliament, but u n t i l  the Conserva­
t iv e  Government set up a new Select Committee on Members' in te re s ts ,  he
91had no au tho r ity  to publish i t .
The Register in operation: 1975-1979
Although the Register was withdrawn a f te r  the May 1979 E lection , 
three months e a r l ie r ,  in February, the Master copy had been consulted 
fo r  the purposes o f  th is  study. A comparison o f c la ss if ie d  entries re ­
corded in the Register in 1975 and 1979, both in aggregate and by party, 
is presented in Appendix 5, Tables 19 and 20. From th is  i t  can be seen 
tha t changes in the p r o f i le  o f in te res ts  recorded by Members during th is  
period were very marginal. The main exception to th is  was the increase 
in  Members - 5% o f Labour Members and 13% o f Conservative Members (aggre­
gating 8% o f the whole House) - who recorded an entry under Overseas V is i ts .  
The number o f MPs recording a n i l  entry in 1979 was only 2% less than 
in 1975; th is  change being p a r t ly  a t t r ib u ta b le  to the small number o f 
Labour Members who had previously not thought to re g is te r  th e i r  f ina nc ia l 
sponsorship by trade unions.
Members included in  the random sample survey fo r  th is  study were 
questioned about the scope and format o f the Register, and th e i r  answers, 
being given in the l i g h t  o f fou r years experience o f the Register, give 
some in d ica t io n  o f  Members' conclusions on the working of the Register.
Asked whether they were s a t is f ie d  with the categories o f reg is trab le  in te r ­
ests , only 20% o f the sample said tha t they were and these were la rge ly  
Members who had voted fo r  the Register (Appendix 2 , Q.10). A fu r th e r  
20%, a l l  o f whom had e i th e r  voted against the Register or abstained, were 
un w il l ing  to express an opinion because they saw the Register as t r i v i a l  
and irre levant.They gave th is  response to  a l l  questions re fe rr in g  to the 
format o f the Register. Among the remaining 60% o f the sample who were 
not s a t is f ie d  with the categories, the main reason fo r  d issa t is fa c t io n  
was th a t the categories were ambiguous. Among those who voted fo r  the 
Register fu r th e r  c r i t ic is m s  frequently  c ited  were tha t the categories 
were not s tr in gen t enough and th a t the Register gave only a sup e rf ic ia l 
p ic tu re  o f the 'd i re c t io n '  o f  in te re s ts ;  not th e i r  nature or amount.
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While a l l  those who were w i l l in g  to express an opinion ( i . e .  80%)
did not th ink  th a t any ex is t ing  categories should be excluded (Q.11) a
th i r d  o f the sample, a l l  of whom had voted fo r  the Register, considered
th a t fu r th e r  categories should be included (Q.12). Their responses tended
to c lu s te r  around two categories o f in te re s t ,  namely 'g i f t s  from United 
92Kingdom sources' and ' a more s tr ingen t formula fo r  shareholdings'. 
Although the number o f the sample ac tu a lly  recommending fu r th e r  stringency 
in the la t t e r  area was low (approximately 17%) a considerable number o f 
other Members expressed d is s a t is fa c t io n  w ith the d e f in i t io n  o f the present 
category concerning declarable shareholdings, and while not recommending 
s p e c if ic  changes, pointed out the anomalies the category gave r ise  tc .
The 'c la s s ic '  case c ited  by both Labour and Conservative Members was tha t 
o f  a prominent Labour Member - Mr Harold Lever - who was able to re g is te r  
' n i l '  in te res ts  w h i ls t  being known to be one o f  the r iches t men in the 
Labour Party. This case was quoted by Robert Adley (Cons) in 1979 to 
i l l u s t r a te  what he considered to be the uselessness o f the Register. He 
pointed o u t : -
' I t  would be te ch n ica l ly  possible to  own 4 per cent of the e n t ire  
shareholding o f B r i t is h  Petroleum, I .C . I .  and Unilever and s t i l l  
have a .h i l  entry in: the re g is te r . 'g g
A m a jo r ity  o f the sample (over 80%) thought i t  would be impractical 
to  re g is te r  and/or declare non-financia l in te res ts  (Q.14} although most 
o f  them thought tha t such in te res ts  could a l te r  a Member's judgment. They 
considered th a t MPs' personal in te res ts  other than pecuniary ones are 
not susceptible to d isc losure treatment. As commented by one Conservative 
Member
'Where do you draw the l in e .  You shop at the Co-op, is  th is  
an in te re s t? '
To require d isclosure o f non-pecuinary in te res ts  - fo r  example, where 
Members educate th e i r  ch ildren - would not only create d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f 
d e f in i t io n  and regu la t ion , but, as several Members in the sample pointed 
ou t, would also a l te r  the balance between privacy and p u b l ic i ty ;  a con­
tentious issue which has been seen to be central to the debate over d is ­
closure.
Although the p r in c ip le  o f  re g is tra t io n  was re s tr ic te d  to Members 
o f  the House o f Commons, 60% o f the sample thought tha t other classes 
should be required to re g is te r  th e i r  f ina nc ia l in te rests  (Q.13). Their 
responses, which often included more than one class o f person were diverse, 
ranging over the fo llow ing  categories: appointed members of public
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bodies/boards (note the subsequent extension o f the p r in c ip le  o f re g is t ra ­
t io n  to the National Enterprise Board^^), jo u rn a l is ts /e d i to rs ,  c i v i l  ser­
vice (top le v e ls ) ,  anyone in an elected position (p a r t ic u la r ly  local govern­
ment), parliamentary lobby and public re la t ions  firm s. Perhaps the most 
in te re s t in g  omission from the classes mentioned by Members in the sample 
was th a t o f  parliamentary candidates; a category alluded to both by the 
Leader o f the House in the 1974 debate on Members' in te res ts  and also 
considered by the 1974/75 Select Committee on Members' in te rests  (Declara­
t io n ) .  Of the Members who were against extending re g is tra t io n  to  other 
classes, several i n i t i a l l y  suggested the inclusion o f  jo u rn a l is ts ,  but 
a f te r  fu r th e r  thought decided th is  would be impracticable.
Members in  the sample were also asked how they would vote on a motion 
fo r  i t s  continuance. Over three-quarters o f the sampled Members said 
they would vote fo r  i t  to be retained (Q.18). This to ta l included a l l  
o f  those who had voted in favour o f  the Register in 1974. I t  also included 
several Members who had voted against the Register or abstained on tha t 
occasion, but were now w i l l in g  to vote fo r  i t s  continuance because, in 
re trospect, they saw i t  as a harmless exercise. Only one Member said 
he would abstain. However, as these responses were to a hypothetical 
question, and involve the problematic l in k  between in tentions and actual 
behaviour, i t  is  l i k e ly  tha t in practice the abstention rate would be 
higher, I t  should also be noted th a t voting fo r  the continuance o f the 
Register would not be qu ite  the same thing as voting fo r  the in troduction 
o f  the Register as in 1974. The la t t e r  was concerned with implementing 
a change in  the procedures regulating Members' in te re s ts ,  whereas the 
former would be a vote fo r  the continuance o f the status quo, unless the 
motion included changes in the format o f  the Register.
Since the in troduc tion  o f  the Register there have been two Registrars 
o f  Members' in te re s ts ;  Mr R.S. Lankester taking over from Mr D.A.M. Pring 
during the Summer recess in 1976. Existing s ta f f  were chosen by the Clerk 
o f  the House fo r  th is  new appointment and took on extra functions; Mr 
Pring a t the time being Clerk o f the Select Committees and Mr Lankester, 
Clerk o f the Expenditure Committee. When interviewed Mr Pring commented 
th a t althoughduring the time o f producing the Register (p a r t ic u la r ly  
the f i r s t  fou r weeks a f te r  a general e lec t ion ) the job of being Registrar 
was t o t a l l y  fu l l - t im e ,  once i t  became rou tine , the work associated with 
the Register took up only between an estimated 5% to 15% o f his time; a 
pattern tha t was confirmed by the experience o f Mr Lankester.
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The nature of the routine work consisted mainly o f  answering queries 
and preparing fo r  meetings with the Committee. Mr Pring remarked tha t 
the Committee met only when they had enough questions to ask, and looking 
back over past parliamentary sessions he recalled tha t in 1975-76 they 
held 4 meetings, in  1976-77, 2 meetings, and in 1977-78, only 1 meeting.
The level o f consulta tion o f the Register was also low. Mr Pring re ­
co llected th a t he possibly answered 2 or 3 le t te rs  a day and used to get 
occasional v is i t s  or'telephone c a l ls  from Members (who could, o f course, 
also consult the L ib rary  copy o f  the Register). Mr Lankester stated th a t 
he received 10 or 12 queries a week. Most o f these were from jo u rn a l is ts ,  
researchers,or other Parliaments - fo r  example, A us tra l ia ,  G ib ra lta r  and 
the Is le  o f  Man - who were considering se tt ing  up reg is ters  and wanted 
adm in is tra tive  advice. There was also a query in July 1975 from the Royal 
Commission on Standards o f  Conduct in Public L i fe ,  who hoped to report 
the fo llow ing  year and wanted to know about the Register in order to judge 
the extent to which they needed to cover the position o f  Members. Very 
few queries were received from the general public .
In the performance o f th e i r  duties both Registrars confirmed tha t 
they followed c lose ly  the d e f in i t io n  o f the ro le  and functions o f the 
Registrar in compiling and maintaining the Register as set out in the 
1975 Select Committee Report on Members' In te rests . They emphasised tha t 
the Registrar has no power o f in i t i a t io n  and does not chase up MPs who 
he may th in k  have not registered a certa in  in te re s t .  Apparently no formal 
complaints ( i . e .  a llega tions  th a t an entry is  not complete or is  inaccurate) 
have come before the Select Committee. Some complaints have arisen in fo r ­
mally through approaches to the Register, but these have never been 
followed up.
However, wh ile  no complaints have come before the Select Committee, 
throughout the fo u r year period o f the working o f the Register covered 
by th is  study they were confronted w ith  the non-compliance o f Mr Enoch 
Powell and, as has been shown, th e i r  response was to prevent fu r th e r  
ed it ions  o f  the Register being published u n t i l  the House had had the oppor­
tu n i ty  to decide on the matter. The consequence o f th is  has been tha t 
the changes and improvements in the Register envisaged by th e i r  Chairman 
as the log ica l next step a f te r  th e i r  i n i t i a l  recommendations (which he 
viewed 'on ly  as a beginning') have not occurred. According to the Chairman, 
the Select Committee had begun looking at d e f in i t io n s  and so on and had 
intended to continue th is  examination - in a wider area than ju s t  the Reg­
is te r  - but were s ta l le d  by the Powell inc iden t. Consequently, the Regis­
te r  has hardly developed from i t s  embryo form.gg
70.
PART 3
CONCLUSIONS AND BROADER OBSERVATIONS
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CHAPTER 7:
Members o f  Parliament and C o n f l ic t  o f In te res t
The f ind ings presented in  Section 2 enable us to draw conclusions 
about the 'modern campaign' fo r  a re g is te r  o f Members' in te re s ts ,  and 
o f fe r  some broad observations on the way in which the House o f Commons 
tackles the problem o f c o n f l ic t  o f i i t te re s t .  More s p e c i f ic a l ly ,  they 
enable us to assess whether the a lte ra t ions  in the regulation o f Members' 
in te re s ts  made by the House in 1974 constitu te  a genuine departure from 
the House's t ra d i t io n a l  approach to the problem as documented and d is ­
cussed in Chapter 3.
The 'modern campaign' fo r  a re g is te r  o f in te res ts
The f i r s t  parliamentary landmark in the 'modern campaign' fo r  a 
re g is te r  o f Members' in te res ts  which began in the early  1960s was the 
1969 Select Committee on Members' In terests  (Declaration). We have seen 
th a t the emergence of th is  Select Committee was consistent w ith the pattern 
manifest in  the h is to ry  o f the House's ad hoc approach to the regulation 
o f  Members' in te res ts  and embodied in the concept of an ' issue-a ttention  
c y c le ' :  tha t w ithout the stimulus o f periodic scandals and the resu l­
ta n t  'p u b l ic '  and parliamentary anxie ty , the House would not of i t s  own 
accord have considered taking the in i t i a t i v e  to regulate Members' in te res ts . 
The Gordon Bagier case, l in k in g  to the wider issue o f declaration of in te re s t ,  
appears to have been the main t r ig g e r  in an accumulation o f events leading
to  the se tt in g  up o f the 1969 Select Committee.
Parliamentary and Government in a c t iv i t y  on the issue o f Members' 
in te res ts  fo l low ing  the publication o f the 1969 Select Committee Report 
ind ica tes th a t the outcome o f such an ' issue -a tten tion  cycle ' need not 
be a move, whether real or apparent, towards greater p u b l ic i ty .  In th is  
instance, by the time the Select Committee had reported the anxiety and 
stimulus fo r  reform which had surrounded i t s  inception had subsided. Cus­
tomary in e r t ia  reasserted i t s e l f ,  encouraged by a Conservative Government 
who, as stressed by Mr Whitelaw, preferred ' to  re ly  on the good sense 
o f  hon. Members ra ther than on formalised ru le s '.^  This period o f in a c t iv i t y  
should not^ however, be overlooked. As explained in  Chapter 1, the fa i lu re  
o f  an e l i t e  to act or make decisions is  in i t s e l f  often o f greater impor­
tance than the decisions they do make, and non-decision making can in
i t s e l f  be a manifestation o f bias. In th is  instance, bias was created 
not simply by ind iv idua ls  such as Mr Whitelaw, Leader o f the House,
172.
making choices between the a lte rna tives  o f introducing formalised ru les 
such as a re g is te r  or re ly ing  on the good sense o f Members. I t  was also 
sustained by the predominant t ra d i t io n a l  ethos and practices o f the House 
which informed ind iv idua l decisions, and which continued to encourage 
t ru s t  in the honour and s e l f - re s t r a in t  o f ind iv idua l Members along with 
a b e l ie f  in  t h e i r  r ig h t  to privacy.
On the basis o f documentation presented in Chapter 5, the Resolu­
t ions  on declara tion and re g is tra t io n  o f Members' outside in te res ts  which 
eventually  emerged in 1974 can be in terpreted as the outcome o f ye t another 
' is su e -a tte n t io n  cyc le ' concerning Members' outside f ina nc ia l in te re s ts ,  
th is  time tr iggered o f f  by the Poulson revelations in 1972. The random 
sample survey provides support fo r  th is  view, with approximately 77% of 
the sample c i t in g  ind iv idua l scartdals, p r im a r i ly  the Poulson a f f a i r ,  as 
a main fa c to r  in f luenc ing the House's approach to disclosure at th is  time. 
Most o f  these Members also c ited  the c a ta ly t ic  e f fe c t  o f the p u b l ic i ty  
surrounding these scandals created by the mass media (Appendix 2, Q.5b).
The survey also ind icates tha t the m a jo r ity  o f the House was at th is  time 
aware o f the pub lic  and parliamentary anxiety generated by these events, 
and th a t th is  c limate o f opinion was in f lu e n t ia l  in guiding Members' a t t i ­
tudes towards disclosure (Appendix 2, Q. 5a and 5b). The extent to which 
the Poulson a f f a i r  changed opinion in the House was best summed up by 
one House o f  Commons Clerk as fo llow s:
'Before th a t (the Poulson a f f a i r )  I believe tha t the vast m a jo r ity  
o f Members thought tha t some kind o f patchwork on the lines o f the 
1969 Committee's recommendations was quite enough; what was needed 
was to apply and underline t ra d i t io n a l  House practices. During 
and a f te r  th a t a f f a i r ,  i t  was a d i f fe re n t  s to ry ; a Register o f 
In te rests  became in e v ita b le ' .
Several other con tr ibu to ry  fac tors  were mentioned by respondents.
A small number o f MPs (13%) a tt r ib u te d  any changes in Parliament's approach 
to  d isclosure to the p o l i t ic a l  motivation o f certa in  groups o f MPs or 
lobbies. Their party a f f i l i a t i o n  indicates that th is  was a b e l ie f  held 
predominantly ' by Conservative Members o f  the House, some o f whom were 
suspicious o f  the motives o f  certa in  ' le f t -w in g '  elements in the Labour 
party in  campaigning fo r  a re g is te r ,  be liev ing them to be concerned with 
creating a fu l l - t im e  House o f Commons. While th is  in te rp re ta t io n  o f p o l i ­
t i c a l  motivation is  la rg e ly  a matter o f opin ion, {parliamentary documen­
ta t io n  examined in Section 2 o f th is  study does lend support to the view 
th a t a small number of MPs or groups o f  MPs were p a r t ic u la r ly  active
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in  the campaign fo r  a re g is te r  o f in te res ts  as 'op in ion - leaders ' .  These 
were mainly Labour MPs, the most notable being Mr Arthur Lewis and Mr 
W illiam Hamilton. The la t te r  can be singled out as the most ardent cam­
paigner fo r  a re g is te r  o f in te re s ts ,  pursuing his cause through P a r l ia ­
mentary Questions, Early Day Motions, ra is ing  the issue on the Adjournment 
and submitting a scheme fo r  a re g is te r  to the 1959 Select Committee on 
Members' In te rests  (Declaration). He was not himself, however, an advo­
cate of an exc lus ive ly  fu l l - t im e  Parliament andmacte th is  c lear in  the 
debate on the 1974 Resolutions:
' I  do not believe in a fu l l - t im e  Parliament. God fo rb id  tha t 
we ever get 635 fu l l - t im e  Members o f th is  House. I t  would be a 
p o l i t ic a l  monastery . . .  This place benefits greatly  from people 
w ith outside f in a n c ia l in te res ts . What I want is  these in te rests  
declared and a recognition tha t the House could not work unless 
i t  had a considerable nucleus of fu l l - t im e  Members'.g
Once the Register was established, his ag ita t ion  on the issue of Members' 
in te re s ts  ceased.
Several Labour MPs in the sample did mention the fac to r  of a growing 
awareness among Members, confirmed by the Boyle Report in 1971, tha t the 
job o f a Member o f  Parliament had changed, and tha t MPs should be paid 
by the House o f  Commons as fu l l - t im e .  This argument was also put forward 
during an in te rv iew  conducted w ith  Mr Michael Foot, who became Leader 
o f  the House sh o rt ly  a f te r  the re g is te r  was established. He expressed 
the b e l ie f  tha t one o f the main pressures fo r  change had come from the 
new wave o f MPs coming in to  the House in February 1974, th ink ing that 
membership should be a fu l l - t im e  job. Analysis o f Members' voting behaviour 
on both the Conservative amendment to the Government's motion on declara­
t io n  o f in te re s t ,  and the motion estab lish ing the Register suggests tha t 
i t  was not only a new wave o f  Labour MPs favouring fu l l - t im e  membership 
th a t fa c i l i ta te d : ,  change in the regulation o f Members' in te re s ts , but 
also the in f lu x  o f new Conservative Members who were more l i k e ly  than 
th e i r  senior colleagues to vote against the amendment and in favour o f 
a re g is te r  (Appendix 4 , Tables 11 and 13).
F in a l ly ,  reference was made to the tim ing o f the Resolutions. : 
Several Conservative and Labour MPs argued tha t these occurred at a p o l i t i ­
c a l ly  sens it ive  time. There had ju s t  been one general e lec t ion , which 
returned a Labour Government more favourably disposed than the Conservatives 
to implementing a re g is te r ,  and another e lection  was pending. Both parties 
were anxious to reassure the public and to avoid being accused o f  dropping
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the issue or o f being secretive. I t  was speculated tha t i f  there had 
not been a general e lection pending, the issue o f  the Register may have 
been q u ie t ly  buried.
In contrast to  the ' issue -a tten tion  cycle ' which involved the Bagier 
a f f a i r  and the 1969 Select Committee,that tr iggered o f f  by the Poulson a f f a i r  
did re s u lt  in  a move (whether real or apparent w i l l  be discussed la te r )  
towards greater p u b l ic i ty .  We have seen tha t in May 1974 the House agreed 
to  the Resolutions concerning the declaration and re g is tra t io n  o f  Members' 
in te re s ts .  From the ava ilab le  evidence i t  appears tha t whereas public 
and parliamentary anxiety slackened o f f  a f te r  the 1969 Select Committee 
had been established, allowing the House to bury the issue, the series 
o f  prosecutions fo r  corruption resu lt ing  from the Poulson a f f a i r ,  and 
fu r th e r  incidents such as the p r iv i le g e  case concerning Mr J. Ashton and 
the minor 'scandal' concerning Mr B. Walden, kept the problem o f Members' 
in te res ts  a l iv e  issue in 1974. A d d it io n a lly ,  as commented above, these 
events coincided a t a p o l i t i c a l l y  sensitive  time.
With the emergence and acceptance o f the 1974 Resolutions on declara­
t io n  and re g is t ra t io n  o f in te res ts  there is also some ind ica tion  o f a 
s h i f t  in the balance o f opinion w ith in  the House on the b e lie fs  values 
and habits o f  thought which had t r a d i t io n a l ly  guided Members' appraisal 
o f  the regula tion o f in te re s ts . This s h i f t  included movement in both 
in t r a -  and in te r -p a r ty  opinion.
F i r s t ,  acceptance o f the proposal fo r  a compulsory re g is te r  in d i ­
cated tha t despite deep d iv is ions  o f  opin ion, a m a jo rity  o f the House 
now agreed w ith Mr Short's view tha t public anxiety about MPs' f inanc ia l 
in te res ts  had created a s itu a t io n  where i t  was necessary fo r  Members c o l le c ­
t i v e ly  to s a c r i f ic e  a certa in  amount o f privacy in order to restore public 
confidence in  the House. The random sample survey indicates tha t Members 
voting fo r  the Register accepted the argument tha t entry in to  public l i f e  
involves some erosion o f  privacy which is  not expected o f  a pr iva te c i t i ­
zen (Appendix 2, Q.2). One such Member (Lab) explained
' I f  MPs want the pr iv i leges  o f  being an MP they also have to 
make some s a c r i f ic e s ,  and privacy is  one o f these s a c r if ice s .  MPs 
must be seen to be above susp ic ion '.
However, the survey suggests tha t over two-th irds o f those voting against
the Register also believed tha t entry in to  public l i f e  e n ta i ls  an erosion
o f  privacy. Therefore, while voting in favour o f the Register was an
ind ica t ion  tha t a Member was w i l l in g  to accept less privacy fo r  MPs, a
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'no' vote did not necessarily ind icate tha t a Member was against such 
erosion o f privacy. As commented in Chapter 5, a Member could favour 
the p r in c ip le  o f  d isc losure , but not the form o f the Register. However, 
on the whole those Members voting against the Register but admitting tha t 
en try  in to  public  l i f e  involved erosion o f privacy did not consider tha t 
i t  was desirable th a t  th is  should occur, merely tha t i t  was ine v itab le .
As stated by one long-serving Conservative MR in th is  category
' I f  you go on a stage you are l i k e ly  to be treated d i f fe re n t ly .
I f  you become an MR i t  is  l i k e ly  there w i l l  be certa in  p r iv i le ges  
and re s p o n s ib i l i t ie s .  You w i l l  not be treated as an ordinary c i t i z e n . '
The sample survey also indicates that those MRs who considered Members 
should not have less privacy than priva te c it izens  e ith e r abstained,or 
voted against the Government Motions, p re fe rr ing  to re ly  on the t ra d i t io n a l 
practices o f the House (Appendix 2, Q. 2 and Q. 7, Table 6 and Table 7).
There are obviously d i f fe re n t  degrees o f privacy and a problem encountered 
in in te rpre tingng the survey data is  tha t Members could say tha t MRs must 
give up some privacy on taking public o f f ic e  but mean very d i f fe re n t  th ings. 
Few Members l iked  to admit to favouring privacy fo r  fear o f connotations 
o f  secredy being a t t r ib u te d  to th e i r  views.
Secondly, i t  has been seen tha t some, predominantly but not so le ly  
Conservative, Members viewed the Government's proposals as conceived under 
pressure to meet the outcry o f the moment. They argued tha t the impositon 
o f  formalised ru les undermined the honour and s e l f - r e s t r a in t  o f the ind i? 
vidual Member and s ig n if ie d  a decline o f  confidence in  the q u a l i t ie s  o f 
lo y a lty  and mutual t ru s t  which had t r a d i t io n a l ly  characterised Parliament 
as a meeting place o f gentlemen.
T h ird ly ,  as indicated above, the proposals fo r  declaration and re g is ­
t ra t io n  o f Members' in te res ts  were viewed by some Conservative Members 
as the f i r s t  step on the s lippery slope towards a fu l l - t im e  House o f Commons. 
This view, reminiscent o f the fears expressed by the Conservative Party 
when opposing the motion to introduce payment fo r  Members in 1911, was 
i l lu s t ra te d  by Mr P rio r who claimed, ' ( t jh e re  are some Members o f the 
Le ft  wing o f the Labour Party who regard th is  whole exercise as one o f
o
creating a fu l l - t im e  House o f Commons.' Although the Government attempted 
to  exclude the question o f whether Members should have outside in te rests  
from the scope o f debate. Members speaking both fo r  and against outside 
in te res ts  indicated a general fee ling  tha t the issue o f Members' in te rests  
was inseparable from the fundamental question o f whether MRs should be 
fu l l - t im e  or part-t im e Members o f Parliament.
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However, the p r inc ip les  o f declaration o f in te re s t  and o f compulsory 
re g is t ra t io n  are concerned only w ith the d isclosure o f in te res ts  and 
not w ith th e i r  p ro h ib it io n .  As such, although the resolutions may have 
been launched on the t id e  o f growing acceptance o f the p r in c ip le  o f  f u l l ­
time membership, and may have indicated a growing awareness among p a r l ia ­
mentarians o f  the problem o f c o n f l i c t ,  or apparent c o n f l ic t ,  o f  in te re s t  
associated w ith the possession of outside in te re s ts ,  th e i r  acceptance 
cannot be equated with a de liberate step towards a fu l l - t im e  House o f 
Commons. Nor did i t  necessarily ind icate a move away from the presump­
t io n  by a m a jo r ity  o f MPs o f the propr ie ty  o f having outside in te re s ts .
The sample survey ind icates tha t over tw o-th irds  o f the House which approved 
the Register s t i l l  believed tha t MPs should be able to have outside in te re s ts ,  
and tha t a s im i la r  proportion a c tu a lly  had outside paid or unpaid employ­
ment.^ (Appendix 2, Q. 25 and Q. 26, Tables 8 and 9). Less than one- 
th i r d  o f the House was in  favour o f  a fu l l - t im e  House o f Commons with 
Members debarred from holding outside in te re s ts ;  these Members would 
almost c e r ta in ly  have been Labour MPs and would have voted in favour o f 
the Register.'-
We should perhaps pause here to consider whether there is in fa c t  
agreement w ith in  the House as to what is understood by fu l l - t im e  and pa rt-  
time membership o f Parliament. The sample survey suggests there is  not 
and also warns against dichotomising too r ig id ly  between fu l l - t im e  and 
part-t im e MPs. F u ll- t im e  membership had been given au tho rity  by the recom­
mendation o f  the Boyle Report in 1971 th a t Members' remuneration should 
be adequate to  provide fo r  fu l l - t im e  Members w ithout other sources o f 
income. As we have seen, in the past the inadequacy o f  MPs' sa laries 
and allowances has contributed to th e i r  seeking or re ta in ing outside sources 
o f income w ith the consequent r is k  o f  c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t .  I t  is  unfortunate 
th a t  the practice o f  Members' o f Parliament receiving a public salary 
i t s e l f  a t t ra c ts  a unique form o f c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t ,  in tha t Members' 
personal economic in te re s t  in determining th e i r  own salaries creates an 
unavoidable c o n f l ic t  o f  in te re s t  to which the House and the public are 
h igh ly  sens it ive .
Following the Boyle Report in 1971, and subsequent Reports of the
5Committee on Top Salar ies, Members^ sa la ries and allowances have improved.
In June 1979 MPs' pay was increased to £9,450 w ith fu r th e r  increases to 
£10,725 in 1980 and £13,950 in 1981. Members in the sample survey were 
asked whether they agreed th e i r  sa laries and allowances should be calculated
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on a fu l l - t im e  basis (Appendix 2, Q. 21). Although 77% o f the sample 
agreed they should, well over h a lf  o f these Members (61%) added the pro­
viso tha t MPs should nevertheless be able to re ta in  and seek outside f inan ­
c ia l  in te re s ts .  Less than one-th ird of the sample, a l l  Labour Members 
who had voted fo r  the Register, ins is ted tha t MPs should be regarded as 
fu l l - t im e  with no outside f in a n c ia l in te rests  and correspondingly paid 
an 'adequate' sa lary. Inev itab ly  the sample indicated disagreement among 
Members as to what would constitu te  an 'adequate' salary. Giving th e i r  
views on the then current salary level (£9,450) only 33% o f the sample 
said i t  was adequate, 60% said i t  was inadequate but improving, while 
7% condemned i t  as inadequate and u n l ike ly  ever to become adequate. When 
asked d i re c t ly  whether i t  would be feas ib le  and desirable to ra ise MPs' 
sa la r ies  and ban outside employment, only 13% o f the sample thought i t  
would be both feas ib le  and desirable (a fu r th e r  10% thought i t  would be 
desirab le but not fe a s ib le ) .  The overwhelming impression gained from 
response to th is  question was tha t the m ajority  o f the House of Commons 
would f in d  such a move d is t in c t ly  undesirable. The most common objec­
t ions raised by Members were tha t i t  would erode the independence of MPs 
and would deprive the House o f  valuable experience and expertise.
There appears to be a fundamental d iffe rence o f opinion between 
those Members who in te rp re t  fu l l - t im e  membership as meaning absolutely 
no outside in te res ts  and those who believe that they can be fu l l - t im e  
in  terms o f  hours and s t i l l  pursue outside in te res ts  (Appendix 2 , Q.21,
Q.25 and Q. 26a). An MP can consider himself fu l l - t im e  in terms o f the 
hours he puts in ,^  but he may s t i l l  have the energy and capacity to 
pursue outside in te res ts  which he counts as 'ove rtim e '. The extent to 
which MPs are regarded as, and consider themselves to be, fu l l - t im e  or 
part- t im e is  part o f  the wider unresolved issue o f whether being a Member 
o f  Parliament in  B r i ta in  is  now an amateur or professional occupation.^
This has im p lica tions fo r  MPs' a tt itudes  not only towards outside f in a n c ia l 
in te re s ts ,  but also the level o f parliamentary remuneration and reforms 
in the hours and procedures o f the House. The dilemma and ambiguity surround 
ing fu l l - t im e  versus part-t im e membership is  therefore central to the 
operation ..of. the House, and is  l i k e ly  to grow as more Members desire , 
or are forced by the pressure o f parliamentary work to take a f u l l e r  part 
in the work o f  the House. The f ru s tra t io n s  th is  creates fo r  Members was 
summed up by a Conservative MP included in Anthony King's study o f
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B r i t is h  Members o f Parliament who complained:-
'The f in a l  th ing I f ind  maddening about the present system is  
the c o n f l ic t  tha t we've not yet resolved as to  whether being a Member 
o f  Parliament in  B r i ta in  is an amateur or a professional occupation.
I can see i t  being played both ways, and I would be quite happy 
to do i t  e i th e r way; but at the moment i t  seems to me we're screwed 
between the two. In e f fe c t ,  the work is  there fo r  being a f u l l ­
time Member provided he has the r ig h t  f a c i l i t i e s  and is  aided to 
do i t .  I t ' s  r id icu lous  doing f i l i n g  and a l l  tha t so rt o f  nonsense 
when one could be spending one's time much be tte r being re a l ly  well 
informed on one or two subjects and exerting an influence. On the 
other hand, there is  s t i l l  the strong fee ling  tha t th is  is  a game 
fo r  gentlemen who have other things to  do, and tha t what you should 
re a l ly  do is earn your money and pay your way, and then d r i f t  over 
to  the House and, you know, d e live r  your opinions and so on. There's 
a great c o n f l ic t  here th a t we haven't sorted out, and I f ind  i t  
very f r u s t r a t in g . ' g
S im ila r f ru s t ra t io n  lay behind the comment by one Conservative MP in the 
sample survey fo r  th is  study who pointed out tha t 'the s truc tu ra l fa b r ic  
o f  the House is  amateur but the a c tu a l i ty  means you are increasingly having 
to  t r y  to do a professional job in these amateur surroundings'. A greater 
understanding o f  what an MP's job ought to  be is required, and th is  in 
turn  in v ite s  fu r th e r  research.
Implementation and operation of the Register
The debate in June 1975 on implementing the 1974 Resolutions lasted 
ju s t  a l i t t l e  over 3 hours as compared w ith the 7 hours which were taken 
up w ith  debating the subject in May 1974. Whereas the 1974 debate had 
involved an extremely high number o f Members taking part in the free vote - 
over 80% o f Members e l ig ib le  to vote had taken part in both d iv is ions - 
as established in Chapter 6, th is  debate a ttrac ted  fa r  fewer pa rt ic ipan ts .
Any comparison between the debatesTs made d i f f i c u l t  by the covert 
management o f the timetable through the usual channels. However, the 
apparent lack o f  in te re s t  exh ib ited in 1975 as compared to the previous 
year is  again consistent w ith the patternoof an ' issue-attention c y c le '.
The well-a ttended 1974 debate on Members' in te re s ts , which resulted in 
the House agreeing to changes in the disclosure o f in te re s ts , occurred 
a t the peak of an a tten t io n  cycle concerning Members' f inanc ia l in te res ts . 
The Select Committee which was set up fo llow ing th is  debate expected there 
to  be considerable public in te re s t  in th e i r  report. However, as the Clerk 
to  the Committee confirmed, the 'p u b l ic '  and parliamentary anxiety which 
had existed then, engendered la rge ly  by the Poulson reve la tions, and main­
tained by the series o f  prosecutions fo r  corruption resu lt ing  from th is
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a f f a i r ,  had la rge ly  subsided by the time the Select Committee Report was 
eventually debated in June 1975. Also, Members were no longer having 
to consider th e i r  image in  the context o f a pending general e lec tion  as 
they Had been in May 1974. Thus, as borne out by the comments o f  several 
key informants, inc lud ing Mr Michael Foot, MPs were less pressured to 
take an in te re s t  in ,  or be seen to take an in te re s t  in ,  the reform o f 
in te rna l procedures re la t in g  to Members' f in a n c ia l in te res ts .
A d d it io n a l ly ,  i t  was suggested by the Clerk to the Committee tha t 
the poor attendance may have re flec ted  the fa c t  tha t th is  debate was simply 
concerned w ith implementing p r inc ip les  already agreed to by the House, 
whereas the debate in  1974 had involved the House in taking a controver­
s ia l decision on whether or not to adopt and formalise the pr inc ip les 
o f re g is t ra t io n  and declaration o f Members' f ina nc ia l in te res ts . I t  was 
suggested by several Labour Party Members tha t th is  was a major reason 
fo r  the low turn out o f Labour Members in the 1975 debate as compared 
w ith 1974 when th is  m a jo r ity  o f Labour Members had f e l t  compelled to attend 
in order to ensure th a t the Resolutions were not thrown out by the Conserva­
t iv e  Party.
As to the scope and format o f the Register as agreed to by the House 
in  1975 and subsequently monitored by the Select Committee on Members' 
in te re s ts ,  a myriad o f problems and ambiguities have been considered in 
foregoing chapters. These stem mainly from differences o f perception 
or judgment on the part o f Members both as to what should or should not 
con s t itu te  a re g is tra b le  in te re s t ,  and who, in addition to MPs, should 
be required to re g is te r .  I t  was because the Leader o f the House had acknow­
ledged there was 'room fo r  genuine and deeply f e l t  differences o f opinion 
on i.both sides of the House' on these matters tha t he had referred them
9
in 1974 to a Select Committee fo r  consideration. The fa c t tha t MPs 
have d i f fe re n t  views on what constitu tes  an in te re s t  not only c a l ls  in to  
question the value o f the Register as a record o f Members' in te re s ts , 
but also ex is ts  as a d i f f i c u l t y  which could undermine the ru le requiring 
Members to declare an in te re s t  when a re levant subject is  being discussed.
In considering th is  problem o f what constitu tes an ' in te re s t '  or 
' in te re s ts '  in p o l i t ic s  we would do well to bear in mind E.E. Schattsch- 
ne ider 's  observation th a t : -
'A l l  discussions o f in te re s ts ,  special as well as general, re fe r  
to motives, desires and in tentions o f people. In th is  sense the 
whole discussion o f in te res ts  is  sub jective. We have made progress
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in  the study o f p o l i t ic s  because people have observed some kind o f 
re la t io n  between the p o l i t ic a l  behaviour o f people and ce rta in  wholly - 
impersonal data concerning th e i r  ownership of property, income, economic 
s ta tus , professions and the l ik e .  A ll tha t we know about in te re s ts ,  
p r iva te  as well as pub lic , is based on inferences o f th is  so r t.  Whether 
the d is t in c t io n  in  any given case is  va l id  depends on the evidence 
and on kinds o f  inferences drawn from the evidence ' . -jq
Ins igh t in to  the va r ie ty  of inferences tha t can be drawn, and one 
which helps to explain divided opinion both on the proprie ty  or otherwise 
o f  Members' possessing outside f ina nc ia l in te res ts  and on the above issue 
o f what does or does not constitu te  a reg is trab le  in te re s t ,  is  provided 
by Steven Lukes who concludes th a t : -
' In general, ta lk  o f in te res ts  provides licence fo r  the making 
o f normative judgments o f a moral and p o l i t ic a l  character. So i t  
is  not surpris ing  tha t d i f fe re n t  conceptions o f what in te res ts  are are 
associated w ith  d i f fe re n t  moral and p o l i t ic a l  positions
To these problems concerning the scope and format o f the Register 
should be added one un intentiona l by-product o f the Register which the 
former Registrar o f Members' In te re s ts , Mr Pring, suggested should be 
set against, but does not outweigh i t s  con tr ibu tion  to increasing public 
knowledge o f MPs' in te re s ts .  This is  the tendency, often un in ten tiona l, 
fo r  MPs to feel tha t because they have registered th e i r  in te res ts  there 
is  no need to declare them in  debate. There is  a danger tha t the Register 
becomes a replacement f o r ,  ra ther than as intended, a supplement to ,  the 
ru le  o f declara tion o f in te re s ts .  Also, i t  can be argued th a t ,  paradoxi­
c a l ly ,  by increasing public knowledge o f MPs' in te res ts  the Register may 
also add to the r is k  o f c o n f l ic t  or apparent c o n f l ic t  o f in te res t a r is in g .
By providing;! a de ta iled catalogue o f  ind iv idua l Member's in te re s ts , i t  
a c tu a l ly  helps public re la t ions  f irm s , companies etc. to id e n t i fy  which 
MPs might be useful to  them.
To gain a f u l l  p ic tu re  o f the working o f the 1974/1975 Resolutions, 
p a r t ic u la r ly  the status o f the Register, i t  has to be asked why, as shown 
in  Chapter 6, the House was not given the opportunity to express a view 
on the force o f i t s  Resolutions a f te r  one Member had refused to re g is te r .  
Also, whether the Select Committee made the correct judgment in deciding 
not to prevent fu r th e r  ed it ions o f the Register being published u n t i l  
such time.
When asked why the 1976 Report from the Select Committee on Members' 
In te res ts  had not been debated, Michael Foot, the then Leader o f the House, 
pointed out tha t whereas at the beginning o f  a new Parliament in 1974
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there had been a temporary le g is la t iv e  void which could be f i l l e d  by the
in troduction  of the Register, by 1976 the p o l i t ic a l  c limate had changed.
The parliamentary session was busy and could not accommodate the new issues
re la t in g  to the Register. He re ferred to two p a r t ic u la r  time pressures
on the parliamentary timetable during th is  period. F i r s t ,  the pressure
o f public  po licy  deriv ing  from the Government's economic and social measures
and magnified by the controversy deriv ing from the devolution issue. Second,
the pressure o f 'Members' o f Parliament m a tte rs ',  i .e .  pay, pensions e tc . ,
which were jo s t l in g  fo r  a tten tion  and which had to be debated, in the
main, la te  a t n ig h t.  To have resolved the matter o f Enoch Powell's refusal
to re g is te r  would, in Mr Foot's view, have taken up much o f th is  valuable
time. Unlike Mr Skinner (Lab) who thought tha t the matter could be disposed
o f in  a few hours, Mr Foot disagreed. As a strong upholder o f  parliamentary
procedures and t r a d i t io n s ,  he did not th ink  i t  r ig h t  tha t the House should
12take l i g h t l y  a matter invo lv ing the possible censure o f a Member. Other 
interviewees? placed d i f fe re n t  in te rp re ta t io ns  on Mr Foot's apparent u n w il l ­
ingness to debate the m atter, noting that during th is  period Mr Powell's 
vote, and the support he had among the U.U.U.C. Members, was cruc ia l fo r  
the Labour Government.
Mr Powell h imself dismissed the accusation tha t there had been an 
arrangement between the Labour Government and the Unionist MPs. He suggested 
an a ltogether d i f fe re n t  reason why the issue o f non-compliance, raised 
by his own re fu sa l,  had not been resolved. Begging the fundamental problem 
discussed e a r l ie r  o f what constitu tes  an ' in te re s t '  in p o l i t ic s  he argued 
th a t he had an 'u n fa i r  advantage' in tha t the House knew tha t he had no 
in te res ts  in fluenc ing his parliamentary behaviour. He considered his 
success, which he construed as the achievement o f destroying the 1974 
reso lu t ion  concerning re g is t ra t io n  by his s ing le  act o f defiance, would 
not have been possible w ithout th is  extraneous advantage. I t  contributed 
to the im p ra c t ic a b i l i t y  o f the House enforcing i t s  resolutions because 
they would have had to censure a Member whom everyone knows has 'no 
in te re s ts ' and would not be influenced by them even i f  he had, and who 
is  a zealous upholder o f  the sovereignty, ru les and procedures o f the 
House. Thus, he concluded tha t extraneous fa c to rs , in his case his 'un­
f a i r  advantage', are often as important or more important than the v a l id i t y  
o f  the case.
On the p r a c t ic a b i l i t y  o f the House upholding i t s  resolutions by passing 
a standing order as recommended by the 1976 Select Committee on Members'
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In te re s ts ,  one House o f Commons' Clerk remarked tha t th is  course was un­
l i k e ly  to be favoured by the House. Part o f i t s  general philosophy is  
to  have as few standing orders as possible; a plethora would be confus­
ing. This view was supported by data co llected during the survey, w ith  
only one-th ird  o f  the sample advocating tha t the Register should be en­
forced by a standing order (Appendix 2, Q. 15). Almost tw o-th irds  o f 
the sample were opposed to any action being taken against MPs refusing 
to re g is te r ,  regardless o f  whether the requirement to re g is te r  was imposed 
by reso lu tion  o f the House, by standing o rder,or was s ta tu to ry  (Q. 16).
On the question of whether the Register should be s ta tu to r i ly  imposed, 
only one-th ird  o f  the sample, a l l  o f  whom had voted in favour o f the Reg­
is te r  a t i t s  incep tion , f e l t  tha t i t  should.
As regards the decision o f the Select Committee to prevent fu r th e r  
ed it ions  o f  the Register being published u n t i l  the House had had the oppor­
tu n i ty  to decide on the m atter, in  retrospect th e ir  action may be judged 
as a mistake on the grounds argued in the House by Mr R. Cryer (Lab).
He believed th a t the Committee should have maintained publication what­
ever arguments i t  might have had with ind iv idua l Members, the main object 
o f  the exercise being to publish the Register to ensure tha t 'Parliament
could be seen to  be laying everything out openly i f  members o f the public
13chose to examine the f in a n c ia l involvements o f Members. Whether the 
Select Committee were ju s t i f i e d  in th e i r  action or not, as became apparent 
in  Chapter 6, t h e i r  decision e f fe c t iv e ly  cu r ta i le d  any improvements or 
changes in the Register which had been envisaged by th e i r  Chairman as 
the log ica l next step a f te r  th e i r  i n i t i a l  recommendations.
The Register: Innovation or extension o f t r a d i t io n ?
How fa r  did the acceptance o f the 1974/1975 Resolutions concerning 
declara tion  and re g is t ra t io n  o f  Members' in te res ts  ind icate a genuine 
change in the House's appraisal o f  and approach towards the problem of 
c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  among i t s  membership?
Looking purely a t changes in p r in c ip le ,  several a lte ra t ions  occurred. 
F i r s t l y ,  as already established, the Resolution in May 1974 concerning 
declara tion  o f in te res ts  implemented a procedural change in tha t i t  con­
verted what had previously been a convention in to  a ru le o f  the House, 
and one which covered past and fu tu re  in te res ts  as well as those o f the 
present. In so doing, i t  in theory removed the prerogative o f the
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ind iv idua l Member to be able to be the sole judge o f  the relevancy o f 
in te res ts  to be declared, and entrusted th is  to the wisdom o f the House 
as a whole.
Secondly, while ne ither reso lu tion indicated a move on the part o f  
the House away from the 'p r in c ip le  of d isc losure ' towards the 'p r in c ip le  
o f  avoidance' in the regulation o f Members' in te re s ts ,  the acceptance 
o f  a Register o f in te res ts  indicated a change in the nature o f  the House's 
a p p l ica t io n s^ 'the  p r in c ip le  o f disclosure. As shown, the House has t ra d ­
i t i o n a l l y  been p ro tective  o f the ind iv idua l Member's privacy, and has 
required d isclosure o f  in te res ts  only at the point in time o f  speaking 
or voting on a matter upon which his action may be influenced by his per­
sonal in te re s t .  While the Register was conceived o f as supplementary 
to ,  and not in place o f th is  form of d isc losure, which continued to be 
embodied in the ru le  o f declaration o f in te re s ts ,  i t  did introduce a d i f fe r ^  
ent approach to d isc losure. This approach, which had previouslyheen re jected 
by the 1969 Select Committee on Members' Interests (Declaration), holds 
tha t d isclosure should be general, comprehensive and public and concedes 
the r ig h t  o f the p u b lic ,  in add ition  to other Members, to general s u rv e i l ­
lance o f  a Member's p r iva te  in te res ts . As explained in Chapter 5, i t  
involves trad ing o f f  some o f a Member's r ig h t  to privacy in favour of 
greater p u b l ic i ty .  Thus, while the Register did not s ig n ify  an exchange 
o f  the p r in c ip le  o f  disclosure fo r  avoidance, i t  is  reasonable to argue 
th a t  i t  s ignalled a commitment by the House to a d i f fe re n t  and additional 
app lica tion  o f the p r in c ip le  o f  disclosure
Whether by adopting th is  app lica tion  o f disclosure o f in te rests  the 
House was p r im a r i ly  concerned with avoiding actual c o n f l ic ts  as i t  has 
been suggested i t  was when requ ir ing  disclosure o f in te rests  p r io r  to 
the Register, or whether i t  was now more anxious to avoid the appearance 
o f  c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  is  obscured by the extraordinary amount o f rhe to r ic  
characteris ing  the speeches on the subject. I t  is doubtful whether the 
primary reason fo r  es tab lish ing the Register was the democratically in ­
spired one o f providing the public w ith  information on Members' in te res ts . 
Information from the sample survey (Appendix 2, Q. 1 and Q. 8) and s ta te ­
ments by successive Leaders o f the House during tha t time (Mr P rio r and
Mr Short) ind ica te  th a t the Register was conceived more in terms o f pro­
tec t in g  Members from gossip and innuendo and in restoring the good name
o f the House than as a means o f  avoiding actual c o n f l ic ts  o f in te re s t
or as a pun it ive  measure imposed on Members c o l le c t iv e ly .  Along with
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pe rs is ten t reference to improving the image o f Parliament th is  suggests 
th a t the Register was viewed la rge ly  as a public re la t ions  exercise on 
the part o f the House.
In add it ion  to these changes in p r in c ip le  or procedure, there is 
also the id io syn c ra t ic  view put forward by Enoch Powell. This, as explained 
in  Chapter 6, argues a con s t itu t io na l po int rather than dealing so le ly  
w ith  the Register. Mr Powell believes tha t the reso lu tion concerning 
re g is t ra t io n  did indeed introduce a change, but one which he considers 
to  be uncons t itu t ion a l. The v a l id i t y  o f his argument must remain a matter 
o f  opin ion, and i t  is  unclear how many MPs, i f  any, share his view. Given 
th a t a B r i t is h  court cannot review or pass judgment on th is  opin ion, i t  
is  in te re s t in g  to note th a t there is  cu rren t ly  an American case which 
involves a s im i la r  charge o f  unconstitu tional action by way o f  Resolution.
In 1977 both Chambers o f Congress added new ethics codes to th e ir  own 
in te rna l ru les. A major issue in the Senate as in the House was the pro­
v is ion  l im i t in g  a Senator's outside income earnings to 15% o f his o f f i c ia l  
sa lary . L i t t l e  more than two months a f te r  the Senate adopted i t ,  the 
eth ics code faced a court challenge. Five Senators announced on July 
14 tha t they were asking the U.S. D is t r ic t  Court in the D is t r ic t  o f Columbia 
to  ru le  tha t the code v io la ted  the Constitu tion by adding additional q u a l i ­
f ic a t io n s  necessary fo r  holding o f f ic e .  The s u i t  was f i le d  by Senator 
Paul Laxalt (R. Nevada) against the Secretary o f the Senate, J.S. Kimmitt. 
Since l im i ta t io n  o f  outside earned income fo r  the U.S. Senators (not 
Representatives) was deferred u n t i l  January 1, 1983, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals fo r  the D is t r i c t  o f Columbia determined tha t the case would be 
heard on or about December 1, 1982.^^
Despite these a lte ra t io n s  in p r in c ip le  or procedure which can be 
id e n t i f ie d ,  th is  study has established tha t in practice very l i t t l e  has 
changed in  the House's appraisal o f  and approach towards the regulation 
o f Members' in te re s ts .  The 1974 Resolutions do not extend to personal 
in te res ts  other than pecuniary ones, and the presumption o f the proprie ty  
o f  possessing outside f in a n c ia l in te res ts  is  s t i l l  predominant in the 
House. As manifested in the House's unswerving pursu it o f the 'p r in c ip le  
o f  d isc losure ' as opposed to the 'p r in c ip le  o f avoidance',, i ts  recognition 
o f  the issue is not whether Members should or should not possess outside 
in te re s ts ,  but whether, and i f  so how, these in te res ts  should be disy 
closed.
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While the 1974 Resolution concerning dec la ra tiona fr ih te re ’sts converted 
a convention o f the House in to  a ru le and extended i t  to past and fu tu re  
in te res ts  as well as current in te re s ts ,  the Government changed i t s  mind 
about extending the ru le  to Question Time. A rr iv in g  at the conclusion 
th a t th is  would involve practices which would be cumbersome and e sse n t ia l ly  
time wasting, in t h e i r  second Motion on Members' Interests (Declaration) 
agreed to  by the House on 12 June 1975 they s p e c i f ic a l ly  la id  down tha t 
fo r  the purposes o f  the 1974 Resolution the term 'proceeding' should not 
include the g iv ing o f any w r it te n  no tice , or the asking o f a supplementary 
question. Thus, what some, mainly Labour, backbenchers regard as a most 
c ruc ia l area where f in a n c ia l in te res ts  can be abused remains, as before 
the 1974 Resolutions, outside the declaration requirements.
The House adopted compulsory re g is t ra t io n  instead o f the form o f 
voluntary re g is t ra t io n  favoured by the Conservative Party. However, con­
t ra ry  to the fears expressed by i t s  opponents, the Register does not under­
mine the honour and s e l f - r e s t r a in t  o f the ind iv idua l Member by removing 
his prerogative to be the sole judge o f  the relevancy o f in te rests  to 
be disc losed, nor does i t  necessarily  signal the demise o f mutual t r u s t  
in  the House. As recognised by the 1974 Select Committee on Members' 
In te re s ts ,  ' in  the end, re s p o n s ib i l i ty  must res t on the Member himself
1 Rto  d isclose those in te res ts  tha t might a f fe c t  his parliamentary actions, 
and the House would t ru s t  them in th is  respect. That a b e l ie f  in mutual 
t r u s t  as one o f the foundations o f  p o l i t ic a l  l i f e  is  s t i l l  widely believed 
in  the House was confirmed by the sample survey (Appendix 2, Q. 32). Approx­
imately 54% of the sampled Members considered tha t mutual t r u s t ,  des­
cribed as part o f  a common-ethos which 'grows in to  MPs' and which stretches 
across party l in e s ,  is  an indispensable element o f p o l i t ic a l  l i f e .  A 
fu r th e r  40% o f  the sample agreed i t  is  an important element but, providing 
a warning against re ly in g  so le ly  on mutual t ru s t  to regulate Members' 
in te res ts  and conduct, ar]gued tha t i t s  extent and/or effectiveness is  
exaggerated. This view was perhaps best summed up by the Conservative 
MP who warned th a t : -
' Although there is  a common ethos, in practice there is  the danger 
o f  " fa lse  camaraderie" . . .  po l it ica ns  would be fo o l ish  i f  they were 
too t r u s t in g ' .
That the ind iv idua l Member is  s t i l l  the judge o f the relevancy o f 
in te res ts  which might a f fe c t  his parliamentary action , and the fa c t  tha t 
the Register cannot provide a guarantee against evasion, are c ruc ia l
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factors  in an assessment o f the extent to which the ru le  o f declaration 
and the establishment o f compulsory re g is t ra t io n  in practice s ig n i fy  the 
erosion o f  a,Member's privacy and ind ica te a move towards greater p u b l ic i ty .  
Combined with the shortcomings in the format of the Register, and the 
danger tha t re g is tra t io n  becomes a replacement fo r  ra ther than supplementary 
to the ru le  o f  d isc losure , these facts po int to the conclusion th a t both 
the con tr ibu t ion  to increasing public knowledge o f  MPs f in a n c ia l in te re s ts ,  
and the concomitant erosion o f a Member's privacy under the requirements 
o f  the Register, are less than the theory o f  re g is tra t io n  would suggest.
The d iffe rence is  th a t Members wishing to  safeguard th e i r  'p r iva cy ' now 
have p o s it iv e ly  to  be un tru th fu l by making a ' n i l '  return in the Register 
instead o f  passively neglecting ( ' f o r g e t t in g ' )  to make an a ff irm a tio n  
in  debate.
Most s ig n if ic a n t  is  the observation made by Mr W illey in the 1975 
debate on implementing the Register tha t i t  constitu tes a ' Parliamentary 
s o lu t io n ' to the problem and as such reta ins the t ra d i t io n  o f exclusive 
s e l f - d is c ip l in e  by the House,in the regula tion o f Members' in te re s ts . 
Inves tiga tion  o f the problem has been treated so le ly  as a domestic matter 
and has been undertaken accordingly by se lect committees o f the House, 
not outside bodies. Although the Royal Commission on Standards o f Conduct 
in Public L ife  commented b r ie f l y  on Parliament, i t  expressly stated tha t 
i t  was not part o f i t s  task to make an examination o f the ways in which 
Parliament governs i t s  own procedures. The Register was set up by a Reso­
lu t io n  o f the House, is  monitored by a se lect committee o f the House, 
and any refusal to comply with i t s  procedures automatically becomes a 
matter fo r  the House to resolve w ithout in terference from any other body 
except, in d i r e c t ly ,  from the media (whose e f fo r ts  might in fa c t  have a 
negative e f fe c t  in promoting a closing o f ranks). In i t s  treatment o f 
th is  issue the House has once more exh ib ited the in s u la r i ty  which re g u la r ly  
in fe c ts  i t s  consideration o f any aspects o f i t s  procedure. This in s u la r i t y  
is  p a r t ly  a product o f the mutual t ru s t  and in te rna l s o l id a r i ty  o f the 
House. Without a t t r ib u t in g  the same ideological position and assumptions 
to  a l l  Members o f  Parliament, i t  is  accompanied by a tendency towards 
in s e n s i t iv i t y  on the part o f  parliamentarians to outside sentiments regard­
ing i t s  workings; in th is  case towards the potentia l problem o f c o n f l ic t  
o f in te re s t  among th e i r  membership and demands fo r  safeguards in  th is  
area.
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When asked whether they viewed Members' in te res ts  as a domestic issue 
fo r  the House to s e t t le .  Members interviewed fo r  the sample survey 
affirmed th is  a t t i tu d e .  Approximately 43% o f the sample considered the 
subject to be e n t i re ly  a domestic matter to be discussed and se tt le d  in ­
te rn a l ly  by the House, and the other 57% o f the sample, although conceding 
the scope fo r  wider discussion, believed the subject must u l t im a te ly  be 
s e tt le d  by the House (Appendix 2 , Q. 31). Thus they endorsed the image 
and r e a l i t y  o f the House as master o f  i t s  own procedures.
Problems o f  s e l f -d is c ip l in e
What problems arise out o f  the exclusive exercise o f s e l f -d is c ip l in e ?
A controvers ia l issue is  the p ropr ie ty  o f the House acting as sole adjud­
ic a to r  upon the conduct o f  i t s  Members in th e i r  parliamentary capacity, 
p a r t ic u la r ly ,  as fa r  as th is  study is  concerned, in c o n f l ic t  o f  in te re s t  
matters. An extension o f th is  question is  the problem tha t at times,
as in th e  Select Committee inves tiga tion  o f the conduct o f Members in 1976/77,
the House is  confronted with the d i f f i c u l t  task o f d is c ip l in in g  i t s  own 
Members, w ith  a l l  the problems and personal lo y a lt ie s  which th is  involves 
and, as Chapter 3 o f th is  study has shown, has involved in the past. The 
Clerk to  the Select Committee on Conduct o f Members stated tha t 'the p r iv ­
i lege  o f  immunity from outside inves tiga tion  o f proceedings in Parliament
ca rr ies  w ith i t  the c o ro l la ry  th a t the House should always, i f  the occasion
17a r ises , be prepared to  do th is  job fo r  i t s e l f .  However, the House 
is re lu c tan t to d is c ip l in e  i t s  own Members and, as we have seen, acts 
c h ie f ly  when issues are forced upon i t  by p u b l ic i ty  or other outside pressures. 
Unfortunate ly, the re fo re , the current posit ion o f parliamentary s e l f -  
d is c ip l in e ,  buttressed by t ra d i t io n  though i t  i s ,  has allowed the House 
to  be open to charges o f partisan p o l i t ic a l  motives or o f acting defen­
s iv e ly  w ith  e s p r i t  de corps in the manner o f a gentlemen's club when charges
are brought against any o f the body.
As explained in Chapter 3, the claim to  be sole judge over both i t s  
Members and proceedings in part derives from the o r ig ins  o f Parliament 
as the High Court o f Parliament, the highest court in the land, and the 
b e l ie f  th a t  i t  would therefore be contrary to every p r in c ip le  fo r  i t s  
proceedings to be regulated or challenged in any other court. However, 
th is  view has been challenged by c r i t i c s  who consider the arrangement, 
whereby Parliament is both prosecutor and judge in i t s  own cause, offends 
against the p r inc ip les  o f natural ju s t ic e ,  and who f in d  the r igh ts  of
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the Commons too in d e f in i te  and uncerta in. This argument, w ith  which th is  
w r i te r  concurs, was cogently put to the Select Committee on Parliamentary 
P r iv i lege  set up in 1967, amid increasing concern at the s e n s i t iv i t y  o f 
Members of Parliament to outside c r i t ic is m ,  to conduct a general review 
o f  the law of parliamentary p r iv i le g e . In th e i r  memorandum of evidence 
to the Committee, the Study o f Parliament Group c r i t ic is e d  the in d e f in i te ­
ness o f the House's scope of p r iv i leges  and contempt powers, arguing th a t : -
'The re s u lt  o f th is  undefined reach o f the House's powers whether 
by way o f contempt or applications o f p r iv i le g e  is  to maintain un­
ce r ta in ty  about a large number o f a c t iv i t ie s  occurring outside the 
House which a f fe c t  Members in th e i r  roles as public representatives.
The development o f d i f f  erent modes o f opinion formation, in te re s t  
group a c t iv i t y  and p o l i t ic a l  organisation inside and outside P a r l ia ­
ment has obviously a lte red in a radical way the pressures which operate 
upon Members and the environment in which they carry out th e i r  du ties. 
Yet P riv i lege  rests in part on eighteenth-century assumptions.'^g
Although not claiming o r ig in a l i t y  fo r  the suggestion, they also recom­
mended a possible tra ns fe r  o f the House's ju r is d ic t io n  to punish fo r  con­
tempts or breach of p r iv i le g e .  In th e i r  v iew:-
'The House o f  Commons . . .  whatever i t s  formal s ta tus, is  not in 
substance a ju d ic ia l  body. An assembly of s ix  hundred and t h i r t y  
Members cannot be, and is  the wrong sortoo f body to carry out an 
e sse n t ia l ly  ad jud ica tive  process, namely the reso lu tion  o f an ind iv idua l 
case a r is in g  under the law and custom o f Pariiament. ' -jg
Just as the House had been persuaded o f the wisdom o f committing to courts 
the ad jud ica tion o f disputed e lections (by the Parliamentary Elections 
Act, 1868) so, they suggested, consideration should now be given to  a 
s im i la r  t ra n s fe r  to  the courts o f ju r is d ic t io n  over cases of contempt 
or breach o f p r iv i le g e : -
' We th in k  th a t there are good reasons both fo r  c la r i fy in g  the 
scope o f  p r iv i le g e  and contempt powers in p r in c ip le  and also fo r  
providing a ju d ic ia l  forum where ju s t ic e  is  seen to be done in in d i ­
vidual cases. I t  is  reasonable tha t c i t izen s  and p o l i t ic a l  in te rests  
o f  a l l  kinds should know what they may and may not do and the s itu a ­
t io n  o f uncerta in ty  which in d e f in i te  powers engender seems unhealthy 
whatever i t s  h is to r ic a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n . ' ^ q
This is  a controvers ia l view and one which has been, and is  l i k e ly  
to  be, opposed not ju s t  on h is to r ic a l  grounds but also because o f the 
p rac tica l problems involved in i t s  implementation. Mr L.A. Abraham, former 
Princ ipa l Clerk o f  Committees (House of Commons) expressed th is  b e l ie f  
to  the aforementioned Committee, who themselves found against t ra n s fe rr in g  
the penal ju r is d ic t io n  o f  the House to some other t r ib u n a l : -
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' I f  . . .  the ju r is d ic t io n  over contempts o f the House o f Commons 
were transferred from the House to the courts, i t  would be necessary 
to enumerate the acts and ommissions which were to cons titu te  crim­
inal offences in the s tatute by which the ju r is d ic t io n  was so tra ns ­
ferred - a task to the d i f f i c u l t y  o f which anyone who has helped 
to  d ra f t  or advise upon Power-and-Privileges-of-Parliament Acts fo r  
the new Commonwealth countries can bear w itness'.^-j
Recalling the House's preference fo r  inde fin iteness, f l e x i b i l i t y  and d is ­
cre tion  in i t s  ru les and procedures, i t  is  in te res t in g  to note th a t s im i la r  
arguments were raised against estab lish ing a Register o f Members' in te res ts  
by s ta tu te ;  a move which would have involved the task, which some MPs 
thought in t ra c ta b le ,  o f de fin ing comprehensively and f a i r l y  in law what 
in te res ts  were to be registered by Members.
Bearing in mind we should not confuse c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  w ith corrup- 
22t io n ,  a dimension o f  the issue o f whether the House should abandon i t s
ju r is d ic t io n  to  punish fo r  contempts or breach o f  p r iv i le g e  which nevertheless
has p a r t ic u la r  relevance fo r  th is  study is  whether Members o f Parliament
can, and should, be brought w ith in  the ambit o f the crim inal law o f  corrup- 
23t io n  fo r  a c t iv i t ie s  in th e i r  parliamentary capacity. The common b e l ie f  
th a t only the House of Commons and not the crim inal courts can deal w ith 
a corrup t Member acting in his parliamentary capacity was dogmatically 
upheld by the Royal Commission on Standards o f Conduct in Public L ife  
which 'note(d) the fa c t  tha t ne ither the s ta tu to ry  nor the common law 
applies to the br ibery  or attempted bribery  o f a Member o f Parliament 
in respect o f his Parliamentary a c t i v i t i e s ' .  Explaining why th is  is so 
they continued:-
' I t  is  c lear to  us tha t a Member o f Parliament cannot, in th a t 
capacity , be deemed an 'agent' fo r  the purpose o f the Prevention 
o f Corruption Act 1906. I t  is  equally c lea r tha t Parliament could 
not be deemed to be a 'pub lic  body' fo r  the purposes o f the Public 
Bodies Corrupt Practices Act o f 1889. Nor does membership o f P a r l ia ­
ment, as such, cons t itu te  public o f f ic e  fo r  the purposes o f  the common 
1 aw . 2^
This view was also confirmed by the former Prime M in is te r, the Rt. hon.
James Callaghan, when asked in October 1976, in the wake of the Poulson 
a f f a i r ,  to  c la r i f y  the position in law o f MPs in re la t io n  to  a llegations
? c
o f  corrup tion . Thus the image is u n in ten t iona lly  created o f Members 
o f  Parliament being above the law (though subject to the law o f Parliament) 
and the danger arises o f  the media and the public  th ink ing tha t double 
standards are being applied by the House.
While in no way questioning the r ig h t  o f  the House to govern i t s  
own procedures, the Royal Commission nevertheless f e l t  tha t the sanctions
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against b r ibery  introduced by the crim inal law in other f ie ld s  had ou t­
str ipped the sanctions now ava ilab le  to Parliament. As explained in Chapter 
3, the power o f commitment, which Erskine May describes as the ‘ keystone 
of parliamentary p r iv i le g e ' ,  has not been exercised by the Commons since 
1880, and the r ig h t  to impose fines has not been exercised since 1666.
This leaves the House with the penalties o f reprimand or admonition admin­
is te red by the Speaker, and expulsion or suspension from the services 
o f the House; the la t t e r  two options, as argued by Michael Foot and S ir  
Derek Walker-Smith in  the debate on the conduct o f M em bers ,im pos ing  
a penalty not only on the Member but also on his constituents. Believing 
these penalties the House may impose to be inappropriate to present c i r ­
cumstances, the Select Committee of Priv ileges in 1967 and again in 1977
recommended tha t le g is la t io n  should be introduced to revive the power
27o f the House to  impose f ine s . Along with most o f the other recommenda­
tions  contained in the 1967 Priv ileges Report th is  suggestion has not 
been implemented. In the context o f seeking a su itab le  sanction fo r  Members 
who refused to  re g is te r  th e i r  in te re s ts ,  the reviva l o f fines was commended 
to  th is  w r i te r  by Mr Lankester, Registrar o f Members' In te res ts , who, 
when in terv iewéd,said tha t he considered a f in e  was a more su itab le  punish­
ment by the House than e ith e r  suspension or expulsion. Although we might 
then f in d  s itua t ions  in which fines were paid by the outside in te re s t  
which was the subject o f the offence, th is  would probably be treated as 
a contempt.
Focussing so le ly  on the adequacy o f sanctions fo r  punishing bribery
and corrup tion , the Royal Commission recommended tha t 'Parliament should
consider bringing co rrup tion , bribery and attempted br ibery o f a Member
o f Parliament acting in  his parliamentary capacity w ith in  the ambit o f 
28the crim inal law. The decision on whether to implement or even discuss
th is  recommendation in e v ita b ly  remains with Parliament. As ye t,  the House
o f  Commons has not discussed the Report, although i t  was debated in the
House o f Lord on 8 December 1976.
However, taking the criminal law on corruption as i t  stands, i t  is
possible to argue along l ines  pursued by Dr. Geoffrey Marshall in November 
291976 tha t there is  in fa c t  no 'b iza rre  loophole' which allows MPs to 
escape prosecution when they are acting in  th e i r  parliamentary capacity. 
Graham Z e l l ic k  develops th is  view and, arguing against the Royal Commission's 
conclusions, constructs a case fo r  asserting tha t the crim inal law can
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30indeed operate in th is  area. The nub o f  his argument is  as fo llow s.
F i r s t ,  he considers i t  is  not at a l l  c lear tha t the House o f Commons could 
not be deemed to be a 'pub lic  body' fo r  the purposes o f  the Public Bodies 
Corrupt Practices Act 1889. Then, turning to common law which punishes 
br ibery  and breach o f t r u s t  by public o f f ic e rs ,  he asks whether member­
ship of Parliament can constitu te  'pub lic  o f f ic e '  fo r  the purposes o f  
th is .  No prosecutions have been brought in England because the House 
has treated corruption o f  Members as s contempt o f the House. However, 
he is  able to po in t to judgments in the High Court and state courts in
A u s tra l ia ,  where i t  has been held tha t membership o f Parliament is  a public
31o f f ic e  fo r  the purpose o f  crim inal law, and accordingly payments to 
an MP in connection w ith his parliamentary work could amount to common 
law misdemeanours. In some o f these judgments a broader basis o f l i a b i l i t y  
has been favoured s tre tch ing  to a l l  persons whatever holding o ff ice s  o f  
'p u b lic  t r u s t  and confidence'. For example, in R v Boston, Higgins J. 
took the view th a t : -
' . . .  i t  seems to me immaterial whether the member is to be treated 
as a public o f f ic e r  or not. He is a member o f Parliament, holding 
a f id u c ia ry  re la t io n  towards the pub lic , and that is enough'.
Thus, on one ground or another, Z e l l ic k  considers Members o f Parliament 
would seem to be caught by the common law. Summing up his argument he 
concludes:-
' I t  must be recorded tha t there is  a d is t in c t  p o s s ib i l i ty  tha t 
the acceptance o f  payments by Members o f  Parliament in certa in  circum­
stances. h ith e r to  thought to l i e  w ith in  the exclusive cognisance 
o f Parliament, may cons titu te  crim inal offences, which the House 
could in s t ru c t  the Attorney-General to prosecute. A r t ic le  9 o f the 
B i l l  o f Rights notw ithstanding '.gg
Z e l l ic k  has p la in ly  shown tha t the ex is ting  law is  not so c lear- 
cut as the Royal Commission believed. In so doing he has provided ammunition 
fo r  the argument advanced by th is  study, tha t the tra d it io n a l view tha t 
only the House can deal w ith corruption o f and by i t s  Members should be 
reviewed and subjected to wide discussion. This would be benefic ia l to 
Members who, i f  the p ic tu re  gained from the sample survey is co rrec t, 
tend to be confused or uninformed themselves both as to the d is t in c t io n  
between c o n f l i c t : o f  in te re s t  and corrup tion , and as to th e i r  posit ion 
in  law in  re la t io n  to a llegations o f  corruption.
A fu r th e r  problem deriv ing  from the House o f Common's practice of 
s e l f - d is c ip l in e  in the regulation o f Member's in te res ts  is  tha t i t  has 
prompted the question as to whether i t  has been as thorough and e ffe c t ive
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in  keeping i t s  own House in order as i t  has been in  making the standards 
fo r  anyone else to  keep.
In contrast to the deta iled code drawn up fo r  m i n i s t e r s , o r  the 
s t r i c t  ru les applicable to  c i v i l  servants, local government counc il lo rs  
and local government o f f i c e r s , a n d  even priva te business under the Companies 
Acts, i t  has emerged th a t Parliament has provided no coherent code to 
guide Members' conduct in the area o f pecuniary in te res ts . Speaking in 
the House o f Commons debate on the Report o f the Select Committee on Conduct 
o f  Members, Mr A lbert Roberts one o f the MPs whose business a c t iv i t ie s  
had been examined by th is  Committee, was u n l ike ly  to have been alone when 
he expressed confusion over the standards expected of Members of Parliament:-
'What standards do I take? One can read the biography o f Beaver- 
brook by Taylor. Do I take my standards from there? From where 
do I take my standards? I have had no book on the do's and don'ts 
o f  Parliament'.gy
As shown in e a r l ie r  chapters, successive Governments have stressed 
the functiona l d ifferences between the House and other in s t i tu t io n s  
engaged in  public service in accounting fo r  d i f fe re n t  degrees o f 
stringency in the regula tion o f pecuniary in te re s ts . The main defence 
has he.eîi tha t you cannot apply the same arguments to Members of Parliament 
as you can, fo r  example, to local counc il lo rs  or m in is te rs , because MPs 
are not 'do ing' anything in terms o f executive action and therefore are 
less exposed to s itua t ions  o f  po ten tia l c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  with the 
attendant r is k  o f corrup tion . Also, as pointed out by a Conservative 
MP in  the sample survey, 'an MP, as contrasted to a m in is te r, has v i r t u a l ly  
no patronage to g iv e '.  The comparison w ith m inisters was cogently described 
by Richard Crossman in  1973:-
' Of the 625 Members o f the House o f Commons i t  is  only the ministers 
who take part in decisions and carry departmental re sp o n s ib i l i t ie s  
which render them open to corruption. As ministers they are required 
to  obey an elaborate w r i t te n  code o f behaviour. Up to now the back­
bench MP has been exempt la rg e ly  because he runs nothing, decides 
nothing, and usually  knows nothing worth paying fo r ' . ^ g
However,as established in Chapter 8, backbenchers may not have much power 
to  in fluence decision-making, but po ten tia l opportun it ies fo r  advancing 
outside in te res ts  do e x is t .  We must also remember tha t recent anxiety 
over Members' in te res ts  has h ighlighted the problem not ju s t  o f actual con­
f l i c t  o f in te re s t ,  but also the appearance o f c o n f l ic t  which might be 
created by the mere existence o f  these opportun it ies , even though they 
may not necessarily  be exp lo ited .
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A separate argument in support o f d i f fe re n t  sets o f  ru les regulating 
pecuniary in te res ts  fo r  d i f fe re n t  sectors o f the public service was advo- ’ 
cated in  1973 by the Canadian Parliament's Green Paper on Members o f P a r l ia ­
ment and c o n f l ic t  o f  in te res ts . Having explained the d iffe rence between 
the 'p r in c ip le  o f d isc losure ' and the 'p r in c ip le  o f avoidance' w ith regards 
to pecuniary in te re s t ,  they decided not to make a s t r i c t  choice between 
these two schools o f  thought, on the grounds tha t 'ne ithe r pos it ion  is  
t o t a l l y  and absolute ly indefensible and tha t the nature of public  t r u s t
ought to be a major fa c to r  in determining the app lica tion  o f any one o f
39these ph ilosoph ies '. From th is  pos it ion they concluded tha t rules 
on c o n f l ic t  o f  in te re s t  which apply to cabinet ministers need not necess­
a r i l y  be imposed on other public  o f f i c ia l s .  I t  would seem tha t a high 
leve l o f  public  t ru s t  in the past has been vested in Members o f Parliament 
and can be traced back in representation theory to  the nineteenth century 
conception o f the MP as a trus tee . Generally speaking. Members o f P a r l ia ­
ment have simply been trusted to comply with the moral dictum of placing 
the public  in te re s t  before th e i r  own advantage. The 'p u b l ic '  and p a r l ia ­
mentary anxiety which culminated in the establishment o f  the Register 
o f In te res ts  may ind ica te  dec lin ing confidence in th is  arrangement. As 
Douglas Houghton (now Lord Houghton) argued, the issue a t stake is not 
simply the narrow one o f Members' f in a n c ia l in te res ts . The la rger issue 
o f the c r e d ib i l i t y  o f p o l i t ic a n s ,  p o l i t ic a l  parties and th e i r  leaders 
is  being questioned.
Review o f theore tica l propositions
As emphasised in  Chapter 1, the exploratory nature o f th is  research 
precluded the te s t in g  o f  precise hypotheses. However, on the basis tha t 
a serious attempt to analyse without some presuppositions would have re ­
sulted in  a chaos o f 'e x is te n t ia l  judgments' about countless ind iv idua l 
e v e n t s , s e v e r a l  theo re t ica l propositions underlying the study were ad­
vanced. I t  is  to  these th a t we now return.
Confidence in  the h e u r is t ic  value o f the two working hypotheses set 
out in d e ta i l  in Chapter 1 has been increased. F i r s t l y ,  the find ings 
presented in  Section 2 support the very general proposition th a t the approach 
o f  parliamentarians towards the problem o f c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t is l i k e ly  
to  derive as much from h is to r ic a l  residues o f ' e l i t e  p o l i t ic a l  cu ltu re ' 
as from functiona l considerations and contemporary pressures such as cases 
o f  alleged misconduct. I t  has become apparent tha t w ith a strong base
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in custom and t ra d i t io n  o f the House (embodied to some extent in p a r l ia ­
mentary p r iv i le g e )  the values o f honour, s e l f - r e s t r a in t ,  lo y a lty  and mutual" 
t r u s t  have encouraged con s t itu t io na l re liance on e th ica l re s tra in ts  and 
in te g r i t y ,  on human character, d iscre t ion  and in te rna lised  psychological 
checks in  the regula tion o f  Members' in te re s ts ,  ra ther than on codes o f  
conduct or w r i t te n  law. Further, i t  has been seen tha t the 'amateur i d e a l ' ,  
though no longer uncontested, s t i l l  provides fo r  many present day p a r l ia ­
mentarians a sublim inal standard fo r  th e i r  actions and prescribes th e i r  
proper ro le . This t ra d i t io n  l inks  c lose ly  with the notion o f part-t im e
membership o f Parliament and stands opposed to a trend towards 'pro fess ion-
42a l is a t io n '  in p o l i t i c s .  The extent to which Members consider themselves
to be fu l l - t im e  or part-t im e has been seen to have implications fo r  th e i r
a t t i tu d e s  towards both level o f  remuneration and outside in te res ts . In
add it ion  to these residues o f  the 'gentleman e th ic ' the claim to privacy,
48which also has a source in the a r is to c ra t ic  t ra d i t io n  in government, 
has emerged as a fundamental value shaping Members' action and behaviour 
towards the d isclosure or otherwise o f  outside f ina nc ia l in te res ts .
Secondly, both the h is to ry  o f the regulation of Members' in te res ts  
and the modern campaign fo r  a re g is te r ,  reveal an ad hoc response on the 
part o f the House to  the problem o f c o n f l ic t  o f  in te re s t  which can use­
f u l l y  be understood in terms o f a series o f ' issue -a tte n t io n  c y c le s ',  
w ith  the House re lu c tan t to take the in i t i a t i v e ,  in the absence o f strong 
outside s t im u l i ,  to regulate Members' in te res ts .
I t  has also become apparent tha t these two propositions are indeed
entangled. The operation and eventual outcome o f each 'issue -a tten tion  
cyc le ' w ith i t s  emphasis on contemporary exposed wrongdoings, 'p u b l ic '  
and parliamentary anxie ty, governmental ta c t ic s  and so on cannot be con­
sidered in is o la t io n  from the predispositions and assumptions which under­
l i e  Members' appraisal o f ,  and approach towards, the problem of c o n f l ic t  
o f  in te re s t .  Thus, while  such predispositions and assumptions underlie 
Members' approaches to environmental s i tu a t io n s , and account fo r  the genuine 
d ifferences o f opinion among Members as to what ac tion , i f  any, on the 
part o f the House is  appropriate a t each stage o f the cyc le , such environ­
mental s itua t ions  themselves give r ise  to changes in the b e l ie fs ,  values 
and habits o f thought which guide and inform Members' action and behaviour.
Also, the mood o f s e l f - c r i t ic is m  o f the House o f  Commons, and the
la t t e r ' s  general re c e p t iv i ty  to reform tends to ebb and flow. Whether 
the mood in  the House fo r  reform happens to be strong or weak when a
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scandal concerning Members' in te res ts  breaks may influence the outcome 
o f  the cycle. The modern campaign fo r  a re g is te r ,  gathering momentum 
in  the 1960s and early  1970s, in fa c t ,  occurred during a time when, as 
several commentators on Parliament have noted, 'procedural reform was 
a l i v e ly  issue o f  d e b a t e F o r  example, under Richard Crossman's Leader­
ship o f the House there had been a package o f  procedural reforms inc lud ing 
experiments w ith the new s p e c ia l is t  se lect committeees and mornings s i t t in g s ,  
and the Parliamentary Commissioner fo r  Administration had been established. 
Amid increasing concern at the in s e n s i t iv i ty  o f Members to outside c r i t ic is m  
the Select Committee o f  P riv ileges had been set up to review the workings 
o f parliamentary p r iv i le g e  and reported in 1967 (H.C. 34), i t s  recommenda­
t ions  being taken up by the Committee o f Priv ileges in 1976-77 (H.C. 417).
In 1971 the Expenditure Committee had replaced the Estimates Committee, 
and in 1975 the House had authorised an experiment in public sound broad­
casting of Parliament. However, re c e p t iv i ty  o f the House to reform at 
th is  or any other time should not be exaggerated.
In presuming the ro le  played by h is to r ic a l  residues o f 'e l i t e  p o l i t ic a l  
c u ltu re ' in  shaping Members' approach to the problem of c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t ,  
the w r i te r  questioned Harold Laski ' s argument tha t the 'gentleman id e a l ' 
has become redundant as a working hypothesis in p o l i t ic a l  research. The 
find ings o f  th is  study support the view th a t the 'gentleman ide a l ' can 
s t i l l  be a useful h e u r is t ic  too l in research on the House o f Commons.
The major in t r a -  and in te r -p a r ty  d ifferences towards the problem of c o n f l ic t  
o f in te re s t  have been seen to  stem la rg e ly  from d i f fe re n t  underlying 
pred ispositions on the part o f  Members towards certa in  fundamental values 
o r b e lie fs  entrenched in 'e l i t e  p o l i t ic a l  cu ltu re ' which, with the excep­
t io n  o f pr ivacy, were id e n t i f ie d  in Chapter 1 as having a common source 
in  a phenomenon in English cu ltu re  often referred to as the 'gentleman 
e t h i c ' .  While ind ica t ing  some s h if ts  in in t ra -  and in te r-p a r ty  opinion 
towards the problem o f  c o n f l ic t  of in te re s t ,  the find ings o f th is  study 
suggest tha t even i f  MPs are now paid and increasing ly becoming more f u l l ­
time because o f the pressures o f parliamentary work, residues o f  the gentle ­
man e th ic  do s t i l l  provide a 'pa tte rn  and example' fo r  many MPs in th e i r  
approach towards the regula tion o f Members' in te re s ts ,  even though they 
are u n l ik e ly  to perceive or describe th e i r  behaviour in these terms.
As observed above, even though the House eventually introduced a com­
pulsory re g is te r  o f in te res ts  th is  is  s t i l l  a 'parliamentary so lu t ion ' 
to the problem o f c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t .  In practice i t  does not undermine
196.
the honour and d iscre tion  o f the ind iv idua l Member, nor does i t  necess­
a r i l y  signal the decline o f mutual t ru s t  in the House. Furthermore, con­
cerning as i t  does the disclosure ra ther than p roh ib it io n  o f  in te re s ts ,  
i t  does not appear to ind ica te  a move away from the presumption exhibited 
by successive Governments, and seen to be held by a m a jo r ity  o f MPs, o f 
the propr ie ty  o f Members pursuing outside f in a n c ia l in te res ts  in addition 
to th e i r  parliamentary duties. Members' insistence on t ra d i t io n a l  practices 
and s e l f - d is c ip l in e  in the regula tion o f outside in te re s ts ,  and the in s u l­
a r i t y  and in s e n s i t iv i t y  to outside sentiments which many disp lay in dealing 
w ith  the problem o f c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  among th e i r  membership, keeps 
a l iv e  the analogy drawn w ith the workings o f a V ictorian gentleman's club.
However, in challenging Laski's  argument i t  must be remembered tha t 
th is  study has been concerned with what has been considered by successive 
parliaments and Governments to be a 'House' issue ra ther than a 'Party ' 
issue, and one which concerns the in te rna l conduct and d isc ip l in e  o f Members 
ra the r than the formulation o f  public po licy . As observed in Chapter 
1, on such matters parliaments and Governments tend to be pe cu lia r ly  in t r o ­
verted, w ith  debate becoming submerged in issues o f p o l i t ic a l  eth ics and 
parliamentary manners. I t  is  l i k e l y  therefore tha t while the 'gentleman 
id e a l '  may be useful as a h e u r is t ic  tool in th is  and other domestic con­
te x ts ,  i t  is  less i l lu m in a t iv e  o f  the House's performance in the wider 
arena o f  public  policy-making. Indeed, an in troverted pre-occupation 
with 'House' matters may be regarded as an anodyne to  sooth painful aware­
ness o f lack o f  in fluence in matters o f  public po licy .
A lte rn a t ive  methods o f  regula ting Members' in te res ts
In Chapter 1 the conscious a f f i n i t y  in the approach o f th is  inqu iry  
to  Max Weber's p resc r ip t io n  fo r  the tasks o f empirical science was acknowledged, 
This meant th a t from the outset i t s  task was not to provide binding norms 
and ideals from which d ire c t ives  fo r  immediate p rac tica l a c t iv i t y  could 
be derived. Rather, in the course o f pursuing the spec if ic  research objec­
t ive s  set out in the in troduction  i t  was concerned both w ith e luc idating  
the values and b e l ie fs  underlying and shaping Parliament's approach to 
dealing with c o n f l ic t  o f  in te re s t  among i t s  membership, and making more 
e x p l ic i t  the 'c o s t '  o f  the various a lte rn a t ive  methods o f prevention and 
d is c ip l in e  ava ilab le  to Parliament in terms o f the predictable loss o f 
other values. The choice between a lte rn a t iv e  methods o f regula ting Members' 
in te re s ts  is  u lt im a te ly  a p o l i t ic a l  one.
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While th is  inq u iry  has revealed the many and s h i f t in g  a tt itude s  towards 
the regula tion o f Members' in te re s ts , these fundamentally bo il  down to 
two points o f  view: on the one hand there is the argument fo r  minimal
ru les and re liance on mutual t ru s t  and ind iv idua l in te g r i t y ;  and on the 
other hand there is  the view tha t co d if ica t io n  o f rules and perhaps even 
the in troduction  o f le g is la t io n  is necessary. Although these are not 
party issues as such, the former so lu tion concerning minimal rules is 
la rg e ly ,  but not uniform ly or exc lus ive ly , favoured by Members o f the 
Conservative Party, whereas the la t t e r  argument fo r  co d if ica t io n  is mainly, 
but again not uniform ly or exc lus ive ly , supported by Labour Members. Each 
so lu t ion  ca rr ies  w ith  i t  a combination o f 'costs ' in terms iof the po ten tia l 
loss o f  other values and these have been id e n t i f ie d  and discussed h'n pre­
ceding chapters. The two positions can be summarized in ideal type form 
as fo llow s.
The minimal rules so lu tion  emphasises the s p i r i t  o f  disclosure and 
the preservation o f t r a d i t io n .  Reliance is placed on the honour and in te ­
g r i t y  o f the ind iv idua l and the mutual t ru s t  o f the c o l le c t iv i t y .  The 
privacy o f the ind iv idua l is  revered and he or she is  entrusted with the 
d isc re t io n  to judge what in te res ts  should be disclosed. The 'costs ' o f 
th is  approach are in terms o f lack o f  guidance, c la r i t y  and ce r ta in ty .
The d i f fe re n t ia l  perception o f Members as to what should be disclosed 
or what is  unacceptable conduct is  a perennial problem, rules or no ru les , 
but is  more l i k e ly  to f lo u r is h  where guidance is  lacking. The co ro lla ry  
o f  the preservation o f privacy is the lack o f p u b l ic a l ly  ava ilab le  informa­
t io n  o f Members' pecuniary in te res ts  which provides a potentia l breeding 
ground fo r  suspicion and a llega tions , often unfounded, o f c o n f l ic t  o f 
in te re s t .
The solution which emphasises co d i f ic a t io n  and possibly le g is la t io n  
aims to  introduce greater c la r i t y  and ce r ta in ty  in to  the regulation of 
Members' in te re s ts .  Public confidence is expected to be increased, depending 
on the effectiveness o f the co d if ica t io n  adopted, because Parliament is 
seen to be regula ting Members' in te res ts . Members themselves are provided 
with a guide as to what standard o f conduct is  required. However, th is  
so lu tion  is  l i k e ly  to involve 'costs ' in terms o f some erosion o f  privacy, 
s p i r i t  o f d isc losure , f l e x i b i l i t y  and d isc re t ion  and o f values such as 
honour, mutual t r u s t  and so on. I f  regula tion o f  Members' in te res ts  is  
imposed by s ta tu te  then the courts become involved and there is  a consequent 
erosion o f  parliamentary sovereignty. Codes o f eth ics and committees
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charged w ith th e i r  enforcement are generally associated w ith the professions, 
and as Richard Crossman noted in 1972, 'p o l i t ic ia n s  have never regarded 
Parliament as a profession with i t s  own code o f  ethics
As s ta ted, the choice between the a lte rna tives  and the form in which 
i t  is  implemented is  a p o l i t ic a l  one. In pursuing the goal o f preventing 
c o n f l ic t  of in te re s t  w ith the attendant r is k  o f corruption from a r is in g ,  
the House has to balance th is  against other competing goals; fo r  example. 
Members' morale. As argued to the extreme by Thurman A rno ld :-
'E th ics in  any group ar ise out o f a sense o f t ra d i t io n  and pride 
in h is p a r t ic u la r  c a l l in g .  Humiliate tha t group. Subject them to 
constant re s t r ic t io n  and supervision. Refuse to t ru s t  them in any 
o f th e i r  a c t iv i t ie s  in or out o f  Government and you destroy any 
p o s s ib i l i t y  o f an e f fe c t iv e  e th ica l code.'^g
However, evidence o f  confusion among MPs themselves as to what stan­
dards are expected o f them ( v iz . A lbert Roberts c ited above) would seem 
to th is  w r i te r  to warrant the House considering whether the time has come 
fo r  i t  to re linqu ish  some of the d iscre tion  and f l e x i b i l i t y  in the regula­
t io n  o f  Members' in te res ts  in order to provide Members with more coherent 
guidance on the 'do 's and don'ts of Parliament'. There exists a strong 
case fo r  ind iv idua l re s p o n s ib i l i ty  and in te g r i ty  as both the primary and 
u lt im ate source o f  a public  service e th ic ,  but external contro ls in terms
o f rules and conventions have become a necessary and secondary support 
47system. In th is  respect, the 1974 Resolutions concerning declaration 
and re g is t ra t io n  o f  in te res ts  can be seen as a step along the path towards 
the 'c o d i f ic a t io n '  so lu t ion . Although the Register of Members' In terests 
may be judged a fa i lu re  in terms o f guaranteeing accurate and comprehensive 
information about Members' f inanc ia l in te re s ts , a t the very least i t s  
existence and the period ic debates and Questions associated with i t ,  c o n t r i ­
bute towards providing MPs with some guidance as to what in te res ts  they 
should keep separate from th e i r  public duties and be prepared to d isclose.
I t  requires an MP to  disclose a l l  re levant in te res ts  or to take a conscious 
decision to conceal them, and i f  he takes tha t decision he w i l l  know tha t 
he is  abusing his pos it ion .
F in a l ly ,  a fundamental question which Weber's p rescrip t ion  fo r  empir-: 
ica l science provokes l is  whether the se tt ing  o f a given 'end' is  i t s e l f  
p a r t ic u la r ly  meaningful or meaningless with reference to ex is t ing  conditions. 
Although the Executive lessens i t s  gr ip  on issues of in te rna l parliamentary 
procedure o r d is c ip l in e ,  allowing parliamentary t ra d i t io n  and the backbencher
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more scope fo r  influence than i t  does in public a f f a i r s ,  i t  is  c e r ta in ly  
not the neutral 'servant o f  the House' tha t i t  claims to be. I t  has some­
times allowed the procedural aspects o f the issue o f Members' in te res ts  
to be debated f re e ly  (a lb e i t  in the framework o f a business timetable 
la rg e ly  o f i t s  own devising) but has s t r i c t l y  dictated the terms o f any
discussion o f more sens it ive  issues, such as Members' remuneration, f a c i l -
48i t i t e s ,  open-government etc. Issues such as these however, along w ith
the debate over whether the House should trans fe r i t s  penal ju r is d ic t io n
to  some other tr ibuna l form an important part o f the environment w ith in
which the narrower issue o f  Members' in te res ts  must be considered. We
must ask, the re fo re , whether the problem o f c o n f l ic t  of in te re s t  w ith
the attendant r is k  o f  corruption can be avoided, or at least adequately
con tro l le d , in the House o f  Commons without making substantial a lte ra t io ns
to the ex is t ing  arrangements and procedures o f the House, and bear in
49mind, as several commentators on Parliament have noted, tha t these changes 
w i l l  not occur u n t i l  there is  a considerable s h i f t  in the t ra d i t io n a l 
a t t i tu d e s  and prejudices o f Members o f Parliament themselves.
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CHAPTER 8 :
C o n f l ic t  o f In te re s t:  Problems and Ambiguities
In Chapter 1, the term 'c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t '  was p ro v is io n a l ly  de­
fined as 'a s i tu a t io n  in which an o f f i c i a l ' s  conduct o f his o f f ic e  con­
f l i c t s  with his p r iva te  economic a f f a i r s '  and was id e n t i f ie d  as a magnet 
fo r  conceptual problems and ambiguities. In subsequent chapters i t  has 
emerged tha t these magnify when the focus moves from abstract d e f in i t io n  
to  real events in the House o f Commons. The purpose o f  th is  f in a l  chapter 
is  to explore fu r th e r  these problems and ambiguities, not on the assump­
t io n  tha t we can give precise answers to a l l  the questions which surround 
the phenomenon o f c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  in a parliamentary context, but 
w ith a view to c learing  away some o f the confusion which has arisen in 
the course o f  the House's own attempts to grapple with these problems.
I t  f i r s t  examines those problems and ambiguities stemming from the repre­
sentative ro le  o f the MP and then tackles those deriv ing from, or assoct 
ia ted w ith ,  the confusion between c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t and corruption. 
U lt im a te ly  i t  touches on the problem posed at the outset o f th is  study, 
o f  determining the po in t at which mere possession o f a pr iva te  in te re s t  
gives r is e  to a s i tu a t io n  o f c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t ,  and the point a t which, 
i f  a t  a l l ,  th is  c o n f l ic t  becomes redefined as corruption.
C o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  shades o f f  in to  representation o f in te res ts
'The representation o f in te res ts  l ie s  a t the heart o f th is matter'
1
asserted one Labour MP during the June 1974 debate on Members' In te res ts .
In so saying he pinpointed a c ruc ia l dimension o f the problem of c o n f l ic t  
o f in te re s t  in Parliament id e n t i f ie d  in Chapter 1, tha t in examining the 
problem one must consider the nature of the representative function o f 
the Member and the unique character o f le g is la t iv e  employment.
As concluded by A.H. B irch :-
" . . .  there is  no s ing le theory o f p o l i t ic a l  representation in 
B r i ta in  which commands general acceptance. Instead there is a con­
t in u in g  debate in  which a va r ie ty  o f theories are invoked, some of 
them being va r ia t ions  on a theme and others being lo g ic a l ly  incom­
p a tib le  w ith one another. 'g
These theories o f representation include the Old Whig view. Liberal views. 
Radical views and, w ith  the r ise  o f  d isc ip l in ed  parties during the nine­
teenth century, the C o l le c t iv is t  view. As indicated in Chapter 3, each 
o f  these theories emerged in a p a r t ic u la r  period in response to a p a r t ic u la r  
combination o f  circumstances. Instead o f replacing older theories they
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took th e i r  place alongside them as additional strands in the B r i t is h  po l­
i t i c a l  t ra d i t io n .  Thus the continuing debate about representation theory ' 
revolves around an accumulation o f convictions and reveals several dicho­
tomies in representative theory concerning the proper ro le  fo r  the elected 
Member. In p a r t ic u la r  there is  the issue o f whether he should be a 
mandated or independent parliamentarian. Deriving from th is  is  the 'de le ­
gate versus tru s te e ' controversy which poses the question as to whether 
a Member is ,  or should be, bound by and act so le ly  upon the ins truc t ion s  
o f  his cons tituen ts , or whether he should use his independent judgment 
and convictions and regard himself as a trustee e ith e r o f ‘ in te re s ts ' ,  
as in Burkean theory, or o f  the opinions o f  ra tiona l independent in d iv id u a ls ,
o
as envisaged by the Liberal formulation o f trustee theory.
How in practice do Members o f Parliament in te rp re t  th e i r  represen­
ta t iv e  role? David Judge argues th a t ,  as in theory, the practice o f  repre­
sentation in B r i ta in  is  fa r  from one-dimensionali-
'The adhesion to  contrasting p r inc ip les  o f representation w ith in  
the p o l i t ic a l  cu ltu re  leads to an ambivalence in the in te rp re ta t io n  
o f  the representa tive 's  ro le  . . .  What emerges . . .  is not a compart- 
mentalisation o f  theories but ra ther a f l u i d i t y  o f  thought tha t allows 
a representative to determine his own s ty le  o f representation at 
any given moment.
While Members may owe th e i r  allegiance to the p o l i t ic a l  party which 
ensured th e i r  e lec tion  and perhaps subscribe to the theory o f the mandate, 
they may simultaneously assert th e i r  independence as la id  down by the 
Burkean t ra d i t io n  and/or be associated w ith one or more sectional economic 
in te re s ts .  This study accords with H. Eulau's view th a t : -
'One can th ink  o f  representation as a continuum, with the Trustee 
and Delegate o r ien ta t ions  as poles, and a midpoint where the o r ien ta ­
t ions tend to overlap and, w ith in  a range, give r ise  to a th i rd  ro le . 
W ithin th is  middle range the roles may be taken simultaneously, poss­
ib ly  making fo r  c o n f l i c t ,  or they may be taken s e r ia l ly ,  one a f te r  
another as conditions c a l l  f o r . 'g
Eulau also points out tha t in empirical research the focal and s t y l ­
i s t i c  dimensions o f representation should be d is tingu ished.^ The fo c i  
o f  representation - lo c a l ,  na tiona l, party and so on - need not be mutually 
exclusive. For example, in an American context he notes tha t a party 
may be so strong in a d i s t r i c t  tha t fo r  the representative the in te res ts  
o f  d i s t r i c t  and party are id e n t ic a l .  Also, in some cases, perhaps more 
l i k e l y  in  America than in the United Kingdom where most MPs do not repre­
sent p e r fe c t ly  homogeneous constituencies, the in te res ts  o f the Member
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and his constituents fo r tu i to u s ly  overlap. As pointed out in the 1973 
Canadian Green Paper on Members' in te re s ts ,  i t  is  often argued tha t in 
choosing representatives the e lec to ra te , or perhaps more accurately the 
local party caucus, take in to  account pr iva te in te res ts . To perform a 
representative function  properly the prospective Member may advance his 
e lec to ra l prospects by showing tha t he has a personal in te re s t which coin­
cides with those o f his constituents . For example, a farmer may choose 
to  represent farming communities and a businessman may be chosen to repre­
sent predominantly commercial communities. Unavoidably, in representing 
his constituen ts , a Member may be seen as working on his own behalf, or 
promoting his p r iva te  in te res ts  and o f v io la t in g  his f id u c ia ry  duty.^ 
A n a ly t ic a l ly ,  although not necessarily in p rac tice , the s ty le  o f represen­
ta t io n  is  neutral as regards the focus o f  representation. The la t t e r ,  
regardless o f  whether i t  is  a geographical u n i t ,  a pressure group, a party 
o r whatever, does not commit the representative to adopting e ith e r the 
independent trus tee  ro le  or the ro le  o f a mandated delegate.
The MPs included in the random sample survey fo r  th is  study were 
asked what in te res ts  i f  any, apart from those o f th e i r  constituents in 
general, they considered an MP may le g it im a te ly  represent in the House 
(Q. 19). Answers to th is  question, which was l e f t  de libe ra te ly  open- 
ended ( in  order to tap Members' views on representation) were not quanti­
f ie d  because th e i r  meaning was ambiguous. However, i t  can be argued tha t 
th is  problem is in i t s e l f  revealing in tha t i t  is  consistent w ith , and 
lends support to .  Judge's premises tha t MPs adhere to  contrasting p r in ­
c ip les  o f representation, often simultaneously, tha t they are ambivalent 
in in te rp re t in g  the representa tive 's  ro le ,  and tha t they often ca l l  upong
's u i ta b le '  conceptions o f representation to j u s t i f y  th e i r  actions.
Some Members specified the broad types o f  in te rests  they f e l t  they 
could le g it im a te ly  represent in the House such as national in te re s t ,  special 
i s t  in te res ts  or party in te re s ts ,  while other Members tackled the question 
in  an even more general way and gave broader answers such as 'any in te res ts  
not contrary to  national in te re s t  or constituency in te re s t ' ,  or 'a decision 
fo r  the MP to take as an in d iv id u a l ' .  Yet a th ird  level o f response was 
provided by several Members who seemed unable to consider the question 
in  a depersonalised way and gave th e i r  response in terms o f th e i r  own 
sp e c if ic  in te res ts  such as membership o f  a p a r t ic u la r  trade union or pro­
fession. The most comprehensive l i s t  o f ' le g it im a te ' in te res ts  tha t could 
be represented was provided by a Conservative MP who entered the House
203.
a t the February 1974 General E lection , and i l lu s t ra te s  ju s t  how in practice 
a Member can simultaneously adhere to a va r ie ty  o f  theories o f  represen­
ta t io n .  The l i s t  consisted o f : -
'His constituency (he represents his party in the constituency and 
his constituency in Parliament);
Party (includes p r inc ip les  and ideology);
Own judgment (re ta ins  independence - p a r t ic u la r ly  on moral issues); 
A t t i tu d e  in  the nation (national in te re s t ) ;
S pec ia l is t  in te re s ts . '
The most frequently  mentioned category - indicated by ju s t  over 30% 
o f the sample - was s p e c ia l is t  in te rests  (pressure groups, trade unions 
e tc . )  although th is  was usually accompanied by the proviso tha t such in te r ­
ests , p a r t ic u la r ly  i f  paid, should be declared in the House. In l in e  
w ith  Judge's observation tha t p o l i t ic ia n s  often ca ll  upon 's u ita b le ' con­
ceptions of representation to  j u s t i f y  th e i r  actions. Members who mentioned 
th is  category usually gave a ju s t i f i c a t io n  fo r  such in te rests  in terms 
o f  the advantage to be gained by the MP and u lt im a te ly  the House from 
the information provided by these in te res ts . A quotation from one Labour 
MP in  the sample i l lu s t r a te s  th is  p o in t : -
' I believe th a t  my sponsorship by the .............  Union informs my
comments and con tr ibu tions on issues a ffec t ing  .............  a f fa i rs  and
as a consequence I believe I am able to act tha t much more e f fe c t iv e ly  
in th is  ra ther sp e c ia l is t  area '.
I t  should be taken in to  consideration that Members may have been
prompted to mention s p e c ia l is t  in te rests  more frequently  than other in te res ts
because they were responding to a schedule which was p r im a r i ly  concerned
w ith outside in te re s ts .  Also, Members often found the categories o f national
in te re s t ,  party in te re s t  and th e i r  own judgment too obvious to mention.
For instance, on most issues MPs are in sympathy w ith , or at least prepared
to  go along w ith ,  th e i r  party l in e  and therefore may take th is  fo r  granted.
A s im i la r  problem was recorded by Eulau who found that Representatives
may take whatever areal fo c i  they have so much fo r  granted that they feel
g
no need to mention them.
Overall the ambivalent in te rp re ta t io n  o f  the representative ro le 
o f the B r i t is h  MP provided by the sampled MPs lends support to Judge's 
suggestion th a t 'they are capable o f holding, a t any given time, a mix 
o f  s ty les  and foc i o f representation' which they can ca l l  upon to j u s t i f y  
th e i r  actions. This confused p ic tu re  o f the representative ro le  ascribed 
to  B r i t is h  MPs is  not re s tr ic te d  to MPs themselves. As one long standing 
Conservative MP in the random sample survey remarked:-
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'A main problem is  the pub lic 's  ambivalent a t t i tu d e  to MP's
in te re s ts ,  and indeed to the proper ro le  of an MP'.
This conception o f 'the pub lic ' is i t s e l f  ind ica t ive  o f a view o f represen­
ta t io n .  Thus, although an understanding o f the representative ro le  o f 
the le g is la to r  is  necessary fo r  an understanding o f c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t ,  
i t  has emerged tha t there is  no one c lea r, commonly agreed-upon concept 
o f  representation which would f a c i l i t a t e  id e n t i f ic a t io n  o f the po in t a t 
which representation o f in te res ts  ends and c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  begins.
I t  has become apparent tha t the confused p ic tu re  of representation 
in  B r i ta in  is  exacerbated by Members representing personal or sectional 
in te res ts  in  addition to those o f th e i r  party, constituents or the nation.
In Chapter 6, through the medium o f Members' recorded entries in the Reg­
is te r ,  we looked a t the types o f  outside f inanc ia l in terests  which Members 
admit to pursuing. Here the main broad categories o f personal or sectional 
in te res ts  th a t Members represent are examined more generally both to show 
the r isks  o f c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  they may present, and to i l l u s t r a te  
the p rac tica l problems o f  c le a r ly  d is tingu ish ing  between c o n f l ic t  o f  in te r ­
est and representation o f  in te res ts . To some extent th is  discussion in e v i t ­
ably begs the question as to how much influence an MP ac tua lly  has, an 
issue which is  considered in  more d e ta i l  below.
E a r l ie r  chapters have shown th a t the re la t ionsh ip  which has been
most c lose ly  monitored by Parliament is th a t between trade unions and 
10sponsored MPs. Although tech n ica l ly  a l l  Labour candidates and therefore 
a l l  Labour MPs have to  have th e i r  candidature supported by one o f the 
organisations a f f i l i a t e d  to the Labour Party, common usage re s t r ic ts  
curren t use o f  the term 'sponsored MP' to trade union supported Members. 
However, i t  should be noted tha t MPs have also been sponsored by organisa­
t ion s  which are not a f f i l i a t e d  to the Labour party ; two major examples 
are the National Union o f  Teachers and the National Farmers' Union (who 
have not sponsored any candidates since 1945). Since 1950 more than one- 
th i r d  o f  Labour MPs returned at successive elections have been trade union 
supported Members; 112 union-sponsored Members were returned in 1970,
127 in February 1974, 126 in October 1974 and 134 in May 1979.^^ The 
union may provide f in a n c ia l aid to the local party and in addition may 
con tr ibu te  up to 80% o f  i t s  candidate's e lec tion  expenses. I f  elected 
to  Parliament the sponsored MP may receive a small supplement to his p a r l ia ­
mentary salary and/or be provided with secre ta r ia l assistance. Unlike 
the amount o f  f in a n c ia l aid which may be given to the local pa rty , there
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is  no l im i t  on th is  and the practice o f unions varies. However, in e v i­
dence to the 1969 Select Committee on Members' Interests (Declaration) 
the Rt. Hon. Douglas Houghton (now Lord Houghton), formerly chairman o f
the Parliamentary Labour Party, said tha t he knew o f no union which paid
19more than £250 a year to i t s  sponsored MPs.
This form o f functiona l representation has been accepted by the House 
w ith the proviso tha t the MP should not enter in to  any contractual agree­
ment w ith  an outside body c o n tro l l in g  or l im i t in g  his complete independence 
and freedom o f  action in Parliament. As was seen in Chapter 3, th is  res­
t r i c t i o n  was adopted by the House in a resolution passed in 1947 fo llow ing
13the W.J. Brown case. At the time, W.J. Brown MP, himself argued tha t 
the root o f the problem did not l i e  in the existence of w r it ten  or even 
unwritten contractual arrangements but in the fa c t  o f a f inanc ia l re la t io n ­
ship between a Member and an outside body, a re la t ionsh ip  which would
continue regardless o f whether the House passed the motion imposing the
14re s t r ic t io n  on contractual agreements.
A major problem fo r  the trade union sponsored MP is  to define which 
group he represents or serves in the House. As recognised by William 
M u lle r, membership o f a trade union lays Members open to the charge tha t 
they neglect the public  in te re s t  and v io la te  the tennets of Liberal and
15Radical theories o f representation inherited  from the nineteenth century.
In passing the reso lu tion  in 1947 fo llow ing the W.J. Brown case the House
d e c is ive ly  reaffirmed th a t the representative duty o f the Member was to
his constituents and to the country as a whole ra ther than to any p a r t ic u la r  
1section thereof.
The 1947 reso lu tion  appears to provide no protection however fo r  
the re la t io n sh ip  between a Member and his constituents , or his local party 
organ isation . In 1971, during a meeting o f the Select Committee o f  P riv ­
i lege s , Harold Wilson, a member o f the Committee, asked the Clerk o f the 
House: ' I f  a constituency party were to  say, a f te r  exercising a l l  the
leg it im a te  pressures, " i f  you vote in the House in th is  way we shall not 
adopt you as a candidate in the next General Election" would tha t con s t i­
tu te  a th rea t and a breach o f p r iv i le g e ? ' The Clerk, S ir  Barnett Cocks, 
thought i t  would not, expla in ing: ' I would th ink  tha t tha t constitu ted
leg it im a te  pressure on a Member imposed by one of his constituency pa rt ies .
I do not th in k  th a t th a t would ever cons titu te  a th reat whifah involved 
a contempt o f the House or a breach o f  p r iv i le ge
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In contrast to  the diminishing importance o f the trade union and 
sponsored MP re la t ion sh ip  brought about by the c loser l ia iso n  between 
government and the unions, declin ing party memberships give greater 
influence to local party a c t iv is ts  who may perhaps have strong ideo lo­
g ica l convictions which could threaten a Member's c a r e e r . F o r  example, 
both Edward Milne (B lyth) and Dick Taverne (Lincoln) lo s t  the backing 
o f  t h e i r  constituency Labour parties and stood against the o f f i c i a l  
Labour candidates in February 1974. Explaining why he resigned his 
seat and stood as a 'Campaign fo r  Social Democracy' candidate. Taverne 
explained th a t he had been t ry in g  to prove something about the ro le
o f an MP - ' th a t  he (was) not a puppet to be d ic ta ted to by his party 
19caucus'. This problem is  not re s tr ic te d  to Labour MPs, as evidenced
by Mr Brocklebank-Fbwler, a Conservative MP who in 1981 was in troub le
w ith  some o f his local constituency o f f ic ia ls  fo r  c r i t i c is in g  Mrs
20Thatcher and the Government. Mr Brocklebank-Fowler has since defected 
to  the Social Democratic Party.
The independence o f MPs has also recently  become an issue in 
the context o f the Labour Party 's decis ion, taken a t the 1980 Labour 
Party Conference, to  introduce mandatory reselection o f MPs by th e i r  
loca l pa rt ies . This proposal, under which a l l  Labour MPs have to 
stand fo r  re-adoption by th e i r  constituencies before each general 
e le c t io n ,  was passed by a narrow 3,798,000 votes to 3,341,000. I t  is
the f i r s t  o f several ' le f t -w in g '  measures to reform the Party's c o n s t i t ­
u tion to be adopted and is  a contentious issue among Labour MPs. Prior 
to the Labour Party adopting th is  measure, during a debate on Members' 
in te re s ts  Mr Robert Adley (Cons) had c ited  re -se lect ion  to support his 
b e l ie f  th a t power is  a fa r  more corrupting influence than money. Begging 
the whole question o f  what constitu tes  corruption he had argued:-
' I f  the Labour Party goes through with the proposals fo r  re­
se le c t ion , w ith hon. Members being subjected to scru tiny by a hand­
fu l  o f people who have a c lear p o l i t ic a l  motive in seeing how they 
behave in the House, tha t w i l l  be the so rt o f power and influence 
over hon. Members th a t is  fa r  more l ik e ly  to corrupt hon. Members 
than is  any amount o f money th a t may be showered on us.'g^
E a r l ie r  chapters have shown tha t business in te re s ts , although less
c lose ly  monitored than trade union connections, also constitu te  a major 
source o f  po ten tia l influence and in te re s t  w ith which the House has to 
grapple. They are less understood or p u b lic ly  recorded than trade union 
connections,^^ and i t  is hoped tha t th is  study provides some con tr ibu tion
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towards D. Coombes and S.A. Walkland's request tha t 'more knowledge is  
required about the re la t ionsh ip  between Members o f Parliament and organ­
ised special in te res ts  outside parliament'
The decline o f p r iva te  le g is la t io n  and the growth of organised p o l i t ­
ic a l  parties has reduced the scope fo r  promoting personal or sectional 
in te res ts  as existed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In 
a d d it io n , i t  can be argued tha t as w ith trade unions, the increasing 
in te rpenetra tion  o f government and industry , which has brought p r iva te  
business organizations increasing ly under the umbrella o f the machinery 
o f  government and adm in is tra tion , has diminished the p o l i t ic a l  importance 
o f the ind iv idua l Member fo r  promoting in te res ts . However, there is  
also an argument the other way, tha t such 'in te rpe ne tra t ion ' has widened 
the scope o f  the p o l i t ic a l  agenda to include new issues upon which MPs 
(as well as departments and m in is te rs) can f r u i t f u l l y  be lobbied. As 
Alan Doig observes, representation or lobbying through Members s t i l l
pe rs is ts  as an accepted means o f keeping the opinions or requests o f
24organised in te re s ts  a t the fore o f public debate.
While the problem o f business a f f i l i a t io n s  is not new, as e a r l ie r  
chapters have shown, recent concern has centred on the growth in consul­
tancy, advisory and public  re la t ions  a c t iv i t y  among MPs. I t  is because 
th is  type o f a c t iv i t y  on the part o f MPs is a comparatively new (or 
newly recognised) 'hazard ', and therefore perhaps less c le a r ly  understood 
than the more fa m i l ia r  business a f f i l i a t io n s  o f a d irec to rsh ip  or share­
ho ld ing, th a t  i t  is  singled out here fo r  closer examination.
Although the focus o f concern has been the ind iv idua l MP acting 
in  a consultancy or advisory ro le ,  both Conservative and Labour Parties 
have become aware o f  the additiona l problem tha t a number of a l l -p a r ty  
groups have been formed to ass is t the covert invasion o f lobbyists fo r  
various organisations and bodies in to  Westminster. Their combined response 
has been to set up a j o i n t  working party to formulate ground rules in 
th is  areato curb abuse o f a l l - p a r ty  groups. Examples o f the type of 
abuse unearthed by backbenchers not on the working party include an MP 
being asked by an outside body to form a group so tha t meetings and dinners
can be held at Westminster, and a number o f cases where an a l l -p a r ty
25group consists o f  more outsiders than MPs.
The suspicion and unease surrounding consultancy and public re la t ions  
a c t i v i t y  among MPs is  exacerbated both by the lack o f c la r i t y  surround­
ing the functions and services the re la t ionsh ip  involves and by the
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fa c t  th a t where the re la t ionsh ip  lacks a d ire c t  pecuniary in te re s t ,  or 
where the arrangement is  such tha t the MP is  not a d ire c t  representative 
o f  the c l ie n t ,  he may consider the declaration of such an in te re s t  unnecess­
ary. What services then do public re la t ions  firms fee l they are ge tt ing  
when they e n l is t  the services o f an MP? Unsure o f (or wanting confirma­
t io n  o f)  the answer, Mr Eric Lubbock (now Lord Avebury) put th is  question 
to Mr Herbert Lloyd, F . I .P .R . ,  President o f the In s t i tu te  o f  Public 
Relations, during the proceedings o f the 1969 Select Committee on Members' 
In te res ts  (Declaration). Mr Lloyd considered the answer was th re e fo ld :-
'An MP is a man o f power, a man dedicated to public service.
He is  a man prepared to  serve the community. He is  a s p e c ia l is t ,  
and he is  a s p e c ia l is t  in a f ie ld  which is  o f  in te re s t  to the whole 
community. For these reasons he is as good as Harley S treet. You 
go to the Member o f Parliament'
Pressed by Lubbock, who asked whether i t  might be possible tha t
some firms employed MPs because i t  merely looked good to have an MP on
the note paper, he added a fou rth  reason:-
, ■ ' I hesitated to say th is  having proper regard to the honour o f
the House but you have a very great prestige , a special va lue '.gy
Public re la t ion s  firm s may employ an MP fo r  no other s k i l l  or purpose
than the fa c t  th a t he or she is  an MP and has prestige value, regardless
o f any influence he or she may or may not in  fa c t possess. As Joe Ashton
(Lab) points ou t, the public  re la t ions  s itu a t io n  is  often a charade.
Someone gets a fee fo r  the idea th a t he is  spending the f i rm 's  money
w ise ly  at the seat o f government, but in r e a l i t y  the MP is  cynical and
28knows tha t he has very l i t t l e  in fluence. Nevertheless, the appear­
ance o f a c o n f l ic t  o f  in te re s t  ;may be damaging to the party , and u l t i ­
mately to  the reputa tion o f Parliament.
From the standpoint o f one who is  frequently  commissioned to act 
as a ' ta le n t  scout' fo r  firm s wanting to re c ru i t  the help o f MPs, Andrew 
Roth says th a t MPs' duties involve 'pu tt ing  down questions in the House,
promoting the company's in te res ts  in any le g is la t io n ,  or even in i t i a t in g
29le g is la t io n  in the form o f Private Members' B i l l s .  However, from 
his experience the h ir in g  o f MPs to influence le g is la t io n  is  a f a i r l y  
minor a c t iv i t y  compared to providing useful information fo r  companies 
which employ them as d irec to rs  or consultants. He argues tha t they have 
the unique q u a l i f ic a t io n  o f having access to  ministers and c i v i l  servants 
and tha t i t  can be extremely valuable fo r  a p a r t ic u la r  f i rm  or industry 
to know in  advance which way p o l i t ic s  are moving in th e i r  f i e ld .
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However, once an issue which they wish to influence has reached the House, 
then i t  may be useful fo r  them to employ a Member sympathetic to th e i r  
cause to advise them on parliamentary ta c t ic s  and to  act as a focus o f 
opinion w ith in  the House, h ir in g  rooms where a meeting, e xh ib it ion  or 
press conference may take place and ensuring tha t other MPs are aware 
o f  the event. A public  re la t ions  consultant w ith experience o f ' r e c r u i t ­
ing ' MPs remarked to th is  w r i te r  tha t i t  is  not cost e f fe c t iv e  fo r  public 
re la t ion s  firm s to re ta in  an MP on a permanent/semi-permanent basis 
to look a f te r  c l ie n ts .  Rather, i f  the f irm  has a ca tho lic  c l ie n te le  
they might wish to contact the r ig h t  s p e c ia l is t  MP at the r ig h t  time, 
eg. i f  the issue concerned prison services then they would approach an 
MP who has a specialism in th is  area, even i f  i t  is  a l i t t l e  out o f  date. 
A lte rn a t iv e ly ,  on some issues, such as the s i t in g  o f a p a r t ic u la r  indus­
t r i a l  concern, they might approach the MP whose constituency would be 
a ffec ted , perhaps in terms o f creating new employment i f  the concern 
is  located there. In th is  instance the in te res ts  o f  the Member's c o n s t i t ­
uency and the sectional in te re s t  may coincide and become d i f f i c u l t  fo r  
the MP to d is t in gu ish  when ca lcu la t ing  what ac tion , i f  any, to take.
The function  o f providing useful information fo r  companies was ex­
plained in the Memorandum by the In s t i tu te  o f Public Relations submitted 
to  the 1969 Select Committee on Members' Interests (Declaration), where 
they advised the Committee th a t : -
'The a c t iv i t ie s  o f government are frequently  o f d ire c t  concern 
to companies and other organisations, many o f whom re ly  on th e i r  
pub lic  re la t ions  s ta f f ,  o r consultants, to  keep them informed o f 
such matters and to advise them i f  action seems desirable. New 
or impending le g is la t io n ,  new regulations by Government departments, 
views expressed by Members in the House of Commons - a l l  may a f fe c t  
th e i r  operations . . .  We submit tha t public re la tions p rac t i t ion e rs  
perform a valuable function  by ensuring tha t th e i r  c l ie n ts  or 
employers are f u l l y  informed o f such matters, and by ass is ting them 
to in te rp re t  them c o r re c t ly  to th e i r  employees and to those members 
o f  the public  w ith whom they dea l. '^g
They also pointed out th a t public re la t ions  is  a two-way process, and 
th a t  i t  is  equally the proper function  o f public re la t ions  p ra c t it io n e rs  
to provide MPs and Government departments with information and opinions 
from those whom they may represent. Although in th is  context, a Member 
has to guard against the temptation o f  turn ing his advisory ro le  in to  
one o f advocating in the House in te res ts  in which he may have a f in a n c ia l 
connection.
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The form o f public  re la tions a c t iv i t y  which prompted the se tt ing  
up o f  the 1969 Select Committee on Members' In terests  was not concerned 
w ith  domestic c l ie n ts  but w ith  foreign governments. There are three 
main areas in which a foreign government w i l l  be most l i k e l y  to seek 
the services o f a public re la t ions  consultancy: the promotion o f to u r ­
ism; in d u s tr ia l  development, investment or trade; the v e n t i la t io n  o f  
a p o l i t ic a l  issue in which the support o f public opinion in B r i ta in  may
31be sought and which may o ve rsp il l  in to  the two previously mentioned areas.
In add it ion  a consu ltan t, whether to a foreign government or to fore ign 
commercial in te re s ts ,  may be required to advise his c l ie n t  as to when 
an issue o f  in te re s t  to him crops up in the House and what the trend 
o f opinion on the issue is .  This, Maurice Fraser maintained, was the 
main ro le  performed by Gordon Bagier MP in re la t io n  to the Greek m i l i ta r y  
Government -  to a le r t  him, Fraser, whenever the top ic o f Greece was d is ­
cussed in  the House. However, as evident in Chapter 4, th is  case demon­
stra ted the ambiguity tha t may attach to the public re la tions function 
on behalf o f fore ign in te re s ts .
In general, i t  is  the view of the In s t i tu te  o f Public Relations
th a t fore ign users of public re la t ion s  - whether governments or commercial
in te re s ts  - should be treated no d i f fe re n t ly  than domestic c l ie n ts  or
employers, but they stress tha t while  any organisation has the r ig h t
to state i t s  case, however con trove rs ia l,  and to promote i t s  own in te r -
32ests , th is  must always be done openly, honestly and le g a l ly .  At the 
extreme, there is  also a security  angle attached to the re la tionsh ip  
between MPs and fore ign governments. For example, the recent a llegations 
(unproven) th a t two Labour MPs are on the regular pay-ro ll of Communist 
in te l l ig e n c e .^ ^
A d is t in c t io n  should be drawn w ith in  the category of MPs engaging 
in consultancy or public  re la t ions  a c t iv i t y .  On the one hand, there 
are the men and women whose job function  before entering Parliament was 
public  re la t ion s  work and who continue to practice th e i r  professions 
a f te r  taking o f f ic e  in the same way as might a lawyer, b a r r is te r ,  accoun­
ta n t e tc. They present s im ila r  po ten tia l c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  problems 
as other management d isc ip l in e s  or consultancies but the la t t e r  a t t ra c t  
less suspicion. On the other hand, there are those men and women who 
acquire th e i r  connections and se l l  t h e i r  services to public re la t ions  
firm s etc. a f te r  entry to the House. The group who continue to do th e i r
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professional job as well as being an MP perhaps experience d i f fe re n t  
types o f c o n f l ic ts  than those MPs choosing ^  MPs to  act as consultants. 
Also, bearing in  mind the problem alluded to e a r l ie r  o f a Member f a i l in g  
to  consider necessary the declaration o f his connection w ith a domestic 
or fore ign in te re s t ,  i t  should be noted th a t a Member o f Parliament may 
provide a function  analogous to tha t o f a public re la t ions  consultant 
w ithout having connections w ith a public re la t ions  f irm  and w ithout des­
c r ib in g  himself as a public re la t ions  consultant. As pointed out by 
the chairman o f Michael Rice and Company in evidence to  the 1959 Select 
Committee on Members' In terests (Declaration), i t  may reasonably be argued 
th a t the recognised and declared public re la tions consultancy is  less 
l i k e ly  to be engaged in a c t iv i t ie s  which may in any way be seen as im­
proper than is  the p r iva te  ind iv idual in Parliament, or out o f i t ,  who 
f u l f i l l s  a public  re la t ion s  function  without i t  being recognised as such.^^ 
Although the In s t i tu te  o f  Public Relations requires a l l  members to sign 
a w r i t te n  undertaking to  observe a code o f professional conduct and makes 
provis ion fo r  i t s  enforcement through a Professional Practices Committee 
and a D isc ip l in a ry  Committee, as we have seen th is  applies only to  those 
p ra c t i t io n e rs  who are members o f  the In s t i tu te ;  i t  does not reach out 
to touch the in te g r i t y  o f those who act as public re la t ions  consultants 
but chose not to  jo in  the In s t i tu te .
Although discussion has focused on trade union sponsorship and business 
a f f i l i a t i o n s  ( in  p a r t ic u la r  P.R. 'a c t iv i t y )  ambiguity may ar ise wherever 
a Member is  a paid parliamentary adviser or consultant to an organisation. 
For example, during the debate in the House on cap ita l punishment on 
19 Ju ly  1979, Mr John Prescott, a trade union sponsored Member, reminded 
the House o f the ru les concerning declaration o f in te res ts  arîd asked 
the cha ir whether Mr Eldon G r i f f i t h s ,  who had ju s t  made a speech in favour 
o f  cap ita l punishment, could be requested to say whether he had a paid 
in te re s t  in the subject. In rep ly , Mr G r i f f i t h s  sought to c la r i f y  his 
pos it ion  and in so doing alluded both to h is independence from the sectional 
in te re s t  and his a llegiance to a wider concept o f representative respon­
s i b i l i t y  :-
' . . .  I advise the Police Federation, ju s t  as many other hon.
Members advise other associations. I f  I agree with the Police Feder­
a t io n ,  I support i t s  case. I f  I disagree, I t e l l  i t ,  and I do not 
support i t s  case. My re s p o n s ib i l i ty  is  to my constituents and to 
the national in te re s t ' .
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The representation o f  sectional in te res ts  in th is  way is  leg it im a te  and 
acceptable to  the House, provided such in te res ts  are declared as and 
when necessary.
C o n f l ic t  o f In te re s t shades o f f  in to  corruption
I t  has become apparent th a t the task o f c la r i fy in g  the phenomenon
o f c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t in  the House o f  Commons is fu r th e r  complicated
by the erroneous b e l ie f  tha t c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t can be treated as a
weak form o f the more emotionally charged phenomenon o f corruption.
Corruption is re ferred to in a va r ie ty  o f contexts but here we are
p r im a r i ly ,  though not so le ly ,  concerned with the overlap between c o n f l ic t
o f  in te re s t  and corruption w ith in  the s ta te , i . e .  p o l i t ic a l  corrup tion .
Like c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t ,  corruption has proved d i f f i c u l t  to define.
In B r i ta in  legal d e f in i t io n s  are embodied in the Corruption Acts which
37have in turn been re in terpre ted by the courts. The offence of corrup­
t io n  as defined in the 1889 Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act and the 
1905 Prevention of Corruption Act consist o f three main ingredients.
I t  has to be shown:-
( i )  tha t a g i f t  or consideration was given or offered by one party 
to another;
( i i )  tha t the g i f t  or consideration was given, or received, as
an i nducement or reward fo r  services to be rendered or already 
rendered in re la t ion  to o f f i c ia l  du ties ; and
( i i i )  th a t  the transaction took place co rrup t ly .
The s ta tu to ry  d e f in i t io n  o f corruption does not attempt to be exhaus­
t iv e  and rests on the im p l ic i t  premise tha t i t  is  preferable fo r  judges 
to  construct d e f in i t io n s  incrementally by way o f l i t i g a t io n ;  a process 
which is : t o  some extent responsive to the nuances o f changing mores.
In 1901, the Lord Chancellor argued in re la t io n  to an e a r l ie r  version 
o f  the 1905 Corruption Act tha t 'the reason why no attempt is  made to
define corruption is  tha t the thing is  so protean th a t to define i t  is
38almost impossible.
As observed by Robert C. Brooks in 1910, the legal concept o f corrup­
t io n  applies 'on ly to those more f lag ran t practices which past experience
has shown to be so pernicious tha t sentiment has c ry s ta l l is e d  in to  s ta t -
39utory p roh ib it ions  and adverse ju d ic ia l  dec is ions '. I t  is  not broad 
enough to cover the concept as seen from the viewpoints o f  p o l i t ic a l  
science and e th ics ; consequently, w ith in  the social sciences several 
broader d e f in i t io n s  o f  p o l i t ic a l  corruption have developed, each u t i l i z in g  
d i f fe re n t  c r i t e r i a : -
213.
1. Public o f f ic e  centred d e f in i t io n  - establish ing a concept o f public 
o f f ic e  and la b e l l in g  as corruption deviations from standards o f  
conduct binding upon incumbents.
2. Market centred d e f in i t io n  - in terms o f theory o f the market whereby 
the public servant regards his public o f f ic e  as a business and seeks 
to  maximise his income, the size o f which depends 'upon the market 
s i tu a t io n  and his ta le n t  fo r  f ind ing  the point of maximal gain on
n 1
the p u b l ic 's  demand curve.'
3. Public in te re s t  d e f in i t io n  - corruption is seen as a subversion
4P
o f public in te re s t .
A ll o f  these d e f in i t io n s  involve ambiguities. D e fin it io ns  1 and 
2 involve asking which norms are to be used to d is tingu ish  corrupt from 
non-corrupt acts , w h i ls t  d e f in i t io n  3 u t i l iz e s  the indeterminant concept 
'p u b l ic  in te r e s t ' .  Thus, while  precision and c la r i t y  regarding corrup­
t io n  are d i f f i c u l t  to obtain even w ith in  the re la t iv e ly  l im ited  boundaries 
o f  law, 'once we step outside the c i r c le  o f le g a l i ty  . . .  we f in d  extremely 
confused, c o n f l ic t in g ,  and even u n fa ir  states o f moral opinion regarding 
corrup tion .
The vagueness o f  the concept o f corruption in part accounts fo r  
the ease w ith  which a llegations o f  c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  can escalate 
in to  accusations o f corruption in the excitement o f a p o l i t ic a l  scandal.
As recognised by Joel H u rs t f ie ld : -
' Because the very word corruption is  vague and e x tra o rd in a r i ly  
d i f f i c u l t  to define, i t  has, quite understandably, become the stock- 
in - t rad e  o f  p o l i t ic a l  controversy. E ither by d ire c t  accusation, 
or by innuendo, i t  is  the easiest charge to make and the most d i f f i ­
c u l t  charge to re fu te  . . .  the f ro n t ie rs  o f corruption are themselves 
vague and undefined; and where f ro n t ie rs  are vague wars are l ia b le  
to  break out and the a i r  grow th ic k  with propaganda and with charge 
and counter-charge.'^^
How do Members o f  Parliament themselves perceive c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  
and corrup tion , and how, and to what extent, do they d is t ingu ish  between 
them?
Members included in  the random survey were asked f i r s t  o f a l l  what 
they understood by the term corruption (Appendix 2, Q. 34a) and then 
how fa r ,  i f  a t a l l ,  t h e i r  view o f c o n f l ic t  of in te re s t  overlapped with 
th is  (Q. 34b). While the l im ited  survey could not uncover a l l  the shades 
o f opinion about c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  and corruption present in the House 
o f  Commons, i t  did h ig h l ig h t  elements o f the fundamental confusion and 
lack o f agreement over the two terms which e x is t  there. In th is
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respect i t  supports the in te rp re ta t io n  o f corruption advanced by Steven 
Chibnall and Peter Saunders - tha t corruption should be regarded 'as 
a negotiated c la s s i f ic a t io n  o f  behaviour ra ther than an inherent q u a l i ty  
o f b e h a v i o u r a n d  suggests tha t c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  in the House o f  
Commons can be s im i la r ly  in te rp re ted . According to th is  in te rp re ta t io n ,  
c la s s i f ic a t io n  o f the behaviour is  accomplished by the app lica tion  o f 
ce r ta in  t a c i t ,  common sense in te rp re t ive  c r i t e r ia ,  dependent on the par­
t i c u la r  socia l context and past experiences o f the observer. The basis 
o f  th is  argument is tha t the same act may be amenable to a va r ie ty  o f 
in te rp re ta t io n s  because people have d i f fe re n t  views on a s i tu a t io n  or 
act according to th e i r  socia l context, experiences, etc.^G For example, 
what is  acceptable to one MP may be t o t a l l y  unacceptable to  another; 
and th is  re la tes both to  the p roprie ty  o f holding an outside f ina nc ia l 
in te re s t  and to the behaviour o f an MP holding such an in te re s t .  Further, 
fo r  those implicated in cases o f  alleged misconduct (whether i t  is ca lled 
c o n f l i c t  o f in te re s t ,  corruption or whatever) th is  often means tha t a t 
some po in t they are faced w ith an unfavourable re -c la s s i f ic a t io n  by another 
body, perhaps a se lect committee, or tr ibuna l o f inqu iry  or even a cou rt, 
o f action they themselves had perceived as acceptable a t the time. How­
ever, i t  should be remembered tha t e a r l ie r  chapters have shown tha t th is  
fundamental confusion and lack o f agreement over the two terms in the 
House is  not ju s t  a problem o f d i f fe re n t ia l  perception, but also one 
o f a lack o f c lear rules applicable to MPs in the f ie ld  o f outside f in a n ­
c ia l in te re s ts .
Although Members' responses to the questions concerning c o n f l ic t  
o f  in te re s t  and corruption varied g re a t ly ,  as recorded in the tables 
below i t  was possible to reduce them to very general categories according 
to the emphasis given by respondents.
Table 1 MPs' views on what constitu tes corruption
What does respondent understand by the term corruption?
Respondent emphasised:
Legal aspect; i . e .  dishonest practice fo r  money
C o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t ;  i . e .  where personal f ina nc ia l 
in te re s t  overcomes or d is to r ts  Member's public duty as MP.
Benefit to  Member or other; i . e .  doing something fo r  one's 
own advantage or to  the advantage o f someone else fo r  
money, posit ion  or bene fit  in  kind
Moral as well as pecuniary aspect o f corruption
Total Sample
%
40.00 
36.67
13.33
1 0 . 0 0
Source: Appendix 5, Q. 34(a)
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Table 2 MPs' views on how fa r  C o n f l ic t  o f In te res t Overlaps w ith  Corruption
Views on how fa r  c o n f l ic t  o f  in te re s t  overlaps with 
corruption
Total Sample
%
T o ta l ly  d i f fe re n t  terms; corruption associated with 
behaviour fo r  personal f ina nc ia l gain whereas c o n f l ic t  o f 
in te re s t  need have no connotation o f personal gain and in 
a non-pecuniary sense is endemic to p o l i t ic s . 26.67
P o te n t ia l ly  overlapping terms; c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  may 
ar ise  innocently but could be resolved in a corrupt way. 36.67
Overlapping terms; no s t r i c t  demarcation between the two 
terms. Both c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  and corruption loosely 
defined as c o n f l ic t  between priva te  in te res t and public 
duty w ith  c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  shading o f f  in to  corruption. 26.67
Other 6.67
Do not know 3.33
Source: Appendix 5, Q.34(b)
As can be seen from Table 1, 40% o f Members interviewed re ferred to 
the legal d e f in i t io n  of corruption embodied in crim inal law. They ra re ly  
mentioned the Prevention o f Corruption Acts d i re c t ly  but used such phrases 
as 'doing something dishonest fo r  money' or 'the taking o f payment in 
the furtherance o f  a cause which might be judged i l l e g a l ' .  Among these 
responses corruption was frequently  associated with b r ib e ry , the one 
sp e c if ic  f in a n c ia l connection not to le ra ted by the House and which has 
been proscribed by a reso lu tion o f the House since 1695.
The ingred ient o f c o n f l ic t  o f  in te re s t in the d e f in i t io n  o f corrup­
t io n  was emphasised by approximately 37% o f Members. However, fo r  them 
i t  was not s u f f ic ie n t  fo r  a c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  simply to e x is t .  Corrup­
t io n  arises only where personal f inanc ia l in te re s t overcomes or d is to r ts  
a Member's duty as an MP. Closely associated with th is  category o f res­
ponse, although not d i re c t ly  picking out the actual c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  
element, were those attempts a t d e f in i t io n  which stressed the act o f 
doing something fo r  one's own advantage or to the advantage of someone 
e lse , not ju s t  fo r  money, but fo r  pos ition or benefit in kind. La s tly ,
10% o f Members stressed tha t people, and in th is  spec if ic  instance MPs, 
can be morally corrupted as well as f in a n c ia l ly  corrupted. Arguing tha t 
'money is  the narrow view' they referred to corruption by d r ink , immor­
a l i t y  and b igo try .
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Members' views on how fa r  c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t overlaps with corrup­
t io n  h ig h l ig h t  some o f the dimensions o f c o n f l ic t  o f  in te re s t  pecu lia r 
to  p o l i t ic s .  As can be seen from Table 2, approximately 27% o f the sample 
considered c o n f l ic t  o f  in te re s t  and corruption to be t o t a l l y  d i f fe re n t  
terms. For them, corruption was associated w ith behaviour fo r  personal 
gain, whereas c o n f l ic t  o f  in te re s t  need have no connotation o f personal 
gain and in a non-pecuniary sense is  endemic to  p o l i t ic s .  As argued 
by one Member, a major function o f an MP may in fa c t  be viewed as tha t 
o f  reconc il ing  c o n f l ic ts  o f  in te res ts . As an elected representative 
the MP is  constantly having to weigh up ‘ the in te rests  o f the country, 
constituency, his or her party outside the House n a t iona lly  and lo c a l ly ,  
and his or her party inside the House, and in addition personal or sec­
t ion a l in te re s ts ' .  These are never a l l  in agreement and there are end­
less permutations. These Members appeared to be making a d is t in c t io n  
s im i la r  to tha t drawn by Robert Getz between 'c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t '  and 
'c o n f l i c t  o f in te re s ts ' .  As explained in Chapter 1, Getz argues tha t 
a 'c o n f l i c t  o f  in te re s ts ' ,  w ith le g is la to rs  representing functional and 
sectional desires in the name o f the 'pub lic  in te re s t '  is acceptable, 
whereas 'c o n f l i c t  o f  in te r e s t ' ,  whereby le g is la to rs  seek to fu r th e r  th e i r  
own in te re s ts ,  is  not.
However, although c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  may have no connotation o f
personal gain, aspects o f  c o n f l ic t  o f  in te re s t  other than the pecuniary
dimension can create problems and a t t ra c t  c r i t ic is m .  For example, there
is  the problem o f  ' t im e '.  While the customary argument against Members
pursuing business in te res ts  focuses on potentia l business bias in the
House, there is  also the argument tha t ' . . . a  m u l t ip l i c i t y  of outside
involvements may pre-empt an unduly large part o f  the time and energy
MPs have a t t h e i r  disposal to th ink  aoout and perform th e i r  parliamentary 
48d u t ie s '.  This problem is  not re s tr ic te d  to business a c t iv i t ie s .  For
example, Mr Keith Best, Conservative MP fo r  Anglesey, found i t  necessary
to  resign his seat on Brighton council because his Westminster and ward
workload became incompatible. This problem was also experienced by Mr
John Heddle, Conservative MP fo r  L ic h f ie ld  and Tamworth, who resigned
from Kent County Council because the dual workload was becoming too heavy
a burden and because many cases involved c o n f l ic t in g  in te res ts  and the
49danger o f ge tt ing  bogged down in parochial a f fa i r s .
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Approximately 37% o f the sample saw an association between c o n f l ic t  
o f in te re s t  and corrup tion , viewing them as p o te n t ia l ly  overlapping terms; 
a c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  may arise innocently but could be resolved in 
a corrupt way. A fu r th e r  27% of Members posited a c loser re la t ion sh ip  
between the two terms, judging tha t no s t r i c t  demarcation could be made 
between them. Here, both c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t and corruption are loosely 
defined as c o n f l ic t  between priva te in te re s t  and public duty w ith con­
f l i c t  o f  in te re s t  shading in to  corruption. This view was summed up by 
one Conserv a t ive  Member who commented, 'a c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  is  where 
your judgment as a p o l i t ic ia n ,  as an MP, c o n f l ic ts  w ith your best in te res ts  
in  the f in a n c ia l and business sense. Corruption fo llows on from th is  
d e f in i t io n  o f  c o n f l ic t  o f  in te re s t  and is  where you allow one to overcome 
the o th e r '.  I t  also underlay the view o f the Labour Member who observed, 
'we know the legal d e f in i t io n  o f  corrup tion , i . e .  the buying o f a vote 
or voice on an issue etc. Beyond tha t i t  shades o f f  in to  c o n f l ic t  o f  
in te re s t  where i t  is  a matter fo r  the conscience of the ind iv idua l MP'.
Although Members themselves tend to experience d i f f i c u l t y  in d is ­
t ingu ish ing  c le a r ly  between c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  and corrup tion , and 
there is  in e v ita b ly  an intermediary grey area partaking o f the q u a l i ty  
o f both, a d is t in c t io n  should be drawn between the two. C o n f l ic t  of 
in te re s t  in i t s e l f  does not imply reso lu tion in favour o f  personal advan­
tage, merely th a t  a c o n f l ic t  ex ists which could be resolved in one o f 
several ways. Corruption, on the otherhand, can be viewed as a p a r t ic ­
u la r method o f  resolving th is  c o n f l ic t ,  whereby personal f ina nc ia l in te r ­
est overcomes or d is to r ts  a Member's duty as an MP; d is to r t io n  may of 
course be in c id e n ta l ly  benefic ia l to the public in te re s t .
How much influence does an MP have?
Much o f  the discussion about the potentia l problem o f c o n f l ic t  o f 
in te re s t  in  Parliament and the attendant r is k  o f  corruption in e v ita b ly  
begs the question as to  how much influence an MP ac tu a lly  has. In order 
to  obtain views on th is  issue. Members included in the sample survey 
were asked what aspects o f  being an MP in th e i r  view provided oppor­
tu n i t ie s  fo r  c o n f l ic t  o f  in te re s t and possibly corrupt a c t iv i t y  (Appendix 
2, Q. 35). To avoid d i f f i c u l t i e s  and ambiguities which might present 
themselves to  Members who had already said tha t c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t 
in a non-pecuniary sense was inev itab le  and endemic to p o l i t i c s ,  in an­
swering th is  question Members were asked to r e s t r i c t  th e i r  understand­
ing o f c o n f l ic t  o f  in te re s t  to d ire c t  or in d ire c t  f ina nc ia l in te re s ts .
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In attempting to  j u s t i f y  why re g is t ra t io n  should be re s tr ic te d  to 
MPs and no other groups, one Labour MP asserted:
' I  th in k  MPs are in a special category because they have power 
to in fluence events . . .  th is  power can be used by outside in te res ts  
by br ibery  and corruption to influence the course o f events '.
This was not a view shared by the other Members in the sample who tended 
to  stress the l im i ta t io n s  on the scope and extent o f the influence 
wielded by ind iv idua l MPs. However, while the general consensus,was 
th a t backbenchers do not have much power,this did not prevent MPs from 
recognising po ten tia l opportun it ies fo r  advancing outside in te re s ts ,  
and the importance o f ju s t ic e  being seen to be done. This did not in d i ­
cate, however, th a t  they thought such opportunities would, necessarily 
be taken advantage o f.
Approximately 36% o f  the sample pointed to po ten tia l scope fo r  pro­
moting in te res ts  on the f lo o r  o f  the House or in committees. Assuming 
a Member had an outside in te re s t ,  th is  could conceivably be advanced 
through Parliamentary Questions, speaking or voting in the House, tab ling  
amendments to le g is la t io n  and so on. I t  was pointed out tha t w ith member­
ship:, o f committees there is  the fu r th e r problem of balancing knowledge 
o f  the subject under discussion w ith impartia l judgment. Taking, fo r  
example, a Select committee o f the House dealing .w ith  the tendering 
fo r  a computer system, while  i t  might be useful to include among the 
membership MPs with knowledge o f computers, often such knowledge would 
be associated w ith in te res ts  in computer f irm s ; a fa c t  which at some 
po int could create a s i tu a t io n  o f po tentia l c o n f l ic t  o f  in te re s t  which 
the ind iv idua l MP would have to resolve, possibly by resigning from member­
ship o f the committee. The f a c i l i t y  o f access to people o f in fluence, 
p a r t ic u la r ly  m in is te rs , which Members possessed was mentioned by 40% 
o f  the sample. A Member could w rite  to or have d ire c t  contact w ith a 
m in is te r  about a business matter w ithout necessarily declaring an in te re s t 
and persuade him to take action. Over 50% o f the sample saw the mere 
possession o f  paid outside in te res ts , domestic or fo re ign , creating poten­
t i a l  scope fo r  c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t .
In contrast to those MPs who recognized tha t opportun it ies do e x is t  
fo r  Members to use th e i r  parliamentary status fo r  personal advantage, 
even i f  th e i r  ca p a b i l i ty  to influence events is low, approximately 20% 
o f  theusample asserted tha t the scope fo r  such a c t iv i t y  was narrow, i f  
i t  existed at a l l .  However, even i f  the scope and extent o f  the
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influence o f  MPs is  low, and opportun it ies fo r  abusing th e i r  pos ition 
few ( a fa c t  which was not endorsed by the random sample survey responses) 
th is  does not e lim inate the problem o f c o n f l ic t  o f  in te re s t .  As was 
pointed out by Joe Ashton (Lab) when discussing public re la t io n s  a c t i v i t y ,  
even i f  MPs themselves may know they have l i t t l e  in fluence, outsiders 
may not. Consequently, as argued by W i l l ie  Hamilton (Lab), 'Business 
f irm s and fore ign governments s t i l l  th in k  i t  is  worth paying MPs - i f  
only to make i t  easier to gain access to M inisters - to ask Questions 
and make speeches on th e i r  b e h a l f T h e  image o f the in f lu e n t ia l  
MP may be a myth, but i t  is  s t i l l  important i f  i t  is  believed and shapes 
people's behaviour.
So fa r  the term ' in f lu e n ce ' has tended to be given negative or im­
proper connotations. As noted by Frank C. Newman, at the extreme i t  
has been associated w ith co rrup tion , br ibery  and other i l l i c i t  conduct, 
from which he considers the B r i t is h  MP is la rge ly  free from suspicion.
As a lesser e v i l ,  i t  can mean, and Newman in s is ts  should mean, only tha t 
'what an MP does may not be iso la tab le  from the fa c t  tha t his associates, 
his cons tituen ts , his party o f f i c i a l s ,  or other persons have spent money 
with p o l i t ic a l  aims'. He argues th a t ,  ' i f  open and above-board, th is  
kind o f influence is  mostly proper; w ithout i t  we could not operate 
our democratic government'. 'In f lu en ce ' can also be clothed with
more pos it ive  connotations. As e a r l ie r  chapters have shown, MPs defend­
ing the assumption th a t i t  is  proper fo r  Members to  possess outside in te res ts  
have constantly  emphasised the benefits  to be gained fo r  the e f f ic ie n t  
working o f Parliament from Members speaking from the experience o f th e i r  
curren t outside in te re s ts .  They believe tha t active p a r t ic ip a t io n  in 
some outside occupation helps to  maintain a Member's awareness o f r e a l i t ie s  
and problems outside Parliament and to ensure th a t his or her 'expe rt ise ' 
is  kept up-to-date. One Conservative Member in the sample survey argued:-
'This House derives strength from outside in te rests  o f Members.
Until the whole s truc tu re  is  reformed good government rests on the
p rac t ica l experience o f  MPs.'
Another Conservative MP who shared th is  b e l ie f  went on to argue tha t 
the suspicion and anxiety over Members' outside in te re s ts ,  and the conse­
quent establishment o f  the Register, had in h ib ite d  MPs in using th e i r  
s p e c ia l is t  knowledge in debates to the detriment o f Parliament. He 
i l lu s t ra te d  his po in t w ith the case o f  a fe l lo w  MP who has o i l  connec­
tions but who d e l ib e ra te ly  does not take part in o i l  debates, thus poten­
t i a l l y  depriv ing the House o f  valuable expertise.
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Comment
I t  has become c lear tha t while possession of an outside f in a n c ia l 
in te re s t  is  a pre requ is ite  fo r  a c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  in the pecuniary 
sense to a r ise , and, as we have seen, aspects o f c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  
other than the pecuniary aspect can a t t ra c t  c r i t ic is m ,  the mere posses-r 
Sion o f such an in te re s t  by a Member does not mean tha t a c o n f l ic t  w i l l  
necessarily  occur. I t  is only when the parliamentary conduct and action 
o f  the Member may be, or may be seen to  be, affected by these in te res ts  
th a t the r is k  o f  c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  a r ises, and even here i t  is not 
e a s i ly  id e n t i f ia b le .  An MP is  an elected representative and as such 
is properly subject to a number o f influences. We are therefore faced 
w ith  the problem o f determining how fa r  an MP may le g it im a te ly  be under
ob lig a t io n  to ,  or influenced by outside in te re s ts ,  occupations or sponsors
in  parliamentary proceedings and at what po int th is  representation o f  
in te res ts  threatens to shade o f f  in to  c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t.
Further, as ind ica ted , even i f  such c o n f l ic t  does a r ise , i t  should 
not be assumed th a t i t  w i l l  be resolved in a s e l f is h ,  possibly corrupt
way. As Samuel Finer protests
'Mr Hamilton's argument (or ra ther his assertion) - and a l l  the 
other s o f th is  kind tha t have been and are being made - res ts , 
in fa c t ,  on three unstated premises. The f i r s t  premise is tha t 
in a l l  cases when an in terested Member raises a matter a ffec t ing  
his material in te re s t  he does so fo r  se lf ish  motives. The second 
premise is  th a t ,  in a l l  cases, a s e lf is h  motive is to the public 
disadvantage. The th i rd  is tha t only causes which are t o t a l l y  un­
prompted by any material consideration are to the public advantage - 
a very Kantian view o f public m o ra l i ty . ' ^2
In cases o f  alleged c o n f l ic t  of in te re s t the circumstances o f the 
tim e, the form and the place o f the Member's ac tion , and the in te rp re ta ­
t io n  to be put on the action , as well as the in te n t ion  o f the Member, 
are a l l  re la t iv e  fa c to rs ,  and, as e a r l ie r  chapters have shown, opinion 
may reasonably d i f f e r  as to the importance to be attached to each o f 
them. C o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t ,  the re fo re , remains a conundrum as well 
as a p ra c t ica l problem confronting the House. In practice i t  is  frequently  
d i f f i c u l t  to determine the borderline between what constitu tes a l e g i t ­
imate representation o f in te rests  and what constitu tes a c o n f l ic t  o f 
in te re s t  w ith the attendant r is k  o f  corruption. The problem is a l l  the 
more in tra c ta b le  because i t  is not ju s t  a matter o f fa c t  but also a matter 
o f  s o c ia l ly  s tructured perception.
221.
NOTES AND REFERENCES
INTRODUCTION
1. This study is  concerned p r im a r i ly  w ith backbench Members o f the 
House o f  Commons and not m in is te rs , who are subject to w r i t te n  guid­
ance on pr iva te  in te res ts  issued by the Prime M in is te r. I t  does 
not extend to the House o f Lords.
2. PATTERSON, Samuel C. 'Review A r t ic le :  The B r i t is h  House o f  Commons
as a Focus fo r  P o l i t ic a l  Research', B r i t is h  Journal o f  P o l i t ic a l  
Science, Vol. 3 (1973-74) pp. 363-381, a t p. 375.
3. STACEY, Margaret. Methods o f Social Research, Oxford, Pergamon 
Press: 1969, p. 8.
CHAPTER 1
1. MCGILL, Barry. 'C o n f l ic ts  o f In te re s t:  English Experience 1782- 
1914', Western P o l i t ic a l  Quarterly , Vol. XII (1959) pp. 808-827, 
at p. 808.
2. GETZ, Robert S. Congressional Ethics. The Conflict: o f  In te res t 
Issue, U.S.A., D. Van Nostrand Co. Ltd: 1966, p .3.
3. VOSE, Clement. Entry on 'C o n f l ic t  of In te re s t ' in In ternationa l 
Encyclopaedia o f  the Social Sciences, (ed. David L. S i l l s ) ,  the 
Macmillan Co. and Free Press: 1968, Vol. 3, p. 242. C it ing : Report 
o f  the Association o f the Bar o f the City o f New York, Special Com­
m ittee on the Federal C on fl ic t  o f In te res t Laws, 1960, C on fl ic t o f 
In te re s t  and Federal Service, Cambridge, Mass. Harvard Univ. press: 
p. 3.
4. Members o f Parliament and C on flic ts  of In te re s t . Green Paper 
signed by President o f the Privy Council o f  the.Canadian Parliament 
Ju ly  1973, p .1.
5. KIRBY, James C. J r .  Congress and the Public Trust, Report o f the
Association o f the Bar o f the C ity  o f New York Special Committee 
on Congressional E th ics, New York, Atheneum: 1971, p. 42. C it ing
the Association o f  the Bar o f the C ity o f New York, C on fl ic t  of 
In te re s t and Federal Service, 1960, op. c i t . p .17.
6. WILLIAMS, Robert J. 'The Problem of Corruption: A Conceptual and
Comparative A n a lys is ',  Paper presented at the Public Administration 
Committee Conference, York, September 1976.
7. GETZ, Robert S. op. c i t . p .4.
8 . O'LEARY, Cornelius. The E lim ination o f Corrupt Practices in B r i t is h
Elections 1868-1911, Oxford at the Clarendon Press: 1962, p. 232.
9. For an in s ig h t fu l  discussion o f th is  problem see: BENN, S . I ,
' " In te re s ts "  in P o l i t i c s ' ,  Proceedings o f the A r is to te l ia n  Socie ty , 
New Series, Vol. LX (1959-60) chapter v i i ,  pp. 123-140.
222 .
10. FINER, Samuel E. Anonymous Empire. A study o f the Lobby in Great
B r i t a in , London, Pal I Mall Press: rev. ed. 1969, p. 108.
11. JONES, George W. 'Corruption and The Public In te re s t ' ,  New Society, 
Vol. 25, No. 572, 20 September 1973, p. 703-705, at p. 705.
12. DISRAELI, Benjamin, Whigs and Whiggism, ed. William Hutcheon, London: 
1913, 'The Letters o f  Runnymede', p. 249.
13. See fo r  example, MILLER, J.D.B. The Nature o f P o l i t ic s ,  England,
Penguin: 1962, espec ia lly  Chapter 4, 'General In te re s t ' .
14. P a r t ic u la r ly  he lp fu l to the researcher were SCHUBERT, Glendon.
The Public In te re s t:  A c r i t iq u e  of the Theory o f  a P o l i t ic a l  Concept,
U.S.A. The Free Press : 1960 ; SORAUF, Frank J. 'The Public In te re s t
re -considered '. Journal o f  P o l i t i c s , Vol. XIX (1957) pp. 616-39.
15. ROUSSEAU, J .J .  The Social Contract and Discourses, trans. with
in t r o ,  by G.D.H. Cole, London, Dent: Î 938, rev. 1973.
16. BENTHAM, J. Theory o f L e g is la t io n , ed. R. H ild re th , London, 1871.
17. GETZ, Robert S. 0£. c i t . pp. 3-4.
18. LONG, Norton E. 'C o n f l ic t  of In te re s t:  A p o l i t ic a l  s c ie n t is t 's
v iew '.  Paper delivered a t the Annual Meeting o f the American P o l i t ic a l
Science Association, Washington D.C., September 6-9, 1962, p. 6.
19. VOSE, Clement E ., lo c . c i t . p. 242.
20. The most useful general texts  on corruption discovered by the w r i te r
were: HEIDENHEIMER, Arnold J. (ed) P o l i t ic a l  Corruption: Readings
in Comparative Analys is , New York, H o lt, Rinehart and Winston Inc:
j 970; Scott, J.C. Comparative P o l i t ic a l  Corruption, New Jersey, 
Englewood C l i f f s :  1972. In so fa r  as c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  s p i l l s
over in to  corruption as defined by the criminal law, then fu r th e r  
ins igh ts  may be obtained from the ju r isp rud en t ia l l i te ra tu re  on 
mens rea and crim inal in te n t.
21. WEBER, Max. Gesammelte Aufsatze sur Relig ionssozio logie, Frankfurt
am main, 1947, p. 3Û. Cited in ADORNO, Theodor W. Trans. E.B. Ashton, 
Negative D ia le c t ic s ,  London, Routledge and Kegan Paul: 1973, p.
1^5T
22. As the main emphasis o f  th is  study is  not h is to r ic a l  except inso far 
as i t  uses h is to r ic a l  data to provide a background fo r ,  and lend 
understanding to ,  recent events, consideration o f parliamentary 
l i t e r a tu r e  before the early  twentieth century is  l im ite d .
23. See fo r  example, MAY, S ir  Thomas Erskine, The Constitutional H istory 
o f  England, 1760-1860, London, Longman, Green, Longman and Roberts: 
1861, 2 vo is . I t  should not be overlooked, however, tha t considerable 
extra-parliam entary concern over corruption in the eighteenth century 
re la ted  to voting in the House o f Commons.
223.
24. See fo r  example, the c lass ic  work on nineteenth century parliamen­
ta ry  procedure by REDLICH, Joseph. The Procedure o f the House o f 
Commons, trans. E.A. S te in tha l,  Archibald, Constable and Co. Ltd;
19Ü8, 3 Vols.
25. JENNINGS, S ir  W. Ivor. Pariiament, Cambridge, Cambridge U nivers ity  
Press: 2nd ed. 1957 ( f i r s t  ed. 1939); especia lly  chapter 11,
'Honourable Members', pp. 13-58.
26. See fo r  example: FINER, Samuel E. op. c i t . passim: BRADSHAW
Kenneth and PRING David. Parliament and Congress, London, Constable: 
1972; WALKLAND, Stuart (ed). The House of Commons in the Twentieth 
Century: Oxford, Clarendon: 1979.
27. RICHARDS, Professor P.G. Honourable Members: A Study o f the B r i t is h
Backbencher, London, Faber and Faber Ltd: 1959. The Backbenchers,
London, Faber and Faber Ltd: 1972.
28. MAY, S ir  Thomas Erskine. Parliamentary P ractice , London, Butterworths: 
F i r s t  published in  1844 and now in i t s  nineteenth e d it io n , 1976. 
Hereafter re ferred to as Erskine May.
29. CAMPION, S ir  G i lb e r t .  An In troduction to the Procedure of the House 
o f  Commons, London, Macmillan and Co. Ltd: 2nd ed. 1950, f i r s t
pub. 1929.
30. ANSON, S ir  W illiam R. The Law and Custom of the C on s titu t ion , Vol.
1, Pariiament, Oxford at the Clarendon Press: f i f t h  ed. 1922.
31. See fo r  example: Viscount K ilm uir, Lord High Chancellor o f Great
B r i ta in .  'The Law o f Parliamentary P r iv i le g e ' ,  a lecture delivered 
before the U n ivers ity  o f London on 4 May 1959, Univers ity  o f London, 
the Athlone Press: 1959; MARSHALL, Geoffrey, 'The House o f Commons
and i t s  P r iv i le g e s ' ,  in WALKLAND, Stuart (ed) o£. c i t . pp. 204-246.
32. PACHURI, P.S. The Law o f  Parliamentary Priv ileges in U.K. and In d ia ,
The In s t i tu te  o f Constitu tiona l and Parliamentary Studies, New Delhi:
1971.
33. GETZ, Robert, S. 0£. c i t . p. 144.
34. MCGILL, Barry, lo c . c i t . p. 808.
35. See fo r  example: GASH, Norman. P o l i t ic s  in the Age o f Peel: A
Study in the Technique of Parliamentary Representation, London,
1953; NAMIER, L.B. The Structure of P o l i t ic s  at the Accession 
o f  George I I I ,  London, 1929, esp. Vol. 1; PORRITT, Edward and 
Annie. The Unreformed House o f Commons: Parliamentary Representation
before 1832, Cambridge,1909. ~
36. For example: BEER, Samuel H. 'The Representation o f  In terests
in  B r i t is h  Government: H is to r ica l Background', The American P o l i t ic a l
Science Review, Vol. LI (1957) pp. 613-650; JUDGE, David, 'B r i t is h  
Representative Theories and Parliamentary S p e c ia l is a t io n ',  Parliamentary 
A f fa i r s ,  Vol. XXXIII (Winter 1980) pp. 40-53
224 .
37.
38.
39.
40
41
42,
43,
44,
45,
46,
47,
48,
49,
ROSS, J.F.S. Parliamentary Representation, London, Eyre and S po tt is -  
woode: 2nd ed. 1948, p. 9. See also, ROSS, J.F.S. Elections and
E lec to rs , London, Eyre and Spottiswoode: 1955.
The Times Guide to the House o f  Commons. London, Times Books L td . ,  
The May 1979 ed it ion  is  the la te s t  in a series which began in 1880.
McCALLUM, 
NICHOLAS, 
BUTLER, D. 
BUTLER, 
BUTLER, 
BUTLER, 
BUTLER, 
BUTLER, 
BUTLER, 
BUTLER,
R.B. and Readman, A. The B r i t is h  General Election o f  1945.
H.G. The B r i t is h  General Election o f 1950 
E.
E.
E.
E.
E.
E.
E.
E.
The B r i t is h  General Election of 1951
Ihe B r i t is h  General Election o f 1955
and ROSE, R. The B r i t is h  General Election of 1959
and KING, A. The B r i t is h  General E lection o f 1964
and KING, A. The B r i t is h  General Election of 1966
and PINTO DUSCHINSKY, M. The B r i t is h  General Election o f 1970
___________________________ of Feb. 1974
and KAVANAGH, D. The B r i t is h  General Election o f  Oct. 1974.
( a l l  published by Macmillan)
MELLORS, Colin. The B r i t is h  MP. A socio-economic study o f the House 
o f Commons, England, Saxon House, 1978.
ROTH,
ROTH,
ROTH,
ROTH,
ROTH,
Andrew. The Business Background of MPs. 1961 ed it ion .
Andrew. The Business Background o f MPs. 1963 ed it ion .
Andrew. The Business Background o f MPs. 1965 ed it ion .
Andrew. The Business Background o f MPs. 1967 ed it ion .
Andrew and KERBEY, Janice. The Business Background of MPs. 1972 
e d it io n .
ROTH, Andrew and KERBEY, Janice, TENCH, Judy. The Business Background 
o f MPs. 1975/76 e d it io n , (a l l  published by Parliamentary P ro fi les  
Services L td . ,  London).
ROTH, Andrew. 0£. c i t .  1967 e d it io n ,  p. xx.
See fo r  example: DONALDSON, Frances, The Marconi Scandal, London,
Rupert Hart Davis: 1962.
NEWMAN, Frank C. 'Reflections on Money and Party P o l i t ic s  in B r i t a in ' ,
Parliamentary A f f a i r s , Vol. X (1956-57) pp. 308-332.
MCGILL, Barry, lo c . c i t .
NOEL-BAKER, Francis. ' "The Grey Zone". The Problem of Business 
A f f i l i a t io n s  o f  Members o f Parliament', Parliamentary A f fa i r s ,  Vol.
15 (1961-62) pp. 87-93.
NOEL-BAKER, Francis. 
NOEL-BAKER, Francis.
lo c . c i t . p. 91. 
loc. c i t .  p. 93.
See fo r  example: ROBERTS, Michael. 'Conduct in Local Government -
S itua t ing  the R ec li f fe  Maud Report', Public Administration B u l le t in , 
No. 18, June 1975; DREWRY, Gavin. 'Corruption: The Salmon Report'
P o l i t ic a l  Quarterly, Vol. 48 (1977) pp. 87-91; KLEIN, Rudolph. New 
Society, Vol. 37, No, 720, p. 181; PINTO DUSCHINSKY, M. 'Corruption 
in B r i ta in :  The Royal Commission on Standards o f Conduct in Public
L i f e ' ,  P o l i t ic a l  Studies, Vol. XXV (1977) pp. 274-284.
225 .
50. ROBERTS, Michael, lo c . c i t . p .46.
51. House o f Commons Library Research D iv is ion Background Paper No. 28.
'The Financial In terests  o f Ministers and Members o f Parliam ent',
1973, not published.
52. HOUGHTON, Rt. Hon. Douglas. 'F inancia l In terests  o f Members o f 
Parliam ent', The Parliamentarian, Vol. 55 (1974) pp. 1-8.
53. See fo r  example: HAMILTON, William W. 'Members and Outside In te re s ts ' ,
The Parliamentarian, Vol. 56-57 (1975-76) pp. 227-231.
54. Report o f the Select Committee on Members' In terests  (Decla ra tion),
H.C. 102, Session 1974-75.
55. WILLEY, Rt. Hon. F.T. 'The Declaration and Registration o f Members'
In te re s ts ' ,  The Parliamentarian, Vol. 56-57 (1975-76) pp. 167-170; 
WINNIFRITH, C. B. 'Members' In te re s ts ' ,  The Table, Vol. X L III (1975) 
pp. 30-35.
56. VIJAY, K .I.  'The Declaration o f In terests  by Members o f the House o f
Commons: An analysis o f the Current Campaign fo r  Reform', P o l i t ic a l
Q uarte r ly , Vol. 44 (1973) pp. 478-486.
57. Report from the Select Committee on Conduct o f Members, H.C. 490 o f 
Session 1976-77.
58. BOULTON, C.J. 'Conduct o f Members', The Table, Vol. XLVI (1978) 
pp. 28-31.
59. ZELLICK, Graham. 'The Imprisonment o f Members o f Parliament', Public 
Law, 1977, pp. 29-47.
60. ZELLICK, Graham. 'The Conduct o f Members o f Parliament', Public Law 
1978, pp. 133-143; 'B ribery o f Members o f Parliament and the Criminal 
Law', Public Law, 1979, pp. 31-58.
61. DOIG, Alan. 'S e lf -D is c ip l in e  and the House o f Commons: The Poulson
A f fa i r  in a Parliamentary Perspective ', Parliamentary A f fa i rs ,  Vol. 
XXXII (1979) pp. 248-267, at p. 255.
62. PATTERSON, Samuel C. 'Review A r t ic le :  the B r i t is h  House o f Commons
as a Focus fo r  P o l i t ic a l  Research', B r i t is h  Journal o f P o l i t ic a l  
Science, Vol. 3 (1973-74) pp. 363-381, a t p. 375.
63. 'Normative theory ' is  here defined as, 'A systematic explanation of 
values or ide a ls , including the reasons why they are held, the e ffec ts  
they may have on behaviour, th e i r  in te rre la t io n sh ip  w ith other values, 
etc. A normative theory may also seek to provide grounds fo r  the 
p rescr ip t ion  o f values, eg. Marxist theory or democratic the o ry '.  
'Empiricism' is  here defined as, 'The b e l ie f  tha t experienced phen­
omena, ra ther than theories or ideas, are the basis o f knowledge,
and th a t,  at best, only those hypotheses, theories and s c ie n t i f ic  
laws which are validated by observable experience should be included 
in the body Of accepted knowledge w ith in  a d is c ip l in e .  Both d e f in ­
i t io n s  are taken from, ROBERTS, Geoffrey K. ' A D ictionary o f P o l i t ic a l  
A n a lys is ',  London, Longman: 1971, pp. 135 and 74 respective ly .
226.
64. The study does not attempt to explain or im p l ic i t l y  adopt Weber's 
approach to social action.
65. WEBER, Max. Methodology o f  the Social Sciences, trans la ted and
edited by Edward A. Shi Is and Henry A. Finch, New York, The Free 
Press: 1949. Essay on ' "O b je c t iv i ty " ! in  Social Sciences and
Social P o l ic y ' ,  pp. 49-112, a t p. 52.
66. Ib id . p. 54.
67. Ib id . p. 53.
68. Ib id . p. 54.
69. PYE, L. and VERBA, S. (eds). P o l i t ic a l  Culture and P o l i t ic a l  
Development, U.S.A., Princeton Univ. Press: 1965, p. 513.
70. PUTNAM, Robert D. The Beliefs o f P o l i t ic ia n s , New Haven and London,
Yale Un ivers ity  Press: 1973. p .2.
71. Ib id . p. 2.
72. SHILS, Edward. 'Centre and Periphery ', in WORSLEY, P. Modern 
Sociology: in troducto ry  readings. Great B r i ta in ,  Harmondsworth,
Penguin Books: 1970, pp. 415-427, a t p. 417.
73. BLONDEL, J. Voters, Parties and Leaders, Great B r i ta in ,  Penguin: 1963, 
pp. 232-249. See a lso , COLE, G.D.H. Studies in Class S truc tu re ,
London, Routledge and Kegan Paul: 1955.
74. ROSE, R. 'England: A T ra d it io n a l ly  Modern P o l i t ic a l  C u ltu re ',  in
PYE, L. and VERBA, S. op^ . c i t . pp. 83-130 at p. 102. See also,
BAGEHOT, Walter. The English C ons t itu t ion , London, Fontana/Collins:
F i r s t  issued with Tntro. by R.H.S. Crossman in 1963 ( f i r s t  pub. in
1867), p a r t ic u la r ly  ch. IV, ‘ The House o f Commons', pp. 150-182.
75. ROSE, R. Ib id . p. 102-103.
76. MILLS, C. Wright. The Power E l i te ,  New York, Oxford University Press: 
1956.
77. Ib id . p. 3.
78. CRENSON, Matthew A. The Un-Polit ics  o f  A ir  P o llu t ion : A Study of
Non-Decision-Making in the C i t ie s , Baltimore and London,, the John 
Hopkins Press: 1971.
79. LUKES, Steven. Power: A radica l view, London, The Macmillan Press
Ltd: 1974, espec ia lly  ch. 3. 'The Two dimensional v iew ', pp. 16-20.
A c lass ica l con tr ibu tion  to th is  view is  BACHRACH, Peter and BARATZ, 
Morton S. ‘ The Two Faces o f Power', American P o l i t ic a l  Science Review, 
56 (1962) pp. 947-52.
80. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, E.E. The Semi-Sovereign People; A R ea lis t 's  View
o f Democracy in America, New York, H o lt ,  Rinehart and Winston: 1960.
227.
81. BACHRACH, Peter and BARATZ, Morton S. Power and Poverty, Theory and 
P rac tice , New York, Oxford Univers ity  Press: 1970, p. 43. _
82. LUKES, Steven, op. c i t . p. 21.
83. Ib id . p. 21-22.
84. ROBERTS, Geoffrey K. £p. c i t . p. 158.
85. In recognising the importance of h is to r ic a l  residues (though not
necessarily residues o f  p o l i t ic a l  cu ltu re ) as opposed to functiona l 
considerations as factors in explanation th is  w r i te r  was prompted
by V. Subramaniam's a r t ic le  where he t r ie s  to account fo r  the present 
pos it ion  o f the s p e c ia l is t  in d i f fe re n t  countries on the basis o f
th e i r  h is to r ic a l  and p o l i t ic a l  evolution in  the la s t  two centuries.
SUBRAMANIAM, V. 'The Relative Status o f Specia lis ts  and Generalists:
An attempt a t a comparative h is to r ic a l  exp lanation '. Public
Adm in is tra tion , Vol. 46 (1968).
86. GREENSTEIN, Fred. Personality and P o l i t i c s , Chicago, Markham Publish­
ing Co: 1969, p. 7.
87. Ib id . p .29.
88. COHEN, Percy S. Modern Social Theory, London, Heinemann: 1968,
pp. 91-92.
89. For the purpose o f th is  study ideology is seen as a dimension of 
p o l i t i c a l  c u ltu re ,  and re fers to the set o f primary values from which 
a person derives his a tt itudes  towards p o l i t ic a l  events and problems, 
and which guide his p o l i t ic a l  conduct.
90. This term and the ensuing argument against re ify in g  cu ltu re  as an
independent variab le  are based on the approach taken by Barrington 
Moore J r .  in Social Origins o f D ic ta torsh ip  and Democracy, Great 
B r i ta in ,  Penguin Univers ity  Books: 1973, pp. 485-487.
91. GUTTSMAN, W.L. The B r i t is h  P o l i t ic a l  E l i t e , London, MacGibbon and
Key: Revised e d it io n ,  1965, p. 247.
92. Ib id . p. 226 and 247.
93. MARQUAND, David. 'Towards a Europe o f the P a r t ie s ',  P o l i t ic a l
Q ua rte r ly , Vol. 49 (1978) pp. 425-445, a t p. 439.
94. No attempt is  made here to trace the h is to r ic a l emergence of the 
gentleman e th ic  and i t s  entrenchment in the House o f Commons in any 
d e ta i l ,  but a b r ie f  sketch o f i t s  development and transmission is 
included in  order to show tha t the values and be lie fs  derive from 
concrete h is to r ic a l  events.
95. REDLICH, Joseph. 0£. c i t . Vol. 11, pp. 128-129.
96. MANNHEIM, K. and STEWART, W.A.C. An Introduction to the Sociology
o f Education, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul : 1962. In ch. IV
Mannheim and Stewart provide a b r ie f  but succinct account o f the 
evo lution o f the 'gentleman id e a l ' .
228.
97. Ib id . p. 43.
98. WILKINSON, Rupert H. The Prefects: B r i t is h  Leadership and the public
school t r a d i t io n ;  comparative study in the making o f ru le rs ,  London,
CUP: 1964. "
99. MANNHEIM, K and STEWART, W.A.C. op. c r t .  p. 43.
100. LASKI, Harold J. Parliamentary Government in England, London, George 
Allen and Unwin Ltd: 1938, p. 210.
101. FLETCHER, Ronald. Sociology: The Study o f Social Systems, London,
Batsford: 1981, pp. 16-17.
102. This analogy has been drawn by Members o f Parliament themselves and
the Media during the campaign fo r  a re g is te r .  A spec if ic  instance can 
be found in  the in troduction  to ROTH, Andrew, The Business Background
o f MPs, London, Parliamentary P ro fi les  Services Limited: 1975-76 ed it ion
103. WEBER, Max. 1949, op. c i t .  p. 78.
104. See fn . 85.
105. SHILS, Edward A. The Torment o f Secrecy, London Heinemann Ltd: 1956, 
p. 27.
106. Ib id . p. 27.
107. See fo r  example: DOWNS, Anthony. 'Up and down with ecology - the
" issue -a tten tio n  c y c le " ' .  The Public In te re s t , No. 26, Winter 1972; 
BRAYBROOKE, David. T ra f f ic  congestion goes through the issue-machine,
London and Boston, Routledge and Kegan Paul: 1974.
108. See fo r  example, RICHARDSON, J .J .  and JORDAN, A.G., Governing under 
Pressure: The Policy Process in a Post-Parliamentary Democracy,
London, Martin Robertson: 1979, p a r t ic u la r ly  ch. 4, 'The Emergence
o f Issues and P o l ic ie s ' ,  pp. 77-96.
109. DOWNS, Anthony, op. cj_t. p. 39.
110. Ib id . pp. 39 and 40.
111. ROURKE, Francis E. 'The United States' in GALNOR, Itzhak (ed).
Government Secrecy in  Democracies, New York, New York University 
Press : 1977, pp. 113-128, a t p. 113.
112. The ' idea l type' is  here used in the Weberian sense o f 'a conceptual 
construct which is  ne ither h is to r ic a l  r e a l i t y  nor even the "true" 
r e a l i t y  . . .  i t  has the s ign if icance o f a purely ideal 1imi t in g  con­
cept w ith  which the real s itu a t io n  or action is  compared and surveyed 
fo r  the exp lica t ion  o f certa in  o f  i t s  s ig n i f ic a n t  components'.
WEBER, Max. 1949, op. c i t . p .93.
113. The concept o f p o l i t ic a l  scandal as a tool fo r  the study o f corrup­
t io n  has been explored by Graeme C. Moodie in ,  'On P o l i t ic a l  Scandals 
and C orrup t ion ',  Government and Opposition, Vol. 15 (1980) pp. 208-222.
114. SHILS, Edward. 1956, op. c i t .  p. 54.
229.
Chapter 2
1. SELLTIZ, C ., JAHODA, M., DEUTSCH, M., COOK, S.W. Research Methods
1n Social Relations, U.S.A., H o lt, Rinehart and Winston: 1965 Rev. ed. 
p. 53.
2. STACEY, Margaret. Methods o f Social Research, Oxford, Pergamon Press 
Ltd. f i r s t  ed. 1969 reprinted 1977, p. 88.
3. RIDLEY, Professor F.F. Parliamentary A f fa i r s , Vol. XXXI (1978) p. 355.
4. FORD, P. and FORD, G. A Guide to Parliamentary Papers, Oxford, Basil
B lackwell: 1955. Revised e d . , I r is h  Univ. Press: 1972.
5. In p a r t ic u la r  these included a survey of Reports of the Select 
Committee o f  P riv ileges since 1945, and o f a l l  ad hoc Select Committees 
concerned in any way with the issue o f  Members' in te res ts  or conduct.
6. Following the refusal o f Enoch Powell to comply w ith the Register, 
the Select Committee on Members' Interests were not prepared to 
commend a fu r th e r  e d it ion  of the Register u n t i l  the House expressed a 
view on the force o f  i t s  Resolutions. Accordingly no published ed i­
t io n  o f the Register appeared a f te r  26 May 1976 (H.C. 284). However, 
in February 1979 the w r i te r  was able to consult the updated Master 
Copy o f  the Register kept by the Registrar o f Members' In terests at 
the House o f Commons. Following the General Election o f 1979 th is  
too was withdrawn. In January 1980 the Register fo r  the present 
Parliament became ava ilab le  fo r  inspection a t the House but not fo r  
pub lica tion .
7. In July 1972 Parliamentary Questions began to be asked on the Poulson 
a f f a i r  and these tended to be indexed under the names o f Mr John 
Poulson or Mr W.G. Pottinger. A major problem encountered when com­
p i l in g  the subject headings was lack o f consistency over time, w ith 
s im ila r  material being indexed sometimes under very d i f fe re n t  head­
ings in d i f fe re n t  volumes. The Hansard index does not lend i t s e l f
to  a systematic or accurate compilation o f subject-headings.
8 . See Appendix 4 . D iv is ion  L is t  Analysis.
9. Early Day Motions are motions tabled by backbench Members who s o l i c i t
signatures from th e i r  parliamentary colleagues. They are p r im ar i ly
a device whereby Members advertise th e i r  views, and unless a motion 
is  sponsored by the Government or O f f ic ia l  Opposition, i t  is  un like ly
to  be debated. For a discussion o f the problems involved in using
EDMs as a va l id  source of information about MPs opinions see: 
BERRINGTON, H. Backbench Opinion in  The House o f Commons 1945-55, 
Oxford, Pergamon Press: 1973, pp. 1-20.
10. These Motions were id e n t i f ie d  from the House o f Commons L ibrary 
Bound Volumes of Early Day Motions (containing data extracted from 
'Notices o f  Questions and M otions ').
11. JONES, G.W. 'P e rso n a li t ie s , Power and Parliament', Book Section,
Pariiamentary A f f a i r s , Vol. XXXII (1979) p. 106.
230.
12. In searching fo r  re levant f i l e s  I would l ik e  to acknowledge the
help received from the Archival Records Section o f both the Cabinet - 
O ffice and the Home Office .
13. The main newspapers consulted were: The Times, The Guardian, The
Daily Telegraph, The Sunday Times, The Sunday Telegraph, The Observer.
14. DEXTER, Lewis Anthony. E l i te  and Specialized In te rv iew ing , Evanston,
North-western Un ivers ity  Press: 1970, pp. 8- 9.
15. A f u l l  l i s t  o f those interviewed is  presented in Appendix 3.
16. SJOBERG, Gideon and NETT, Roger. uA Methodology fo r  Social Research
U.S.A., Harper and Row: 1968, p. 175.
17. For a b r ie f  but c lear exposition o f random sampling see STACEY,
Margaret, op. c i t . pp. 88-97. For a more de ta iled account see MOSER, 
C.A., and KALTON, G. Survey Methods in Social Inve s t ig a t io n , London, 
Heinemann, Education Books: 1971, reprinted 1973, pp. 77-117.
18. The labels o f  's t ru c tu re d ' and 'standardized' in terv iew schedule are 
here taken to be synonymous. See STACEY, Margaret, op. c i t .  p. 75-80 
fo r  a discussion o f 's tru c tu re d ' in terv iews; and SELLTIZ, C. e t a l .  
op. c i t . pp. 255-263 fo r  a deta iled explanation o f 'standardized' 
in terviews.
Chapter 3
1. Pari. Debs. Vol. XXIX, co ls. 1365-1484, Session 1911, 10 August 1911.
2. Payment o f Members was one o f the 6 p o l i t ic a l  demands o f 'The People's
Charter' drawn up in  1838.
3. For a discussion o f Labour Party finance see: PINTO-DUSCHINSKY, 
Michael. B r i t is h  P o l i t ic a l  Finance 1830-1980, London and Washington, 
American Enterprise In s t i t u te ;  1982. esp. Ch. 3.
4. Pari. Debs. Vol. XXIX, co l.  1382, Session 1911, 10 August 1911.
5. Mr A rthur Lee fo r  the Opposition moved an amendment to th is  e f fe c t .  
Ib id . co l.  1384.
6. I b id . co l.  1411.
7. Review Body on Top Salaries, F i r s t  Report: Ministers o f the Crown
and Members o f  Parliament. Chairman: The Rt. hon. Lord Boyle o f
Handsworth. Cmnd. 4836 o f December 1971.
8. For example, the 1946 Select Committee on Members' Expenses (H.C. 93 
o f  1945-46) did not regard the sum paid to a Member as a professional 
salary and f e l t  i t  was unwise to c u r ta i l  his freedom by paying him an 
amount which would demand his fu l l - t im e  attendance. A s im ila r  
Committee in 1954 (H.C. 72 o f 1954) noted the increasing d i f f i c u l t y
o f  combining outside work w ith Membership but recognised 'some Members
can, however, add to th e i r  income by d irec to rsh ips , by jo u rn a l is t ic  
work, broadcasting, le c tu r in g , consulta tive work, advising and s im ila r  
tasks, which do not ca l l  fo r  long absences from the House, and some are 
in rece ip t o f payments made to them as o f f i c ia ls  o f o rgan isa tions '.
231 .
9. In June 1979 MPs' pay was increased to £9,450 with fu r th e r  increases 
to £10,725 in 1980 and £13,950 in 1981. As developed in Chapter 4, 
the modern wave o f concern over MPs' in te res ts  arose at a time when 
MPs' sa la ries  were inadequate, before the in s t i tu t io n  o f  the secre­
ta r ia l  allowance and the improvements o f  the Boyle Report.
10. WILDING, Norman and LAUNDY, P h i l ip .  An Encyclopaedia o f Parliament,
London, Cassell and Co. Ltd: 1958, p% 419, 'Payment o f Members'.
11. PORRITT, Edward and Annie. The Unreformed House of Commons: P a r l ia -
mentary Representation before 1832, Cambridge: 1909, Vol. 1, p .153;
NEALE, J.E. The Elizabethan House o f Commons, London, Cope: 1949,
pp. 321-4. “
12. REDLICH, Joseph. The Procedure o f  the House o f Commons, trans.
E.A. S te in th a l,  Archibald, Constable and Co. Ltd : 1908, Vol. I I ,
pp. 128-129.
13. GUTTSMAN, W.L. The B r i t is h  P o l i t ic a l  E l i t e , London, MacGibbon and 
Key: Rev. ed. 1965, p. 29.
14. SUBRAMANIAM, V. ‘ The Relative Status o f Specia lis ts  and Generalists;
An attempt a t a comparative h is to r ic a l  exp lanation '. Public Adminis­
t r a t io n ,  Vol. 46 (1968) pp. 331-340, a t p. 333.
15. SUBRAMANIAM, V. Joe. c i^ .  p. 334.
16. PORRITT, Edward and Annie, op. c i t . pp. 181-203.
17. 9. Anne, c. 5. See PORRITT, Edward and Annie. 0£* 111* PP* 166-9.
This Act did not apply to Scotland.
18. S w if t ,  L e t te r  to  Pope, 10 January 1721. Cited in PORRITT, Edward and
Annie, op. c i t . p. 170.
19. 33. Geo. I I ,  c. 20. See PORRITT, Edward and Annie, op. c i t .  pp.
172-174.
20. 1 and 2 V ie t . ,  c. 48.
21. PORRITT, Edward and Annie, op. c i t .  pp. 174-177.
22. See PORRITT, Edward and Annie, p p . cv t. passim. See also O'LEARY,
Cornelius. The E lim ination o f Corrupt Practices in B r i t is h  Elections 
1868-1911, Oxford a t the Clarendon Press, 1962, p. 232.
23. NAMIER, L.R. The Structure o f P o l i t ic s  at the Accession of George I I I , 
London: 1929, Vol. I .  In th is  volume Namier gives a typology of
Members.
24. BEER, Samuel H. ‘ The Representation o f Interests in B r i t is h  Govern­
ment. H is to r ic a l Background', American P o l i t ic a l  Science Review,
Vol. LI (1957) pp. 613-650, a t p. 623. He derives these figures from 
JUDD, G e r r i t t  P. Members o f Parliament 1734-1832, New Haven: 1955.
25. JENNINGS, S ir  W. Ivor. Parliament. Cambridge Univers ity  Press: 1957, • 
2nd ed. p. 46.
232.
25. Namier records tha t in 1760 out o f 489 English MPs, 192 had been 
returned by patrons, along w ith 32 others returned by Government 
in fluence. NAMIER, L.B. o£. c i t . Vol. 1, p. 182.
27. McGILL, Barry. 'C o n fl ic ts  o f In te re s t:  English Experience 1782- 
1914', Western P o l i t ic a l  Q uarte rly , Vol. XII (1959) p. 808.
28. BEER, Samuel H. 16c. c i t . p .620 and 621.
29. For an examination o f Private B i l l  procedure see: WILLIAMS,
0. Cyprian, The H is to r ica l Development o f Private B i l l  Procedure 
and Standing Orders o f the House o f Commons, 2 Vols, London,
H.M.S.O: 1948; CLIFFORD, F. H istory o f Private B i l l  L e g is la t io n ,
2 Vols, London, Butterworth: 1887.
30. During the nineteenth century pr iva te  b i l l  procedure was substan­
t i a l l y  revised on q u a s i- ju d ic ia l  l in e s ,  w ith Members s i t t in g  on 
opposed pr iva te  b i l l  committees being required to make a declaration 
o f non-in te res t. See note 92.
31. Cited by BEER, Samuel H. lo c . c i t .  p. 622.
32. Ib id ; p. 628.
33. REDLICH, Joseph, op. c i t . Vol. I I ,  p. 116.
34. JENNINGS, S ir  W. Ivor. op. c i t .  p. 46.
35. REDLICH, Joseph, op. c i t . Vol. 11, p. 125.
36. BAGEHOT, Walter. The English C on s t itu t ion , London, Fontana/Collins: 
f i r s t  issued in 1963 with in t ro ,  by R.H.S. Crossman ( f i r s t  published 
in 1867) ch. V II .
37. REDLICH, Joseph. 0£. c i t . Vol. I I ,  p. 120.
38. Of Radical theory, which also emerged during the nineteenth century
to r iv a l  the Old Whig dominance. Beer says, although, as w ith L iberal
theory, th e i r  u lt im ate u n it  o f representation was the ra t iona l inde­
pendent man. Radical theory was h o s t i le  to sp e c ia l is t  in te res ts  and 
instead sought to  pursue the national in te re s t  through the w i l l  o f the 
m a jo r ity .
39. BEER, Samuel H. lo c . c i t . p. 640.
40. Ib id . pp. 645-650.
41. See fo r  example ROSS, J.F.S. Parliamentary Representation, London,
Eyre and Spottiswoode: 1948 (2nd ed. ) *, The Times Guide to The House
o f Commons, London, Times Books Ltd. The May 1979 ed it ion  is the 
la te s t  in a series which began in 1880; ROTH, Andrew. The Business 
Background o f MPs, London, Parliamentary P ro fi les  Services L td . , ed i- 
t ions as c ited  in Chapter 1, note 41; and since 1975 the Register
o f  Members' In te res ts .
42. BEER, Samuel H. loc. c i t .  p. 649.
233.
43. Report o f  the Select Committee on the O f f ic ia l  Secrets Act, H.C.
101, Session 1938-39, p.v.
44. Members o f Parliament and C on fl ic ts  o f  In te res ts , Green Paper 
signed by the President o f the Privy Council o f t h e  Canadian 
Parliament, July 1973, p. 10.
45. M in is ters  are subject to w r it te n  guidance on priva te  in te res ts
issued by the Prime M in is te r. This detailed code, drawn to th e i r  
a t te n t io n  on taking o f f ic e ,  covers d irec to rsh ips , partnerships, 
shareholdings, investments, underwriting and g i f t s .  For a d is ­
cussion o f  the h is to ry  and content of th is  code the reader is
re ferred to : PLATT, D.C.M. 'The Commercial and Industr ia l
In terests  o f  M inisters o f the Crown', P o l i t ic a l  Studies, Vol. 9 
(1951) pp. 267-290. ----------------------------
46. 1 W illiam and Mary. Sess. 2. ch. 2.
47. CJ (1837) 418-419.
48. PACHAURI, P.S. The Law o f Parliamentary Priv ileges in U.K. and In d ia ,
The In s t i tu te  o f Constitu tiona l and Parliamentary Studies, New Delhi,
1971, ch. I I I .
49. MAY, S ir  Thomas Erskine. Parliamentary Practice, London, Butterworths: 
F i r s t  published in  1844 and now in i t s  nineteenth e d it io n ,  1976.
p. 67. Hereafter re ferred to as Erskine May, 19 ed; see also ANSON, 
S ir  W illiam R. The Law and Custom o f the C ons titu t ion , 5th ed. by 
Maurice L. Gwyer, C.B., Oxford, Clarendon Press: 1922, Vol. 1
Pariiament, espec ia lly  chapter 4.
50. REDLICH, Joseph. 0£. c i t . Vol. 1, p. 46.
51. These are the organizational categories under which G. Marshall 
surveys the app lica tion  o f p r iv i leges  in the twentieth century. They 
in e v ita b ly  overlap. MARSHALL, Geoffrey, 'The House o f Commons and
i t s  P r iv i le g e s ' in WALKLAND, Stuart (ed). The House o f Commons in the 
Twentieth Century, Oxford, Clarendon: 1979, chapter IV, pp. 204-246.
52. MAY, S ir  Thomas Erskine, op. c i t . p. 69. Also H.C. Debs. Vol. 601, 
c. 48. Session 1958-59, 2 March 1959.,
53. Ib id . p. 68. See also Halsburys Laws o f  England, 3rd ed. Vol. 285
p.^464. \
54. BLACKSTONE, S ir  W illiam. Commentaries on the Laws o f England, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1775.
55. Report from the Select Committee on P riv ileges. H.C. 247 o f session 
1963-64, Evidence, para. 239. (Clerk o f the House o f Commons).
56. Report o f  the Select Committee on Members' Interests (Declaration),
H.C. 57, 4 December 1969, S. 1969-70, Part I I ,  para 12.
57. Ib id . para. 87.
58. Enacted as 22 George I I I ,  c. 45; sometimes called S ir  P h il ip  
Gierke's Act.
234.
59. See McGILL, Barry, lo c . c i t . pp. 808-827, fo r  a discussion o f th is
act and the other events during the period 1782-1855.
60. Special Report from the Select Committee on the House o f Commons 
D isq u a l i f ic a t io n  B i l l .  H.C. 349. Session 1955-56.
61. CJ (1693-97) 317.
62. Ib id . 331.
63. Erskine May, 19 ed. op. c i t . p. 149. See fo r  example. Freeman and 
Dalby Thomas, CJ (169T-9"9ir538; Quin, CJ (1714-18) 493; Vernon,
CJ (1718-21) 547.
64. MARSHALL, Geoffrey, In WALKLAND S.A. (ed), op. c i t .  p. 228.
65. For a formal statement o f th is  see: Report from the Committee o f
P r iv i le g e s , H.C. 85 o f Session 1943-44, concerning the case o f A lder­
man Robinson and the National Union o f  A l l ie d  and D is tr ib u t iv e  Workers.
66. The case o f  Mr W.J. Brown (H.C. 118 o f Session 1946-47) in which the
C iv i l  Service C le r ica l Association resolved to terminate his f in a n c ia l 
support because he no longer represented th e i r  views in Parliament.
67. CJ (1946-47) 310.
68. CJ (1660-67) 646, but see Ib id . 322 and CJ (1667-87) 86.
69. CJ (1830) 107.
70. CJ (1857-58) 247; see also Ib id . (1884) 167.
71. Pari. Debs. Vol. 151, cols. 176-209, Session 1858.
72. Pari. Debs. Vol. 20, co ls. 1000-1012, Session 1811, 17 July 1811.
See also H a ts e l l 's  Precedents, Vol. I I ,  p. 169.
73. In the evidence to the 1969 Select Committee on Members' In terests 
(Declaration) the Clerk o f the House o f Commons c la r i f ie d  th is  point 
by re fe r r in g  to the Local Taxation, Customs and Excise Duties B i l l ,  
1890, which granted compensation fo r  public house licences which were 
to be extinguished. Three MPs voted in a d iv is ion  on that b i l l  - a l l  
owners o f  public  houses - but the Speaker ruled the motion to d is ­
a llow th e i r  votes not in order because the compensation to be grantdd 
under the b i l l  was not automatic but contingent on County Councils 
exercis ing permissive powers (Evidence. Q. 1).
74. Pari. Debs. Vol. XXIX, cols. 1679-1682, Session 1911, 14 August 1911.
75. H.C. Debs. Vol. 261, co l. 192, Session 1931-32, 3 February 1932.
76. Pari Debs. Vol. XXIX, op. c i t . cols 1681-2, where reference is  made 
to  Speaker G u lly 's  ru lin g  on the Local Government ( Ire land) B i l l  tha t 
'the re  must be a d ire c t  pecuniary in te re s t  o f a pr iva te  and p a r t ic ­
u la r and not o f a public and general nature, and when the question
i before the House is o f a publ ic  and general nature and in c id e n ta l ly  involves 
the pecuniary in te re s t  to a class which includes Members o f the House, 
they are not prevented by the rules o f  the House from v o t in g '.
235.
77. H.C. Debs. Vol. 431, co ls . 1614-1616, Session 1946-47, 16 December 
1946.
78. Pari. Debs. Vol. XXXIX, co l. 877, Session 1896, 14 A pril 1896.
79. Report from The Select Committee on Members o f Parliament (Personal 
In te re s t ) ,  H.C. 274 of 2 July 1896.
80. Ib id . p. i i i .
81. Ib id . p. iv .
82. McGILL, Barry, lo c . c i t . p .825-826.
83. CJ (1892) 98.
84. In evidence to the 1969 Select Committee on Members' In terests
(Declaration) the Clerk of the House i l lu s t ra te d  th is  po in t by con­
firm in g  th a t a Member would not be disabled from voting on a pr iva te  
b i l l  such as the Brighton Marina B i l l  ju s t  because he lived  in 
Brighton (Evidence, Q. 6).
85. Erskine May, 19 ed. op. c i t . ch. X V III ,  a t pp. 407-412. Section 
E, 'Votes on Matters Affected by Personal Pecuniary In te re s t ' .
Also an annotated l i s t  o f  precedents. Speakers'rulings, etc. con­
cerning both public  and pr iva te  matters p r io r  to 1896 is  provided
by the (former) Clerk o f the House as an Appendix to the 1896 Select
Committee on Members' Personal In te re s t ,  op. c i t . pp. 30-48.
86. Report o f  the Select Committee on Members' Interests (Declaration)
1969, o_p. c i t . Examination o f  the Clerk o f the House, Q. 9.
87. Report o f the 1896 Select Committee on Members o f  Parliament
(Personal In te re s t)  op. c i t . Q. 158.
88. Erskine May, 19 ed. c i t . p. 411.
89. H.C. Debs. Vol. 261, co l. 192, Session 1931-32, 3 February 1932.
90. H.C. Debs. Vol. 431, co ls. 1614-1616, Session 1946-47, 16 December 1946
91. WILLIAMS, 0. Cyprian. The H is to r ica l Development o f Private B i l l  
Procedure, op. c i t . Vol. 1, p. 30 and note 1.
92. For the h is to ry  o f th is  formula see: CLIFFORD F. H istory o f Private
B i l l  L e g is la t io n , op. c i t . Vol. I I ,  pp. 828-843; WILLIAMS, O.C.
Ib id . Vol. I I ,  pp. 1 3 9 ^ 1 .
93. Now under Standing Order 120 (Private Business). See Erskine May 
19 ed. 0£. c i t . p. 962.
94. For example see CJ (1845) 386; Ib id . (1845) 904; i b id . (1892) 398; 
i b i d . (1945-46) 277.
95. Report from the 1896 Select Committee on Members o f Parliament 
(Personal In te re s t)  op. c i t .  Q. 158.
236.
96. For example. Pari. Debs. Vol. 76, co ls. 467, 682, Session 1844;
Pari. Debs. Vol. 298, co ls. 342, 348, Session 1884-85.
97. Report from the 1969 Select Committee on Members' In terests 
(Declaration) 0£. c i t . Q. 13.
98. H.C. Debs. Vol. 510, co l. 2040, Session 1952-53, 5 February 1953.
99. H.C. Debs. Vol. 557, co l.  358, Session 1955-56.
100. H.C. Debs. Vol. 712, co l. 525, Session 1964-65.
101. H.C. Debs. Vol. 529, co l. 588, Session 1953-54; ib id .  Vol. 536,
co l.  415 Session 1954-55; ib id . Vol. 666, co l.  968, Session 1962-63.
102. H.C. Debs. Vol. 779, co l. 1563, Session 1968-69, 13 March 1969.
103. View expressed by the Leader o f the House during debate on the motion 
to set up the Select Committee on Members' Interests (Declaration).
H.C. Debs. Vol. 783, co ls. 1556-1660, Session 1968-69, 14 May 1969, 
a t c o l . 1558.
104. H.C. Debs. Vol. 510, co l.  2040, Session 1952-53, 5 February 1953.
105. This d is t in c t io n  was pointed out in a personal minute by Prime
M in is te r A tt lee  with regard to the inclusion o f the Attorney General
in the Committee's membership. PRO re f :  Prem 8/629. Prime M in is te r 's
Personal Minute 26.10.1947.
106. Growing concern expressed at th is  : s e n s i t iv i ty  to  outside comment and 
c r i t ic is m  stimulated the se tt ing  up o f a Select Committee in 1967 to 
review the law and procedure o f parliamentary p r iv i le g e  and to recom­
mend whether any changes in the law o f p r iv i le g e  or practice o f the 
House were desirab le . Report from the Select Committee on Parliament­
ary P r iv i le g e , H.C. 34, December 1967.
107. An annotated tab le  o f complaints referred to the Committee o f P r iv ­
ileges since 1945 is  appended to the Third Report from the Committee 
o f  P r iv i le g e s , Session 1976-77, H.C. 417, Appendix C.
108. H.C. Debs. Vol. 365, co ls . 829-831, Session 1939-40, 17 October 1940. 
See also Report o f the Select Committee on the Conduct o f a Member,
H.C. 5 o f  Session 1940-41.
109. Special Report from the Select Committee on Marconi's Wireless Tele­
graph Company Limited Agreement, H.C. 351, 430, 515, 515-1. 28 October
1912, 14 January and 12 February 1913. For the Debate on the M a jority  
Report see: H.C. Debs 5th series. Vol. LIV, S. 1913, 18 and 19 June
1913.
110. Report from the Select Committee on Conduct o f Members, H.C. 490 o f 
Session 1976-77, 13 July 1977.
111. For a discussion of these cases and the more general subject of 
tr ib u n a ls  see: KEETON, George W. T r ia l by T r ibuna l, London, Museum 
Press L td . ; 1960.
237 .
112. For a discussion o f  the procedure by tr ibuna l see the Royal 
Commission on Tribunals o f Inqu iry . Cmnd. 3121 o f November 1966.
113. Budget Disclosure Inqu iry . Report o f the Tribunal appointed under 
the Tribunals o f Inquiry (Evidence) Act, 1921, May 1936, Cmd. 5184.
114. Report o f the Tribunal appointed to inquire in to  a llegations r e f le c t ­
ing on the O f f ic ia l  Conduct o f  Ministers o f the Crown and other Public 
Servants, Cmd. 7616 o f January 1949.
115. Erskine May, 19 ed. 0£. c i t . ch. IX.
116. CJ (1880) pp. 77, 235.
117. In 1947 Mr G. A llighan MP was expelled from the House fo r  co rru p t ly  
accepting payment fo r  the disclosure o f information about matters
to be proceeded w ith in Parliament obtained from other Members under 
the ob lig a t io n  o f  secrecy. H.C. Debs. Vol. 443, co l. 1199, Session 
1947-48, 30 October 1947.
118. CJ (1660-67) 690.
119. Memorandum appended to The Third Report from the Committee o f P r iv ­
i leges , H.C. 417 of Session 1976-77. This Committee recommended tha t 
le g is la t io n  should be introduced to re ins ta te  the power o f the House 
to  impose f ine s .
120. These p r in c ip les  are discussed in the Canadian Green Paper on C o n f l ic t  
o f  In te re s ts , 1973, 0£. c i t .  pp. 5-6.
121. Report o f the 1969 Select Committee on Members' In terests (Declaration) 
op. c i t .  p. x i i i ,  para 35.
122. JENNINGS, S ir  W. Ivo r . Cabinet Government, Cambridge U nivers ity  Press:
3rd ed. 1959, p. 8 .
123. Note by the Secretary o f the Cabinet, 22 October 1947. PRO re f :
Prem 8/629 and Cab 129/22.
124. Report from the Select Committee on the Conduct o f a Member, Session 
1940-41, op. c i t . Evidence, p. 160.
125. REDLICH, Joseph, op. c i t . Vol. I I ,  p. 128.
Chapter 4
1. H.C. Debs. Vol. 842, co ls. 1203-1204, Session 1971-72, 4 August 1972.
2. Report o f  the Select Committee on Members' In terests (Decla ration),
H.C. 57, 4 December 1969, Session 1969-70. Hereafter re ferred to as 
the 1969 Select Committee.
3. Report o f  the Select Committee on Members o f Parliament (Personal
In te re s t ) ,  H.C. 274, 2 July 1896.
4. The Sunday Times, 5 May 1974.
238.
5. H.C. Debs. Vol. 676, co ls . 411-412, Session 1962-53, 25 A p r i l  1963.
6. NOEL-BAKER, Francis. 'The Grey Zone. The problem o f business a f f i l ­
ia t io ns  o f Members o f Parliament', Parliamentary A f fa i r s ,  Vol. 15 
(1961-62) pp. 87-93. ----------------------------------
7. H.C. Debs. Vol. 642, co ls. 1678-1680, Session 1960-61, 22 June 1961.
8 . H.C. Debs. Vol. 643, cols. 173-174, Session 1960-61, 27 June 1961.
9. H.C. Debs. Vol. 676, co ls , 411-412, Session 1962-63, 25 A pri l  1963.
10. CHESTER, D.N. and BOWRING, Nona. Questions in Parliament, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press: 1962, p. 282.
11. Mr F. Noel-Baker (2 ),  Rt. Hon. H. Wilson (2 ), Mr M. Edelman (1 ),
Mr A. Lewis (6) ,  Mr W. Hamilton (9), Mr W. Hamling (1 ), Mr A. Morris (1 ),
Mr W. Price (1 ) ,  Mr E. Brooks (1 ), Mr E. Milne (1).
12. Casse ll's  Parliamentary D irecto ry , ed. Malcolm Hulke, London, Cassell: 
T974T
13. H.C. Debs. Vol. 713, co l. 44, Session 1964-65, 25 May 1965.
H.C. Debs. Vol. 715, co ls. 11-12, Session 1964-65, 28 June 1965.
H.C. Debs. Vol. 715, co l.  121, Session 1964-65, 1 July 1965.
H.C. Debs. Vol. 715, co ls. 307-8, Session 1964-65, 8 July 1965.
H.C. Debs. Vol. 798, co ls . 369-70, Session 1969-70, 24 March 1970.
He also asked a question on p o l i t ic a l  honours - H.C. Debs. Vol. 697,
c o l.  53, Session 1963-64, 23 June 1964.
14. H.C. Debs. Vol. 716, co ls. 271-4, Session 1964-65, 13 July 1965.
H.C. Debs. Vol. 770, co l. 101, Session 1967-68, 15 October 1968.
H.C. Debs. Vol. 779, co ls. 209-10, Session 1968-69, 4 March 1969.
H.C. Debs. Vol. 781, cols. 228-30, Session 1968-69, 1 April 1969.
H.C. Debs. Vol. 791, co l.  407, Session 1969-70, 12 November 1969.
15. H.C. Debs. Vol. 781, cols. 483-4, Session 1968-69, 2 April 1969.
16. H.C. Debs. Vol. 733, co ls. 679-80, Session 1966-67, 4 August 1966.
17. See fo r  example:
H.C. Debs. Vol. 676, co ls . 411-412, Session 1962-63, 25 A pri l  1963.
H.C. Debs. Vol. 699, co l.  266, Session 1963-64, 21 July 1964.
H.C. Debs. Vol. 716, c o ls .2.71-4, Session 1964-65, 13 July 1965.
H.C. Debs. Vol. 767, co ls. 1689-90,Session 1967-68, 4 July 1968.
18. Mr Risdale, S ir  G. Nicholson, S ir  R. Cary, S ir  G. Nabarro, S ir  Derek 
Walker-Smith.
19. H.C. Debs. Vol. 733, co ls . 679-80, Session 1966-67, 4 August 1966.
20. i b i d . co l. 680.
21. H.C. Debs. Vol. 767, co ls . 1689-1690, Session 1967-68, 4 July 1968.
H.C. Debs. Vol. 779, co ls. 209-10, Session 1968-69, 4 March 1969.
239.
22. His actual words were: 'There is  th is  d iffe rence . This House is a
le g is la tu re ,  whereas the members o f  a local au tho r ity  are an executive 
as well as, in certa in  cases ,a le g is la tu re . '  H.C. Debs. Vol. 767, _ 
co l. 1690, Session 1967-68, 4 July 1968.
23. The EDMs concerning a re g is te r  o f Members' in te res ts  a ttrac ted  17 
and 21 signatures respective ly , w ith considerable overlap o f signa­
to r ie s  between the two. The th i rd  EDM attrac ted no other support 
apart from the sponsor. EDM 201, Session 1968-69, 10 March 1969,
EDM 202, Session 1968-69, 10 March 1969, EDM 219, Session 1968-69,
17 March 1969.
24. Mrs Winnifred Ewing, SNP.
25. H.C. Debs. Vol. 746, co ls. 1415-1422, Session 1966-67, 10 May 1967.
26. The B i l l  d id not pass, and as Mr Hamilton confirmed when interviewed,
l ik e  most ten minute ru le  b i l l s  i t  was introduced to pub lic ise  the 
campaign ra ther than in the b e l ie f  tha t i t  would become law.
27. A n tic ipa t ing  the demise o f the Private Members' B i l l ,  the Liberal 
Party f e l t  th a t a re g is te r  could be established w ithout an Act o f 
Parliament. Consequently, in June 1967, they established a voluntary 
open re g is te r  o f  Liberal MPs' in te re s ts ,  subject to revis ion every 
s ix  months.
28. H.C. Debs. Vol. 746, co l.  1416, Session 1966-67, 10 May 1967.
29. ib id .  co l.  1418.
30. i b i d . co l.  1420.
31. i b i d . c61. 1421.
32. Mr Warbey raised as a possible breach o f  p r iv i le g e  and possibly a
wider contempt o f Parliament certa in  a r t ic le s  appearing in the 
Spectator, which he ins is ted  contained the innuendo tha t because he 
had received h o s p i ta l i ty  from the Communist f ro n t in Vietnam he was 
no longer an independent agent but ' a bribed spokesman o f a fore ign 
o rg a n isa t io n '.  See: H.C. Debs. Vol. 707, co l. 42, Session 1964-65,
22 February 1965; ib id .  cols. 240-2; H.C. Debs. Vol. 709, cols. 
576-642, Session 1964^5, 24 March 1965.
33. H.C. Debs. Vol. 715, co ls . 1134, 1349-68, Session 1964-65, 5 July 1965
34. Report o f the Select Committee o f P r iv i leges , H.C. 269, S. 1964-65,
July 1965.
35. H.C. Debs. Vol. 770, co l.  101, Session 1967-68, 15 September 1968.
36. H.C. Debs. Vol. 780, co ls. 1630-9, Session 1968-69, 26 March 1969.
Statement by the Prime M in is te r.
37. i b i d . co l.  1632.
38. i b id . co l.  1632.
39. ib id .  co l.  1634.
240.
40. Report o f  a Top Salaries Review Body. F i r s t  Report: M inisters o f
the Crown and Members o f Parliament, Cmnd. 4836, S. 1970-71,
December 1971,Chairman, Lord Boyle.
41. H.C. Debs. Vol. 780, op. c U . co l. 1638.
42. The Sunday Telegraph, 14 May 1961.
43. NOEL-BAKER, Francis, 1oc. c i t .
44. HAMILTON, W illiam M.P. 'Members and Outside In te re s ts ' ,  The Parlia  
mentarian. Vol. 56-57 (1975-76) pp. 227-231.
45. FINER, S.E. Anonymous Empire. A study of the Lobby in Great B r i t a in , 
London, Pall Mall Press: 1"958, 2nd ed it ion  1964, Rev. ed. 1969.
46. RICHARDS, P.G. Honourable Members, London, Faber & Faber Ltd: 1959, 
2nd ed. 1964. Also, The Backbenchers, London, Faber & Faber Ltd:
1972, p a r t ic u la r ly  ch. 9, ‘ Members and th e ir  in te re s ts ' .
47. ROTH, Andrew. The Business Background o f M.Ps., London, Parliamentary
P ro f i le s  Services Ltd: 1963 ed. p. x x v i i i .
48. The Times, 8 May 1967, E d i to r ia l .
49. The Times , 7 March 1969, E d ito r ia l .
50. The Sunday Telegraph, 4 August 1968.
51. The Sunday Times, 6 October 1968.
52. i b i d .
53. Bagier had previously met Fraser through his in te re s t  in working 
men's clubs and gambling machines.
54. The Sunday Times, 6 October 1968. ' In s ig h t ' .  The Sunday Telegraph,
6 October 1968.
55. The Sunday Telegraph, 6 October 1968.
56. The Times, 29 September 1968.
57. See Appendix XX o f the Report o f the Select Committee on Members' 
In terests  (Declaration) 1969, 0£. c i t .
58. Renamed the Independent Broadcasting Authority  under the Sound Broad­
casting Act o f  1972.
59. Transmitted on March 6 1969 and produced by P h il ip  Whitehead who is  
now a Labour MP himself.
60. The Times, 7 March 1969.
61. i b id .
62. ROURKE, Francis E. 'The United S ta te s ',  In GALNOR, Itzhak (ed) 
Government and Secrecy in Democracies, New York, Univers ity  Press:
W ll  chr'7T pp. H3-TZ8 a t  p. 113.
241.
63. CROSSMAN, Richard. The Diaries o f a Cabinet M in is te r. Vol. Three,
London, Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape: 1977, pp. 405-406
and 410.
64. ib id , p. 406.
65. ib id .  p. 410.
66. Report o f  the Select Committee on Members' In terests (Declaration) 
1969 o^ p. c i t . para. 55.
67. H.C. Debs. Vol. 783, co ls. 1556-1660, Session 1968-69, 14 May 1969. 
Motion to set up a Select Committee.
68. I b id . co l.  1558.
69. Ib id . co l.  1558.
70. Ib id . co l. 1584.
71. Ib id . co l.  1585.
72. Sponsor o f one o f  the two EDM's tabled during th is  period expressing
a wish fo r  a re g is te r  o f Members' in te res ts . EDM 202, Session 1968-
69, 10 March 1969.
73. H.C. Debs. Vol. 783, Session 1968-69, op. c i t .  co l. 1561
74. Ib id . c o l . 1561.
75. Ib id . c o l . 1561.
76. Ib id . c o l . 1566.
77. Ib id . c o l . 1567.
78. Ib id . c o l . 1578.
79. Ib id . c o l . 1579.
80. Ib id . c o l . 1583.
81. There is . o f  course, a longstanding suspicion on the part
benchers about the ro le  o f the Whips in  nominating se lect committee 
members, v iz .  the controversy over membership o f the 12 new select 
committees established in 1979.
82. H.C.! Debs. Vol. 783, Session 1968-69, op.- co l.  1592.
83. 1 1 ^ .  co l.  1596.
84. I ^ d .  co l.  1598.
85. I ^ d .  co l.  1600.
86. RHODES, Gerald. Committees o f  Inqu iry , London, George Allen & Unwin 
1975, p. 77.
242.
87. For example, RHODES, Gerald, op. c i t . ; ;  WHEARE, K.C. Government 
by Committee, Oxford, Clarendon Press: 1955. JOHNSON, N ev il ,
Parliament and A dm in is tra tion , A llen & Unwin: 1966; ROBINSON,
Ann, Parliament and Public Spending, Heinemann: 1978.
88 . The shortest time being 14 years (Rt. hon. J. Ramsden) and the 
longest ( in e v i ta b ly  d is to r t in g  the average) being the 40 years 
served by Rt. hon. G.R. Strauss, who in 1974 became Father o f the 
House.
89. WHEARE, D.C. op. c i t .  p. 38.
90. Ib id . p .39.
91. Ib id . p. 41.
92. Lubbock also pointed out tha t the probable reason why S ir Eric 
F letcher supported his amendment was tha t as Chairman o f Ways and 
Means and Deputy Speaker during 1966-68 he was un like ly  to have any 
outside in te res ts  to motivate him against morning s i t t in g s ;  the 
pension o f the Speaker and Deputy Speaker ex is ting  la rge ly  to d e f le c t 
ind iv id ua ls  from taking up outside in te res ts  on leaving o f f ic e .
93. Report o f  the Select Committee on Members' In terests  (Declaration) 
1969, op. c i t .
94. I b id . para. 3.
95. Ib id . Evidence, Q. 124.
96. Ib id . Appendix v i i i ,  E.J. M ilne, MP.
97. See p a r t ic u la r ly  Leader o f  the House (Peart), Ib id . Evidence, p. 22,
para. 2; Opposition Chief Whip (Whitelaw), Ib id . Evidence, p. 37, 
para 4 and Qs 209 and 283; Leader o f the Liberal Party (Thorpe), 
Ib id . Evidence, Qs 430 and 502.
98. Ib id . Report, para 9.
99. Report o f  the Select Committee on the House o f  Commons D isq u a l i f ica ­
t io n  B i l l ,  H.C. 349, 9 July 1956.
100. Report o f  the Select Committee on Members' Interests (Declaration), 
1969, op. c i t . para 32.
101. I b id . Evidence, p. 22, para. 7, and Qs 97-100, 153.
102. Ib id . Evidence, p. 103.
103. Ib id . Evidence, p. 75.
104. Memorandum by Hamilton, i b i d . Evidence, pp. 91-92; Memorandum by
Roth, ib id .  Evidence, pp. 102-103.
105. Ib id . Evidence, Q. 474.
243.
106. Ib id . Evidence, Q. 112.
107. Ib id . Report, para. 55.
108. The Committee considered the Liberal Party Register but accepted 
th a t  the Liberal Party themselves described th is  as a ' p i l o t '  
p ro jec t and not complete or appropriate as a model fo r  the House. 
i b id . Evidence, Qs 415 and 456.
109. Ib id . Report, para. 64, also Evidence, Q. 221.
110. The Committee co llected information on the Rules and Practices
regarding Members' in te res ts  of the French National Assembly 
(Appendix XXI) ,  the Canadian Parliament (Appendix XX II) , The Swedish 
Parliament (Appendix XXIII) and the Congress of the United States 
(Appendix XXIV).
111. Ib id . Report, para. 74.
112. I b id . Report, para. 78.
113. Ib id . Report, para. 85.
114. Ib id . Report, para. 86.
115. Ib id . Report, para. 103.
116. I b id . Report, para. 107.
117. Ib id . Report, para. 110.
118. Ib id . Report, para. 115.
119. Ib id . Report, para. 117.
120. Ib id . Proceedings o f the Select Committee, p. xxxix.
121. Witnesses examined were: S ir  Barnett Cocks, K.C.B., O.B.E.,
Rt. hon. Frederick Peart, M.P.; Rt. hon. William Whitelaw, M.C., M.P.;
Mr Herbert Lloyd, Mr John C ris fo rd , Mr James Derriman and Mr Colin 
Mann (O ff ice rs  o f  the In s t i tu te  o f Public Relations); Rt. hon.
Jeremy Thorpe, M.P. and Dr. M.P. Winstanley, M.P.; Mr William 
Hamilton, M.P.; Mr Andrew Roth
122. Report o f the Select Committee on Members' Interests (Declaration)
1969 op. c i t . Evidence, p. 37, para 4.
123. I b id . Evidence, Q.142.
124. Ib id . Evidence, Q.538.
125. Ib id . Evidence, Q.541.
126. The Sunday Times, 21 December 1969.
127. The Financial Times, 22 December 1969.
244.
128. The Sunday Telegraph, 21 December 1969.
129. The Times, 18 December 1969.
130. The Guardian, 18 December 1969.
131. The Sunday Times, 21 December 1969.
132. H.C. Debs. Vol. 795, co l.  341, Session 1969-70, 11 February 1970.
Chapter 5
1. H.C. Debs. Vol. 874, co l.  393, Session 1974, 22 May 1974.
2. Figures derived from Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1970-71, p.
24037. ~ ~
3. Source: The Times, 31 July 1970. Richard Spiegelberg looks a t the
business p r o f i le  o f the new Parliament.
4. However, a large number o f  these Conservative MPs became Members o f  
the New Government and in doing so, according to M in is te r ia l  ru les , 
had to  give up th e i r  business in te res ts .
5. The Times, 31 July 1970.
6. S i r  Harmar Nicholls (Cons) who, in a supplementary Question, drew
a tten t io n  to the impropriety o f Mr Hamilton's (Lab) a t t i tu d e .
H.C. Debs. Vol. 805, co ls. 214-5, Session 1970-71, 28 October 1970.
7. H.C. Debs. Vol. 803, co l.  95, Session 1970-71, 9 July 1970.
8 . H.C.Debs. V o l.805, co ls . 214-5, Session 1970-71, 28 October 1970.
9. Ib id .
10. ROTH, Andrew. The Business Background o f MPs, London, Parliamentary 
P ro f i le s  Services Ltd: 1972 e d it io n ,  p. 18.
11. Report o f the Select Committee on Members' In terests  (Declaration)
H.C. 57, Session 1969-70, 4 December 1969, p. 37, para. 4.
12. H.C. Debs. Vol. 811, co ls. 521-2, Session 1970, 10 February 1971.
13. H.C. Debs. Vol. 812, co l.  1703, Session 1970-71, 3 March 1971.
14. Report of the Select Committee on Members' Interests (Declaration),
1969, op. c i t . .  Evidence, p a r t ic u la r ly  p. 36, para. 1: ' I believe
th a t tïïe present rules o f the House as regards voting and the con­
vention concerning Members declaring th e i r  in te res t when speaking 
in  a debate are sa t is fa c to ry  and should be l e f t  as they a re '.
15. H.C. Debs. Vol. 812, co l.  1704, Session 1970-71, 3 March 1971.
16. Review Body on Top Salaries. F i r s t  Report: M inisters o f the Crown
and Members o f Parliament. Chairman: The Rt. Hon. Lord Boyle o f
Handsworth. Cmnd. 4836 o f  December 1971.
245.
17. See Chapter 3.
18. The Lawrence Committee in 1964 considered the question but pre­
ferred not to express any opinion. Report o f the Committee on the 
Remuneration o f Ministers and Members o f Parliament. Chairman:
S ir  Geoffrey Lawrence. Cmnd. 2516 of November 1964.
19. Review Body on Top Salaries. F ir s t  Report, 1971, op. c i t .
Appendix A.
20. Ib id . , pp. 3-4, para. 10.
21. Ib id . , p. 9, para. 25.
22. Ib id . , p. 13, para. 36.
23. H.C. Debs. Vol. 827, cols. 949-956, Session 1971-72, 6 December 1971.
24. Ib id . , co l.  951.
25. Ib id . , co l.  954.
26. H.C. Debs. Vol. 829, co l.  182, Session 1971-72, 19 January 1972;
Vol. 829, co l.  525, Session 1971-72, 28 January 1972.
27. For a general commentary on Poulson see fo r  example: THOMKINSON,
Martin. Guide to the Poulson Case: Private Eye Extra, London,
Pressdram Ltd: 1973; MILNE, Edward. No Shining Armour, London,
John Calder Ltd* 1976. The Salmon Commission (Cmnd. 6524opi976) also 
provides a useful summary o f the case.
28. THOMKINSON, Martin. 0£. c i t .
29. 'John Poulson: notice o f expulsion' in Royal In s t i tu te  o f B r i t is h
Arch itec ts  Journa l, No. 80 (February 1973) pp. 63-65.
30. Former Under Secretary in charge o f Agricu ltu re  at the Scottish 
O ff ice . Seconded in 1959 to ass is t (Lord) Hugh Fraser with the Avie- 
more Centre in the Scottish Highlands. Acted as l ia is o n  o f f ic e r  
between the developers and the Government.
31. In evidence to the Salmon Commission the Attorney General stated 
th a t:  'A substantia l part of the Poulson investiga tion  has been
taken up w ith  inves tiga ting  a llegations against Members o f Parliament' 
PRO Ref. HO. 241/9. Although no MPs were prosecuted - MPs are not 
covered by the crim inal law in respect o f corruption and bribery
in th e i r  capacity as MPs - a se lect committee was eventually set up 
in November 1976 to inqu ire  in to  the conduct o f Members in  connec­
t io n  w ith the a f fa i r s  o f Poulson.
32. FITZWALTER, Ray. 'Breaking the Poulson S to ry ',  New Statesman, 4 May 
1973, p. 652-3. Mr F itzw a lte r ,  the jo u rn a l is t  involved in breaking 
the s to ry , was interviewed by th is  researcher in 1976 fo r  an under­
graduate d isse rta t io n  e n t i t le d  'P o l i t ic a l  Corruption in B r i ta in :
A c r i t iq u e  and an a lte rn a t ive  an a lys is '.
246.
33. Mr Poulson's connection with the Maudling fam ily  had already been 
gone in to  by Private Eye, but did not receive wider c i rc u la t io n  
u n t i l  the Poulson scandal broke with the commencement o f the bank­
ruptcy proceedings. Private Eye had also made much o f Mr Maudling's 
previous involvement w ith  an off-shore t r u s t .  Real Estate o f America.
34. The 3 MPs named were the la te  S ir  Herbert Butcher (Nat. L ib ) ,  Mr 
John Cordle (Cons) and Mr A lbert Roberts (Lab). During the course 
o f  the bankruptcy hearings the name o f Mr Anthony Crosland (Lab) 
was also mentioned in connection with the acceptance of a s i lv e r  
coffee pot from Poulson, alleged to be worth £500. He announced he 
would send the pot to the O f f ic ia l  Receiver in Bankruptcy, The Times,
19 March 1973. --------
35. EDM 407, Session 1971-72, 5 July 1972.
36. H.C. Debs. Vol. 840, co l.  756, Session 1971-72, 6 July 1972.
37. Mr M. Edelman (Lab) 3, Mr J. Grant (Lab) 1, Mr A. Lewis (Lab) 10,
Mr G. Cunningham (Lab) 2, Mr C. Davies (Lab) 1, Mr M. Lipton (Lab) 1,
Mr W. Hamilton (Lab) 1, Mr D. Steel (L ib) 1, Mr M. Havers (Cons) 1.
38. EDM 410, Session 1971-72, 6 July 1972.
39. H.C. Debs. Vol. 840, co ls. 1854-6, Session 1971-72, 13 July 1972.
40. Ib id . In a speech in Shildon (County Durham) on 20 July 1973 Mr
Wilson then Leader o f  the Opposition, called fo r  the appointment o f
a Royal Commission to inquire in to  a llegations o f corruption in 
public  l i f e .  Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 1973-74, p. 26584.
41. H.C. Debs. Vol. 841, co ls . 402-408, Session 1971-72, 18 July 1972.
42. Ib id . c o l .  402. On 2 October 1973, he d id , however, appoint a
committee to consider the rules o f conduct applying to Members and 
o f f ic e rs  in  local government. This committee was not concerned with 
inve s t iga t in g  past events or spec if ic  a llegations o f misconduct such 
as the Poulson a f f a i r .  See: Report o f the Prime M in is te r 's  Committee
on Local Government Rules o f Conduct, Cmnd. 5636 o f 23 May 1974,
Session 1974.
43. Ib id . co l.  403.
44. Government motions on parliamentary expenses were withdrawn a t the 
la s t  moment because the Government saw th a t wrecking amendments by 
Hamilton and his a l l ie s  would prevent the motions going through 'on the 
nod'. Hamilton then used the collapse o f business before 4 p.m. to 
ra ise the same matters on the adjournment.
45. H.C. Debs. Vol. 842, co ls. 1176-1222, Session 1971-72, 4 August 1972.
46. I b id . co ls . 1188-1190.
47. Then Parliamentary Secretary to  the C iv i l  Service Department.
48. EDM 151, Session 1972-73, 31 January 1973.
247.
49. H.C. Debs. Vol. 857, cols. 1494-5, Session 1972-73, 13 July 1973. 
The Second reading o f  the B i l l  was deferred from 20 July to 24 July 
and did not take place before the Summer recess. The co-sponsors 
were: Mr Thomas Cox, Mr A. S ta l la rd ,  Mr John Grant, Mr Barry Jones
Mr P h i l ip  Whitehead, Mr William Price, Mr J. Wellbeloved, Mr Joseph 
Harper, Mr Leslie  Huckfield.
50. H.C. Debs. Vol. 849,
51. H.C. Debs. Vol. 854,
52. H.C.
H.C.
Debs.
Debs.
Vol.
Vol.
854,
858,
53. H.C. Debs. Vol. 858,
54. H.C. Debs. Vol. 849,
55. Thi s t ra d i t io n a l cone
were in Parliament because i t  furthered th e i r  in te res ts  had been 
epitomised by Simon Haxey in ,  Tory M.P., London, V ic to r Gollancz 
Ltd: 1939.
56. When interviewed Mr J. Ashton (Lab) revealed tha t in 1972, on the 
n ight o f the recess, he and Mr P. Whitehead (Lab) had co llected 67 
signatures from Labour MPs demanding the Shadow Cabinet set up a 
committee o f  the Labour party to draw up proposals fo r  a re g is te r .
57. Information about the Parliamentary Labour Party Sub-Committee on 
Members' outside in te res ts  was obtained from the Assistant Secretary 
o f  the Parliamentary Labour Party.
58. The Guardian, 10 May 1973, records tha t only about 50 MPs attended 
the meeting.
59. Information about the proposals fo r  a reg is te r and the code was 
obtained from the Labour Party Information Unit.
60. The Guardian, 11 May 1973.
61. Only one Member voted against the code. Ib id .
62. I t  should be remembered tha t the Chairman of the 1969 Select Committee 
which had found against a re g is te r  was Mr G. Strauss, a Labour Member, 
who had since confirmed his antipathy to a re g is te r .
63. A Member o f  the Younger Committee on Privacy; I ts  Report is ,  Cmnd. 
5012 o f  July 1972.
64. The Times, 19 March 1973.
65. Ib id .
66. The Financial Times, 29 June 1973.
248.
67. This a f f a i r  involved disclosure o f payments o f  Lonrho's funds by the 
Company's ch ie f executive 'T iny ' Rowland, as g i f t s ,  rewards and 
inducements in connection with the group's overseas business (mainly 
in A fr ic a ) .  I t  was revealed in  1971 tha t Rowland had personally 
appointed a Conservative MP, Rt. hon. Duncan Sandys as consultant
to  the company on a fee paying basis. This consultancy was kept 
secret, and on learning tha t i t  had not been sanctioned by the Board 
of D irectors o f Lonrho, Duncan Sandys gave up his contract and 
returned the fee. As a re su lt^o f  these disclosures Mr E. Heath 
made his speech in the House about 'the unpleasant and unacceptable 
face o f  c a p ita l is m '.  H.C. Debs. Vol. 856, co l.  1243, Session 1972-73 
15 May 1973.
68. The Daily Telegraph, 30 June 1973.
69. Key informants contacted at Whitehall (Cabinet O ffice ) requested to 
remain anonymous. They had acted as p o l i t ic a l  advisors to past 
leaders o f the House.
70. H.C. Debs. Vol. 854, co l.  27, Session 1972-73, 2 Apri l 1973.
71. Mr Poulson and Mr Pottinger were convicted on 11 February 1974 of 
various offences under the prevention o f  corruption acts. Other pros­
ecutions fo r  corruption followed.
72. The Guardian, 18 April 1974.
73. H.C. Debs. Vol. 870, co ls. 662-4, Session 1974, 18 March 1974.
74. When interviewed Mr Short recalled tha t when, as Leader o f the House,
he had taken over the in te r -p a r ty  ta lks  in 1974, there was l i t t l e  
Conservative inheritance in terms o f  progress made on th is  issue.
75. H.C. Debs. Vol. 870, co l.  664, Session 1974, 18 March 1974.
76. H.C. Debs. Vol. 872, co ls . 770-780, Session 1974, ,29 April 1974.
See Report from the Royal Commission on Standards o f Conduct in
Public L i fe ,  Cmnd. 6524 of 15 July 1976, Session 1975-76, hereafter
re ferred to as the Salmon Commission. Also see note 40.
77. The Guardian, 23 A pril 1974.
78. H.C. Debs. Vol. 872, co l.  777, Session 1974, 29 A pril 1974.
79. Ib id . co l.  779.
80. Ib id . c o l.  780.
81. H.C. Debs. Vol. 872, co l.  1333, Session 1974, 2 May 1974.
82. The Financial Times, 2 May 1974.
83. EDM 87, Session 1974, 2 May 1974. The s igna to r ies , other than Labour
Members, were Dr. Keith Hampson (Cons), Mr Russell Johnston (L ib) and
Mr Dafydd E l is  Thomas (P.C).
84. H.C. Debs. Vol. 872, co ls. 783-6, Session 1974, 29 April 1974.
249 .
85. H.C. Debs. Vol. 872, co ls. 950-54, Session 1974, 30 April 1974.
86. See NORTON, P h i l ip .  Dissension in the House o f Commons 1974-1979,
Oxford, Clarendon PressT 1980, pp. 5-6.
87. For an account o f Mr Short's connection with Mr T. Dan Smith see: 
Report from the Select Committee on Conduct o f Members, H.C. 490, 
Session 1976-77, p. v i i i - i x ,  paras. 9-11. See also: MILNE, Edward. 
op. c i t . pp. 173-177.
88. When interviewed Mr Ashton said tha t he withdrew the a llegations not 
because they were unfounded but because another general e lec tion  
was imminent and he did not want to f ig h t  th is  on the Poulson issue. 
A d d it io n a l ly ,  one of his aims had been to establish a re g is te r  and by 
the time o f  his withdrawal th is  had been agreed in p r in c ip le  by the 
House.
89. F i r s t  Report from the Committee o f  P riv i leges, H.C. 228 o f Session 
1974.
90. Report from the Prime M in is te r 's  Committee on Local Government Rules
o f Conduct, 1974, 0£. c i t . , p. 14-15, paras. 57 and 58.
91. The Guardian, 13 May 1974.
92. Information on procedure a t the Parliamentary Labour Party Meeting 
on 15 May 1974 was obtained from the Assistant Secretary o f the Par­
liamentary Labour Party.
93. EDM 128, Session 1974, 16 May 1974.
94. H.C. Debs. Vol. 874
co ls . 391- 392.
95. Order Paper :  22 May
96. H.C. Debs. Vol. 874
97. Ib id . c o l . 393.
98. Ib id . c o l . 393.
99. Ib id . c o l . 395-396.
100. Ib id . c o l . 397.
101. Ib id . c o l . 398-399.
102. Ib id . c o l . 405.
103. Ib id . c o l . 411.
104. Ib id . c o l . 414.
105. Ib id . c o l . 416.
106. Ib id . c o l . 421.
250.
107. H.C. DebÉ. Vol. 874, co ls. 194-198, Session 1974, 21 May 1974.
108. H.C. Debs. Vol. 874, co ls. 426-7, Session 1974, 22 May 1974.
109. For example. Ib id . co ls. 434, 457, 476-7, 483-4.
110. Ib id . co l.  486.
111. co l.  501.
112. I ^ .  co l.  430.
113. EDM 128, Session 1974, 16 May 1974.
114. H.C. Debs. Vol. 874, co l.  440, Session 1974, 22 May 1974.
115. Ib id . co l.  450.
116. I ^ .  c o l.  456.
117. Ib id . co ls. 450-1
118. Ib id . co l.  528.
119. Ib id . co ls. 519-520.
120. Ib id . co l.  483.
121. Ib id . co l.  478.
122. Ib id . co l.  534.
123. Ib id . co l.  468.
124. The view th a t free votes are not expressions o f raw opinion but are 
modified by subtle pressures in any social context is  advanced by 
Hugh BERRINGTON in  Backbench Opinion in the House o f Commons 1945-55, 
Oxford, Pergamon Press: 1973, p. 16.
Chapter 6
1. H.C. Debs. Vol. 874, co l.  399, Session 1974, 22 May 1974.
2. Labour: Mr R. Cant, Mr A. Davidson, Mr S. I rv in g ,  Mr W.H. Johnson,
Mr S. Mahon, Mr A. Palmer, Mr F. W illey. Conservative: Mr N. Edwards,
Mr A. H a ll-Davis , S ir  M. Havers, Mr I .  MacArthur, Mr J. P rio r,
Mr A. Maude, L ib e ra l:  Dr. M. Winstanley. In June 1974 both Mr
P rio r and Mr Johnson were discharged and Mr C. Onslow (Cons) and Mr
N. Spearing (Lab) correspondingly added.
3. Labour Party Manifesto, October 1974, p. 24.
4. Of the 6 Conservative Members appointed, 5 had previously shown th e i r
antipathy towards compulsory re g is tra t io n  by voting against the motion 
to estab lish  the Register.
251 .
5. The Report o f  the Select Committee on Members' Interests (D ec la ra tion), 
H.C. 102, Session 1974-75, 12 December 1974.
6 . Ib id . para. 7.
7. Ib id . Evidence, Q. 85; Evidence, Memorandum, p. 4, para. 11.
8 . Ib id . p. v i i ,  para. 11.
9. Ib id . pp. v i , v i i ,  paras 9 and 10.
10. I b id . p. v i i ,  para. 10.
11. Ib id . p. v i i ,  para. 10.
12. WINNIFRITH, C.B. Evidenced both during interview and in the fo l lo w ­
ing a r t i c le :  'Members' In te re s ts ' ,  The Table, vo l. X L III  (1975)
pp. 30-35, at p. 32.
13. Report o f the Select Committee on Members' Interests (Declaration), 
1974/1975, op. c i t . pp. v i i - v i i i ,  para. 13
14. Ib id . p. i x ,  paras. 19, 20, 21.
15. Ib id . p. X ,  paras. 28 and 30.
16. Ib id . p. x i , para. 84, Also Evidence, p .2.
17. See Appendix 5, Fig. 3 , fo r  a copy o f the form and le t te r  sent to
Members by the Registrar o f  Members' In terests .
18. The government eth ics B i l l  (S555 - PL 95-521) signed in to  law by 
President Carter October 26, 1978 requires a l l  Members, th e i r  p r inc ipa l 
ass is tan ts , congressional o f f ic e rs  and employees paid at the GS - 16 
salary level or hfgher, and any candidate fo r  congressional o f f ic e  to 
f i l e  annual public f in a n c ia l d isclosure reports. I t  provides tha t the
designated committees in the House and Senate should review a l l  reports
to  see i f  they were properly and completely f i le d  and requires the
committees to n o t i fy  any reporting ind iv idua l who did not f i l e  an
accurate report and give the ind iv idua l an opportunity to correct i t .
I t  also provided fo r  c i v i l  penalties o f up to $5,000 against any per­
sons who knowingly and w i l l f u l l y  f i le d  a fa lse  report or fa i le d  to 
f i l e  a repo rt.  Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. XXXIV (1978)
pp. 835-850.
19. Report o f  the Select Committee on Members' Interests (Declaration) 
1974/1975, ojp. c i t . Evidence, p. 3.
20. Report from the Prime M in is te r 's  Committee on Local Government Rules 
o f Conduct, Cmnd. 5636 o f  23 May 1974, Session 1974.
21. Report o f  the Select Committee on Members' In terests (Declaration)
1974/1975. ojp. c i t . , pp. x i i  and x i i i ,  paras 39 and 41.
22. Ib id . p. x i i i ,  para. 40.
23. Ib id . p. x i i i ,  para. 41.
252.
24. Ib id . p. x iv ,  paras. 45 and 46.
25. Ib id . p. x iv ,  para. 47.
26. Ib id . pp. X V ,  x v i ,  paras. 50-55.
27. Although a Speaker's Conference has frequently  been promised, i t
has not so fa r  dea lt with th is  issue. The Clerk to the Committee
concludes tha t a formidable array o f problems await th is  Conference 
so i t  must be doubtful tha t th is  recommendation w i l l  be put in to  
e f fe c t ,  WINNIFRITH, C.B., Joe. c i t .  1975, p. 35.
28. WILLEY, Rt. Hon. F .T., 'The Declaration and Registration o f  Members'
In te re s ts ' ,  The Pariiamentarian. Vol. 56-57 (1975-76) p. 170.
The Report was in fa c t  debated in the House on 12 June 1975, not 11 June,
29. H.C. Debs. Vol. 882, co l.  326, Session 1974-75, 2 December 1974, and
H.C. Debs. Vol. 885, co ls . 24-25, Session 1974-75, 27 January 1975
respective ly .
30. H.C. Debs. Vol. 887
31. H.C. Debs. Vol. 893
32. Ib id . c o l . 735.
33. Ib id . c o l . 735.
34. Ib id . c o l . 736.
35. Ib id . cols,, 737- 738.
36. Ib id . c o l . 738.
37. Ib id . cols.. 738- 740.
38. In 1973/74 Mr Powell
by reason o f being a Conservative MP and had not made payment to the 
Association. In February 1974 when Parliament dissolved he ceased to 
be a Member o f  the Conservative Party. He said, when interviewed, 
th a t there was no connection between not standing as a Conservative 
MP in February 1974 and then becoming a Unionist MP at the October 1974 
e lec t ion .
39. H.C. Debs. Vol. 893, co l.  741, Session 1974-75, 12 June 1975.
40. Ib id . cols. 742-744.
41. Ib id . co l. 744.
42. Ib id . co l.  745.
43. Ib id . co l.  745.
44. Ib id . co l.  781.
45. Ib id . co l.  748.
253.
45. Ib id . cols. 771-776 and 798. (This complaint was eventually  considered
by the Select Committee on Members' In terests  who recommended th a t -
'Any Member who sponsors a function in the Palace o f Westminster from 
which sponsorship he receives a taxable b e n e f it ,  should declare the 
source o f  the b e n e f i t ' ) .
47. Ib id . co l. 785.
48. Ib id . co ls. 761-2.
49. eg. Ib id . co ls . 753,777-8, 794.
50. Ib id . co l. 796.
51. Ib id . c o l .  800.
52. The 3 Members who voted against the Select Committee Report were
Mr Alex Lyon (Lab), Rt. Hon. J. Enoch Powell (U.U.U.C.) and Mr
James Molynequx (U.U.U.).
53. The other two Members voting in the 'yes' lobby were Conservative 
Members, Mr T. Rathbone and Mr D. Knox.
54. H.C. Debs. Vol. 897, co l.  424, Session 1974-75, 7 August 1975.
55. H.C. Debs. Vol. 899, co l.  526, Session 1974-75, 10 November 1975.
56. H.C. Debs. Vol. 897, co l.  324, Session 1974-75, 7 August 1975;
ib id .  Vol. 897, co l. 561, Session 1974-75, 13 October 1975; ib id .
Vol. 901, co l.  95, Session 1975-76, 25 November 1975.
57. Second Report from the Select Committee on Members' Interests 
(D ec la ra tion), H.C. 677, Session 1974-75, 11 November 1975, pp. 3-4, 
para. 5.
58. Ib id , p .4 . ,  para. 6 Although i t  is  a f te r  the c u t -o f f  po int fo r
th is  study, the Committee in th e i r  F i r s t  Report 14 January 1980,
para. 4 stated:
Financial Sponsorship.
"The rece ip t o f a g i f t  in re la t io n  to a Member's Parliamentary du ties , 
other than from overseas (to  which category 7 applies) should be re g is ­
tered under the sub-section (b) o f Category 5, Financial Sponsorships.
59. Ib id , p. 4, para. 7.
60. Ib id , p. 4, para. 8.
61. Ib id , p. 3, para. 4.
62. Register o f Members' In terests  as on 1st November 1975, Edition No. 1, ,
H.C. 699, Session 1975-76, 12 November 1975.
63. Ib id , p. i i i ,  para 7.
64. The in te re s t  deriv ing  from authorship gained to p ic a l i t y  in 1978 with the 
passage o f  the Public Lending Right B i l l ,  which was enacted in March 1979 
During the second reading o f th is  B i l l  Michael English (Lab) asked Mr 
Speaker fo r  an explanation o f the position regarding personal f in a n c ia l 
in te res ts  in re la t io n  to the B i l l .  H.C. Debs. Vol. 957, co l.  1360-61,
10 November 1978.
254.
65. See Chapter 1, Footnotes 37-41 inc lus ive .
66. Quoted in The Sunday Times, 30.11.1975.
67. Register o f Members' Interests as on 26 May 1976, H.C. 284, Session 
1975-76, 27 May 1976.
68. Report from the Select Committee on Members' In te re s ts , H.C. 479,
Session 1975-76, 26 May 1976.
69. I b id , p. 7.
70. I b id , p. 7.
71. Ib id , Appendix I I ,  p. 6 .
72. John Wilkes (1727-1797) MP fo r  Aylesbury and subsequently Middlesex.
Vindicated the r ig h t  o f  e lectora te  to return the candidate o f th e i r
choice to  House o f Commons.
73. Rt. Hon. Michael Foot took over from Rt. Hon. Edward Short as Leader 
o f the House on 8 April 1976.
74. H.C. Debs. Vol. 914, co l.  24, Session 1975-76, 28 June 1976.
75. Rt. Hon. Harold Wilson hhd resigned from being Prime M in is te r on 
16 March 1976.
76. The measures to be 'g u i l lo t in e d '  were the A irc ra f t  and Shipbuilding 
Industr ies B i l l ,  Dock Work Regulation B i l l ,  Education B i l l ,  National 
Health Services B i l l  and Rent (Agr icu ltu re ) B i l l .
77. Report from the Royal Commission on Standards o f Conduct in Public 
L i fe ,  Cmnd. 6524 o f  Session 1976-77, July 1976.
78. H.C. Debs. Vol. 918, co ls . 971-1108, Session 1975-76, 1 November 1976
Mr Callaghan had announced his in ten tion  o f se tt ing  up such a Select
Committee on 21.10.1976, H.C. Debs. Vol. 917, co l.  1658, Session 
1975-76.
79. H.C. Debs. Vol. 917, c o l .  361, Session 1975-76, 19 October 1976.
80. Quoted in The Guardian, 30.10.1976.
81. Report from the Select Committee on Conduct o f  Members, H.C. 490, 
Session 1976-77, 13 July 1977.
82. H.C. Debs. Vol. 935, co l.  2047, Session 1976-77, 22 July 1977.
83. H.C. Debs. Vol. 936, co ls. 332-462, Session 1976-77, 26 July 1977.
84. BOULTON, C.J. 'Conduct o f Members', The Table, Vol. XLVI (1978) 
pp. 28-31.
85. Special Report from the Select Committee on Members' In te res ts ,
H.C. 84, Session 1976-77, 21 December 1976, para. 3.
255.
86. H.C. Debs. Vol. 936, co ls. 996-998, Session 1976-77, 28 July 1977.
87. Although not debated in the House o f Commons the Report from the 
Royal Commission on Standards o f Conduct in Public L ife  was debated 
in the House o f Lords on 8 December 1976. Pari. Debs. Lords F i f th  
Series: Vol. 378, co ls. 585-671, Session 1976-77.
88. Report from the Royal Commission on Standards o f Conduct in Public 
L i fe ,  July 1976, op. c i t . p. 99, para. 311.
89. H.C. Debs. Vol. 936, co l.  1037, Session 1976-77, 28 July 1977.
90. Recorded in Tribune July 13, 1979, and expressed during conversation 
w ith  the author o f th is  study.
91. The Reg is trar, Mr Lankaster, explained tha t when Parliament was d is ­
solved there were no current Members and hence no current Register.
He had no au tho r ity  to permit the, now, former Register to be inspected 
and therefore allowed no public inspection and withdrew the L ibrary 
copy from the time o f d isso lu t ion . When the Committee f i r s t  met in the 
new Parliament they authorised him to deposit the Register fo r  the 
1974-79 Parliament in the Record Office in V ic to r ia  Tower where i t  is  
ava ilab le  fo r  public inspection.
92. See fn . 58.
93. H.C. Debs. Vol. 973, co l.  558, Session, 1979-80, 7 November 1979.
94. In July 1975, less than a month a f te r  the format o f the Register was
agreed fo r  Members, Mr Cyril Smith moved an amendment to clause one 
o f the Industry B i l l  to the e f fe c t  tha t the N.E.B. should maintain a 
re g is te r  o f  f in a n c ia l in te res ts  on the same lines  as the House o f 
Commons. (H.C. Debs. Vol. 894, cols. 1250-1267, S. 1974-75). The 
amendment was agreed to without d iv is io n  and the N.E.B. subsequently 
adopted a re g is te r  o f the f inanc ia l in te res ts  o f a l l  Members o f the 
Board which, un like th a t applicable to the House o f Commons, was a 
s ta tu to ry  requirement.
95. As explained in the in troduc tion , the termination date fo r  the period 
examined by th is  study was the May 1979 General Election. However, 
the Register is  s t i l l  a l i v e ,  i f  low p r io r i t y  issue. The new Select 
Committee on Members' In terests was f i n a l l y  set up in November 1979, 
and while  s t i l l  upholding the opinions o f the e a r l ie r  Select Committee 
eventually decided to go ahead and allow publication o f a new Register 
and then deal w ith actions against Members who refused to comply - 
these now to ta l le d  5: Mr Enoch Powell (U.U.U.C.), Mr Alex Lyon (Lab),
Rev. Ian Paisley (U .U.), Mr Kenneth Lewis (Con) and S ir  John Lanford- 
Holt (Con).
See: F i r s t  Report from the Select Committee on Members' In te re s ts ,
H.C. 337, Session 1979-80, 14 January 1980, and Second Report from 
the Select Committee on Members' In te res ts , H.C. 616, Session 1979-80, 
21 May 1980.
256.
Chapter 7
1. H.C. Debs. Vol. 812, co l.  1704, Session 1970-71, 3 March 1971.
2. H.C. Debs. Vol. 874, co l.  432, Session 1974, 22 May 1974.
3. Ib id . , c o l . 407.
4. Appendix 2, Q. 25 and Q. 26. Table 8 and Table 9. The actual per­
centage o f Members pursuing some kind o f regular or occasional 
employment was 70%. This f ig u re  is  the same as tha t emerging from 
the survey conducted by the Boyle Commission in  1971 (see ch. 5, note 
20). While the two f ind ings cannot be d i re c t ly  compared, they do : 
suggest th a t i t  is  l i k e ly  tha t the proportion o f MPs pursuing some 
kind o f  outside employment remained f a i r l y  constant between 1971 and 
1974. However, they reveal nothing about the time spent on such 
employment, which might have changed.
5. For d e ta i ls  o f  pay, allowances and pensions o f MPs 1912-1979 see: 
BUTLER, David and SLOMAN, Anne. B r i t is h  P o l i t ic a l  Facts 1900-1979, 
London, The Macmillan Press: f i f t h  ed. 1980, pp. 193-194.
6. As S ir  W. Ivor Jennings recognised in 1957, 'the average Member has 
to spend more time on his parliamentary duties than he would normally
spend in earning a l iv in g .  There is no eight-hour day or fo r t y - f iv e
hour w e e k . . . ' .  JENNINGS, S ir  W. Ivor. Parliament, Cambridge Univer­
s i t y  Press: 1957, 2 ed. pp. 44-45.
7. Although the sample survey indicated lack o f agreement among Members 
as to  what they understood by amateurism (and i t s  opposite, profes­
sionalism) over 80% of the sampled Members ins is ted th a t in general 
the conduct o f  the House could s t i l l  be described as amateur.
Appendix 2 , Q. 24.
8.' KING, Anthony. B r i t is h  Members o f Parliament: A Self P o r t ra i t ,  
London, The Macmillan Press Ltd. in connection w ith Granada T.V:
1974, p. 115.
9. H.C. Debs. Vol. 874, co l.  399, Session 1974, 22 May 1974.
10. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, E.E. The Semi-Sovereign People, New York, H o lt,
Rinehart and Winston: 1960; p. 24-25.
11. LUKES, Steven. Power, A Radical View, London; the Macmillan Press 
Ltd: 1974, reprin ted 1977, p. 34.
12. H.C. Debs. Vol. 953, co l.  26, Session 1977-78, 3 July 1978.
13. H.C. Debs. Vol. 973, co l.  544, Session 1979-80, 7 November 1979.
14. Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. XXXIII (1977) pp. 763-781.
The e th ics code contains no provision to separate one defective
section from other va l id  ones. Thus, i f  the Court were to  declare
the income section vo id , the en tire  code would be void.
15. The Report o f  the Select Committee on Members' Interests (Declaration)
H.C. 102, Session 1974-75, 12 December 1974, p. v i i ,  para. 10.
257.
16. The Report from the Select Committee on Conduct o f Members, H.C. 490, 
Session 1976-77, 13 July 1977.
17. BOULTON, C.J. 'Conduct o f Members', The Table, Vol. XLVI (1978), p .31
18. The Report o f the Select Committee o f Parliamentary P r iv i le g e , H.C.
34, Session 1967-68, December 1967, Appendix v, pp. 189-90.
19. Ib id . p. 194.
20. Ib id . p. 195.
21. Ib id . p. 106.
22. The confusion between c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t and corruption is examined 
in  Chapter 8.
23. The Prevention o f Corruption Acts include: Public Bodies Corrupt
Practices Act 1889 (Halsbury's Statutes o f England, 2nd ed. Vol. 5
pp. 919-921; The Prevention o f Corruption Act 1906 ( Ib id .pp . 924-
925); The Prevention o f Corruption Act 1916 ( Ib id . pp. 1043-1044). 
For a summary o f the Acts see the Report of the Royal Commission on
Standards of Conduct in Public L i fe ,  Cmnd. 6524 o f July 1976,
pp. 15-25 and 154-162.
24. Report o f  the Royal Commission on Standards o f Conduct in Public
L i fe ,  op. c i t .  para. 307, p. 98.
25. H.C. Debs. Vol. 917, co l. 1446, Session 1975-76, 20 October 1976.
26. H.C. Debs. Vol. 936, cols. 348 and 419, Session 1976-77, 26 July
1977.
27. The Report from the Select Committee of Parliamentary P r iv i le g e ,
H.C. 34, Session 1967-68, December 1967, paras. 194-197. Third 
Report from the Select Committee of Parliamentary P r iv i le g e , H.C.
417, Session 1976-77, paras. 13 and 15.
28. The Report o f the Royal Commission on Standards o f Conduct in 
Public L i fe ,  op. c i t . para. 311, p. 99.
29. The Times, 5 November 1976, Letter.
30. ZELLICK, Graham, 'B ribery o f Members o f Parliament and the Criminal 
Law', Public Law, Spring 1979, pp. 31-58.
31. For example see, R. v White (1875) 13 S.C.R. (N.S.W.) (L) 322;
R. V Boston (1923) 33 C.L.R. 386, 400.
32. R. V Boston, op. c i t . at p. 412.
33. ZELLICK, Graham, lo c . c i t .  p. 53.
34. See Chapter 3, Note 45.
258.
35. For a summary o f the rules applicable to the c i v i l  service see:
Report o f the Royal Commission on Standards o f Conduct in Public
L i fe ,  op. c i t . pp. 37-38 and Appendix 11.
36. For a summary o f the rules applicable to local government,see.
Ib id , pp. 38-39 and Appendix 12.
37. H.C. Debs. Vol. 936, co l. 342, Session 1976/77, 26 July 1977.
38. The Times, 4 July 1973.
39. Members o f Parliament and Conflic ts  o f In te re s ts , Green Paper 
signed by President of the Privy Council o f the Canadian Parliament,
July 1973, p. 6.
40. HOUGHTON, Douglas Rt. hon. 'F inancia l Interests o f Members o f P a r l ia ­
ment', The Parliamentarian, Vol. LV (1974) p. 7.
41. WEBER, Max. Methodology o f the Social Sciences, translated and edited 
by Edward A. Shi Is and Henry A. Finch, New York, The Free Press:
1949. Essay on '"O b je c t iv i ty "  in Social Sciences and Social P o l ic y ' ,  
p. 78.
42. This study adopts a d i f fe re n t  in te rp re ta t io n  o f p ro fess iona lisa t ion
than tha t used by BUCK, P.W. Amateurs and Professionals in B r i t is h  P o l i t i c s
1918-59, Chicago, Univers ity  o f Chicago Press: 1963, and MELLORS,
Co1in. The B r i t is h  M.P., Great B r i ta in ,  Saxon House: 1978. Mellors
fo llows Buck in  d iv id ing  MPs in to  'amateurs' and 'pro fess ionals ' 
according to th e i r  length o f parliamentary service. This study agrees 
with Michael Rush (Book review in The P o l i t ic a l  Q uarterly , Vol. 50 
(1979), pp. 142-43) tha t although length o f service is an important 
va r ia b le , i t  is  misleading to equate i t  w ith 'p ro fess iona lisa t ion '
- the extent to which MPs are fu l l - t im e  or part-time in carrying out 
th e i r  parliamentary duties.
43. For a discussion op th is  view see,for example, SHILS, Edward A.
The Torment o f Secrecy, London, Heinemann L td .: 1956, esp. pp. 37,
48 and 57.
44. See fo r  example, DREWRY, Gavin, 'The Outsider and House o f Commons
Reform: Some Evidence from The Crossman D ia r ie s ',  Parliamentary
A f f a i r s , Vol. XXXI (1978), pp. 424-435; BARKER, Anthony, 'Parliament 
and Patience ' ,  Poli teal S tudies, Vol. 15 (1967) pp. 74--81.
45. The Times, 19.7.1972. For a useful discussion o f whether p o l i t ic a l
careers can be assessed as a profession, the reader is  referred to 
EULAU H. and SPRAGUE J. Lawyers in  P o l i t ic s ,  A Study In Professional 
Convergence, Ind ianapo lis , Bobbs M e rr i l l  Co: 1964, pp. 139-141.
46. ARNOLD, Thurman, 'U.S. Congress Senate, Committee on Labour and
Public W elfare '. 1951. Establishment o f a Commission on Ethics in 
Government: Hearings before a sub-committee to study Senate
Concurrent Resolution 21 of the Committee on Labour and Public 
Welfare. 82d Congress, 1st Session, Washington: Government P rin ting
O ff ice , p. 372.
259.
47. This view is explored by Susan Wakefield in 'E th ics and the Public 
Service: A case fo r  Ind iv idual R e sp o n s ib i l i ty ' ,  Public Administra- 
t ion  Review, No. 6 , Nov/Dec 1976, pp. 661-666.
48. Over 80% of the sampled Members believed tha t Members' in te res ts  
and the problem o f c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  are part o f ,  or in d i r e c t ly  
associated w ith ,  the wider debate about open government (Appendix 
2, Q. 28). I t  was the view o f several MPs tha t Members' In terests  
are ju s t  one small part o f the problem, and tha t the campaign fo r  
more open-government was side-tracked away from the real problems 
gripp ing Parliament in to  the campaign fo r  the disclosure o f Members 
in te re s ts .
4-9. See fo r  example, NORTON, P h i l ip ,  The Commons in Perspective, Oxford, 
Martin Robertson: 1981, and others.
Chapter 8
1. H.C. Debs. Vol. 893, co ls. 756-757, Session 1974-75, 12 June 1975.
2. BIRCH, A.H. Representative and Responsible Government, London,
George Allen and Unwin; 1964: p. 227.
3. The d ifferences and s im i la r i t ie s  between Burkean and Liberal formu­
la t io ns  o f trus tee  theory are explored by David Judge in : 
'Representative Theories and Parliamentary S p e c ia l iza t io n ',  Paper 
prepared fo r  the annual conference of the P o l i t ic a l  Studies Associa­
t io n ,  Exeter, 1980; and 'B r i t is h  Representative Theories and P a r l ia ­
mentary S p e c i la is a t io n ', Parliamentary A f fa i r s ,  Vol. XXXIII (1980) 
pp. 40-53.
4. JUDGE, David. 'B r i t is h  Representative Theories and Parliamentary
S p e c ia l iz a t io n ',  Parliamentary A f fa i r s , Vol. XXXIII (1980), p. 51.
5. EULAU, H. e t.  a l . ,  'The Role o f the Representative: Some Empirical
Observations on the Theory o f Edmund Burke', American P o l i t ic a l  
Science Review, (1959), p. 750.
6. Ib id . p. 745.
7. Members o f Parliament and C on fl ic ts  o f In te res ts , Green Paper signed 
by the President o f the Privy Council o f the CanJian Parliament,
Ju ly 1973, p. 3.
8. JUDGE, David, lo c . c i t . pp. 51 and 52.
9. EULAU, H. Joe. c i t .  p. 754.
10. For a thorough discussion of th is  re la t ionsh ip  see: HARRISON, 
Martin. Trade Unions and The Labour Party since 1945, London,
George Allen and Unwin Ltd: 1960; MULLER, William D. Jhe 'Kept
Men'? , Great B r i ta in ,  Harvester Press Ltd: 1977.
11. A l l  e lec t ion  f igu res are from BUTLER, David and SLOMAN, Anne,
B r i t is h  P o l i t ic a l  Facts 1900-1979, f i f t h  e d i t io n .  Great B r i ta in ,  
Macmillan: 1980.
260.
12. Report o f the Select Committee on Members' In te rests  (Declaration)
H.C. 57, Session 1969-70, 4 December 1969, Evidence, Appendix I I I ,  - 
p. 121.
13. H.C. Debs. Vol. 440, co l.  369, Session 1946-47, 15 July 1947.
14. Ib id . co l.  301.
15. MULLER, William D. op. c i t . p. 194.
16. See note 13.
17. Report from the Select Committee o f P r iv i leges , H.C. 50, Session 
1971-72, p. 5, para. 14.
18. DOIG, Alan, 'S e lf -D is c ip l in e  and The House o f Commons: The Poulson
A f fa i r  in a Parliamentary Perspective ', Parliamentary A f fa i r s ,
Vol. XXXII (Summer 1979) p. 258.
19. Stated during BBC 1 Television programme. Question Time, 26 March 1981
20. The Guardian, 14 January 1981.
21. H.C. Debs. Vol. 973, co l.  558, Session 1970-80, 7 November 1979.
22. A f f i l i a t i o n  o f union-sponsored MPs is  recorded in the Reports o f the 
Annual Conference o f the Labour Party.
23. COOMBES, D. and WALKLAND, S.A. (eds). Parliaments and Economic
A f f a i r s , London, Heinemann: 1980, p. TDl
24. DOIG, Alan, loc. c i t .  p. 259.
25. The Times, 22 December 1980. A Private Members' B i l l  was introduced
by Mr Bob Cryer (Lab) on 2 February 1982 w ith the in ten tion  o f re g is ­
te r ing  The "professional lobby is ts" o f Parliament.
26. Report o f  the Select Committee on Members' In terests (Decla ra tion),
1969, op. c i t . Evidence, Q. 343.
27. Ib id . Evidence, Q. 344.
28. In Labour Weekly, 26 A pril 1974.
29. The Daily Telegraph, 20 May 1974.
30. Report o f  the Select Committee on Members' Interests (Declaration)
1969, op. c i t . Evidence, p. 50.
31. Ib id . Evidence, p. 145.
32. Ib id . Evidence, p. 52
33. The Guardian, 27 March 1981. These a llegations were made by
Chapman Pincher, the former defence correspondent o f the Daily
Express.
261.
34. Report o f  the Select Committee on Members' In terests  (Declaration) 
1969, op_- c i t . Evidence, p. 146.
35. H.C. Debs. Vol. 970, co ls. 2025-6, Session 1979-80, 19 July 1979.
Mr Eldon G r i f f i t h s  in fa c t  moved the motion tha t 'This House 
believes th a t the sentence o f cap ita l punishment should again be 
ava ilab le  to the co u r ts '.
36. See Chapter 7, fn . 23.
37. For example, R. v Smith (1960), 1. A.E.R. 256.
38. Lord Chancellor, 1901, contained in Home Office Papers and c ited
in evidence to the Royal Commission on Standards o f Conduct in 
Public Life., op. c i t . by the Home O ffice . Public Records O ffice  
reference: Hïï/124/41.
39. BROOKS, Robert C ., 'The nature of P o l i t ic a l  C orrup t ion ',  in
HEIDENHEIMER, Arnold J . , P o l i t ic a l  Corruption: Readings in Compara-
t iv e  A na lys is , U.S.A., H o lt, Rinehart and Winston Inc: 1970,
p. 56.
40. For example, used by NYE, J .S .,  'Corruption and P o l i t ic a l  Development
A Cost-Benefit A na lys is ',  in HEIDENHEIMER, Arnold J . , 1970, op. c i t . ;
pp. 564-579.
41. For example, used by van KLAVERN, Jacob, 'The Concept o f C orrup t ion ',
in HEIDENHEIMER, Arnold J . ,  1970, op. cv t. , pp. 38-41.
42. For example, used by FRIEDRICH, Carl J . ,  'P o l i t ic a l  Pathology',
in P o l i t ic a l  Q uarte r ly , No. 37 (1966), p. 74.
43. BROOKS, Robert C . , lo c . c i t .  p. 57.
44. HURSTFIELD, Joel. 'P o l i t ic a l  Corruption in Modern England; the
H is to r ia n 's  Problem', H is to ry , No. 52, February 1967, pp. 16-34, 
a t p. 18.
45. CHIBNALL, Steven and SAUNDERS, Peter. 'Worlds Apart: Notes on 
the Social Rea lity  o f  C orrup tion ', B r i t is h  Journal o f Sociology,
Vol. 28 (1977) p. 138.
46. There is  a s im i la r i t y  between th is  argument and Steven Lukes'sobser­
vation th a t d i f fe re n t  conceptions o f what in te res ts  are associated 
w ith d i f fe re n t  moral and p o l i t ic a l  positions. See Chapter 7, fn . 11.
47. Although i t  should be remembered tha t one feature o f Parliament's
handling o f  misconduct on the part o f i t s  Members is tha t i t  avoids
recourse to the courts.
48. The Financial Times, 9 May 1974.
49. The Times, 22 July 1980.
50. HAMILTON, W illiam W. 'Members and Outside In te re s ts ' ,  The 
Parliamentarian, Vol. 56-57 (1975-76) p. 230.
262.
51. NEWMAN, Frank C. 'Reflections on Money and Party P o l i t ic s  in  
B r i t a in ' , Pariiamentary A f fa i r s , Vol. X (1956-57) p. 318.
52. FINER, Samuel E. Anonymous Empire: A Study of the Lobby in
Great B r i t a in , London, Pall Mall Press: 1969 Rev. ed. p. 117.
53. When reporting  on the case o f  Mrs Tennant, the Select Committee 
o f  P riv ileges pointed to s im ila r problems in order to i l l u s t r a te  
the d i f f i c u l t y  o f determining the borderline between leg it im a te  
p o l i t i c a l  a c t iv i t y  and i l le g itm a te  pressure upon MPs. Report
From the Select Committee of P riv i leges , H.C. 181, Session 1945-46, 
para. 4.
263.
APPENDIX 1
The Random Sample Survey: a statement on technique
1
The in te rv iew  schedule
A copy o f the in terv iew schedule used fo r  the random sample survey 
is  attached ( f ig .  1). This went through three d ra f t  stages in an attempt 
to formulate c lear and unambiguous questions. Each d ra f t  was revised in  
the l ig h t  o f comments by academic advisers and MPs who were kind enough 
to ass is t in th is  process.
Taking in to  consideration tha t MPs are busy people and (as they 
confirmed) are inundated with requests fo r  assistance with research, i t  
seemed sensible to r e s t r i c t  the schedule to one which could be completed 
adequately in 45 minutes. One tha t was longer would have courted the 
danger of t i r i n g  the respondents and so reducing the r e l i a b i l i t y  o f th e i r  
re p l ie s .  A t r i a l  run on the schedule amended i t  f i n a l l y  to 37 questions. 
Some o f the factua l information required was confined to a separate l i s t  
o f questions, the answers to which could be derived from various re fe r ­
ence books on Parliament.
The i n i t i a l  in troductory  le t t e r  ( f ig .  2) played a cruc ia l ro le  in 
gaining the assistance o f Members and ju s t i f ie d  the d isproportionate 
amount o f time spent on i t s  construction and on typing i t  out in d iv id u ­
a l l y  fo r  each Member.
The sample frame
As stated in Chapter 2, the sampling frame comprised a l l  those MPs 
who had been in  the House a t the time o f the 1974 d iv is io n  on the Register 
o f  Members' In te res ts  and who were s t i l l  Members in 1979. This involved 
sub tracting from a l i s t  o f MPs s i t t in g  in  the House in May 1974 a l l  those 
who had d ied, re t i re d ,  been elevated to the peerage, were in e l ig ib le  to 
vote^ or who had lo s t  th e i r  seats in the October 1974 General E lection or 
the May 1979 General E lection. Therefore the to ta l  population included 
in  the sampling frame was:-
Total o f  MPs in  1974: 835
Total o f  MPs missing or in e l ig ib le  to vote in 1979: 180
Total sampling frame: 455
The most convenient l i s t  to use fo r  the sampling frame was the 
D iv is ion  l i s t  i t s e l f  (Div. 31 o f 22 May 1974) which l i s t s  separately, in 
a lphabetical order, the Members who voted fo r  or against the motion.
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The 'absent/abstained' stratum was obtained by working through the alpha­
be tica l l i s t  o f Members provided in the Times Guide to the House o f 
Commons (February 1974 e d i t io n ) ,  s t r ik in g  o f f  a l l  Members who voted yes 
or no. This l e f t  an alphabetical l i s t  o f  a l l  Members who were absent or 
abstained or in e l ig ib le  to  vote. Having thus obtained an alphabetical 
l i s t  fo r  each stratum, those MPs missing in 1979 or in e l ig ib le  to vote 
were e lim inated, leaving three alphabetical l i s t s  o f the 455 Members mak­
ing up the sampling frame.
The sampling f ra c t io n
The sample o f MPs required was 30, and as explained in  Chapter 2, 
the precis ion o f the sample was increased by s t r a t i f y in g  on the voting 
patterns in the d iv is io n  on the motion to establish the Register.
To obtain a sample re f le c t in g  the climate o f opinion in the House 
in 1974 the procedure followed was to f i r s t  ca lcu la te the correct propor­
tions in each stratum tha t would have resulted i f  the en t ire  1974 popu­
la t io n  o f the House could have been sampled. The composition o f the
3
whole House s t r a t i f ie d  by voting behaviour in the d iv is io n  was:- 
Ayes: 363 + 2 te l le r s  = 365
Noes: 168 + 2 te l le rs  = 170
A/A : 97 = 9 7
To obtain the ta rge t sample o f 30 MPs the correct un if ied  sampling f ra c ­
t io n  would have been:- 632 = 21
mo­
using th is  sampling f ra c t io n ,  the 30 MPs required would have been d i s t r i ­
buted in the fo llow ing  proportions:- 
Ayes: 17
Noes: 8
A/A : 5
Having established the correct proportions required in the sample, 
the variab le  sampling fra c t ions  required to a rr ive  at th is  d is t r ib u t io n  
could be calcu lated fo r  the actual sample as fo l lo w s :-
( i )  Composition o f the 455 Members in the sample popula tion:- 
Ayes: 260
Noes: 131
A/A : 64
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( i l )  Calculation o f variab le sampling f ra c t io n s :
260 = 15.29 = 15Ayes : 
Noes : 
A/A :
17
131 = 16.37 = 16
8
64 = 12.8 = 13 
5
Using these sampling f ra c t io n s ,  the sample o f 30 MPs would be d is ­
t r ib u te d  in  the ra t io  17:8:5, re f le c t in g  the voting ch a ra c te r is t ics  o f 
the House in  1974.
Drawing the sample
The random sample was drawn by the method o f 'systematic sam pling '; '
i . e .  where the desired sampling f ra c t io n  is  ' k ' ,  se lecting every kth per­
son throughout the l i s t ,  s ta r t in g  with a randomly chosen number between 
one and k in c lus ive .
Bearing in mind th a t a proportion o f those 30 MPs would fo r  various 
reasons not respond, a second sample of 30 MPs was drawn in exactly the 
same way as the o r ig in a l sample; the in te n t ion  being to reach the 
c o r re c t ly  proportioned ta rge t o f 30 MPs by system atica lly  working 
through the names in the second s t r a t i f ie d  sample u n t i l  the ta rge t number 
was reached.
Composition o f the sample
The fo llow ing  is  an alphabetical l i s t  o f the MPs who made up the 
completed sample:-
Mr F. Allaun 
Mr J. Ashton 
Mr E. Bulmer 
Mr L. Carter-Jones 
Mrs L. Chalker 
Mr S. Cohen 
Mr J. Cope 
Mr E. Deakins 
Mr M. English 
Mr E. Fletcher
Mr P. Fry
S ir  Raymond Gower
Mr I .  G r is t
Mr P. Hawkins
Mr F. Hooley
S ir  John Langford-Holt
Mr I .  Lawrence
Miss J. Lestor
Mr K. Lewis
Mr K. Marks
Mr T. McMillan 
Rt. Hon. C. Morris 
Mr.N. Miscampbell 
Mr J. Moore 
Rt. Hon. J. Peyton 
Mr R. Sims 
Mr I .  Stanbrook 
Mr R. Taylor 
Mr S. Thorne 
Mr P. Whitehead
Response rate
The response rate fo r  the sample as a whole was 57%. As shown in 
Table 3 , the rates fo r  each o f the s tra ta  were as fo llows: Ayes 61%; 
Noes 50%; and Absent/Abstained 56%. Several factors  con tr ibu ting  to an
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explanation o f these differences in  response rates emerged from the in te r ­
views and from le t te rs  o f re fusa l.  Those who voted to estab lish  the 
Register tended to be more in terested in  the subject o f the research than 
those who voted no or abstained and were more ready to ta lk  about i t .
Many o f those who voted no or abstained f e l t  they had nothing to c o n t r i -  
butetiTi the subject, and even a f te r  reassurance tha t th e i r  opinions were 
equally valuable as those who voted yes in  gauging the climate o f opinion 
in  the House in 1974, some s t i l l  declined to be interviewed. Closely 
associated with th is  explanation was the fa c to r  o f Party. A l l  those in  
the 'Noes' stratum and the 'Absent/Abstained' stratum were Conservative 
Members who, as Table 4 ind ica tes , had a lower response rate than the 
Labour Members contacted. S im ila r ly  the m ajority  o f the 'Ayes' stratum 
(82%) were Labour Members who had the higher response ra te . As the study 
confirms, more Conservative than Labour Members are l i k e ly  to have outside 
in te re s ts .  For th is  reason, among others id e n t i f ie d  in  the te x t ,  they 
are more l i k e ly  to be an t ipa the t ic  to the idea o f a re g is te r ,  which they 
have a tendency to see as the f i r s t  step on the 's l ip p e ry  slope' towards 
a fu l l - t im e  House o f Commons. This is  not to a t t r ib u te  such a view to a l l  
Conservative Members.
A de ta iled  analysis o f  non-response is provided in Table 5. Here 
the category o f non-response is  broken down in to  i t s  main components o f 
no re p ly , reasoned refusal and unreasoned re fusa l.
No rep ly : Only two Members (approximately 7% o f the numbered sampled)
did not reply a t a l l .  Both were Labour Members who had voted fo r  the 
Register in 1974. Perhaps s ig n i f ic a n t  in terms o f th e i r  non-response, 
both abstained or were absent from the debate on the Register in June 1975.
Reasoned re fusa ls : Of the reasoned re fusa ls , th ir teen  out o f the sixteen
Members in  th is  category (81%) gave lack o f time as a reason fo r  th e i r  
re fusa l.  This was p a r t ic u la r ly  so o f Conservative Members, many o f whom 
were now, w ith  the change o f Government, in  m in is te r ia l  pos it ions. Of 
the remaining three reasoned refusals one was unclear, another explained, 
' t h is  is  not a s p e c ia l is t  in te re s t  of m ine ! ',  and the th i r d ,  su rp r is in g ly  
a Labour Member, f e l t  he had nothing to add to his opinion tha t 'the 
clamour fo r  a re g is te r  came from the unemployable and the envious'.
Unreasoned re fusa ls : Five Members, three Labour and two Conservative,
gave no reason fo r  th e i r  refusals but did at least acknowledge rece ip t o f 
the request fo r  assistance and confirmed th e i r  non-response.
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Footnotes
A discussion by Arthur Korn hauserof the problems a r is in g  in  the 
construction o f in terv iew schedules proved p a r t ic u la r ly  he lp fu l 
fo r  th is  researcher. See, KORNHAUSER, A rthur, 'Constructing 
Questionnaires and Interview Schedules', in  JAHODA, M., DEUTCH, M ., 
COOK, S.W. Research Methods in Social Relations, Part Two. 
Selected Techniques, New York, The Dryden Press: 1951, pp. 423-
W T .
2. Mr Speaker, the Chairman o f Ways and Means and the F i r s t  and Second 
Deputy Chairman o f Ways and Means are in e l ig ib le  to vote because 
o f  the Offices they hold. At the time o f the 1974 D iv is ion  there 
was no Second Deputy.
3. Excluding the three Members in e l ig ib le  to vote (see note 2. above).
4. As explained by MOSER, C .A ., and KALTON, G., Survey Methods in
Social In ve s t ig a t io n , London, Heinemann: 1973, pp. 83, s t r i c t l y
speaking 'systematic sampling' is  not equivalent to simple random 
sampling. I t  does not give a l l  possible samples o f size n from the
population o f s ize N an equal chance o f se lection. Once the samp­
l in g  f ra c t io n  has been determined, the random selection o f the 
f i r s t  s ta r t in g  po in t determines the whole sample.
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Survey on Members' In terests  
w ith  special reference to the in troduction  o f a 
Register o f  Members' In te re s ts .
Sandra Williams - Bedford College.
Seria l number o f informant..............
1. In what ways and to  what extent do you th ink  the decision in May 
1974 to  estab lish a compulsory re g is te r  o f Members' in te res ts  s ig ­
n i f ie d  a change in the a t t i tu d e  o f the House o f Commons towards d is ­
closure o f in te rests?
2. The 1969 Select Committee on Members' In terests  (Declaration) 
reached i t s  conclusion not to recommend a re g is te r  o f Members' 
in te res ts  on the assumption tha t MPs should be treated no d i f f e r ­
en tly  than outside c it iz e n s .  Do you agree with th is  assumption, or 
do you th ink tha t on entering public l i f e  an MP should be prepared 
to  give up some o f his privacy in the area o f his f ina nc ia l in te r ­
ests and a c t iv i t ie s ?
3. What information do you th ink  the public has a r ig h t  to know about 
the f ina nc ia l a c t iv i t ie s  and in te res ts  o f i t s  le g is la to rs  outside 
the House o f Commons?
4. Do you agree w ith the statement made by Edward Short (now Lord
Glenamara) in the May 1974 Debate on Members' In terests  th a t a com­
pulsory re g is te r  was necessary to restore public confidence in Par­
liament?
5. (a) Do you th ink  tha t public anxiety over Members' f in a n c ia l
in te res ts  has been the main fa c to r  in fluencing the change in
Parliament's a t t i tu d e  to disclosure o f in terests?
(b) What other fac tors  do you th ink influence Parliament's approach 
to d isclosure o f in terests?
6. Could you give me the main reason fo r  the position you took in the
debate on Members' in te res ts  on 22 May 1974, and fo r  the way you 
voted on the motion to establish a compulsory re g is te r  o f Members' 
in te rests?
Fig. 1: Interview Schedule
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7. Would you have voted fo r  a voluntary re g is te r ,  or would you have
preferred the arrangements regarding Members' in te res ts  which 
existed before the May 1974 resolutions to have continued unchanged? 
(To be askèd o f those who voted no or were absent or abstained in 
the above debate).
8. What do you consider disclosure o f Members' in te res ts  is  for?
(a) Pre-coded reasons
( i )  To provide the House with information on any pecuniary 
in te re s t  or other material bene fit  which an MP may 
receive and which may be thought to a f fe c t  his conduct 
as an MP or influence his a c t iv i t ie s ,  speeches or vote 
in  Parliament?
( i i )  To provide the general public w ith such information?
( i i i )  To pro tect a Member against any a llegations or innuendos 
which might be made against him?
(b) Any other reasons; i f  so, please state what?
9. Have you ever made a disclosure statement? I f  so, when and where?
10. Are you s a t is f ie d  with the categories o f reg is trab le  in te res ts  
included in  the Register? (show card disp laying c la s s i f ic a t io n s  
used by the Register).
11
1 2 ,
13.
14.
(a
(b
(a
(b
(a
(b
(a
(b
Do you th ink  any o f the ex is ting  categories should be excluded? 
I f  so, what?
Do you th ink  any fu r th e r  categories should be included?
I f  so, what?
Do you th ink  any other classes o f person besides MPs should 
re g is te r  th e i r  f ina nc ia l in terests?
I f  so, whom?
Do you th ink  tha t in te res ts  other than f in a n c ia l in te res ts  
should be declared and/or registered?
I f  so, what?
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15. Do you th ink  tha t the re g is te r  should be enforced by a standing 
order as suggested by the Select Committee on Members' In terests? -
16. (a) In your view, should the House take action against any Member
who refuses to reg is ter?
(b) I f  so, what action should be taken?
17. In your opin ion, should the re g is te r  be s ta tu to ry  ra ther than set
up by a reso lu tion  o f the House?
18. In the l ig h t  o f experience o f the workings of the re g is te r  since
1974 i f  you had to vote fo r  i t s  continuance which way would you
vote? Please give reasons fo r  your answer.
* * * * *
I would now l ik e  to ask you some general questions about Members and th e i r
in te re s ts .
19. What in te re s ts ,  i f  any (apart from those o f your constituents in 
genera l), do you th ink  an MP may le g it im a te ly  represent in the 
House?
20. What, i f  any, outside in te res ts  do you th ink  MPs may le g it im a te ly  
have?
21. In 1971 the Review Body on Top Salaries reached the conclusion tha t 
most Members must be considered as working on a fu l l - t im e  basis, 
and the level o f remuneration assessed accordingly. Do you th ink  
MPs' sa la r ies  and allowances should be calculated on a fu l l - t im e  
basis?
22. Are present salary leve ls sa tis fac to ry?
23. Would i t  be feas ib le  and/or desirable to ra ise sa laries and ban out­
side employment?
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24. (a) I t  was suggested in the debate on the motion to set up the
1969 Select Committee on Members' In terests  (Declaration) and 
has been endorsed by a recent Select Committee on Procedure, 
tha t the House often behaves in a way tha t might be described 
as amateur. Do you th ink  th is  is  a f a i r  description?
(b) Can you t e l l  me what you understand by the term 'amateur' in 
th is  context?
(c) Conversely, can you t e l l  me what you understand by the term 
'p ro fess iona l' in th is  context?
25. Do you th ink  the House should consist e n t i re ly  o f fu l l - t im e  Members?
26. (a) To what extent do you consider the job o f an MP is  fo r  your­
s e l f  a fu l l - t im e  occupation?
(b) Apart from your work as an MP do you have any other paid or un­
paid employment?
27. The issue o f Members' in te res ts  has been considered by both Labour 
and Conservative Governments to be a House issue ra ther than a party 
issue. Do you th ink  MPs view the issue in a s im ila r  way, or do you 
th ink  there is  in practice party c lus te r ing  in terms o f a tt i tu d e s  on 
th is  subject?
28. Do you consider the top ic o f disclosure o f Members' in te res ts  to be 
part o f  the wider debate about open government?
29. Can you t e l l  me whether you are in favour o f public sound broadcast­
ing o f the procedures o f Parliament?
30. Can you t e l l  me whether you are in favour o f te le v is in g  the proced­
ures o f Parliament?
31. Do you th ink  the issue o f Members' f in a n c ia l in te res ts  is  a domestic 
matter which should be se tt le d  e n t i re ly  w ith in  the House, or do you 
th ink  i t  is  a subject fo r  wider discussion, drawing on expertise 
from th is  country and perhaps from abroad?
272.
32. To what extent do you th ink tha t mutual t ru s t  among Members is  one 
o f the foundations upon which p o l i t ic a l  l i f e  is  conducted?
33. Do you th ink  MPs should be subject to the corruption laws in  th e i r  
parliamentary capacity as well as in th e i r  p r iva te  capacity , or do 
you th ink  tha t parliamentary p r iv i le g e  should continue to  regulate 
MPs' behaviour in th e i r  parliamentary capacity as regards a llega ­
tions o f  corruption?
34. (a) Can you t e l l  me what you understand by the term 'c o r ru p t io n '? 
(b) How fa r  does i t  overlap w ith the term 'c o n f l i c t  o f in te re s t '?
35. Could you t e l l  me what aspects, i f  any, o f being an MP might provide 
the opportun ity  fo r  a po ten tia l 'c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t '  and possibly 
corrupt a c t iv i ty ?
36. Have you ever been worried about a possible c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t  in 
your own parliamentary career?
37. Did you give up or se l l  any in te res ts  when you entered Parliament 
to  avoid any po ten tia l c o n f l ic t?
Date o f In te rv ie w :
Length o f In te rv iew : 
Location o f In te rv iew : 
Permission to acknowledge 
Permission to  Quote: 
Comments
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Additional information co llec ted on respondents 
(but not included in  the random sample in te rv iew  schedule).
38. What age was Member:^
(a) a t the time o f  the motion to estab lish a compulsory re g is te r  
- May 1974?
(b) a t time o f in terv iew in 1979?
39. What was the la s t  school Member attended?
40. What was the la s t  u n ive rs ity ,  i f  any, Member attended?
41. At which General E lection or by-e lection did Member enter the House?
42. How long had Member served in the House at the time o f the motion
to estab lish a compulsory re g is te r  - May 1974?
43. Which way did Member vote, i f  at a l l ,  in the d iv is io n  on 12 dune 1975 
to agree w ith the recommendations made by the Select Committee on 
Members' In terests (Declaration)?
44. Which way did Member vote, i f  at a l l ,  in the d iv is ions on 24 February 
1975 on the motion to authorise an experiment in the broadcasting
o f Parliament by:-
(a) Public Sound Broadcasting
(b) Television
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Bedford College
(U n iv e rs ity  of London)
REGENT’S PARK LONDON NW1 4NS
Telephone:  01-486 4400  
Telegram s:  Edforcoll London N W 1
House o f Commons, 
London S.W.1.
, MP,
Date
Dear S ir ,
I am w r i t in g  to you as a post-graduate student a t Bedford College, 
Un ivers ity  o f London, to ask whether you would k ind ly  spare some time 
to ass is t me w ith  my research.
The research p ro je c t,  to be submitted fo r  a Ph.d., is concerned
with the issue o f 'c o n f l i c t  o f in te re s t '  in government. To a large
extent i t  focuses on the rules and conventions governing Members o f 
Parliament in th is  area, and looks p a r t ic u la r ly  a t the campaign fo r  the 
re g is t ra t io n  o f Members' In terests  and the Register i t s e l f  as i t  was 
f i n a l l y  established by a reso lu tion  o f the House. I have already con­
sulted most o f  the re levant l i te ra tu re  and O f f ic ia l  Publica tions, but 
would l i k e  to ta lk  to Members, l ik e  yo u rse lf ,  who were MPs at the time 
o f the debate on se tt ing  up the re g is te r  which took place in May 1974.
I have already had a f r u i t f u l  ta lk  w ith the Registrar o f Members'
In te res ts  and would be most g ra te fu l i f  you would s im i la r ly  agree to a
short in te rv iew  on the subject o f Members' in te res ts .
I hope to in te rv iew  a t least t h i r t y  MPs who were in the House at 
the time o f the 1974 debate. Your name appears in the random s ta t is t ic a l  
sample tha t I have drawn. That sample has been devised in order to  cover 
a representative cross-section o f opinion in the House and I am sure you 
w i l l  understand my anxiety to maintain a correc t s ta t is t ic a l  balance by 
gaining the co-operation of as many Members as possible.
I envisage the in terv iew taking about fo r t y - f i v e  minutes, although 
th is  would obviously depend on the time tha t you f e l t  you could spare. 
Would i t  be possible to meet you at a convenient time, date and venue in 
the near future? I rea lise  tha t you are extremely busy, but would be most 
g ra te fu l fo r  your assistance. I need hardly add tha t any information you 
give me w i l l  not be a tt r ib u te d  to you w ithout your permission.
Yours f a i t h f u l l y .
Sandra Williams
(F ig. 2)
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Response Rate fo r  Random Sample Interviews
Strata
2
Sample
Drawn
Completed
Sample
Response
Rate
Ayes 28 17 60.71%
Noes 16 8 50.00%
Absent/Abstained 9 5 55.56%
TOTAL 53 30 56.60%
Footnotes
1 For analysis o f non-response see Table 'F ive .
2 Total number drawn in order to reach the ta rge t number to be in te r ­
viewed w ith in  each stratum. A l l  were drawn on a random sample 
basis.
Table 3
276.
Overall Response Rate by Party
Category o f Response
Conservative Labour Liberal Total
No. %1 No. % No. % No. %
Replied/Interviewed 
(Completed Sample) 16 51.61 14 66.67 0 0 30 56.60
Total non-response 15 48.39 7 33.33 1 100 23 43.40
2
Sample drawn 31 100.00 21 100.00 1 100 53 100.00
Footnotes :
Percentage figures re fe r  to percentage o f the number o f tha t 
Party sampled who responded in a p a r t ic u la r  way. i . e .  51.61% 
o f the 31 Conservative Members in the sample drawn rep lied  and 
were interviewed. The f igures add v e r t ic a l ly .
Total number drawn in order to reach the ta rge t number to be 
interviewed w ith in  each stratum. A ll were drawn on a random 
sample basis.
TABLE 4
277 .
Analysis o f Non-Response
Stratum
1
Number
Sampled
Category o f Non-Response Total Non-Response
No Reply ReasonedRefusal
Unreasoned
Refusal Number % Rate
Ayes 28 2 7.14% 6 21.43% 3 10.71% 11 39.29%
Noes 16 0 0 7 43.75% 1 6.25% 8 50.00%
Absent/
Abstained 9 0 0 3 33.34% 1 11. 11% 4 44.44%
Total 53 2 3.77% 16 30.19% 5 9.43% 23 43.40%
Footnotes :
1 Total number sampled in order to reach the ta rge t number to be 
interviewed w ith in  each stratum. A ll were drawn on a random 
sample basis.
TABLE 5
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Footnotes
A ll  starred questions or parts o f  questions involved m u lt ip le  res­
ponses. Each category o f response was a llocated a separate column 
on the ind iv idua l coding sheets, and the respondents were coded 
according to whether or not they mentioned the category. Thus 
the frequencies fo r  each category in these questions is the number 
and percentage o f  the to ta l  sample (or stratum) who mentioned the 
category, and the f igu res fo r  the question as a whole do not to ta l  
30 or 100%.
This question is  only applicable to the 13 respondents who voted no 
or abstained. Therefore the percentage f igu res are a percentage o f  
13 and not 30.
Part (b) o f question 16 is  only applicable to the 11 respondents 
who said yes to part (a). Therefore, the percentage figures are a 
percentage o f 11 and not 30.
During re-evaluation o f the in terv iew  schedule and responses a f te r  
the interviews were completed i t  was decided to delete question 19 
from the coding schedule and the frequencies tab le  because i t  seemed 
to produce unre liab le  responses. Some discussion o f  the responses 
w i l l  be included in the te x t .
In in te rp re t in g  the figures fo r  the respondents coded as being ‘ f u l l ­
time; w ith no outside in te re s ts ' and s im i la r ly  having no outside 
paid/unpaid employment, i t  should be taken in to  account th a t the 
to ta ls  include 3 Members who are now m in is te rs  and are therefore pre­
cluded by m in is te r ia l  rules from pursuing outside in te re s ts .  A l l  
3 Members previously held outside in te re s ts ,  and gave m in is te r ia l  
o f f ic e  as the reason fo r  re linqu ish ing  them. Thus, the to ta ls  may 
overestimate the amount o f Members who by choice would regard them­
selves as fu l l - t im e  with no outside in te res ts .
The d e f in i t io n s  o f  corruption provided by respondents (Question 34(a)) 
varied g rea tly  and here have been reduced to very general categories 
according to the emphasis given by respondents. More deta iled  d is ­
cussion o f the d e f in i t io n s  w i l l  be included in the te x t .
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Although th is  question has been coded care must be taken in in te r ­
preting the responses. Whether a Member responded yes or no appeared 
to depend on whether he l im ite d  his understanding o f  'c o n f l i c t  o f  
in te re s t '  to c o n f l ic ts  invo lv ing a pecuniary aspect, or whether he 
extended his d e f in i t io n  to  c o n f l ic ts  o f  in te re s t  o f  a non-pecuniary 
kirid, which he deemed to be endemic to p o l i t ic s .  A Member could in 
fa c t  have experienced the c o n f l ic ts  which led another Member to  be 
coded in category 3, bu t, because o f h is re s tr ic te d  d e f in i t io n  o f  
'c o n f l i c t  o f  in te r e s t ' ,  could have answered no to the question and 
have been coded in  category 1. This problem w i l l  be discussed fu r th e r  
in the te x t .
A ll  respondents in the categories '1974 and above' (Question 41) and 
'under 4 months' (Question 42) were elected a t the General E lection 
in  February 1974.
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Table 6
Q.2: M.P.'s views on whether they should have less Privacy in  the
area o f Financial In terests and A c t iv i t ie s  than outside C itizens
Voting
Behaviour
Views on whether MPs should have less privacy
Yes No Other
Yes 16 0 1
No 5 3 0
A/A 2 3 0
Total 23 6 1
Table 7
Q.2 and Q.7: Of those M.P.s who voted no or abstained:
Preference fo r  Voluntary Register or pre-1974 
Practices cross-tabulated with views on Privacy
Preferred
Practice
Views on Privacy
Limited erosion 
o f privacy
No erosion o f 
privacy
Voluntary
Register 3 0
Pre-1974
Practices 2 6
Other 2 0
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Table 8
Q.25: M.P.'s Views on Fu ll- t im e  Membership o f the House o f Commons
Voting
Behaviour
Views on whether MPs should be fu l l - t im e
Yes: no outside 
in te re s ts *
Yes : but w ith 
outside in te res ts
No Do not know
Yes 8 6 3 0
No 0 1 • ' .6 1
A/A 0 1 ' :4 0
Total 8 8 ' 13 1
This was the only category o f response to define fu l l - t im e  member­
ship in  terms o f debarring Members from holding outside in te res ts , 
Excluding the one Member who gave no opin ion, twenty-one 
Members (approximately 70% o f the sample) thought M.P.s should 
be able to  hold outside in te res ts .
Table 9
Q.26(b): Members' involvement in outside paid/unpaid Employment
Voting
Behaviour
Does Respondent have outside paid/unpaid employment?
Yes No
Yes 11 6
No 6 2
A/A 4 1
Total , 21 9"^
This to ta l  includes three M inisters (the two 'no' votes and the 
one 'A /A ')  who were prohib ited by M in is te r ia l  rules from holding 
outside in te re s ts . A l l  three, when backbenchers, had previously 
held outside in te res ts  and gave M in is te r ia l  O ffice as the reason 
fo r  re linqu ish ing  them. Therefore, the to ta l  o f  twenty-one 
Members (or approximately 70% of the sample) may underestimate 
the proportion o f Members who by choice would hold some type o f 
outside employment.
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APPENDIX 3
P ro f i le  o f Key Informant Interviews
Name Location
Clerks of the House o f Commons
Mr K.A. Bradshaw, Clerk Assistant. H o f C
(Clerk to the 1969 Select Committee on Members' In te res ts )
Mr R.S. Lankester, H o f C
Registrar o f Members' In te res ts .
Mr D.A.M. Pring, Clerk o f the Committees H o f C
(Former Registrar o f Members' In te re s ts ) .
Mr C.B. W in n i f r i th ,  H o f  C
Deputy Principal Clerk. (Clerk to the 1974 Select 
Committee on Members' In te re s ts ) .
Members o f the House o f Commons
Mr J. Ashton H o f C
Mr M. English H o f C
Rt. Hon. M. Foot H o f C
Leader o f the Labour Party
(Leader o f  the House, A p r i l  1976 - May 1979)
Mr W. Hamilton H o f C
Mr I .  Mikardo H o f C
(A former Chairman of the P.L.P.)
Rt. Hon. J. Enoch Powell, M.B.E. Home
Rt. Hon. F. W illey H o f C
(Chairman o f the 1974 Select Committee on Members' In te res ts )
Members o f the House o f Lords
Lord Avebury (formerly Eric Lubbock, Libera l Chief Whip, Home
Member o f the 1969 Select Committee on Members' In te res ts )
Lord Houghton o f Sowerby (formerly Rt. Hon. Douglas Home
Houghton. Member o f the Salmon Commission, a former
Chairman o f the P.L.P.)
Lord Glenamara (formerly Rt. Hon. E. Short, Leader o f the Place of 
House, March 1974 - Apri l 1976, Chairman o f Labour Sub- Employment
Committee on Members' In te rests)
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Name
Lord Peart (formerly Rt. Hon. Frederick Peart, 
Leader o f the House, October 1968 - June 1970)
Lord Strauss (formerly Rt. Hon. G. Strauss, 
Chairman o f the 1969 Select Committee on Members' 
In te res ts )
Location 
H o f L
Home
Government Departments 
*
Cabinet Office Cabinet O ffice
Cabinet O ffice Cabinet O ffice
Miscellaneous
Mr N.D. E l l i s ,  Gen.i Sec. o f Association o f 
F i r s t  D iv is ion C iv i l  Servants
Prof. Arnold J. Heidenheimer, ed. o f 
P o l i t ic a l  Corruption: Readings in Comparative
Analysis
Mr R.A.C. Hooper, Members' Services O ff ic e r ,  
Hammersmith and Fulham Council
Mr M. Madden, D irecto r o f P u b l ic i ty ,
The Labour Party, (former M.P.)
Mr B. Payton, B a rr is te r ,  Member o f Society 
o f  Labour Lawyers
Mr E. Razzel,
C iv i l  Service College
Mr Andrew Roth, Lobby Journa lis t/Au thor
Place o f 
Employment
London
Council O ffices
Labour Party 
Headquarters
Chambers
C iv i l  Service 
College, London
O ff ice , London
Notes :
* These two interviewees, both C iv i l  Servants, requested th a t 
they remain anonymous.
H o f  C - House o f Commons
H o f L - House o f  Lords
These interviews were conducted between A pril 1978 - A pr i l 1980.
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APPENDIX 4
D1 v is ion  L is t  Ana ly s is
302.
Voting by Party on the Amendment to  the Government's Motion,
' Î
Members' In terests  (Declaration)(No. 1)
Party Ayes Noes Absent or Abstained Total
Labour 0 0 287^ 95.67% 13 4.33% 300
Conservative 22l" 74.92% 29 9.83% 45 15.25% 295
Liberal 0 0 10 71.43% 4 28.57% 14
Others 0 0 10 43.48% 13 56.52% 23
Total
(Whole House) 221 34.97% 336 53.16% 75 11.87% 632*
Source: Derived from H.C. Debs. Vol. 874, co ls . 553-538,
Div. 30, Session 1974, 22 May 1974. Although Hansard and 
Commons Journal (t974) p. 143 records 335 Members voting 
against the amendment, a count o f those names l is te d  as 
voting with 'Noes' to ta l le d  334. This tab le works with 
the la t t e r  f ig u re .
Including Te lle rs
Total o f  Members e l ig ib le  to vote. I t  does not include 
Mr Speaker, Rt. Hon. Selwyn Lloyd (subtracted from 'O th e rs ') ,  
Chairman o f Ways and Means, Rt. Hon. G. Thomas (Labour), and 
F i r s t  Deputy Chairman o f Ways and Means, Rt. Hon. H.O. Murton 
(Conservative). These three Members are excluded from voting 
because o f th e i r  appointments. At th is  time there was no 
Second Deputy Chairman o f Ways and Means.
The p e r c e n t a g e  f i g u r e s  a lw a y s  r e f e r  t o  t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  w i t h i n
a c a t e g o r y  o f  Members v o t i n g  i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  way .
TABLE 10
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Voting w ith in  the Conservative Party on the Amendment 
to  the Government's Motion, Members' In terests  (Declaration)(No.1)
Type o f Conservative Ayes Noes Absent or Abstained Total
2
New' Conservatives 36 65.45% 13 23.64% 6 10.91% 55
3
'O ld' Conservatives 185 77.08% 16 6.67% 39 16.25% 240
Total 221* 74.92% 29 9.83% 45 15.25% 295*
Source: Derived from H.C. Debs. Vol. 874, co ls . 533-538,
Div. JO, Session 1974, 22 May 1974.
Includes a l l  Conservative Members newly elected to the House 
at the General Election on 28 February 1974 (Source: Times
Guide to the House o f Commons, February 1974) ,
Includes a l l  Conservative Members who were Members before 
the General E lection on 28 February 1974 and who were re­
el ected.
Includes Te lle rs
Total o f Conservatives e l ig ib le  to  vote ( i t  excludes Rt. Hon, 
H.O. Murton, who, as F i r s t  Deputy Chairman o f Ways and Means 
is  in e l ig ib le  to vote)
The percentage figures always re fe r  to the percentage w ith ­
in  a category o f Members voting in a p a r t ic u la r  way.
TABLE 11
304.
Test o f  S ignificance
Question : Is there a s t a t is t i c a l l y  s ig n i f ic a n t  d iffe rence in
voting behaviour between 'New' and 'Old' Conserva­
tives  on the amendment to the Government's motion 
regarding declaration o f in te rest?
Chi-square t e s t : A chi-square te s t  on Table 11 produced a computed
value o f = 14.7375. (degrees o f freedom = 2)
Value o f X^  when P = 0.001 and N = 2 is 13.82.
Therefore, we can say w ith 99.9% confidence tha t there is  a s ig n i f ­
ican t d iffe rence in voting behaviour between 'New' and 'Old' Conservatives 
on the amendment to the Government's Motion regarding declaration of 
in te re s t .
However, a large proportion o f the computed values o f chi-square 
derives from the category o f 'New' Conservatives who voted against the 
amendment. The to ta l number o f 'New' Conservatives is  only 55, and once
these have been categorised by voting behaviour the numbers in each c e l l
are low (actual c e l l  values are 6 , 13 and 36) w ith a small number change 
re su lt in g  in  a large percentage change. Consequently, the 'New' Conser­
vatives voting against the amendment would appear to have a marked e f fe c t  
upon the s ign if icance o f the re s u lt .  I t  would therefore be more correct 
to in te rp re t  the resu lts  o f the s ign if icance  te s t  as being in d ica t ive  o f 
a tendency fo r  those Conservatives entering the House a t the February 
1974 General E lection to be more l i k e ly  to vote against the amendment 
than those Conservatives w ith longer service in Parliament.
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Voting by Party on the Government's Motion, Members' In terests  
(Declaration)(No. 2), to establish a
Compulsory Register o f Members' In terests
Party Ayes Noes Absent or Abstained Total
Labour 282^ 94.00% 2 0.67% 16 5.3% 300
Conservative 62 21. 01% 168^ 56.95% 65 22.03% 295
Liberal 10 71.43% 0 0 4 28.57% 14
Others 11 47.83% 0 0 12 52.17% 23
Total
(Whole House) 365 57.75% 170 26.90% 97 15.35% 632^
1 Source: Derived from H.C. Debs. Vol. 874, co ls . 539-544,
Div. 31, Session 1974, 22 May 1974.
2 Including T e lle rs .
 ^ Total o f  Members e l ig ib le  to vote. I t  does not include
Mr Speaker, Rt. Hon. Selwyn Lloyd (subtracted from (Others), 
Chairman o f Ways and Means, Rt. Hon. G. Thomas (Labour), and 
F i r s t  Deputy Chairman o f Ways and Means, Rt. Hon. H.O. Murton 
(Conservative). These three Members are excluded from voting 
because o f th e i r  appointments. At th is  time there was no 
Second Deputy Chairman o f Ways and Means.
The p e r c e n t a g e  f i g u r e s  a lw a ys  r e f e r  t o  t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  w i t h i n
a c a t e g o r y  o f  Members V o t i n g  i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  w ay .
TABLE 12
306.
Voting w ith in  the Conservative Party on the Government's 
Motion, Members' In terests  (Declaration)(No. 2), to
estab lish a Compulsory Register o f Members' Interests
Type o f Conservative Ayes Noes Absent or Abstained Total
2
'New' Conservatives 21 38.18% 26 47.27% 8 14.55% 55
3
'O ld ' Conservatives 41 17.08% 142 59.17% 57 23.75% 240
Total 62 21. 02% 168* 56.95% 65 22.03% 295*
1 Source: Derived from H.C. Debs. Vol. 874, co ls. 539-544,
Div. 31, Session 1974, 22 May 1974.
 ^ Includes a l l  Conservative Members newly elected to the House
at the General E lection on February 28 1974. (Source: Times
Guide to the House o f Commons, February 1974).
 ^ Includes a l l  Conservative Members who were Members before the
General Election on 28 February 1974 and who were re -e lected.
*  Includes Te lle rs
+ Total o f Conservatives e l ig ib le  to vote ( i t  excludes Rt. Hon.
H.O. Murton, who as F i r s t  Deputy Chairman o f Ways and Meons 
is in é l ig ib le  to vote).
The percentage figures always re fe r  to the percentage w ith in  
a category o f Members voting in a p a r t ic u la r  way.
TABLE 13
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Test o f Significance
Question: Is there a s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n i f ic a n t  d iffe rence  in
voting behaviour between 'New' and 'Old' Conservatives 
on the Government's motion to estab lish a Compulsory 
Register o f Members' Interests?
Chi-square t e s t : A chi-square te s t  on Table 13 produced a computed value
of X^= 12.3409 (degrees o f freedom = 2)
Value of X^  when P = 0.01 and N = 2 is  9.210 
Value o f X2 when P = 0.001 and N = 2 is  13.82
Therefore we can say w ith 99% confidence tha t there is  a s t a t i s t i ­
c a l ly  s ig n i f ic a n t  d iffe rence in voting behaviour between 'New' and 'Old' 
Conservatives on the Government's motion to estab lish a Compulsory 
Register o f  Members' In te rests .
However, a large proportion o f the computed value o f chi-square 
derives from the category o f 'New' Conservatives who voted fo r  a Compul­
sory Register. As in Table 11, the to ta l number o f 'New' Conservatives 
is  only 55, and once these have been categorised by voting behaviour the 
numbers in  each ce l l  are low (actual ce l l  values are 8 , 21 and 26) w ith 
a small number change resu lt ing  in a large percentage change. Conse­
quently , the 'New' Conservatives voting fo r  a Compulsory Register would 
appear to have a marked e f fe c t  upon the s ign if icance o f the re s u l t .  I t  
would therefore be more correct to in te rp re t  the re su lt  o f the s ign if icance  
te s t  being in d ica t ive  o f a tendency fo r  those Conservatives entering the 
House in  February 1974 to be more l ik e ly  to vote fo r  a Compulsory Register 
than those Conservatives with longer service in Parliament.
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Voting by Party on the Government's Motion,
Members' In terests  (Declaration)(No. 1), to agree w ith the
Recommendations made in the Report o f the Select Committee
1
on Members' In terests  (Declaration)
Party Ayes Noes Absent or Abstained Total
Labour
2
137 45.97% 1 0.36% 160 53.69% 298
Conservative 33 11.19% 20^ 6.78% 242 82.03% 295
Liberal 4 28.57% 0 0 10 71.43% 14
Others 9 39.13%
2
2 8.70% 12 52.17% 23
Total
(Whole House) 183 29.05% 23 3.65% 424 67.30% 630^
1 Source: Derived from H.C. Debs. Vol. 893, co ls . 799-8(
Div. 231, Session 1974/75, 12 June 1975.
Including T e lle rs .
Total o f Members e l ig ib le  to vote. I t  does not include Mr 
Speaker, Rt. Hon. Selwyn Lloyd (subtracted from 'O th e rs ') ,  
Chairman o f Ways and Means, Rt. Hon. G. Thomas (Labour),
F i r s t  Deputy Chairman o f Ways and Means, Rt. Hon. H.O. Murton 
(Conservative) and Second Deputy Chairman o f Ways and Means, 
S ir  Myer Gal pern (Labour). These four Members are excluded 
from voting because o f th e i r  appointments. Further, one seat 
was vacant. A by-e lection was pending a t Greenwich, Woolwich 
West, owing to the death on 19 March 1975 o f Mr W. Hamling 
(Labour).
The percentage figures always re fe r  to the percentage w ith in  
a category o f Members voting in a p a r t ic u la r  way.
TABLE 14
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Voting by Party on the Amendment proposed by Mr J. Golding (Labour)
to  the Motion, Members' In terests  (Declaration)(No. 2)
Party Ayes Noes Absent or Abstained Total
Labour
2
76 25.50%
2
51 17.11% 171 57.38% 298
Conservative 2 0. 68% 32 10.85% 261 88.47% 295
Liberal 0 0 4 28.57% 10 71.43% 14
Others 0 0 9 39.13% 14 60.87% 23
Total
(Whole House) 78 12.38% 96 15.24% 456 72.38% 630^
Source: Derived from H.C. Debs. Vol. 893, co ls. 801-804,
Div. 232, Session 1974/75, 12 June 1975.
Including T e lle rs .
Total o f  Members e l ig ib le  to vote. I t  does not include Mr 
Speaker, Rt. Hon. Selwyn Lloyd (subtracted from 'O th e rs ') ,  
Chairman o f Ways and Means, Rt. Hon. G. Thomas (Labour),
F i r s t  Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means, Rt. Hon. H.O. Murton 
(Conservative) and Second Deputy Chairman o f  Ways and Means, 
S ir  Myer Gal pern (Labour). These four Members are excluded 
from voting because o f th e i r  appointments. Further, one seat 
was vacant. A by-e lection was pending at Greenwich, Woolwich 
West, owing to the death on 19 March 1974 o f Mr W. Hamling 
(Labour).
The percentage figures always re fe r  to the percentage w ith in
a category of Members voting in a p a r t ic u la r  way.
TABLE 15
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APPENDIX 5
Information from the Register o f Members' In terests
Comprises: Le tte r and form sent to Members from the Registrar,
tab les,derived from the Registrar.
3 M .
The Register of 
Members’ Interests
House of Commons, London SWIA OAA June 1975
In accordance with the Resolutions of the House of 22nd May, 1974 
and 12th June, 1975,1 enclose a form on which you should 
enter details of your registrable interests, together with a copy of 
the Report of the Select Committee on Members’ Interests 
(Declaration).
I would remind you that this form should be completed and 
returned to me within four weeks of the above date.
I would also remind you that the Resolutions require you to 
notify me of any changes which may occur in your registrable 
interests within four weeks of the changes occurring.
As soon as practicable after the return of all the forms a Register 
containing the details entered on the forms will be printed and 
published as a House of Commons paper by Her Majesty’s 
Stationery Office. At the same time a copy of the Register will be 
open for inspection to the public as well as to Members.
It was agreed by the House that :
‘The purpose of this Register is to provide information of any pecuniary interest 
or other material benefit which a Member of Parliament may receive which 
might be thought to affect his conduct as a Member of Parliament or 
influence his actions, speeches or vote in Parliament.’
The House also decided that entries in the Register should disclose 
only the sources and not the amounts of the remuneration and 
benefit, and that interests should be entered which date from the 
first day of the present Parliament.
I hope that this information will help you to complete your form 
without too much difficulty. If you have any difficulty,
I will be pleased to help if I can. I need hardly add 
that any discussions would be on a completely confidential 
basis. My telephone number is 01-219 3277 (House of Commons 
Extension 3277) and my room is in the Committee Office.
D a v id  P r in g
R egistrar o f  Members^ Interests
312.
Register of Interests
hJOTES:
j. For details of the information which is required to be registered, see the Report of the Select Committee on
Members’ Interests (Declaration), especially paragraphs 12 to 28.
ii. I f  there is not enough space on this form for the information needed, other papers can be attached to it; 
but each such paper should carry the Member’s signature,
JUNE 1975
Name
Constituency
Registrable Interest Details
♦ 1 Remunerated director­
ships of companies, public 
or private
I* 2 Remunerated employ- 
I ments or offices
3 Remunerated trades, 
professions or vocations
4 The names of clients 
when the interests referred 
to above include personal 
services by the Member 
which arise out of or are . 
related in any manner to 
his membership of the 
House
‘ In Items 1, 2 and 3 remuneration includes taxable expenses, allowances or benefits. PTO
Registrable Interest Details
5 Financial sponsorships 
a as a Parliamentary 
candidate where to the 
knowledge of the Member 
the sponsorship in any case 
exceeds 25 per cent of the 
candidate’s election 
expenses, or
b as a Member of Parlia­
ment by any person or 
organisation, stating 
whether any such sponsor­
ship includes any payment 
to the Member or any 
material benefit or advant­
age direct or indirect
6 Overseas visits relating to 
or arising out of member­
ship of the House where 
the cost of any such visit 
has not been wholly borne 
by the Member or by 
public funds
7 Any payments or any 
material benefits or 
advantages received from 
or on behalf of foreign 
Governments, 
organisations or persons
8 Land and property of a 
substantial value or from 
which a substantial income 
is derived
9 The names of companies 
or other bodies in winch 
the Member to his 
knowledge has, either 
himself or with or on behalf 
of his spouse and infant 
children, a beneficial interest 
in shareholdings of a 
nominal value greater than 
one-hundredth of the 
issued share capital
Signature
C83SSS8 650 11/76
313 .
Composition o f  the House o f  Commons as on
1st November 1975 and as on 13th February 1979
Party Number o f MPs
1975 1979
Conservative
2
277 282
Labour 303 292*
3
Labour and Co-operative 15 16
Libera l 13 13
United U ls ter Unionist Council 10 2
U ls te r Unionist 0 8
Scottish N a t io n a l is t 11 11
Scottish Labour 0 2
Plaid Cymru 3 3
Social Democratic Labour 1 1
Independent 1 1
Non Party 1 1
Total 635 632*
Footnotes :
Sources : Vacher's Parliamentary Companion, November 1975,
No. 1000 (corrected to 22nd October 1975) and February 1979, 
No. 1013 (corrected to 31st January 1979).
Including the Speaker: Rt. Hon. Selwyn Lloyd
For the purposes o f  a l l  other tables in th is  research,
Labour and Labour and Co-operative are combined under the 
heading 'Labour*.
Including the Speaker: Rt. Hon. George Thomas.
Three By-elections were outstanding as o f  13th February 1979 
(when the data was co llec ted) and the number o f  MPs in the 
House e l ig ib le  to re g is te r  is  therefore taken as 632 in 1979 
and not 635. The vacant seats were C lithe roe , Edge H i l l  and 
Knutsford.
TABLE 16
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Reg istration as on 1st November 1975 and 13th February 1979
Registered
Entry
Number of MPs % o f
2
House
1975 1979 1975 1979
3 3
One or more en tr ies 550 561 86. 6% 88. 8%
Registered 'N i l ' 84 70 13.2% 11. 1%
Refused to Register 1 1 0. 2% 0. 2%
635
*
632 100. 0% 100. 0%
Footnotes :
Sources :
Totals may 
decimals.
Register o f Members' In terests  as on 1st 
November 1975. HC. 699, F i r s t  Ed it ion .
Register o f Members' In terests  as on 13th 
February 1979 - amended Master Copy kept by 
Registrar a t the House o f  Commons.
not agree due to rounding to f i r s t  place o f
Includes Speaker.
At the time o f co l le c t in g  the data (13.2.1979) there 
were three By-elections outstanding - C li the roe , Edge 
H i l l  and Knutsford. Therefore the number o f MPs e l i ­
g ib le  to re g is te r  a t th a t po in t in time was 632 not 
635.
TABLE 17
315 .
Number o f MPs by Party Registering 'N i l '  - 1975 and 1979
Party Total o f MPs % o f Party
1975 1979 1975 1979
Labour 63 54 19.8% 17.5%
Conservative 10 5 3.6% 1. 8%
Liberal 2 2 15.4% 15.4%
Other 9 9 33.3% 31.0%
Total
(Whole House) 84 70 13.2% 11. 1%
Footnotes :
Sources : Register o f Members' In te rests  as on 1st November
1975, HC. 699, F i r s t  Ed it ion .
Register o f  Members' In terests  as on 13th February 
1979 - amended Master Copy kept by Registrar at 
the House o f Commons.
The percentage f igu res  always re fe r  to the percentage w ith in  
a p a r t ic u la r  category o f Members, i . e .  19.8% o f the Labour 
Party registered ' n i l '  in 1975.
The category 'o th e r ' is  made up o f a l l  those Members who do 
not belong to the Labour, Conservative or L iberal Party. As 
the f igu res  calcu lated fo r  th is  category are therefore fo r  
an aggregate o f parties they are not meaningful in the same 
way as the f igu res  calcu lated fo r  s ing le  pa rt ies . This is  
applicable to a l l  the tab les . The composition o f 'o th e r ' can 
be found by reference to f igures in Table l b . This category 
aggregated 27 Members in  1975 and 29 Members in 1979.
TABLE 18
316.
C lass if ied  en tr ies  in the Register as on 1 November 1975
and 13 February 1979
Abbreviated heading in the 
Register
1. D irectorships
2. Employment or o f f ic e
3. Trades or professions etc.
4. C lients
5. Financial sponsorships
6. Overseas v is i t s
7. Payments etc. from abroad
8. Land and property
9. Declarable shareholdings
Number o f MPs making 
entry under heading^
1975
187
136
268
23
160
132
27
81
108
1979
190
158
284
21
163
185
23
90
105
% o f  House
1975 1979
29.4%
21.4%
42.2%
3.6%
25.2%
2 0 . 8%
4.6%
12. 8%
17.0%
30.1%
25.2%
44.9%
3.3%
25.8%
29.3%
3.6%
14.2%
17.2%
Sources: Register o f Members' In terests  as on 1 November 1975.
H.C. 699. F i r s t  Ed it ion . Register o f Members' In terests  
as on 13th February 1979 - amended Master Copy kept a t 
the House o f Commons.
Notes :
The to ta l  fo r  each heading is  the number o f MPs who have made 
one or more en tr ies  under tha t heading. I t  does not record 
the amount o f en tr ies each MP made under tha t heading.
The percentage o f those MPs in the House e l ig ib le  to re g is te r  
who made one or more en tr ies  under th a t heading. As Members 
could have en tr ies  under more than one category the percentage 
columns w i l l  not to ta l  100%.
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L is t  o f Members entering ' n i l '  in the F i r s t  Edition o f the Register
Member Party
A lison, Michael (Barkston Ash) Con.
Armstrong, Ernest (Durham N. West) Lab.
A tk ins , Ronald (Preston North) Lab.
Bain, Mrs Margaret (East Dunbarton) SNP.
Bates, A lfred (Bebington and Ellesmere Port) Lab.
Bennett, Andrew (Stockport North) Lab.
Blenkinsop, Arthur (South Shields) Lab.
Boothroyd, Miss Betty (Bromwch West) Lab.
Bradford, Rev. Robert (Be lfas t S) UUUC
Brown, Hugh (Glasgow, Provan) Lab.
Callaghan, James (Middleton and Prestwich) Lab.
Canavan, Dennis (West S t i r l in g s h ire )  Lab.
Cant, Robert (Stoke on Trent Central) Lab.
Castle , Rt. Hon. Mrs Barbara (Blackburn) Lab.
Clemitson, Ivor (Luton East) Lab.
Cockcroft, John (Nantwich) Con.
Cohen, Stanley (Leeds, S.E.) Lab.
Colquhoun, Mrs Maureen (Northampton N) Lab.
Cook, Robin (Edinburgh Centra l) Lab.
Crosland, Rt. Hon. Anthony (Grimsby) Lab.
Dempsey, James (Coatbridge and A ird r ie )  Lab.
Dormand, John (Easington) Lab.
E l l i s ,  Tom (Wrexham) Lab.
F e l l ,  Anthony (Yarmouth) Con.
P i t t ,  Gerald (Be lfas t West) SDLP
Forreste r, John (Stoke-on-Trent) Lab.
Fowler, Gerald (The Wrekin) Lab.
Freeson, Reginald (Brent East) Lab.
G i lb e r t ,  John (Dudley East) Lab.
Grant, John Douglas ( Is l in g to n  Central) Lab.
G r is t ,  Ian (C a rd if f  N) Con.
Grocott, Bruce (L ic h f ie ld  and Tamworth) Lab.
H atte rs ley , Rt. Hon. Roy (Birmingham Sparkbrook) Lab.
Hatten, Frank (Moss Side) Lab.
320.
Member Party
Healey, Rt. Hon. Denis (Leeds East) Lab.
Jones, Stephen Barry (East F l in t )  Lab.
K ilro y  S i lk ,  Robert (Ormskirk) Lab.
Latham, Arthur (Paddington) Lab.
Lestor, Miss Joan (Eton and Slough) Lab.
Lever, Rt. Hon. Harold (Manchester C en tra l) Lab.
L i t t e r i c k ,  Thomas (Birmingham, Se lly  Oak) Lab.
Lyon, Alexander (York) Lab.
MacCormick, Ia in  (A rg y l l)  SNP.
McCusker, Harold (Armagh) UUUC
McElhone, Frank (Glasgow, Queens Park) Lab.
Mackenzie, Gregor (Rutherglen) Lab.
Maclennan, Robert (Caithness and Sutherland) Lab.
Madden, Max (Sowerby) Lab.
Mahon, Simon (Bootle) Lab.
Marks, Kenneth (Manchester, Gorton) Lab.
Marshall, Dr. Edmund (Goole) Lab.
Marshall, James (Leicester South) Lab.
Maxwell Hyslop, Robin (T iverton) Con.
Mendleson, John (Penistone) Lab.
M i l le r ,  Mrs M i l l ie  (Redbridge, I l f o r d  N) Lab.
Molyneaux, James (South Antrim) UUUC
Morgan-Gile s , Rear Admiral M.C. (Winchester) Con.
Morris, Rt. Hon. John (Aberavon) Lab.
Murray, Rt. Hon. Ronald King (Edinburgh, Le ith )  Lab.
Noble, Michael (Rossendale) Lab.
O 'Halloran, Michael ( Is l in g to n  N) Lab.
Ovenden, John (Gravesend) Lab.
Parker, John (Barking, Dagenham) Lab.
Parry, Robert (L ive rpoo l, Scotland Exchanges) Lab.
Penhaligon, David (Truro) L ib .
Price, W illiam (Rugby) Lab.
Rowlands, Edward (Merthyr T y d f i l )  Lab.
Shaw, Arnold (Redbridge, I l f o r d  S) Lab.
Short, Rt. Hon. Edward (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) Lab.
Spearing, Nigel (Newham S) Lab.
321.
Member Party
Stewart, Donald (Western Is le s )  SNP
S trad ling , Thomas, John (Monmouth) Con.
Summerskil1, Hon. Dr. Sh ir ley (H a lifax) Lab.
Thatcher, Rt. Hon. Mrs Margaret (Barnet, Finchley) Con.
Thompson, George (Galloway) SNP
Thorpe, Rt. Hon. Jeremy (N. Devon) Lib.
Townsend, C yr i l (Bexley, Bexleyheath) Con.
Walker, Terence (Kingswood) Lab.
Watkinson, John (West Gloucestershire) Lab.
Welsh, Andrew (South Angus) SNP
W illiams, Alan John (Swansea West) Lab.
W ill iam s, Alan Lee (Eavering Hornchurch) Lab.
Wise, Mrs Audrey (Coventry South West) Lab.
Young, S ir  George (Ea ling , Acton) Con.
Source: Register o f Members' In terests  as on 1st November 1975.
H.C. 699.
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